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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 76 Records
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1972 (7) TMI 98
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... ... ..... t opportunity to put forward his objections before the assessing authority he can still have that opportunity before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal. That is what was meant by the Board when it stated that the appellate authority could have disposed of the appeal on merits. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order of the Board of Revenue in this case. We, however, make it clear that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who has been directed to dispose of the appeal on merits, will give sufficient opportunity to the assessee to put forward all his objections in relation to the matters referred to in the show cause notice as well as in the revised assessments made by the assessing authority. We also make it clear that the observations of the Board of Revenue, if any, on the merits of the case will not bind the appellate authority in disposing of the appeal. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (7) TMI 97
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... ... ..... ing of revision by the assessee. In the writ petition the petitioner has averred in paragraph 13 of the petition that he had filed a revision and has appended a true copy of the grounds of revision as annexure F to the petition. This fact has not been controverted, and as such the appellate order cannot be sustained, and we are, therefore, of the view that the appeal should be heard afresh. Inasmuch as we are directing a fresh hearing of the appeal, we do not think it necessary to express any opinion on the order passed by the Sales Tax Officer. We accordingly allow the writ petition and quash the order dated 10th June, 1971, of the judge (Appeals) (annexure I to the petition), and direct him to decide the appeal afresh. Inasmuch as the matter has been pending for a considerable time before the taxing authorities, it would be advisable for the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 96
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... ... ..... purchasers under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. Apart from the fact that no evidence was produced either before the Deputy Commissioner or before the Tribunal in this regard, it is irrelevant in deciding the question whether the transactions are taxable under the Central Sales Tax Act. The Central sales tax is payable irrespective of whether it has suffered tax under the State Act or not. If tax has been levied under the State law in respect of a sale or purchase which is taxable under the Central Sales Tax Act, it may be that under section 15(b) the dealer who paid the tax would be entitled to get a refund of the tax paid by him under the State Act. But the imposition of Central sales tax is not dependent on whether the transaction has suffered tax under the local law or not. Therefore, there is also no substance in this contention of the petitioners. For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (7) TMI 95
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... ... ..... there is no provision in the Madras Revenue Recovery Act which enables the Collector to attach and sell land not registered in the defaulter s name for arrears of revenue due from the defaulter. Respectfully following the ratio as set out above, in the instant case, the property ceased to be the property of the defaulter on the day when action was initiated to attach and sell the same. If the property, therefore, is not the property of the defaulter, then the statutory authority functioning under the Revenue Recovery Act can neither attach nor sell the same as if the property is that of the defaulter. The petitioner s contention, therefore, has to be accepted and the rule nisi made absolute. The writ petition is allowed, but there will be no order as to costs. The respondent is at liberty to take such action in law as is available to establish that the property in question is still to be deemed as the property of Mr. Chettiar notwithstanding the settlement. Petition allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 94
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... ... ..... ees of the change in the definition and of the rates of tax. Mr. Bhattacharjee could not show any provision of law which requires the sales tax department to do so. The only ground given by the Board is thus irrelevant and extraneous to the real point at issue and any order passed by it on extraneous and irrelevant consideration is liable to interference in exercise of our powers under article 226 of the Constitution as the order in that case becomes perverse in the absence of reasons known to law. It follows, therefore, that the Board has failed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law which it had jurisdiction as well as duty to do. 6.. The impugned order of the Board is, therefore, set aside. The application is allowed. The appeal before the Board is restored to its file and the same shall be disposed of in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. We will, however, make no order as to costs. BINDRA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 93
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... ... ..... trary. Having regard to the well-laid principles in the two decisions cited supra, it is clear that the revising authority had no jurisdiction to revise the assessment which was concluded not only because that the data or materials scrutinised by him do not warrant such a revision, but also because the records prove that the entire commercial activity of sale took place beyond the territorial limits of the State of Tamil Nadu. Mr. C.S. Chandrasekhara Sastry also refers to me incidentally that the revising authority, which in this case is the assessing authority, has no jurisdiction to revise, and it is only the appellate or the revisional authority such as the Deputy Commissioner who could undertake such a revision. In the view that I am taking, it is unnecessary for me to go into this question, and this is left open. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed and the rules nisi are made absolute. There will be no order as to costs in all the petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 92
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... ... ..... he grievance cannot be said to be personally aggrieved persons to enable them to approach the court under article 226 for the appropriate rule. This preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondents has to be upheld. Even otherwise, I am not satisfied that the rule in question is in any way arbitrary and is purposeless. As a matter of fact, it is made clear that by reason of the attitude adopted by persons having expellers and rotaries, the owners of country chekkus had to be necessarily roped in so that the entire body of traders in that field may not evade taxation. As the rule is based upon a very salient principle, namely, the nonevasion of lawful tax, I am unable to agree that the rule is purposeless and is the product of arbitrary or capricious exercise of power under section 17 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. On both the grounds, the writ petition has to fail. The rule nisi is discharged. The petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (7) TMI 91
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... ... ..... between the two situations posed in this case. The legislature or the delegate legislature is presumed to enact laws and grant exemption with a complete knowledge of all the existing laws pertaining to the same subject-vide Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph(1). If the local legislature, to augment the revenue of the State, has withdrawn certain exemptions in the matter of intra-State sales, that cannot be the foundation or the reason for the automatic withdrawal of the exemption granted by a contemporaneous competent legislative body under section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act in the matter of inter-State sales. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the petitioners are entitled to a rule prohibiting the respondents from bringing to tax the turnover of inter-State sales of the respective dealers during the period commencing from 1st January, 1968, to 20th March, 1969. The writ petitions are allowed, but there will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 90
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... ... ..... , Writ Petition No. 153 of 1970 is allowed. No particular orders are necessary in W.P. No. 152 of 1970 because, the order challenged is only an administrative order and not an order passed by the 1st respondent as a quasi-judicial Tribunal. W.P. No. 152 of 1970 is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in both the writ petitions. It is for the petitioner to place such material as would fit in with the formula and the data laid down by this court in Sadak Thamby and Co. v. Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1969 24 S.T.C. 468., and satisfy the authorities that the earlier appellate order has resulted in an illegal levy. For this purpose the 1st respondent is directed to take on file the application for rectification dated 3rd October, 1969, and deal with it in accordance with the principles indicated in this judgment and in Sadak Thamby and Co. v. Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1969 24 S.T.C. 468. Ordered accordingly.
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1972 (7) TMI 89
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... ... ..... ioner passes an order of stay during the pendency of an appeal or revision, such an order would certainly come to an end on the decision of the appeal or the revision. But the Commissioner under section 8(4) may extend the time for payment of sales tax, even if no appeal or revision is pending. The order passed in the instant case by the Commissioner was to remain in force until further orders. It is thus clear that the stay order passed by the Commissioner on 29th November, 1960, remained in operation until it was revoked by the Commissioner in August, 1967. During the intervening period the petitioners were not defaulters and were not liable to pay penal interest. The petition succeeds and is allowed to the extent that the respondents are restrained from realising penal interest from the petitioners in respect of the period during which the stay order of the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow, remained in operation. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 88
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... ... ..... he reasons in the order rejecting the application. It is sufficient for the Government to satisfy this court that the application was rejected after due consideration for reasons which were germane to the exercise of the power. From the return it appears that the petitioner was unable to satisfy the Government that it was continuously running into loss due to undercrushing or purchase of cane yielding low sugar recovery. The case of the petitioner admittedly does not fall under any other clause of section 16 of the Purchase Tax Act. In these circumstances, the rejection of the application appears to be justified. 6.. No other point was pressed before us. The petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. Since this petition was filed in the year 1967, before some of the important questions raised in this petition were finally settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, we hereby direct that the parties shall bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (7) TMI 87
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... ... ..... ld be filed within a prescribed time, an assessee could not be denied the benefit of the concessional rate of tax under section 3(3) on the ground that the filing of the declaration forms was not along with the returns as contemplated by rule 22(5) of the Rules. The facts of this case squarely come within the principle laid down in the case. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the concessional rate of tax under section 3(3) of the Act, based on the declarations filed by him in form XVII before the assessing authority. But, as the said declaration forms have not been verified by any of the authorities for finding out whether the assessee is entitled to the benefit under section 3(3) and if so, to what extent, it has become necessary to remit the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. The tax case is, therefore, allowed and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 86
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... ... ..... ontentions. In our opinion, failure to exercise the power vested under section 28(1) of the Act in favour of the petitioner, amounts to denying an opportunity which the petitioner is undoubtedly entitled to under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Act. 5.. It appears that it would facilitate the officer to exercise his power under section 28 in a proper way if the petitioner gives clear and precise details. The petitioner is therefore given an opportunity to do so and to request the officer to exercise the power under section 28 of the Act to summon the necessary materials. 6. For the reasons stated above, we quash the impugned order of assessment dated 26th June, 1967, and remit the case to the Commercial Tax Officer for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made in the course of this order. It is unnecessary to mention that the petitioner is entitled to raise all available contentions before the Commercial Tax Officer. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 85
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... ... ..... of the assessment record of the assessees, their partners and their individual Hindu undivided families, that the partners of the assessees had contrived to divert profits of the assessees to their respective Hindu undivided families and had tried to evade proper taxation and, on that ground, he initiated proceedings for reopening the assessment. The Supreme Court held that this statement did not satisfy the requirement that the officer must have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The proceedings were held to have been rightly quashed. This decision, in our opinion, helps the assessee rather than the department. In our opinion, the Sales Tax Officer had no reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of the dealer for the assessment year in question had escaped assessment. The notices issued by him are without jurisdiction. The petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned notices are quashed. Petition allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 84
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... ... ..... goods sought to be transported on the relevant date. I am not, however, inclined to issue the rule at this stage, because, the position was not approached from this angle by the checking officer. I am inclined to direct the petitioner to file a regular revision petition before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes under section 32 of the Act who shall entertain the revision without rejecting it on the ground of delayed presentation and deal with it in accordance with law and in the light of the observations above made. The revision petition shall, however, be filed by the petitioner within two weeks from this date. In view of the pendency of this writ petition in this court and as the petitioner is entitled to relief, the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes will take up the revision as and when it is filed and dispose of the same within two months from the date of such filing. With the above directions, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (7) TMI 83
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... ... ..... x Officer could easily have utilised that information while passing the assessment order. This contention must be rejected on two grounds. In the first place, no such ground has been taken in the writ petition. Secondly, we find that the assessment order passed on 28th February, 1971, was not the original assessment order but an order passed in pursuance of the remand order by the appellate authority. The remand order authorised the Sales Tax Officer only to scrutinise certain exemptions claimed by the petitioner. Such a remand order would obviously restrict the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer to the matter which he was required to investigate under the remand order. The whole assessment could not be said to have been open before him. It was, therefore, not possible for the Sales Tax Officer to have enhanced the assessment as fixed by him in the original assessment order. For the reasons stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (7) TMI 82
Whether the purchases of groundnuts made by assessee did not become taxable as soon as they made those purchases?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is clear that each of the appellants becomes liable to the payment of tax as a purchasing miller just as a last dealer would be liable on the purchases made by him. Hence, the last dealer and the miller, who purchases presumably to convert the groundnuts into other products, are placed on an equal footing. We were not satisfied that there is a possibility of double taxation or of taxation of the same product at more than one point of purchase.
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1972 (7) TMI 72
Power to investigate into affairs of a company-in-liquidation ... ... ... ... ..... s considerations. In the result, all the objections raised by respondents Nos. 3 and 7 to 9 fail and the permission sought must be granted. Summons is, therefore, made absolute in terms of prayer (a). We also direct that respondents Nos. 3 and 7 to 9 should afford all facilities to the person or body of persons that will be appointed by the applicants in their work of carrying out the investigation contemplated by section 15A. Respondents Nos. 3 and 7 to 9 will pay the costs of the summons to the applicants costs quantified at Rs. 750. Mr. Desai applies for stay of the operation of our order. We do not think that a blanket stay as asked for should be granted. We direct that the Central Government can proceed to appoint a person or body of persons to investigate into the affairs of the undertaking of the 1st respondent-company. We, however, further direct that commencement of the investigation at the hands of that person or body of persons is stayed for a period of eight days.
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1972 (7) TMI 63
Dividend manner and time of payment of ... ... ... ... ..... er when they are issued and they must be taken to be held by the shareholder from the date of their issue and not from the date when the original shares in respect of which they are issued were acquired by the shareholder. The bonus shares in the present case were, therefore, acquired by the assessee on 5th September, 1961, and they were held by him from that date and since they were sold within a few days on 12th September, 1961, the conclusion must inevitably follow that they were held by the assessee for not more than twelve months immediately preceding the date of their transfer and they were accordingly short-term capital assets within the meaning of section 2(42A). The Tribunal was, therefore, not right in holding that the capital gain arising from the sale of the bonus shares did not arise out of the sale of short-term capital assets. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner.
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1972 (7) TMI 53
Winding up - Power of court to declare dissolution of company void ... ... ... ... ..... sion for declaring a dissolution void The purpose of this provision is to make possible the distribution of assets which belonged to the company before the dissolution and were, for some reason, overlooked accordingly, the court refused to make a declaration in favour of the company in order to secure the benefit of a legacy which had never belonged to the company . Since as a result of amalgamation the company has ceased to have any assets and liabilities and as it is not the case of the petitioner that it has left any undistributed assets before dissolution, no purpose would also be served by declaring the dissolution void except that the income-tax department will have satisfaction of having taken reassessment proceedings against the company, whatever may be the result of that. I do not think that in any view of the matter the jurisdiction under section 559 can be exercised by this court. In the result this company-petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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