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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 89 Records
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1973 (2) TMI 122
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... ... ..... to our opinion, apply squarely to the present case. It is no doubt true that the expression paper other than hand-made paper is wide in terms and may include all forms of papers, but it will include only that kind of paper, which is understood in the popular sense to be a paper. We are definitely of the opinion that ammonia and ferro paper are not paper as understood generally. Our view finds support from a decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Sree Rama Trading Company v. State of Kerala 1971 28 S.T.C. 469. , where it was held that cellophane was not paper. It was emphasised in that case also that a word, which is not defined in the Act, has to be understood according to its popular and commercial sense with reference to the context in which it occurs. For all these reasons, we answer the question in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department. Assessee is entitled to its costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (2) TMI 121
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... ... ..... ave to be treated as an entrustment from Government . This only means that he has to keep the articles for the purpose of sale to authorised retail distributors and this does not mean that he is the agent of the Government. For these reasons, this contention has also to be rejected. When this judgment is being pronounced, the recent Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow v. Ram Bilas Ram Gopal 1969 24 S.T.C. 508., is brought to our notice, where the Allahabad High Court has held that the sales effected by an assessee to the Regional Food Controller under the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order were sales as contemplated by the Indian Sale of Goods Act and were also liable to sales tax. Therein, their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court, we find, have reached this conclusion on almost the same line of reasoning we have adopted in this case. The revision case is dismissed. However, we do not pass any order regarding costs.
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1973 (2) TMI 120
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... ... ..... isclose nor the court can summon and admit in evidence any of the documents that are prohibited by section 57 of the Act. So far as the present case is concerned, there can be no objection to the court admitting in evidence items 1 to 5 which do not fall under section 57(1) of the Act. So far as item 6 is concerned, namely, assessment files relating to the assessment of K.S. Velayutha Nadar for the years 1952-53 up to 1971-72, it may contain documents that are referred to in section 57(1) of the Act and, therefore, it cannot be permitted. If the respondent wants any particular document to be summoned and admitted in evidence, the court will consider whether such document is prohibited under section 57(1) of the Act and decide whether it should be admitted or not. In the result, the petition is allowed so far as item 6 of the documents mentioned in I.A. No. 469 of 1972 is concerned and dismissed as regards the rest. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1973 (2) TMI 119
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... ... ..... third class of cases are cases in which, although the proceeding is criminal in form, it is really only a summary mode of enforcing a civil right. These three classes are generally the classes of cases where the presumption of mens rea is ousted. In any view of the matter, the present case will come within the last category, where, though the proceeding is criminal in form, still, it is only a summary mode of enforcing a civil right. We, however, hasten to state that we do not subscribe to the view that the proceeding in this case is criminal in form we only point out that even if it is so (accepting the position for the sake of argument), even then, the case will be covered by the last category of cases mentioned by Hegde, J. Therefore, this contention cannot also avail. The foregoing discussion will clearly show that the writ petition has no force and the prayer in the writ petition cannot be allowed. The writ petition is dismissed, but, without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (2) TMI 118
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... ... ..... d along with his return . The amended rule 26 is in the following terms (1) Any dealer, who wishes to deduct from his gross turnover the amount in respect of a sale on the ground that he is entitled to make such deduction under the provisions of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 5 shall, along with his return in form S.T. VIII in respect of such a sale furnish C and D parts of declaration in form S.T. XXII duly filled up and signed by purchasing dealer or by his agent. (2)....................... Thus the words on demand have been substituted now by the words along with his return . In view of the above, it is clear that, at the relevant time, the aforesaid documents were to be produced only when demanded and, in the present case, as no demand was made, the Assessing Authority or the appellate authority were not justified in disallowing the deduction. The question referred is, consequently, answered in the negative. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (2) TMI 117
Whether the High Court was not justified in interfering with a proceeding that was pending before the tax department, by exercising its extra- ordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution?
Whether the High Court erred in holding that the transfer of timber from Madhya Pradesh to Uttar Pradesh did not amount to sale?
Whether the High Court further erred in holding that sales effected by the assessee in Madhya Pradesh were not first sales?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.The power of the Government was merely to exempt one or more dealers from paying tax. That power cannot be used directly or indirectly to retrospectively levy tax on someone else. Hence, we see no substance in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant.
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1973 (2) TMI 116
Whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had powers to enhance the tax levied on the assessee-respondent by the Sales Tax Officer?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The enhancement made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was well within his powers.
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1973 (2) TMI 115
Whether groundnut is oil-seed?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Both the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Punjab and Haryana High Court were wrong in holding that groundnut is not oil-seed.
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1973 (2) TMI 114
Whether the case is a fit one for exercising jurisdiction of the Board or not is entirely a matter for the Board to consider and decide? - Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (2) TMI 86
Appointment of sole selling agent ... ... ... ... ..... bject. At this stage we might also make it clear that clause (12) appears to be an independent and severable clause and if we had not found any other defect in the order, it would have been possible to merely cancel or quash this clause, without interfering with the rest of the order passed by the Company Law Board. However, as we find that there are other grounds on which the order is defective we are inclined to quash it as a whole. In the view we take, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 20th April, 1965, as amended by the order dated 13th May, 1965, is quashed. The appellant-company will be entitled to its costs throughout from respondents Nos. 1 to 4. The costs in the trial court to be Rs. 250 as already quantified and the costs in this court be fixed by the taxing master. No order as to costs in respect of respondent No. 5-company throughout. Liberty to the appellant s attorneys to withdraw the amount already deposited towards respondents costs.
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1973 (2) TMI 77
Oppression and Mismanagement - Right to apply under section 397 and 398 ... ... ... ... ..... he constructive petitioners has been transposed. Secondly, the transposed petitioner was always constructively a petitioner and, therefore, it is not necessary for her to satisfy the same conditions as would be necessary if a new petition were to be filed. The contention on behalf of the company that the transposed pirty must also satisfy the same conditions as the original patitioner does not seem to be justified on any principle. If she was constructively a petitioner initially, then she continues to be a petitioner and on the application of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, a change in the situation, vis-a-vis the provisions of section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956, will not make the petition non-maintainable. It would, therefore, follow that the decision of the single judge has to be affirmed and this appeal has to be dismissed. As the question involved in this appeal appears to have arisen for the first time, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1973 (2) TMI 67
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... repared to advance further capital for the revival of the company are not denied. I, therefore, find that there was mismanagement of the affairs of the company and that there is no practical possibility of remedying it. It, therefore, appears to me also just and equitable that the company should be wound up apart from the fact that the directors have by special resolution resolved that it should be wound up. I would, accordingly, order that the company be wound up. The official liquidator of this court should act as liquidator of the company and forthwith take charge of the properties and effects of the company. The official liquidator is directed to cause a sealed copy of this order to be served on the company by pre-paid registered post. The petitioner is directed to advertise within fourteen days a notice in the prescribed form of the making of this order in two local dailies Samaj and Prajatantra. Costs of the winding up be taxed and paid out of the assets of the company.
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1973 (2) TMI 57
Cotton yarn ... ... ... ... ..... ned the significance of a term of art in the textile trade and industry and was always understood to mean hank which contained the maximum length of 768 metres of yarn on any straight reel, the department thought it advisable and rightly so to remove any doubt about the meaning of the term hank . The grievance of the petitioners that the hank was defined for the first time by notification, Annexure B , which the petitioners contend is an amending notification, is without any justification. Notification Annexure B , in my opinion, was issued only to clarify the term hank and did not purport to impose any duty with retrospective effect. In this view of the matter, it is not possible to sustain the contention of the petitioners that notification, Annexure B , is by way of amendment of notification, Annexure A , and has been made to operate retrospectively. 16.For the reasons stated above the writ petition is without any merit and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200/-.
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1973 (2) TMI 56
Seizure of goods - Natural justice - Violation of principles ... ... ... ... ..... by the Collector of Customs in the counter-affidavit filed and it has been specifically mentioned in paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit that it is wrong that respondent No. 1 took into consideration any material gathered behind the back of the petitioner or took into account facts which were not relevant or admissible, the contravention of the principles of natural justice has rightly been termed as vague and misconceived and has been denied. Moreover this ground was not pressed by the petitioner before the Central Board of Revenue in his appeal, nor has it been stated in the writ petition that he had raised this ground before the Board and the Board did not decide it. Under the circumstances there is no substance in this contention and the same is rejected. 12.No other point has been urged in this writ petition. As a result the writ petition fails and is dismissed. In view of the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their respective costs in this Court.
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1973 (2) TMI 55
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... ... ..... red and the plaintiff was deprived of interest on this amount during the period the suit remained pending on account of opposition by the defendant, we do not see any reason why the plaintiff should be deprived of interest pendente lite. In fact the learned Counsel for the appellant was not able to resist this prayer on any ground except that the discretion exercised by the trial Court should not be interfered with. As we have already stated above, no reasons whatsoever have been assigned by the lower court for disallowing interest pendente lite and the discretion arbitrarily exercised cannot bind the appellate court. We are, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiff - respondent is entitled to get interest pendente lite on the suit amount from 20-9-1963 to 27-1-1966 at the rate of 6 per annum. 18.The result is that we dismiss the appeal with costs. We partly allow the cross-objection to the extent mentioned above with costs proportionate to the success of the cross-objection.
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1973 (2) TMI 54
Workers - Criteria for determination of number of workers - Connotation of - Notifications and Trade Notices - Canons of interpretation
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1973 (2) TMI 53
Printed and lacquered extruded aluminium tubes and plain extruded tubes - Distinction between - Plain extruded tubes
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1973 (2) TMI 52
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the house property in Avanashi Road ,Coimbatore, is not liable to estate duty as property deemed to pass on the death of the deceased under section 10 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?
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Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the sum of ₹ 1 lakh gifted by the decreased to his sons in 1953, is not liable to estate duty as property deemed to pass on the death of the deceased under section 10 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?
Held that:- Neither the property gifted to the donees, nor the amount of Rs. one lakh gifted to the five sons, could be included in the estate of the deceased. The appeal is accordingly dismissed
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1973 (2) TMI 51
Jurisdiction Of High Court, Service Of Notice, Waiver Of Penalty, Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... relating to the assessment of his wealth-tax. The Commissioner has not stated in his order that any of these conditions were wanting in the case of the petitioner. In fact a reading of the impugned order of the Commissioner shows that he was satisfied that all other requirements were present as is apparent from the following observation in connection with the assessment for the year 1964-65 In this view of the matter, it is clear that the return for 1964-65, filed on December 2, 1971, was before the issue of any notice. Since the return was accepted as full and true the requirements of section 18(2A) are satisfied. We accordingly allow this writ petition and by a writ of certiorari quash the order of the Commissioner dated September 7, 1972. He is directed to restore the petitioner s application under section 18(2A) to its original number and to decide it afresh in accordance with law and keeping in view the observations made herein. The petitioner is entitled to the costs.
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1973 (2) TMI 50
Account Books ... ... ... ... ..... ts held in the name of the assessee and those held in the name of a third party. Under section 68 now the assessee has to prove that such third party was in a position to lend such sums and that he did, in fact, so lend to the assessee in order to satisfy the Income-tax Officer that the credits shown in the account books were genuine. This section has laid the onus of proof on the assessee. The Income-tax Officer, therefore, called upon the assessee-firm to prove the source of the deposits by the two ladies and since he was not satisfied with the explanation given by the representative of the assessee-firm, he treated those two deposits as the income of the firm. Under the circumstances, no question of wrong placing of onus arises in the case and no question of law arises out of the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. For the reasons given above, we find no merit in this petition which is dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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