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Showing 41 to 60 of 62 Records
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1974 (5) TMI 22
Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... t brought to the notice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It is also to be noticed that in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria, the Supreme Court by implication has observed that Commissioner of Income-tax v. McMillan and Co., did not depart from the view expressed in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria. Although the discussion so far made relates to the construction of section 31 of the 1922 Act, it has to be held that the position in law has not altered under the 1961 Act as the language of the relevant provisions in both the Acts is almost the same. In the result, these petitions succeed. The Commissioner of Income-tax is directed to modify the orders passed by, him by deleting the sum of Rs. 83,600 from the order of assessment relating to the year 1960-61 and a sum of Rs. 1,82,887 from the order in respect of the assessment year 1961-62. These petitions are accordingly allowed. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1974 (5) TMI 21
Net Wealth, Tax Liability, Voluntary Disclosure, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... of the Finance Act, 1965, as the income which had accrued to the assessees during the assessment year 1959-60 itself and which became their net wealth on the valuation date relevant to that assessment year. The tax liability on this amount which had not been discharged by the said valuation date was a debt owed and it had to be deducted from the income declared by the assessees in order to arrive at the assessees net wealth for the assessment year 1959-60. As this tax liability still remained undischarged in the subsequent years under reference, it continued to be a debt owed and, therefore, it was liable to be deducted from the gross wealth of the assessees on the valuation dates relevant to the subsequent years also. In view of the above discussion, the questions in both the wealth-tax references are, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessees and against the revenue. There shall be no order as to costs. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (5) TMI 20
Commission Paid To Directors ... ... ... ... ..... -tax department pertaining to Messrs. Textile Processing Agency was made prior to this occasion, and, therefore, the question of res judicata does not arise at all. The doctrine of res judicata will apply only if there is an earlier decision on the same question, which cannot be reopened. There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee and the same is repelled. No other point was urged before us. For the reasons given above, it is held that the Tribunal was right in sustaining the disallowance of the commission paid to Messrs. Textile Processing Agency and question No. I must be answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the result, both the questions referred by the Tribunal for the opinion of this court are answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. D. K. MAHAJAN C.J.---I agree. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (5) TMI 19
Delay In Filing Return, Question Of Law, Reasonable Cause ... ... ... ... ..... estion of fact. The only ground on which a conclusion of fact can be challenged are (a) that it is not supported by any legal evidence or material, and (b) that the conclusion of fact drawn by the Appellate Tribunal is perverse and is not rationally possible vide Oriental Investment Co. P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, G. Venkataswami Naidu and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rajasthan Mines Ltd. In the instant case, the Appellate Tribunal held that there was a reasonable cause for the assessee for not filing the return of income till July, 1961, and deleted the penalty levied under section 271(1)(a) of the Act. This is a pure question of fact and, therefore, no direction is to be issued to the Tribunal to refer the question mentioned above in the earlier part of the judgment for the opinion of this court. There is no substance in this petition and the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. D. K. MAHAJAN J.---I agree.
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1974 (5) TMI 18
Business Expenditure, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... hich has become unsuitable for its use is replaced by something which makes it possible for the existing set up to function efficiently, the cost incurred on such replacement would be revenue expenditure. In the case before us, we find that the service-line undoubtedly was a part of the entire set up for the functioning of the cold storage. This was to be replaced by another line capable of carrying higher K. V. A. electric power current to enable the cold storage to function properly. By effecting such a change no new asset of enduring nature, belonging to the assessee, came into existence. We are, therefore, of opinion that the expenditure in question could not be described as capital expenditure. In the result we answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to receive the costs of the reference from the Commissioner of Income-tax which is assessee at Rs. 200. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (5) TMI 17
Net Wealth, Tax Liability, Voluntary Disclosure, Wealth Tax
... ... ... ... ..... minor son was considered by the Income-tax Officer in making assessment upon the father. Factually, he did not consider this income. It was not in dispute that the return of the father did not display this income. It cannot be, therefore, said that the Income-tax Officer had come to a conclusion that the income of the son was not to be included and for that reason he left it out. The case is clearly distinguishable. In the present case the Income-tax Officer had considered the expenses claimed by the liquidator and had come to the conclusion that they were admissible. It is not a case where the relevant income or the expenses were not within the knowledge of the officer. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the deparment. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee there would be no order for costs. The fee of the counsel for the department is assessed at Rs. 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1974 (5) TMI 16
Benami Transaction ... ... ... ... ..... n 271(1)(c) read with section 274(2) was exigible ? I.T.C. No. 53 of 1973. The penalty has been imposed on the assessee for not filing the return with regard to the amount of capital gains which is the subject-matter of I.T.C. No. 32 of 1973. The imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Act will depend on the answers to the questions which have been directed to be referred to this court in that case. Consequently, the following question of law does arise in this case Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Act was exigible ? We accordingly direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to draw up the statement of the case and to refer these two questions of law also for decision to this court along with the questions of law formulated in I.T.C. No. 32 of 1973. The petitions are accordingly accepted but without any order as to costs. BHOPINDER SINGH DHILLON J.--I agree.
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1974 (5) TMI 15
Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... dently such conditions would have been mentioned in the section. The absence of any condition shows an intention that the consent was not supposed to be granted at any particular stage of the proceedings or before any specific event. We are in agreement with the Tribunal that the consent to be operative need not be a prior consent. This was the only aspect from which the consent granted by the Income-tax Officer was challenged before the Tribunal. In respect of the second question, the controversy whether the original assessment order for the year 1967-68 was prejudicial to the interest of the revenue was merely academic. The original order passed by the Income-tax Officer cannot, in view of our answer to the first question, be said to be erroneous merely because (sic) in the interest of the revenue. In the result the first question is answered in favour of the assessee. The second question is returned unanswered. The assessee is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1974 (5) TMI 14
Appeal To AAC, Assessment Order, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... section 31 will become inapplicable. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner was, in our opinion, justified in law in not fixing a date and place for hearing of the appeal when he was satisfied that the appeal could not be disposed of on merits because due to cancellation of the assessment order under appeal the appeal has become infructuous. By insisting that even in such a situation the Commissioner must fix a date and place for hearing of the appeal, the assessee would have been put to unnecessary harassment by having to appeal before the Commissioner, without any useful purpose being achieved. In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in holding that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should not have dismissed the appeal as infructuous without fixing a date and place for hearing of the appeal. In the result the question referred to us is answered in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. No order as to costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (5) TMI 13
Factory Building, Income From Business, Income From House Property, Income From Letting Out, Income From Other Sources, Rental Income
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1974 (5) TMI 12
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Assessment Order ... ... ... ... ..... n 31 will become inapplicable. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner was, in our opinion, justified in law in not fixing a date and place for hearing of the appeal when he was satisfied that the appeal could not be disposed of on merits because due to cancellation of the assessment order under appeal the appeal has become infructuous. By insisting that even in such a situation the Commissioner must have fixed a date and place for hearing of the appeal, the assessee would have been put to unnecessary harassment by having to appear before the Commissioner without any useful purpose being achieved. In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in holding that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should not have dismissed the appeal as infructuous without fixing a date and place for hearing of the appeal. In the result the question referred to us is answered in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. No order as to costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1974 (5) TMI 11
Any Remuneration, HUF Income, Individual Income ... ... ... ... ..... t because of the remuneration paid to the managing director. There is no finding that the shares held by the family did not yield dividend. The family funds aided Hari Krishna in becoming a director. But there the aid and assistance of the family funds ceased. It could not be said that the remuneration paid for working as managing director was itself received with the aid and assistance of the family funds. Taking all the facts into consideration, it is difficult to hold that the remuneration paid to Hari Krishna was in substance a return made by the company to the family of its slender investment in the company. Our answer to the question referred to us is that the amount of Rs. 6,000 received by Hari Krishna by way of salary as managing director was his individual income and was not liable to be taxed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family. The assessee would be entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200. Fee of the learned counsel is assessed at the same figure.
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1974 (5) TMI 10
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Assessment Order, Commissioner To Revise, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... view as was taken by the Gujarat High Court. For reasons mentioned above, we are unable to subscribe to this view. In Satish Chandra Nirmesh Kumar v. Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax a Division Bench of this court held that as the appeal was dismissed as barred by time and not on merits, therefore, the original assessment order did not merge in the appellate order. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sheodan Singh s case we doubt whether the decision in Satish Chandra Nirmesh Kumar s case has been correctly rendered. Moreover, since in the present case an appeal was taken and decided on merits, the decision in Satish Chandra Nirmesh Kumar s case is distinguishable. In our opinion the impugned order dated December 29, 1973, passed under section 263 of the Income-tax Act is not sustainable. In the result the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 29th December, 1973, and 24th January, 1974, are quashed. The petitioner would be entitled to costs.
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1974 (5) TMI 9
Rejection Of Accounts ... ... ... ... ..... e out a case that it was neither grossly nor wilfully negligent in filing its return. The Explanation to section 271(1)(c) merely provides that where the returned income is less than 80 of the income actually assessed, it would unless proved otherwise be presumed that the failure to return the correct income was due to fraud or gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee. On the finding recorded by the Tribunal it appears that the assessee had satisfied the Tribunal that the neglect, if any, on its part was neither fraudulent nor gross or wilful. In our opinion the Tribunal has correctly applied the law laid down in the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the Income tax Act to the facts of the present case. We, accordingly, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. The fee of the counsel for the department is assessed at Rs. 200.
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1974 (5) TMI 8
A Firm, In The Nature, Liability To Tax ... ... ... ... ..... by the assessee was income assessable to tax as it did not fall within the exceptions enumerated in section 4(3)(vii) of the Act. As it was the case of Col. Keshri Singh himself that the amount was paid by the Tata Company to him and was received by the firm only as his benamidar, the amount of Rs. 1,50,000 is assessable to tax in the hands of Col. Keshri Singh. In this view of the matter, the said amount could not be taxed as the income of the firm. We are thus of the opinion that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the payment of Rs. 1,50,000 made by M/s. Belpahar Refractories Ltd., Sambalpur (Orissa), to the assessee (Col. Keshri Singh) was not income assessable in his hands. We would, therefore, answer the question referred to us in Reference No. 34 of 1969 in the negative. However, in view of the aforesaid, we would answer the question referred to us in Reference No. 40 of 1969 in the affirmative. We leave the parties to bear their own costs. Answered accordingly.
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1974 (5) TMI 7
Burden Of Proof, Flat Rate, Income Returned ... ... ... ... ..... t the correct income was determined by merely applying a flat rate on the returned turnover. In view of these facts it could not be said that the assessee was guilty of either fraud or of wilful neglect in the matter. In our opinion, the assessee discharged the burden which lay upon him by establishing the facts mentioned above from which it is clear that it was not a case of either fraud or of commission of any gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee. The only neglect of which the assessee could be held guilty is that he was not maintaining day to day stock register. But that was not relevant to the question whether the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars or concealed his income. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee would be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200. The fee of learned counsel for the department is also assessed at the same figure.
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1974 (5) TMI 6
Flat Rate, Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... the burden upon the assessee to prove that there was no gross or wilful neglect, where the returned income was less than 80 of the correct income. A perusal of the order of the Tribunal leads us to the conclusion that it proceeded on the basis that the burden of proof was upon the assessee. The only fact proved was that the assessee had not maintained the accounts regularly, for which reason they were rejected. The correct income was estimated by applying a flat rate. On these facts the Tribunal held that it could not be said that the assessee was guilty of fraud or gross or wilful neglect. In our opinion, the Tribunal applied the Explanation from a correct view-point. It did not place the burden of proof upon the department. In this view the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200. The fee of the learned counsel for the department is also assessed at the same figure.
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1974 (5) TMI 5
Burden Of Proof, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... , but tried to contend the same was not given in accordance with law. Therefore, it is not a matter of presumption that the approval was given. The factum of granting of approval by the Board has been established. I have already referred to the endorsement by the Secretary of the Central Board of Revenue stating that the Board had approved action under section 34(1)(a). Therefore, it is not a case where there is no proof that the approval was ever granted by the Board. As the approval itself has been proved to have been granted it should be presumed that such approval was regularly and properly given. The burden was upon the petitioner to prove that there was any absence of regularity in granting such approval by the Board. The petitioner has not proved anything in this behalf. In the result, this rule must fail. I accordingly discharge this rule with costs. Hearing fee being assessed at four gold mohurs. Let the operation of the order remain stayed for four weeks from date.
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1974 (5) TMI 4
Return was filed voluntarily beyond the time limit and there was no application for extension of time - " (1) Whether on a correct interpretation of the provisions of section 139(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, interest could be legally charged on the assessee as provided in proviso (iii) of section 139(1) of the Act? (2) Whether Tribunal was legally right in holding that sub-section (4) of section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, does not require an assessee to apply for extension of time for filing its return of income as a condition precedent for charging of interest as provided in proviso (iii) of section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? "
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1974 (5) TMI 3
" 1. Whether the amount of Rs. 5,256 deducted by Ails. Iron & Steel Stockists (Civil Supplies) Association, Delhi, is a proper deduction from the business income of the ' assessee as business loss, bad debt or business expense ? 2. Whether legal expenses incurred by the assessee in defending a suit filed by its former managing director for a declaration that his removal was illegal and he continued as the managing director were admissible deduction from business income? 3. Whether the law charges incurred by the assessee-company in connection with criminal complaints against the former managing director for misappropriation of company's funds and efforts to take forcible possession of company's business premises, respectively, are a permissible deduction from business profits of the assesseec-ompany ? "
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