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Showing 1 to 20 of 85 Records
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1975 (1) TMI 102 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tions, which a court has to take into account in deciding whether bail should be granted in a non-bailable offence, is the nature of the offence and if the offence is of a kind in which bail should not be granted considering its seriousness, the court should refuse bail even though it has a very wide powers under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. Bearing in mind the above noted illuminating observations and taking into consideration the seriousness of the offences with which Bhagwan Singh respondent is charged, the larger interests of the public, and the report of the Medical Board, I cannot allow the said respondent to remain on bail. Accordingly I allow the application, cancel the bail of the respondent and direct him to surrender to his bail bond. It is hoped that the authorities in charge of the Judicial Lock-up will take due care of the accused and will provide proper medical treatment to him during the period of his detention as an under-trial prisoner.
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1975 (1) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion order is not a cloak to avoid the irksome procedure of a trial in Court. There are two social implications of dropping prosecutions and resorting to substitutive detentions which deserve to be remembered. Where a grievous crime against the community has been committed, the culprit must be subjected to condign punishment so that the penal law may strike a stem blow where it should. Detention is a softer treatment than stringent sentence and there is no reason why a dangeral should get away with it by enjoying an unfree but unpaid holiday. Secondly, if the man is innocent, the process of the law should give him a fair chance and that should not be scuttled by indiscriminate resort to easy but unreal orders of detention unbound by precise time. That is a negation of the correctional humanism of our system and breeds bitterness, alienation and hostility within the cage. We accordingly allow me writ petition, make the rule absolute and' direct that the petitioner set free.
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1975 (1) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s claim would be a matter for the Tribunal to adjudicate upon. The question as to what would be the effect of the different Firmans on the rights of the appellant relates to the merits of his claim and the same can be gone into only in the proceedings before the Tribunal and not in writ proceedings before the High Court nor in appeal in this Court against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition. 41. So far as the other two appeals are concerned, they relate to properties about which notification has been issued under Section 7 of the Act. The properties covered by these two appeals have not been included in the first Schedule to the Act. I agree with my learned brother Jaganmohan Reddy J. that none of the impugned provisions has been shown to be violative of the Constitutional rights of the appellants in these two appeals. 42. I further agree that all the three appeals should be dismissed and that the parties be left to bear their own costs of the appeals.
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1975 (1) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... had passed the detention order had clearly explained and disclosed on affidavit all the material circumstances on which his satisfaction was based, and further averred "Having regard to the activities of the detenu as disclosed in the grounds of detention and having regard to the possibility of (his) being enlarged on bail, I was satisfied that the detenu should be detained under the Act." In the present case, 'there is nothing in the counter- affidavit to show that on 21-8-1972, the date of the detention order, the petitioner was about to be released on bail or discharged for deficiency of evidence or difficulty of its production in court. Nor is there any averment that the District Magistrate was otherwise satisfied from credible information received that the charges against the detenu were true. In the light of what has been said above, we would quash the impugned order, make the rule absolute and direct the lease of the petitioner. V.M.K. Petition allowed.
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1975 (1) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ncident of crime which was communicated as a ground to the detenu, there is also a series of other injurious circumstances of the immediate past about the criminal antecedents of the detenu which were nor communicated. Indeed, this chain of facts explain why in the counter affidavit it has been stated that the petitioner is a notorious wagon breaker and railway criminal and was indulging in committing thefts from goods train. 4. For one thing, a notorious wagon-breaker implies a course of conduct and not a single instance. For another, the factors which make up notoriety and which are recited in the history sheet presented to the District Magistrate certainly must have induced him into the subjective satisfaction resulting in the detention. They were not communicated. The consequence is that the order is in violation of the Constitutional provision in Article 22(5) and is bad. For this reason, the rule is made absolute and the petitioner is directed to be released forthwith.
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1975 (1) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... admissions in Parliament on behalf of the Government. We, are, however, unable to hold that such admissions, if any, which are mere expression of opinion limited to the context and also being rather vague hopes, not specific assurances, are binding on the Government to create an estoppel. 22. In the view we have taken the case is distinguishable from Union of India and Ors. v. M. Ravi Varma and Ors. etc.(1) principally relied upon by the petitioners. 23. In the result the petition is partly allowed only to the extent that the Assistants who have been absorbed in the Service in conformity with the instructions will rank senior to the direct recruits appointed after such absorption. The seniority list shall be adjusted and corrected accordingly. This direction will, however, not affect those Assistants who have already been promoted and confirmed in a higher rank prior to the date of this petition. In the circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1975 (1) TMI 96 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... habai A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 97 , relying upon Sapdar Qurbaksh v. Gurdial Singh, observed thus It is the bounden duty of a party per sonally knowing the facts and circumstances, to give evidence on his own behalf and to submit to cross-examination and his on-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance which will go to discredit the truth of his case. After giving our anxious consideration to this subject, we are of the view that the suit is out of time, since the plaintiff should be deemed to have with reasonable diligence, discovered the mistake as to the mistaken payments on the date when the second notification was made and the suit having been filed beyond three years from the said date, it is barred under Article 24 of the Limitation Act, The learned Judge went wrong in having applied a wrong principle and ultimately decreeing the suit. 19. The result is that the appeal is allowed, but in the peculiar circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (1) TMI 95 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... efore, its price could not be determined. He allowed ₹ 2,000.00on account of compensation for a well and in view of what has been stated by the learned Additional District Judge, there is no scope either for enhancement Or reduction in the amount. The only other claim relates to a building on the acquired land. The claimant demanded ₹ 3,000.00 for the same but the Collector awarded a sum of ₹ 700.00 only. Shri Raj Kumar Goel Draftsman, prepared plan, Exhibit P-5, and estimated the cost of construction of the building as ₹ 1,850.00 in his report. Exhibit P- 6. He appeared as P. W. 4 to support his report. That report was accepted in the absence of any rebuttal on behalf of the State of Punjab. There is, therefore, no scope either for enhancement or reduction in the amount of compensation for the building. ( 7. ) As a result of the above discussion, we find no merit in these appeals which are dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs. .
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1975 (1) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Civil Court, Madras, that the respondent was entitled to a reasonable notice of four months and on that account was entitled to a compensation of ₹ 16,000 for the notice period is not correct. It the respondent was not entitled to the said sum of ₹ 16,000 under the head referred to above, the respondent himself admittedly owing a sum of ₹ 13,432-41 to the appellants as against the sum of ₹ 6,250 due by the appellants to the respondent, the respondent will not be entitled to any decree in the present suit. Hence, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, in so far as he decreed the suit of the respondent against the appellants for a sum of ₹ 8,817-(sic)9, are set aside. Having regard to the nature of the question raised and discussed by me above, admittedly there being no decision of any High Court on the point, I do not make any order as to costs either here or in the trial court.
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1975 (1) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ssential to the community It cannot be said that the satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of this single occurrence that if the petitioner were to be let at large he would indulge in similar activities in future and thus act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community was not based on adequate materials. 4. We also do not think that there is any merit in the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the State Government went wrong in forwarding the representation to the Advisory Board after rejecting it. In law, the State Government was bound to consider the representation before forwarding it to the Advisory Board It may be recalled that the State Government rejected the representation on 4-4-1973 and the same was forwarded to the Board. And it was after considering the representation that the Board made the report. We see no circumstances vitiating the order of detention. 5. We dismiss the petition.
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1975 (1) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... get sufficient evidence to secure conviction. This contention was repelted by this Court and it was held that the above circumstance was not sufficient to lead to the inference that. the action of the detaining authority was mala fide. This Court observed "We cannot infer merely from the fact that the authorities decided to drop the case under the Official Secrets Act and thereafter to order the detention of the petitioners under the Rules that the order of detention was mala fide."' In view of the above, we hold that the order for the detention of the petitioner has not been shown to be mala fide." We must for the same reasons hold that the order of detention made by the District Magistrate in the present case does not suffer from the vice of mala fide or colourable exercise of power. These were the only contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner and since there is no substance in them, the petition fails and the rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (1) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
Order of detention - there was no proximity between the incidents leading to the detention and the order of detention as 'there was a gap of about 4 months in between - Held that:- We are not inclined to dismiss as untrue the oral explanation offered on behalf of the District Magistrate that he could not make the report on the 14th due to administrative difficulties. As it cannot be said that the District Magistrate had slept over the order or was "lounging supinely" over it and since the explanation of one day's delay may be accepted as reasonable, there is no violation of the requirement that the report to the State Government shall be made forthwith.
The explanation of the interval is that the petitioner was being prosecuted and an order of discharge had to be obtained on June 17, 1972. The order of detention was passed 4 days before the order of discharge was passed. We do not suppose that the length of time which a decision takes necessarily reflects the care or openness brought to bear upon it. The answer to yet another contention that the entire material which influenced the subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate in passing the order of detention was not supplied to the petitioner is that according to the countered affidavit of the District Magistrate, nothing apart from what is stated in the grounds and the particulars was taken into account while passing the order of detention. Thus validity of the detention confirmed.
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1975 (1) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
Demands for the payment of Fixed Fees made on vendors of ,Foreign Liquor holding licences in Forms L-3, L-4 and L-5 challenged on the ground that they were contrary to the terms of Rule 12 and therefore illegal.
Held that:- Under Rule 11, applications for renewal of licences for the following year have to be made before .the end of October' By Rule 12 the Excise Inspector has to lay before the Collector by the 7th January each year a.list of licences requiring renewal, together with a certificate of sales as provided by rule 30, to facilitate the determination of assessed fee. No order for renewal can be made after January 20 in respect of licences to be valid for the following financial year, except with the special sanction of the Financial Commissioner. The appellants holding licences for sale of Foreign Liquor applied duly for renewal of their licences any orders granting renewals were passed before January 20. Later the Rules were amended on March 22 and March 30, 1968 under which the appellants holding licences in Form Nos. L-3, L-4 and L-5 became liable to pay fixed fees up to ₹ 20,000 per annum in addition to fees assessed under rule 31. The grievance of those appellants is that since their licences were renewed in January 1968, the amendments made in March 1968 cannot apply to them and therefore the ,demand made on the basis of amended rules is illegal.
It is true that the amendments under which the appellants have been called upon to pay fixed fees were made after the licences were renewed. But the licences, though renewed in January 1968, were lo be effective from April 1, 1968. The amendments having come into force before April 1 would govern the appellants' licences and they are, therefore, liable to pay the fixed fees under the amended Rules. The payments due from the' appellants holding licences in Form L-14A are also due to the Government on account of any contract relating to the excise revenue" as provided in section 60(1)(c) of the Act. It is therefore open to the Government to recover its dues in the manner authorized by section 60. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (1) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
Whether no privilege can be claimed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under section 123 of the Evidence Act in respect of what is described for the sake of brevity to be the Blue Book summoned from the Government of Uttar Pradesh and certain documents summoned from the Superintendent of Police, Rae Bareli, Uttar Pradesh?
Held that:- In the present case, it cannot be, said that the blue book is a published document. Any publication of parts of the blue book which may be described the innocuous part of the document will not render the entire document a published one or these reasons, the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The learned judge will consider the affidavit a firmed by R. K. Kaul. The learned Judge will give, an opportunity to the head of the department to file affidavit in respect of the documents summoned to be produced by the Superintendent of Police. The, learned Judge, will consider the affidavits. If the learned Judge will be satisfied on the affidavits that the documents require protection from production, the matter will end there. If the learned Judge will feel inclined in spite of the affidavits to inspect the documents to satisfy himself about the real nature of the documents, the learned Judge will be pleased to inspect the same and pass appropriate orders thereafter,. If the Court will find on inspection that any part of a document is innocuous in the sense that it does not relate to affairs of State the Court could order disclosure of the innocuous part provided that would not give a distorted or misleading impression. Where the Court orders disclosure of an innocuous part as aforesaid the Court should seal up the other parts which are said to be noxious because their disclosure would be undesirable
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1975 (1) TMI 87 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion in accordance with law and the observations made by him in his judgment. This order appears to us to be completely in favour of the assessee. It was urged by the learned counsel for the assessee before us that the assessment should have been totally quashed and no further assessment proceedings should have been permitted to be taken in the circumstances. We do not find any tenability whatsover in this contention. The assessee cannot escape his liability and if his account books were not properly taken into consideration by the assessing authority, the learned Judge (Revisions) was justified in directing that the matter of assessment be reconsidered after taking the account books into consideration. In doing so, he had not exceeded the bounds of law or in any manner caused harassment to the assessee. Our answer to the question, therefore, is in the affirmative in favour of the department. We assess Rs. 100 as costs payable by the assessee to the Commissioner of Sales Tax.
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1975 (1) TMI 86 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r Industries v. Income-tax Officer 1960 40 I.T.R. 618 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 182., S.K. Das, J., speaking for the court, observed Where the Income-tax Officer had virtually refused to carry out the clear and unambiguous directions which a superior tribunal, like the Incometax Appellate Tribunal, had given to him by its final order in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him, such refusal is in effect a denial of justice, and is further more destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is on the hierarchy of courts. The assessing authority being an inferior tribunal was bound to follow the decision of this court. It is not open to him to prefer the decision of the Patna High Court to the decision of this court. We, therefore, set aside the impugned assessment orders and allow the writ petitions with costs to the extent of the freight charges. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions allowed.
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1975 (1) TMI 85 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... goods obtained by the agents on behalf of the principals. Mr. Parekh further relied on the circumstance that in the debit note dated 19th December, 1963, there is no separate reference to the cost of the material and the expenses and the commission of the respondents. This circumstance, however, does not rule out a transaction of agency, because the agents could very well have furnished the particulars aforesaid to the principals as and when they were demanded. Apart from this, in view of the other circumstances, which strongly point to the transaction being one of agency, this circumstance would not lead to the conclusion that the transaction was one of sale. In our view, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the transaction in question was one of agency and not of sale. The question referred to us must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative. The applicant to pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (1) TMI 84 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... only to the turnovers below rupees three lakhs mentioned in section 5-A. Where the total turnover exceeds rupees three lakhs, section 5-A is attracted and additional tax at the rate of one-fourth paisa on every rupee of the assessee s turnover has to be levied. A reading of the order of the Tribunal would show that there was no issue or question as to the rate of tax payable by an assessee whose annual turnover exceeded rupees three lakhs. The decision in Oruganti Venkateswarlu s case was referred to by the Tribunal only for guidance in respect of cases other than those coming within the purview of section 5-A. Therefore, when the applicability of section 5-A was not in issue before the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had exceeded his jurisdiction in exercising his powers under section 20(1) of the Act. We, therefore, confirm the impugned order of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (1) TMI 83 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce got out of the paddy milled the dealers have been subjected to sales tax on the sale turnover of the rice. The levy in regard to paddy or rice is at a single point. Therefore, the same transaction could not be subjected to tax both at the purchase point as well as at the sale point. The article disposed of is only rice, which was the result of the paddy milled, and that has been subjected to tax under the Act. It is, therefore, inconceivable that there was any other disposal of the paddy as such so as to come within the ambit of the second clause of section 6(i). 16.. We, therefore, hold that the respondents were not liable to pay tax on the purchase turnover of the paddy milled in their mills either on the ground that they had consumed paddy in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise or disposed of such goods in any manner other than by way of sale in the State. 17.. The revision petitions, accordingly, fail, and are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (1) TMI 82 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... th respect, unable to agree with the view taken in the said case. We may also mention that it was further submitted by Mr. Cooper that to get the benefit of the exemption conferred by entry No. 14, cooked food and non-alcoholic drinks should be served for consumption either at the eating establishment itself or immediately outside it. His contention was that the word outside should be restricted to the immediate vicinity of the eating establishment or other establishments referred to in the said entry. In this regard, we find that in Govindshram Hotel v. State of Gujarat 1966 17 S.T.C. 100., to which we have already referred, this contention has been categorically negatived, and we are in respectful agreement with the said decision. This contention of Mr. Cooper must also, therefore, be rejected. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The applicant must pay the costs of this reference to the respondent. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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