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1975 (9) TMI 176
... ... ... ... ..... he State action in a particular case amounts to an arbitrary classification or a hostile discrimination which is violative of Art. 16 of the Constitution the Court is there to act as sentinel on the qui vive in order to strike down such an action. For the reasons given above, I have come to the conclusion that r. 13-A.A. of the rules is a valid piece of statutory provision which is fully justified under Art. 16(1) of the Constitution of India and does not fall within the purview of Art. 16(4). I would, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct the status quo ante to be restored. In the circumstances of this case, I leave the parties to bear their respective costs. ORDER Order by Majority- The validity of Rule 13AA of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 and two orders, Exhibits P- 2 and P-6 is upheld. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. P.B.R.
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1975 (9) TMI 175
... ... ... ... ..... erested who paid them as long as they were paid. lt would bear repetition to say again that the. Original mistake arose out of the assumption by the Labour Commissioner that this was a case of an ordinary contract which would apply to other contractors also. He had apparently not seen the contract between the company and the appellant and that mistake was adopted by the State Government and they stuck to it inspite of the application made to them by the appellant after the disposal of the earlier appeal by this Court, giving all relevant facts. It does not appear from the communication of the Government to the appellant that they had applied their mind to any of the considerations set out in the appellant's application. In the circumstances this appeal must be allowed and the Government of orissa must be directed to reconsider this matter and take a decision in the matter of reference in the light of the relevant facts. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (9) TMI 174
... ... ... ... ..... t is pointed out by the learned Advocate General that in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which was in force when the Defence of India Rules, 1971 were enacted, the provisions relating to bail were set out in Chapter 39 which formed part of Part IX dealing with "supplementary" provisions. It is urged that if the scheme of Part IX is examined it will be found to correspond with Part XIX of the Defence of India Rules dealing with "supplementary and procedural" provisions. We are invited to consider whether the presence of Rule 184 in this Part does not mean that the power to grant bail has been expressly conferred on the Special Tribunal, Even if that be assumed, there is nothing which necessarily war- rants the conclusion that the powers of the High Court in the matter of bail have been abridged or ousted. 28. In my opinion, the High Court has power under Section 438 and Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to grant bail to the petitioners.
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1975 (9) TMI 173
... ... ... ... ..... e is somewhat unconventional but where public interest is involved. "Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go where only private interests are involved. Accordingly, the granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon considerations as of public interest .. "(27 Am. Jur.2d, Equity,p.626) We hope the vigilant legislature will activise itself on behalf of the little men and the law and make quickmoving, easily accessible and free of-cost consumer protection measures. Slogans are not law and the rule of law in a welfare oriented constitutional order demands ’poverty law none too soon; with emphasis on the delivery of legal services with distances shortened and road hazards removed. It is not for the Court to spell out more, but it is for the State to awaken to a overlooked, but not infrequent, legal phenomenon. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (9) TMI 171
... ... ... ... ..... ugned Act could not be called part of the Act; this Act does not even say that such orders are to be treated as if enacted in the Act. This is an important aspect of the case, and I do not think it can be assumed or taken for granted without further consideration that these orders formed part of the Act and the President's assent (1) 1962 1 S.C.R 9 7 to the Act cured the repugnancy created by the surcharge order. However, as I have already held the Act to be invalid on the other ground. I prefer not to express any concluded opinion on this point. In may judgment the Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 is invalid on the ground of excessive delegation. I would therefore dismiss the appeals but without any order as to costs. ORDER In view of the decision of the majority. the appeals are allowed and Civil Appeals Nos. 1425, 2575, 2576 of 1972 and 97, 1373 and 1374 of 1973 are remanded to the High Court. There will be no order as to costs. P. B. R .
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1975 (9) TMI 170
Levy of demurrage - Whether the scale of fees under which the appellants charge demurrage is void as being unreasonable and as being beyond their powers?
Whether the 1st respondent is liable to pay the demurrage claimed by the appellants?
Held that:- The High Court was therefore in error in holding the scale of rates fixed by the Board as ultra vires and void on the grounds that it is unreasonable and that it is in excess of the power conferred by section 42 of the Act.
The 1st respondent had no title to or interest in the goods except to deliver them in accordance with the instructions of the Corporation. If the appellants were to enforce their statutory lien, the incidence of the demurrage would have fallen on the Corporation in whom the title to the goods was vested. The appellants permitted the goods to be cleared without then demanding the demurrage which they claimed later, thereby depriving the 1st respondent of an opportunity to reject the goods as against the supplier unless, of course, the Corporation was within to accept them and along with them the liability for the payment of demurrage. In the absence of any more facts we find it impossible on the record as it stands, to accept the appellants' claim against the 1st respondent.
Therefore, hold that the claim against the 1st respondent must also fail. In the result, we confirm the decree of the High Court dismissing the appellants' suit, though for entirely different reasons.
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1975 (9) TMI 169
Whether the power of the District Magistrate to revoke the licence under s. 12 can be for only any of the grounds mentioned in s. 9?
Held that:- The power under s. 12 is to pass the kind of order which might be passed under section 7 or 9. The reasons for which this power can he exercised are not restricted to those mentioned in section 7 or 9. The revisional power under s. 12 is not a limited one. It is as wide as that of the original authority. The considerations which the District Magistrate took into account in revoking the appellant's licence were the same as those which were before the Village Panchayat when it decided to grant the licence. The revising authority is entitled on the same material to take a view different from that of the authority whose order is revised.
The order passed by the District Magistrate post-haste immediately he received the appellants reply without either giving him the copies asked for or at least telling him that the material already furnished was sufficient to enable him to make his representation and if he had ally further representation to make he could do so offends the principles of natural justice. We are aware that we are dealing with an appeal questioning the proceedings initiated under Article 226 of the Constitution where the power of the court is a limited one, that is to say, limited to cases where there is any error of law apparent on the face of the record. But the observance of the principles of natural justice is fundamental to the discharge of any quasi-judicial function. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the District Magistrate. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (9) TMI 168
... ... ... ... ..... efined in section 2(14) of the Bengal Excise Act, 1909, which includes beer. That being so, in my view, sales tax can be imposed upon beer also. As all the points raised by the petitioners fail, this rule is discharged. There will be no order for costs. C.R. No. 4681(W) of 1974. As the identical points are involved in this rule, the above order shall govern this rule also. Lastly, it is stated by Mr. Banerjee that there is an injunction granted against the petitioners in respect of another matter by which there has been injunction upon the petitioners not to charge and/or assess or demand sales tax on either of the purchase or sale of country spirit. I make it clear, that the injunction shall continue only with respect to country spirit, but with respect to other liquors as stated in item 37 of Schedule II of the Act of 1972, the petitioners shall be liable to pay sales tax and, as such, they would be competent to realise the said tax from the customers. Petitions discharged.
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1975 (9) TMI 167
... ... ... ... ..... the ground that there has been a decline in the turnover when no defect has been found in the account books of the assessee? In Shambhu Ratan Shailendra Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow 1972 30 S.T.C. 374 1972 U.P.T.C. 336., it has been held that unless some defect is found in the account books the book version of the assessee cannot be rejected solely on the ground of decline in the turnover. We are in respectful agreement with the principle laid down in that case. This being so, no question at all arose for making a best judgment assessment. In view of our answer to the first question the other questions became academic, and it is not necessary to enter into any answer in respect of these questions. We, accordingly, answer the first question in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The other two questions are returned unanswered. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (9) TMI 166
... ... ... ... ..... f State of Rajasthan v. Nenuram 1970 26 S.T.C. 268 (S.C.). is also a case of fixing of wooden windows and doors in a building. The Supreme Court, relying upon its earlier decision in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Man Industrial Corporation 1969 24 S.T.C. 349 (S.C.). , held that the contract was a contract of work and labour and not a contract of sale. The case of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Mysore, Bangalore v. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. 1972 29 S.T.C. 438 (S.C.). is a case of building of railway coaches in the railway yard from the materials supplied by the railway authorities. This case has been noticed and distinguished by the Supreme Court in T.V. Sundram Iyengar and Sons v. State of Madras 1975 35 S.T.C. 24 (S.C.). For the reasons stated above, we answer the question by saying that the sum of Rs. 1,08,633.08 represented the turnover of sale of goods liable to tax. The Commissioner is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (9) TMI 165
... ... ... ... ..... n to the assessing officer. The case in hand is one of that type. We have no doubt in our mind that if in this case confrontation would be withheld, a material collected behind the back of the assessee and never disclosed to him would form the basis of assessment. That is the foundation for rejection of his accounts and for penalising him by entering an assessment according to the assessing officer s best of judgment. 7.. Our answer to the question, therefore, shall be In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not right in rejecting the prayer of the assessee to summon the third-party for confrontation when reliance was placed on the accounts and also the statement of the third-party which was not recorded in the presence of the assessee. The assessment made in such circumstances would not be valid. 8.. We direct that the assessee shall have his costs of these references. Hearing fee rupees one hundred. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (9) TMI 164
... ... ... ... ..... or of Palghat(1), the statutory fiction in section 23(2)(b) contained in the words as if it were a fine imposed by him is only for its recovery and not for anything else. The Magistrate s jurisdiction to recover tax is in the Sales Tax Act and not in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of the fact that what he has to exercise is only a ministerial or executive function we need not have to look into the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code as to whether the Magistrate has particular jurisdiction to impose the fine concerned. The provision makes any Magistrate competent to entertain application and direct the recovery of the tax. As long as that function does not involve the appreciation or sifting of evidence or the formulation of any decisions, any Executive Magistrate will have also jurisdiction in the matter. In view of this, the original petitions have only to be dismissed. The original petitions are dismissed but I make no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (9) TMI 163
... ... ... ... ..... ds plastic droppers the matter is different. They are essentially plastic goods and they can be used in the clinical side and as well as in many other ways. Therefore, they should be taxed at 7 per cent. However, these sales appear to be very little and merely because some plastic droppers might have been sold the entire assessment previously made cannot be disturbed and it would be a matter of hardship if the appellant is again assessed on the ground that he has been under-assessed. The approach of the Tribunal is certainly contrary to all accepted canons of assessment of tax. The State is entitled to recover its legitimate dues. Merely because the tax dues may be smaller, it is not open to take the view it has. Our answer to the second question, therefore, is The Tribunal is not entitled to annul assessments in respect of sale of plastic rubbers and plastic pieces on the ground of hardship. We make no order as to costs. N.K. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (9) TMI 162
... ... ... ... ..... cos Ltd. s case 1965 16 S.T.C. 240 (S.C.)., the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the use of materials which is accessory or incidental to the execution of the work does not involve sale of goods. In my opinion, the present case is directly covered by the above decision of the Supreme Court and no sales tax can be imposed with respect to galvanizing of portals supplied by the railways. The contract was a works contract and did not include any sale of goods. In the result, this rule is made absolute. The impugned orders of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Calcutta North, and the order dated 17th May, 1966, passed by the Commercial Tax Officer, Manicktola Charge, are quashed by a writ of certiorari. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the respondents not to give effect to the said impugned orders. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1975 (9) TMI 161
... ... ... ... ..... or a poem. 16.. We therefore hold that the Tribunal had, on the basis of relevant materials available to them, come to the correct conclusion in regard to the sale of bill books, vouchers, receipt books, letter heads and notices. These are liable to be taxed as finished products. In the case of question papers, however, we hold that they are the subject-matter of a contract for work and labour and the charges realised by the assessee for printing them are not liable to be taxed under the Sales Tax Act. In view of what is stated above, we direct the Sales Tax Officer to quantify the charges realised by the assessee in respect of the question papers during the relevant years and separate them from the turnovers in respect of the other products which are, as we have already stated, liable to be taxed. Subject to what is stated above relating to question papers, the tax revision cases are dismissed. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1975 (9) TMI 160
... ... ... ... ..... assessee. We agree with the contention raised on behalf of the assessee that the proviso cannot be applied to a case of this type. In our opinion, the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion in the matter. The ratio indicated by the Supreme Court in the case of Instalment Supply Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer 1974 34 S.T.C. 65 (S.C.). supports this view. 5.. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Member, Sales Tax Tribunal, was correct in holding that even sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce can be sales inside the State if the goods are inside the State of Orissa and, for coming to that conclusion, the Tribunal rightly relied upon the definition of sale including the explanation in the definition in section 2(g) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The assessee shall be entitled to costs of these references. Hearing fee is assessed at rupees one hundred. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (9) TMI 159
... ... ... ... ..... annot be held to have defaulted in payment of tax due under the Act which would entitle him to rebate under section 13(8) of the Act. Factually, it must be held that the assessee has satisfied the conditions laid down In sub-section (8) of section 13 of the Act and has, therefore, rightly claimed the rebate. The Tribunal should have given this as the reasoning for its conclusion. 6.. We would accordingly answer the question referred to us by saying On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not right in holding that the short credit being negligible, the rejection and disallowance of the claim of rebate in its entirety was not justified. We must, however, make it clear that for the reasons we have indicated, the ultimate decision of the Tribunal was correct. We would have saddled the revenue with the costs of the proceedings, but for the mistake made by the Tribunal In its reasoning for the conclusion. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (9) TMI 158
... ... ... ... ..... hat by virtue of section 29(2) of the new Limitation Act, principles of section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to an appeal filed before the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 23(1) of the Act. The application made for condonation of delay in preferring of the appeal before the Assistant Commissioner was, therefore, maintainable and the Assistant Commissioner went wrong in rejecting it as incompetent in law and the Tribunal equally erred in upholding the decision of the Assistant Commissioner on such score. Our answer to the question referred to is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee was entitled to obtain extension of time for filing of the appeal before the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax upon satisfying him that there was good cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. 8.. The assessee shall have his costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 200. N.K. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (9) TMI 157
... ... ... ... ..... ernment of India under open sale. These are questions of fact which the assessing authority should carefully examine. 5.. In the result, we quash the impugned order by issuing a writ of certiorari and remand the case to the assessing authority for re-examination and recomputation in accordance with law and our observations made above. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. 6.. It may be noted for future that In an endowment case, Bhimsen Dixit v. B.K. Misra, Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, OrissaI.L.R. 1971 Cut. 987. , this court has held that the Commissioner of Endowments was guilty of contempt for not having followed the decision of this court though the matter was brought to his notice. We clarify the position that subordinate authorities are bound to acquaint themselves with the decisions of this court and in case these authorities are not followed, in appropriate cases they are liable to be proceeded with for contempt. ACHARYA, J.-I agree.
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1975 (9) TMI 156
... ... ... ... ..... as below the taxable limit he need not have filed the returns. After the receipt of the notice under s. 148 he had explained the cause for not filing the return due to severe illness. The ITO, as there was no compliance of the notice had straight away passed exparte assessments on 13th March, 1972. So if at all there was any delay in the filing of the returns that was only for about two to three months. Even that has been properly explained by the assessee as due to his severe illness. The penalty proceedings being quasi criminal the mere failure to file the returns in time is not sufficient to levy penalty. Following the trend of the decision of the various High Court we agree with the finding of the AAC that the assessee had not disregarded his legal obligations nor was he guilty of any contumacious conduct. Under such circumstances the cancellation of the levies of penalty by the AAC for all the three years is proper. 9. In the result, the Revenue s appeals are dismissed.
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