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Showing 21 to 40 of 102 Records
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1976 (10) TMI 141
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... ... ..... applicable to proceedings before the Sales Tax Tribunal under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973? There cannot be the slightest doubt that this question as framed has to be answered against the assessee in view of the judgment in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur 1975 35 S.T.C. 413 (S.C.). The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urges that the appeal to the Tribunal was presented within sixty days from the date of the communication of the order to the assessee, though not within sixty days from the date of the order. He, therefore, urges that there was no need to have the delay condoned. The assessee sought a reference of this question also, but the Tribunal expressly declined to refer this question. We are, therefore, not in a position to say anything about this aspect of the case. The question referred to us is answered against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (10) TMI 140
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... ... ..... and the transactions entered into in exercise of the powers under the Levy Order between the miller and the dealer on the one hand and thereafter between the State and the corporation and then between the corporation and the other States form one composite process which owed its origin to the arrangement arrived at between the State Government and the Central Government under which the States were required to contribute to the Central Food certain percentage of foodgrains, which, in turn, was passed on to the deficit States through the agency of the corporation. The Bench held that no sales tax or purchase tax was exigible on these transactions. Since Food Corporation of India s case(2) was decided later in point of time and is the decision of a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, we are bound to follow the same with respect. We, accordingly, answer the question referred to us in the negative. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1976 (10) TMI 139
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... ... ..... amendment to exclude the possibility that groundnut becomes a different commodity after it is parched. The legislature understood that the groundnut in any shape whatsoever does not cease to be groundnut and even if the shape of the groundnut is changed-parched or unparched-it remains the same commodity. (iii) Whether, having levied purchase tax on groundnut, the revenue was competent to impose sales tax on parched groundnut treating groundnut to be different commodity when it is parched? In the light of our earlier discussion, our answers to the questions are as follows (i) Groundnuts and parched groundnuts are commercially different commodities. (ii) Hans Raj Choudhri v. J.S. Rajyana 1967 19 S.T.C. 489. was wrongly decided, though the test was correctly stated. (iii) The revenue was competent to impose sales tax on parched groundnuts notwithstanding the fact that purchase tax had been levied on groundnuts. There will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (10) TMI 138
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... ... ..... .C. 165. , the Allahabad High Court was concerned with the question whether milk shake answered the description of the word milk or not. It was held that when a little sugar and some flavouring article is added to the milk it does not change its character and people do use this preparation in place of milk. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable because in the milk shake no such commodity is added which loses its own shape when the final product conies into being. Apparently, in the instant case, powdered cashew-nuts still appear in the milk and it is precisely for this reason that the milk sold by the petitioner is known as khaja milk . We are accordingly of the view that the product sold by the petitioner does not answer the description of the word milk appearing in item No. 17 of Schedule B to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. The question is, therefore, answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. No costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (10) TMI 137
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... ... ..... ne hand and rubber transmission belting on the other are put clearly indicates that they cannot be considered similar in nature. That was the view which was taken by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Punjab, and we agree with that view. In order to come within entry 30-C, rubber transmission belting must first be capable of being described as a fabric. In common parlance, fabric means a woven, felted or a knitted material for wear or ornament, as cloth, felt, hosiery or lace . In a broad sense, it may mean anything that is fabricated or put together. From a reading of entry 30-C, it has to be held that it is used in the former sense and not in the latter sense. The expression leather cloth, imitation leather cloth and cotton fabrics found in entry 30-C gives the necessary colour and meaning to the word fabrics . In the result, both the questions referred to us are answered in the negative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1976 (10) TMI 136
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... ... ..... ld not be characterised as a legislation in the matter of procedure. It would not automatically operate retrospectively. Since the appellate order dated 26th October, 1968, did not attain finality on the day when it was passed because it was subject to the suo motu revisional jurisdiction, it could not, in law, be said that it gained finality because of the effect of Amending Act No. 3 of 1971. Its status as an order which was subject to being revised continued. In relation to that order the revisional authority could exercise the suo motu revisional jurisdiction. In this view the Judge (Revisions) had jurisdiction to revise the aforesaid appellate order dated 26th October, 1968. In the result, we answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. The fee of the learned counsel appearing for the department is, however, assessed at Rs. 100.
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1976 (10) TMI 135
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... ... ..... dered are rendered by the totality of employees in the establishment some of them may be in the kitchen and some of them may be at other places. In other words, they may be employed in the task with which the customer is not directly concerned at all. It will, therefore, be seen that what is charged as service charges and required to be paid by the customer is in effect an addition to the price which he has to pay and is properly to be considered as sale price of the food ordered by him in that establishment. If we may say so, with respect, we entirely agree with the above reasoning and conclusion of the Bombay High Court. In view of this, we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal in this case in including the service charges in the taxable turnover of the assessee is correct. Hence the tax revision cases fail and they are dismissed. The respondent is entitled to its costs-counsel s fee Rs. 250 (rupees two hundred and fifty only) one set. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (10) TMI 134
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... ... ..... re us are electrical goods. It is common ground between the learned counsel appearing before us that if the batteries are treated as scrap or even if they are found to be not falling under any specific entry in the First Schedule, they would be governed by the general entry and would be liable to sales tax at 4 paise in the rupee. It is, therefore, clear that the assessment order which has proceeded on the footing that the batteries in question are batteries covered by item 1 is wrong and must be quashed and set aside. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the Commercial Tax Officer and the demand notice consequent upon that order are quashed and set aside. The Commercial Tax Officer will now proceed to assess the transaction in accordance with the observations made in the course of this judgment. The respondent must pay the costs of this writ petition to the petitioner. Advocate s fee Rs.150. Rule made absolute accordingly. Petition allowed.
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1976 (10) TMI 133
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... ... ..... and cultivators are agricultural implements, but that does not solve the problem. Various questions arise. Whether the list in column 3 is merely illustrative or exhaustive? What is the precise function of the legal fiction in column 3? What is the effect of the notification under section 4(2)? These are the considerations to be kept in view. We refrain from expressing any opinion thereon. Suffice it to say, the construction of an entry raises a question of law. In our opinion, the order of the Board of Revenue, therefore, does give rise to a question of law. The Board was not justified in refusing to state a case. We, accordingly, direct the Board to state a case and refer to the High Court for its opinion the following question, namely Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, disc-harrows and cultivators are agricultural implements under clause (b) of item 8 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act and are exempt from tax? Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (10) TMI 132
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... ... ..... elp in the determination of the case before us. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the definition of the word tobacco , according to item 4 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act of 1944, does not bring tobacco seed within its purview and, therefore, tobacco seed is not exempted from the levy of sales tax under the A. P. General Sales Tax Act, since tobacco seed does not fall within the meaning of the word tobacco as defined in the Fourth Schedule to the A.P. General Sales Tax Act. It is clear in view of this conclusion of ours that since tobacco seed Is not tobacco for the purposes of exemption under section 8 of the Act, much less can tobacco seed oil or tobacco seed oilcake or tobacco seed cake be said to be tobacco for the purposes of this exemption. Under these circumstances, each of these writ petitions fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each matter. Rule discharged in each of the two matters. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (10) TMI 131
Whether carbon paper is paper falling within the purview of the word "paper" as used in serial No. 2 of Notification No. ST-3124/X-1012(4)-1964 dated July 1, 1966, issued by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of the power vested in him under section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 so as to be liable to sales tax at the point and at the rate specified in the schedule to the notification?
Whether ribbon is an accessory or a part of the typewriter?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The mere fact that the word "paper " forms part of the denomination of a specialised article is not decisive of the question whether the article is paper as generally understood. The word "paper" in the common parlance or in the commercial sense means paper which is used for printing, writing or packing purposes. We are, therefore, clear of the opinion that carbon paper is not paper as envisaged by entry No. 2 of the aforesaid notification.
Regarding ribbon also to which the abovementioned rule of construction equally applies, we have no manner of doubt that it is an accessory and not a part of the typewriter (unlike spool) though it may not be possible to use the latter without the former.
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1976 (10) TMI 121
Was the Tribunal right in holding that, although the assessment order was made after the Constitution of India came into force, article 286 was thereby not contravened, because such order related to a period prior to January 26, 1950 - Held that:- Yes. The provisions of article 286 were not contravened.
Was the Tribunal right in holding that explanation (II) to section 2(g), as was originally embodied in the Sales Tax Act, 1947, got restored on the statute book because of the unconstitutionality of the substituted explanation enacted in the Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1949 - Held that:- There is no question of restoration of unamended explanation (11) to section 2(g) as the purported amendment itself did not take effect.Hence, the unamended provision stood as it was before the attempted amendment. The question framed rests on a misconception that there was something to be restored. As nothing was taken away, nothing was there to be restored. And, there was nothing added or substituted.
Does the Tribunal's decision not contradict the true meaning of the language "sale of any goods which are actually in the Central Provinces and Berar at the time when the contract of sale as defined in that Act in respect thereof is made", as occurring in explanation (11) to section 2(g) of the Sales Tax Act, with reference to "in respect thereof " is reference to "specified or earmarked" goods which are actually present in the taxing State when the contracts are made - Held that:- This is a question of fact as to what contracts specify and whether those goods were taxed, on which the findings already recorded are enough to dispose it off against the assessee.
Was the Tribunal right in its interpretation, application and use of the provisions of original explanation (11) to section 2(g) of the Sales Tax Act even as they were? - Held that:- Yes.
Was the Tribunal right in assuming the law to be that the existence of ingredients of ores in the taxing State in question, which were sufficient if and when mixed in due proportion for yielding different varieties of standard mixtures contracted for by the overseas buyers, was in law enough to attract the tax? - Held that:- There is no question of assuming anything. The process which was revealed and findings of fact given on it show that it did not result in the production of a new commodity at the port. It was only manganese ore of different grades which was unloaded at the port and given the name of "oriental mixture" because the ingredients got mixed up automatically in transportation and satisfied certain specifications. No new commodity was produced in this process.
Was the Tribunal right in holding that the sales tax authorities had found as a fact that the goods consisting of oriental mixture were in the Madhya Pradesh State when the contracts in respect of these goods were made? - Held that:- Yes.
Thus Assessee's appeals dismissed.
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1976 (10) TMI 120
Whether the appellant-firm had failed to prove that it had stood dissolved on a date prior to the date of assessment, viz., March 12, 1962?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The facts and circumstances referred to by the High Court throw a considerable doubt upon the correctness of the statement made on behalf of the appellant-firm that it had stood dissolved on August 8, 1961. It has to be borne in mind that the High Court was dealing with the matter on the writ side. In a writ petition, the scope for interference with a finding of the departmental authorities is much more restricted and the court can normally interfere only if the finding is based upon no evidence or is based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence or is otherwise perverse. The same cannot be said of the finding of the sales tax authority embodied in its report sent to the High Court in the present case thus no sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.
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1976 (10) TMI 103
Whether the excise duty deposited directly in a State treasury or a sub-treasury by the purchasers of the Indian-made foreign liquor called "Indian liquors" before removing the said liquor from a distillery and the countervailing duty remitted directly to a State treasury or a sub-treasury by the purchasers of the aforesaid specie of liquor before removing it from a bonded warehouse can properly be said to form part of the turnover of the manufacturer and of the owner of the bonded warehouse respectively and as such liable to sales tax under the Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. No hesitation in holding that the excise duty and the countervailing duty paid directly by the buyers of the Indian liquors as stated above did not constitute a part of the turnovers of the appellants.
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1976 (10) TMI 102
Sales tax liability - Held that:- Appeal allowed. The appellant-firm is entitled to be paid the amount of sales tax levied under the State Act in respect of the goods sold by it in the course of inter-State trade provided the appellant has paid the sales tax under the Central Act in respect of those sales. Set aside the judgment of the High Court and order that the appellant-firm be paid the amount of sales tax levied under the State Act in respect of the goods sold by it in the course of inter-State trade provided the appellant has paid the sales tax under the Central Act in respect of those sales. The appellant shall be entitled to recover its costs both in this Court as well as in the High Court from the respondent.
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1976 (10) TMI 101
Refusal to include certain items in the sales tax registration certificate of the appellant - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Cultivation and growth of tea-plants no doubt results in the production of raw material in the form of green tea-leaves which are ultimately processed into tea meant for sale. Such cultivation and growth are in the very nature of things prior to the manufacturing process and do not answer to the description of manufacture and processing of tea meant for sale. There is a vital difference between an agricultural operation and a manufacturing process, and the same should not be lost sight of. What is needed for being used purely in an agricultural operation cannot be held to be goods required for use in a manufacturing process. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant was not entitled to get fertilisers and other goods mentioned in item No. (1) included in the registration certificate. The same reasoning would also hold good in respect of weighing machines used not in the factories but in the tea fields.
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1976 (10) TMI 81
Memorandum of association – Alteration to be registered within three months, Effect of failure to register
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1976 (10) TMI 72
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... ... ..... . 4,182 to the Rahar account 5. In this account, the assessee declared its sales at Rs. 1,83,962 and gross profit of Rs. 5,318. The rate of gross profit worked out to 3 per cent. In the absence of varifiable accounts, the ITO estimated the sales of the assessee at Rs. 1,90,000 and applied the rate of gross profit at 5 per cent. In this way, he made an addition of Rs. 4,182 to the trading account of the assessee. 6. On appeal, the AAC reduced the sales from Rs. 1,90,000 to Rs. 1,85,000 and adopted the rate of gross profit at 4 per cent. Thus, he sustained the addition of Rs. 2,082. 7. The ITO has not referred to any comparable case to justify the adoption of the rate of gross profit at 5 per cent. His order cannot, therefore, be restored. There is nothing on record to suggest that the AAC has not exercised his discretion in a judicial manner in reducing the estimated sales and the rate of gross profit. I, therefore, confirm his order. 8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (10) TMI 70
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... ... ..... d it is because of certain difficulties of positive proof that she had offered the investments for assessment. That does not mean that the assessee had done so because of any fraud or gross or wilful neglect on her part. The explanation of the assessee has not, according to us, been proved to be false. In that case the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) of the Act itself could not be invoked. We find that the assessee, even though could not explain the sources of her investments satisfactorily, it cannot be said the failure of the assessee to file the correct income and for any fraud or gross or wilful neglect on her part. The circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) of the Act cannot be invoked. Under such circumstances, we find that even the Explanation is not applicable and hence the penalty levied by the I.A.C. cannot be sustained. 7. In the result, the assessee rsquo s appeal is allowed and the levy of penalty of Rs. 1,00,850 is cancelled.
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1976 (10) TMI 68
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... ... ..... squo s learned counsel there were no fresh borrowals during the course of the relevant year under appeal and that the interest is paid only on the subsisting borrowal of Rs. 1,91,178 as claimed the assessee is entitled to succeed. This matter has not been gone into by the lower authorities. In the interest of justice, therefore, we set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on this point and restore the matter to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with a direction to examine this contention in the light of the statement filed and the explanation offered by the assessee and dispose of the income issue on merits and in the accordance with law. For this year also the assessee should file an analysis statement and establish his claim before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner is directed to dispose of the appeal on this point afresh on merits and in accordance wide with law. 10. In the result the appeal is allowed in part.
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