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1976 (3) TMI 236
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... ... ..... ed. The State Governments should not adopt a litigious approach and waste public revenues on fruitless and futile litigation where there - are no chances of success. It is unfortunately a fact that it costs quite a large sum of money to come to this Court and this Court has become untouchable and unapproachable by many litigants who can not afford the large expense involved in fighting a litigation in this Court. It is, therefore, all the more necessary that State Governments, which have public accountability in respect of their actions, should not lightly rush to this Court to challenge a judgment of the High Court which is plainly and manifestly correct and drag the opposite party in unnecessary expense, part of which would, in any event, not be compensated by award of cost. The present appeal is an instance of the kind of unnecessary and futile litigation which the State Governments can and should avoid. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs. S.R. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 235
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... ... ..... quential relief. And, as we have already indicated, it is still open for the authorities to proceed in a just and legal way against the respondent if there is really a substantial case against him deserving punitive action. As we are leaving the authorities free to take action, in accordance with either applicable rules for a comparative assessment of merits of the respondent and others who may be eligible to officiate in the post of a Senior Station Incharge, or, to take disciplinary proceedings, it considered necessary no observation made that in this judgment or by the High Court will operate as a finding on any question except that the quashed reversion order was punitive and passed contrary to rules of natural justice embodied in Article 311(2). It is not necessary to invoke the aid of Article 16 of the Constitution at all on such a finding. This, we think, was also the position in Sughar) Singh's case (supra) . This appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 234
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... ... ..... terials before it, without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. (See Arjun Singh Alias Puran v. Kartar Singh and Ors.(1). In the instant case, we have not been able to experience any difficulty in rendering the judgment on the material already before us. Instead we feel that the prayer for adducing additional evidence has been made merely to fill up gaps on the basis of some revenue record which has been found by the Collector and the Commissioner to the spurious. We also do not find any other substantial reason to accede to the request of the appellants to allow them to adduce additional evidence. There is no inherent lacuna or obscurity which we require to be filled up or removed to be able to pronounce judgment. The application of the appellants is accordingly rejected. In the result we do not find any merit in this appeal which is also hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 233
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... ... ..... aw, against any such action or Govt. notification as is alleged to infringe that right. We are unable to find any such right in any writ petition, as framed, now before us. 3. Any petitioner who applies for a writ or order in the nature of a mandamus should, in compliance with a well known rule of practice, ordinarily, first call upon the authority concerned to discharge its legal obligation and show that it has refused or neglected to carry it out within a reasonable time before applying to a Court for such an order even where the alleged obligation is established. Accordingly, subject to the observations made above, we allow Civil Appeals Nos. 844-860 of 1975, and set aside the judgment and orders of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and dismiss the Writ petitions. We also dismiss the Writ Petitions Nos. 1309-1318 and 1371-1373 of 1975, subject to the observations made above, filed in this Court. Parties will bear their own costs. Appeal allowed and Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 232
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... ... ..... of six months. Now, in the present case, there is no material to show as to when notices of demand requiring the respondents and other rate-payers to pay the amount of tax were issued by the Municipal Borough or which rate-payers paid the amount of tax and when. It is not possible to say, in the absence of such material, as to when the cause of action for filing the suit arose to the respondents and other ratepayers and whether it arose within six months before the filing of the suit or at a point of time earlier than that. The Municipal Borough cannot, in the circumstances, be held to have established that the suit was not commenced by the respondents and other rate-payers within six months after the accrual of the cause of action and the plea of limitation based on s. 206A must fail. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no substance in the appeal and it must be dismissed, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 231
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... ... ..... by their ancestors. Under the agreement Ext. B-4 the Rowthers on behalf of the Muslim community undertook not to claim any right in the mosque and although that would not act as an estoppel once the property becomes a public wakf we think that the Court at the time of framing a scheme would consider the desirability of associating some of the defendants with the framing of the scheme and may even appoint a suitable person from among the Labbais to look after the properties on imposing such terms and conditions as the Court thinks fit. But the primary consideration should be the welfare of the wakf properties. In case the Labbais are not found suitable for being given any share in the administration of the mosque, the Court will be free to withhold the right. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the High Court in all the appeals. The result is that the appeals filed are dismissed, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs in this Court.
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1976 (3) TMI 230
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... ... ..... They have also admitted that they use power only in breaking lumps of the subject goods which are powdered in a Pulveriser which works with a 5 H.P. Motor. According to the appellants it is immaterial in the case of exemption under the aforesaid notification whether power was used or not. 2. I have considered the above submissions. The main issue to be decided is whether the subject goods are Emulsifiers/Wetting Out Agents. In this connection it is reported that the product is completely soluble in water and does not form emulsion. Since the product is soluble in water and does not form an emulsion, it cannot be treated as Emulsifiers/Wetting Out Agents. The product is therefore not entitled to the exemption under Notification No. 101/66, dated 17-6-1966. Levy of duty thereon and other action taken by the Assistant Collector against the appellants is therefore justified on facts and in law. I, therefore, uphold the order of the Assistant Collector and reject the appeal.
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1976 (3) TMI 229
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... ... ..... f their price lists. The Central Excise Officers should have therefore verified whether the prices submitted by the appellants and as approved by them included the value of the grills or not. In view of the above position the contention of the appellants that the demand of duty from them on the value of the grills would be hit by the time-bar under rule 10 seems to be justified and is upheld. 4. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case, I pass the following orders on the appeal of the appellant - (i) The grill is an integral part of a blower type of cooler and its value should be included in the value of the cooler for the purpose of assessment. (ii) Demands of duty from the appellants are hit by the time-bar under rule 10 of the C.E. Rules because duty was short levied through inadvertence or error on the part of officers concerned. Therefore demand of duty which is more than one year old under rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules is ordered to be withdrawn.
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1976 (3) TMI 228
Whether the whole, or part of the amount sought to be attached, represented provident fund or pensionary benefits nor did the High Court go into the question?
Held that:- It is possible to take a broad view that cases where public policy is involved and the court has a certain duty to observe statutory prohibitions, a wider concept of locus standi has to be taken. Any public authority interested in the matter and not behaving partially as an officious busy- body may bring to the notice of the court the illegality of the steps it proposes to take. When the court's jurisdiction is so invoked, it may be exercised without insisting on some other directly affected party, like the judgment-debtor in the instant case, appearing to defend himself. The argument that the Rajya Sabha Secretariat is different from the Union of India is a new gloss which Shri Rohatgi has put upon his contention of locus standi. He has pressed into service Articles 300 and 98(2) of the Constitution of India, neither of which is helpful or applicable. This point has the merit of novelty, little else. Consequentially, we set aside the decision of the High Court and of the executing court, but this is not the end of the matter.
We direct the court of the Subordinate Judge to go into the merits of the objection raised by the Union of India as to whether the entire amount or any portion thereof held by it on behalf of the Rajya Sabha Secretariat staff, so far as the judgment-debtor in this case is concerned, represents provident fund and compulsory deposits or pensionary benefits, excluded from attachability in execution of civil decrees under the provisions already adverted to. If it is feasible to effect service of notice on the judgment-debtor, well and good, but if it is not, the court cannot absolve itself of the duty to investigate into the merits of the claim or character of the amounts, so long as the Union of India is ready to make good its contention. The appeal is allowed
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1976 (3) TMI 227
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... ... ..... 59 Act. We are unable to hold that this decision is in any way an authority for the position that an appeal is also provided to the State under section 36. We have no doubt that under section 36 only an assessee or such of those persons who are referred to in sections 22(2), 23, 27 and 42 alone can prefer an appeal and not the State. The petition for enhancement filed by the revenue was therefore maintainable, since we have held that on the merits the enhancement ought to have been allowed in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Burmah Shell Co. Ltd. 1973 31 S.T.C. 426 (S.C.). The order of the Tribunal, in so far as it dismissed the enhancement petition, is liable to be set aside. We, accordingly, allow the revision petitions, set aside the order of the Tribunal and direct the inclusion of the turnover relating to iron scrap also in the taxable turnover. The petitioners will be entitled to costs. Counsels fee-Rs. 150 in each. Petitions allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 226
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... ... ..... e Tribunal should re-examine the matter regarding service of notice in the preceeding under section 12(8) of the Act. As things stand, he seems to have doubted the Sales Tax Officer s proceedings and if what has been said is correct, it is indeed reprehensible that a public officer chose to manipulate his record. The matter should be re-examined to ascertain whether within thirty-six months from 31st March, 1964, the assessee had actually been called upon to file a return in terms of section 11(1) of the Act. If it is found that such notice had not been issued within the statutory period, the assessee has to succeed on the footing that the proceeding is a nullity and in case notice is found to have been served as required under the law, there would nothing more to be contended. In the circumstances, we decline to answer the third question and leave the matter to be redisposed of by the Tribunal. We make no direction for costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (3) TMI 225
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... ... ..... ounsel for the assessees that there was no sale of the imported art silk yarn but the licences themselves have been sold. But to a specific question, the learned counsel stated that he could not produce any evidence of sale and it is not possible for him to do that and that, in form, the import was effected as if it was by the assessees themselves. Further, we are unable to permit the assessees to contend that they have sold the licences or that the art silk yarn imported had not been brought into this State. Once they have imported the art silk yarn, it is for them to prove how it was disposed of in order to claim exemption. Since that has not been made, as held by this court even in Oveekee Textiles v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Tiruchengode 1971 27 S.T.C. 439., they are liable to be assessed. In the result, all the tax revision petitions are liable to be dismissed and, accordingly, they are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 224
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... ... ..... nly to serve as a duplicating machine. It may be that in the process electricity is used. But in order to come within the scope of entry 41, it is not enough if electrical power is used. It must essentially be electrical machines or electrical goods described in the said entry. Even taking that the equipment is usable only with the aid of electricity, still, where there are two entries, one general and the other particular, we have to take the particular or specific entry for the purpose of levying the tax. In this case, the particular entry is entry No. 1, where duplicating machines have been specified. In the circumstances, we consider that the assessing authority was right in taxing these goods as duplicating machines. In the result, Tax Revision Case No. 310 of 1971 is allowed and Tax Revision Case No. 316 of 1971 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in both the revisions. Tax Revision Case No. 310 of 1971 allowed. Tax Revision Case No. 316 of 1971 dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 223
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... ... ..... ate, as we consider that it comes within the scope of cash discount provided in the section. The only point to be further considered is whether it is in accordance with the practice normally followed in the trade. The learned counsel for the assessee pointed out that this practice has been there for the earlier four years and that it had been allowed as a deduction by the sales tax authorities in those years. We understand that the assessee is the only manufacturer of this kind of polythene liner and is selling it to several tobacco manufacturers. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that there is a practice in giving this kind of cash discount. We consider that this amount is allowable as a deduction on the ground that it is a cash discount though it does form part of the price. The result is that the order of the Tribunal is sustained though on grounds different from those given by it. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 222
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... ... ..... dition or otherwise was sought for or granted, and that, therefore, the turnover relating to food and drinks was not properly before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. This observation also was a reference to the factual position and not a considered view on the jurisdiction of the appellate authority to raise additional grounds under section 31 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. We are, therefore, of the view that there was no jurisdiction for the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to permit the raising of additional grounds in respect of the turnover which was not disputed in the original appeal filed in form I and that, therefore, the Tribunal erred in directing the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to decide the assessability of the additional turnover on merits. This revision petition is accordingly allowed and the order of the Tribunal on this point is, therefore, set aside. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 221
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... ... ..... should not be held liable. We are wholly unable to understand this argument. If the assessee s transaction was the first sale, it is that transaction that could have been taxed by the State. It is not an answer by the assessee in such a case to say that the second sale had already been taxed and, therefore, the first sale should not be taxed. It is for the person who effected the second sale to raise the contention that, being a second sale, it is not liable to be taxed, and it is not for the assessee who made the first transaction of sale to raise that contention. In the view that the transaction by the assessee is the first sale, it is liable to be taxed. The assessing officer was right in including the turnover in the assessment. We, accordingly, allow T.C. No. 287 of 1974 and dismiss T.C. No. 439 of 1974. The revenue will be entitled to its costs in both these tax revision cases. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each. T.C. No. 287 of 1974 allowed. T.C. No. 439 of 1974 dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 220
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... ... ..... sale. Thus solely for the purpose of deciding whether the article sold by the assessees still retains the character of yarn and whether it is commercially different from the one they had purchased, in order to attract a fresh single point taxation, we are remanding the case to the Tribunal. The assessees will be permitted to adduce such evidence as they may choose before the Tribunal. Needless to say that if the Tribunal considers that it could be better disposed of by any other authority, it is open to the Tribunal to remand the matter to such authority as it may choose. Since the assessees have failed in the main point which they had raised and we have allowed them only to raise an additional point in this court, we consider that the revenue will be entitled to the costs of these revision petitions, though we remand the case to the Tribunal. There will be an order accordingly and the revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each. Ordered accordingly.
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1976 (3) TMI 219
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... ... ..... the area have a turnover of more than twice the lease amount. It might be that in similar trade the assessees had submitted returns of more than twice the lease amount. But that itself could not prove that every lessee should get a turnover of twice the lease amount. It would depend on the age of the trees and the varieties of coconuts in the thope. There is no evidence relating to the same. Since we have said that rejection of the accounts was proper, an addition is called for. Though we also do not have any positive material to fix the addition, we think that the assessee, on the facts and circumstances of this case, could be given a benefit of reduction of 50 per cent of the addition made by the assessing officer. Therefore, the addition will be restricted to one half of Rs. 17,172.09. The assessment will be revised accordingly. Since the revenue had succeeded on the substantial question, the revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 218
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... ... ..... f the two vehicles are different. The tyres and tubes used for cycle rickshaws are of a different variety and thicker make, which are not ordinarily used for cycles. The fact that the tyres and tubes used for cycle rickshaws could also be used by cyclists is not a ground for holding that cycle tyres and tubes are the same as cycle rickshaw tyres and tubes. The tyres and tubes of cycle rickshaws are manufactured having regard to the weight a cycle rickshaw has got to bear. That is why they are much thicker and made more durable than the cycle tyres and tubes. The prices of cycle rickshaw tyres and tubes are much higher than the prices at which tyres and tubes are sold for cycles. Therefore, it is difficult for us to agree with Mr. Dasaratharama Reddi that cycle tyres and tubes are the same as tyres and tubes used for cycle rickshaws. In the result, we agree with the view expressed by the Tribunal and dismiss the revision with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 217
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... ... ..... al rate of tax will be applicable to all interState sales made either to the Government or to other registered dealers, whereas in sub-section (2) of section 6, the exemption is only in regard to sales effected to registered dealers. It cannot, therefore, be said that the omission to refer to Government in the unamended provision of subsection (2) of section 6 is accidental. By Act No. 31 of 1958, the Central Sales Tax Act was amended introducing the unamended sub-section (2) of section 6 and also making amendments to section 8. Therefore, when both amendments were made simultaneously maintaining the distinction between the sales effected to the registered dealers in sub-section (2) of section 6 and sales effected to the Government and also registered dealers in section 8, it cannot be said that the omission is accidental. We, therefore, agree with the findings recorded by the Tribunal and dismiss the revisions with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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