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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 161 Records
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1976 (3) TMI 189
Whether the assessee is liable to be taxed in respect of a turnover of Rs. 7,41,393.62 consisting of Rs. 6,88,911.33 being the inter-State sales of cotton effected by the assessee to Nellai Cotton Mills, Tirunelveli, and Rs. 52,482.29 being the inter- State sales of cotton effected by the assessee to Karur Mills?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. A dealer claiming exemption for subsequent sale during the movement of goods from one State to another is required by section 6(2) of the Central Act to furnish to the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner a certificate duly filled and signed by the registered dealer by whom the goods were purchased containing the particulars. In the present case, the appellant would be entitled to exemption on production of appropriate form by the Bombay seller and by showing that the buyer is a registered dealer. The appellant produced the form from the Bombay seller but did not prove that his buyer was a registered dealer in cotton. Therefore, the Tribunal rightly held that the appellant was not entitled to exemption under section 6(2) of the Act
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1976 (3) TMI 180
Whether the fertiliser mixtures in question can be treated as the same article as chemical fertilisers composing them?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As in the instant cases, the mixtures produced by the appellant are different from their component parts, their properties and uses are also different and they are sold as different commercial products, the appellant was not entitled to the exemption claimed by it.
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1976 (3) TMI 177
What is the scope of the suo motu power under section 32 of the Act?
Whether the Deputy Commissioner rightly refused to exercise discretion under section 32 of the Act in favour of the appellants?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The suo motu power of revision of the Deputy Commissioner is of wide amplitude and can be exercised in favour of the revenue as well as the taxpayer in order to correct any error or illegality committed by the assessing authority in his order of assessment. The Deputy Commissioner rightly refused to exercise his revisional jurisdiction in favour of the appellants and the High Court was right in reversing the order of the Appellate Tribunal in so far as it related to the appellants' claim to the aforesaid exemption.
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1976 (3) TMI 158
Recovery proceedings in pursuance of the assessment orders and the demand was sought to be realised from the sons of the deceased proprietor by coercive measures - Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. The judgments of the High Court are affirmed but the orders with regard to the recovery proceedings, which are invalid, are set aside.
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1976 (3) TMI 156
Whether sales of are carbons, known as "cinema are carbons", manufactured by the appellant-company, were rightly subjected to sales tax for two assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67 on the ground that they fall under entry No. 4 of the First Schedule of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As the main use of the arc carbons under consideration was duly proved to be that of production of powerful light used in projectors in cinemas. The fact that they can also be used for searchlights, signalling, stage lighting, or where powerful lighting for photography or other purposes may be required, could not detract from the classification to which the carbon arcs belong. That is determined by their ordinary or commonly known purpose or user. This, as already observed by us, is evident from the fact that they are known as "cinema arc carbons" in the market. This finding was enough, in our opinion, to justify the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the goods under consideration are covered by the relevant entry No. 4.
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1976 (3) TMI 142
Fees to be credited to central government ... ... ... ... ..... ll be paid to the Central Government in respect of such fees. The court has, in respect of these realisations, power, as I have already stated, to reduce the rate at which the fees are to be paid in case it is found that the amounts are excessive. In fact, the amounts do not seem to be large in the present case and I have no reason to believe that they are excessive. In case it is found that large amounts are involved, the company may approach the court for a reduction in the rate, if so advised. As at present advised, I do not find any necessity to reduce the rate of fees payable on realisations. I may particularly note that the revival of the company is, to a large measure, due to the fact that the official liquidator has made realisations from the debtors of the company. This is a factor to be taken into consideration when the question of reduction of fees is to be considered. The application is disposed of in accordance with the directions contained hereinabove. No costs.
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1976 (3) TMI 131
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... esent another scheme. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the scheme cannot be worked out satisfactorily and it is just and equitable that the company be wound up. In the result, the summons are made absolute in terms of prayer (a ), (b) and (d). Mr. Chhatrapati applies for costs of the company to come out of the assets of the company. The question of costs of the company is reserved till Wednesday, 10th March, 1976, to enable Mr. Ghhatrapati to make his submissions on this point. Shri Daulatram Gyanchand Jaisinghani, who is a creditor of the company to the extent of Rs. 6,000, had supported this judge s summons and submitted that in view of the stay granted by this court under section 391(6) of the Companies Act, he is unable to proceed with his suit in the Bombay City Civil Court. Now that the scheme does not exist and order for winding up has been passed, the embargo in commencing or continuing suits or proceedings against the company automatically stands lifted.
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1976 (3) TMI 116
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... ated upon in the suit to be filed. I, therefore, refrain from adjudicating upon this question at this stage. The counsel for the 4th respondent contended that the directors will have to answer two proceedings and, therefore, leave should not be granted. I am not satisfied that this plea has any basis since they have to blame themselves for this state of affairs, necessitating the filing of a suit by the applicant-bank to enforce the personal charge against respondents Nos. 2 to 4. On a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that this is a fit case to grant leave to the applicant-bank to institute a suit against the respondents before the Sub-Court, Cochin, for the recovery of the amount due to the said bank. The application is thus allowed. Parties are directed to bear their costs. It is made clear that no steps will be taken in execution of any decree that the bank may obtain in the suit without obtaining previous leave of this court.
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1976 (3) TMI 115
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... r-company without winding up. It is no doubt true that a single scheme of amalgamation or reconstruction in a given case may involve both types of companies, namely, those under winding up and those which are not, one or more of the latter category coming in for dissolution In such a situation both the provisos come into operation. On the other hand, there may be cases where, as in the instant case, no company which is under winding up may be involved. In such an event, the first proviso does not come into play at all and only the second proviso will be operative. This is not the same as saying that the second of the provisos would come into operation only when the first proviso operates, as contended for the respondent-companies. The result is that this appeal deserves to succeed. But in view of the submission made on behalf of the appellant, referred to earlier, and subject to the above declaration, we dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1976 (3) TMI 99
... ...
... ... ..... pection reports and the inspection report of Shri Singh merely mentions that the stock kept in a bank godown was not verified. It does not show that the Inspecting Officer wanted to inspect those godowns and the dealer refused to assist him much less obstructed him in that verification. The order report does not contain anything about the bank godown at all. This ground for rejecting the books of account is also misconceived. 2. As no other reason for distrusting the books of account has been suggested, it follows that the books of account has been wrongly disbelieved. I would, accordingly, allow the application, set aside the order of the learned Addl. Dy. CIT and modify the order of assessment by directing that the dealer be assessed on the basis of the gross turnover disclosed by his books of account and the taxable turnover should be determined by deducting also the amount Rs. 11,249.00 from the gross turnover on account of sales to the registered dealer, Badriram Hirala.
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1976 (3) TMI 97
... ...
... ... ..... against the assessment order. This view has been uniformly followed by the Tribunal in a number of cases and accepted by the Revenue. Though the ground regarding levy of interest was entertained by the Tribunal, it has ultimately directed the ITO to examine all aspects regarding levy of interest under s. 139(1). There is no finality in the finding given by the Tribunal, as the matter regarding levy of interest is left to the ITO for determination along with other issues remitted back to the ITO for consideration. In the circumstances, we are inclined to feel that the questions sought to be referred to by the Revenue border the realm of barren technicalities. Though we have reached this conclusion, with some hesitation and difficulty, we are clear in our mind that no referable question of law at the instance of the Revenue, arises on the findings of the Tribunal. We, therefore, decline to make the reference sought for by the Revenue and reject all there reference applications.
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1976 (3) TMI 95
... ...
... ... ..... of the returns continued even after 1st April, 1969, the WTO was justified in calculating penalties at the new rates after 1st April, 1969. On the other hand, the learned Chartered Accountant for the assessee relied on the decision of the Madras High Court, referred to by the AAC. 5. The decision of the Madras High Court, even though it was under the Gift tax Act had clearly laid down that where the infringement is the failure to furnish the return in time, the offence is complete when the return is not filed on the due date and the law as on that date alone has to govern the levy of penalty. In this case, the assessee had to file the Wealth-tax returns on 30th June 1967 and 30th June, 1968 and the law existing to penalty under s. 18(1)(a) of the Act there was only on tax base. As the matter stands, we are bound by the Madras High Court decision. Hence, the contention of the learned Departmental Representative, cannot be accepted. 6. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 93
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... ... ..... nts and basic facts relating to sales returns. We are also in full agreement with both the parties and inclinded to remit the matter back to the CTO III/CAC with a direction to call for the accounts and records and consider the claim in accordance with the principle laid down by the High Court in T.C. No. 369/70 as referred to in the aforementioned T.C. Nos. 465,566 etc. dt. 10th April, 1975. The Claims which have to be remanded for the years are as under mdash S.No. Year T.C. No. T.A. No. Turnover . 1. 1965-66 91/73 105/72 38,617.37 . 2. 1966-67 466/70 117/69 3,43,433.37 1 . . . . 88,738.81 1-1/2 3. 1967-68 465/70 845/70 5,998.10 1 . . . . 1,33,151.51 1-1/2 . . . . 1,963.50 2-1/2 4. 1968-69 63/74 735/72 2,034.43 3 . . . . 729.09 5 . . . . 52,559.95 2 5. 1969-70 92/73 104/72 1,33,135.43 2 . . . . 16m269.00 3 3. In the result the claims for the years mentioned in the preceding paragraph are remanded to the CTO III/C.A.C. Madras for dealing with the same in accordance with law.
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1976 (3) TMI 92
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... ... ..... he preceding paragraph clearly show that he wanted the extent of expenditure to b ascertained after enquiry in a reasonable manner even if there be no direct voucher for the same. There is no ambiguity in his order and we totally endorse the reasonableness of his view. As for the learned Authorised Representative rsquo s alternative arguments that the income especially from sugarcane, is grossly over-estimated and that the expenditure on paddy is under estimated with reference to some other decisions like 162 of 671 and others, we find that it is not specifically raised in the grounds, of appeal before us. At any rate, we do not find the cases comparable and the net income estimated is not in any manner unreasonable considering the extent of holding etc. Under the circumstances we cannot possibly tinker in the estimates at this stage. 5. In the result, the orders of the Asstt. CIT are confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no refund of the institution fee.
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1976 (3) TMI 91
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... ... ..... xemption for rice bran and wheat bran or husk and dust or pulses and grams by naming them as cattle feed. If the object of naming the cattle feed exempt from tax was to supply an exhaustive list of exempt items only, there was no necessity to exclude some other items specifically from exemption as they would have even otherwise been taxable if the learned State Representative is right. Under these circumstances we are of the view that the scope of namely is not to restrict the meaning but only to bring certain doubtful or marginal items within the hold of exemption had not to take away the exemption on other normal cattle feeds. In this sense we have to hold that cotton seed husk, tapioca flour dust and cotton seed hull bran are all cattle feeds and exempt even after 22nd March, 1974 even under second Notification. Turnover of Rs. 21,994 will therefore be exempt. 9. Under the circumstances, the appeal is partly allowed Relied due at 3 1/2 per cent on a turnover of Rs. 91,816.
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1976 (3) TMI 90
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... ... ..... p on resale of such scrap will not be liable to tax. 6. In the view, we have taken, the appellant will be liable to tax only on sale value of purchase of Rs. 28,839.09 mentioned in para 4 supra. the sale value thereof is Rs. 38,759.74 after adding 34.4 per cent for profit on purchase value. The learned counsel claimed that not all the purchases were resold during the same year. But the extent of stock thereon is not clearly established and we do not think that it is necessary to make any adjustment on the same. However, in respect of purchases from Murray and Co. it is known that only less than 1/3rd of that purchased goods had been sold during the year. Adjustment might have been necessary if such goods were liable to tax on resale. Since it is not liable to tax under resale, it is not necessary the consider the extent of stock in such goods. 7. In the result, an addition of Rs. 38,759.74 alone would be eligible for confirmation. Relief due Rs. 1,27,081.89 at 3 1/2 per cent.
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1976 (3) TMI 85
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... ... ..... or members in the proportion in which capital has been contributed by them. The residue of the net wealth of the firm or association shall be allocated among the partners or members in accordance with the agreement of partnership or association for the distribution of assets in the event of dissolution of the firm or association, or, in the absence of such agreement, in the proportion in which the partners or members are entitled to share profits. The sum total of the amounts so allocated to a partner or members shall be treated as the value of the interest of that partner or member in the firm or association . The exemption is provided under s. 5 (1)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. On a true and correct interpretation of Rule. 2 read with s. 5 (1)(iv) of the WT Act, the assessee s claim is well founded. The authorities below ought to have allowed exemption under s. 5 (1)(iv) of the WT Act at least to the extent of Rs.20,000. 3. In the result, the appeals are partly allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 84
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... ... ..... , as observed by the AAC that the whole thing was due to inadvertent omission or a wrong impression of the assessee or his counsel as mentioned above from the asst. yr. 1964-65 onwards. ON the top of all, there is another aspect which requires deeper consideration. After all, the assessee has been showing a wealth to the extent of Rs. 4,00,000 every year. It is unthinkable that he would have though of concealing the value of small sites to the extent of Rs. 15,000 from his wealth thereby exposing himself to the risk of draconian penalties. We are of the opinion that it is most unlikely that he is would have incurred the wrath of the severe penal provisions with the view to avoid a paltry sum of wealth tax. It cannot, therefore, be said that the assessee omitted to include the value of the sites in his net wealth as a conscious and deliberate act of suppressing the wealth. For these reasons, we uphold the orders of the AAC. 4. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 83
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... ... ..... ith the assessee rsquo s case with this difference that the land did not belong to the assessee whereas in the assessee rsquo s case they are the owners of the land and buildings. But this facts does not make any difference to the principle which they have laid down and which we have quoted in the earlier paragraphs. The assessee company in this case had been letting out properties on short durations to various persons and in so doing they are completely in control of the properties and are not exercising their rights as a mere landholder but are using a commercial asset intelligently in order to see that it gives the company maximum returns. That was the only was in which under the circumstances the commercial asset could be exploited by them. We will, therefore, hold on the authority of the Supreme Court decision quoted last (33 ITR 700) that the assessee in letting out the godowns is doing business and the income is assessable as business income. 13. The appeal is allowed.
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1976 (3) TMI 82
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... ... ..... criminal, including both the safe-blower and the armed burglar. 5. We think, therefore, that the facts of the case would be governed by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Nainital Bank case 55 ITR 707 (SC) rather than the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision 51 ITR 213 (AP). We have found as a fact that the amount lost was part of the funds which the assessee is compelled to keep in cash in view of the business requirement. He has to pay off in cash to the ryots for the purchase of the agricultural products. The loss was incurred in the business premises where the cash hand been kept. The fact that the assessee was sleeping in the premises makes no difference. His family and residence is in Vijayawada and he remains at Palacol during business seasons. The mere fact that in the night he was sleeping in the business premises does not covert the business premises to his residence. On these facts, we think the loss claimed has to be allowed. 6. The appeal is allowed.
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