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Showing 21 to 40 of 74 Records
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1976 (5) TMI 90
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... ... ..... ts at 10 per cent, but, in case the assessee is able to establish that although he is a manufacturer of spare parts, but they are used for purposes other than as parts of motor vehicles, then his case would not fall within the scope of item No. 10 of the notification issued on 1st June, 1963. In this case, the assessee did not lead any evidence that the spare parts manufactured by him were used for purposes other than parts of motor vehicles. In our opinion, the courts below were justified in treating the assessee as a manufacturer of spare motor parts and rightly assessed his turnover at the rate of 10 per cent. In view of what we have stated above, our answer to the first question is in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department and the answer to the second question is in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the department. In view of the divided success of the parties, they shall bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (5) TMI 89
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... ... ..... given under rule 27(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules and, therefore, the proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act was not attracted. (2) In the facts and circumstances of the case, the sales by the assessee to the Japanese buyer are covered by the embargo under article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution of India read with section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act and, therefore, are not exigible to sales tax under the Orissa Act. The remaining question, in view of what we have already stated, does not survive for answer. When the matter was referred, it involved questions of contentious nature, which have been directly solved by the Supreme Court in Mod. Serajuddin s case 1975 36 S.T.C. 136 (S.C.). and by this court in Joharimal Gajananda s case 1976 37 S.T.C. 157., during the pendency of these references. We do not think, it would be appropriate that we would give any direction for costs. R.N. MISRA, J.-I agree. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (5) TMI 88
Whether the goods called "rayon tyre cord fabric" sold by the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. to manufacturers of tyres, who use it for the purpose of impregnating it with rubber, fall under entry 18 of the Schedule of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is no sufficient reason for overriding and discarding the High Court's view that, on what appeared to the High Court to be a question of fact, it should not decide whether the product under consideration constitutes a fabric entitled to exemption.
There was no appeal by the State of Rajasthan. It does not, therefore, seem proper for us to finally decide, on merits, the question argued before us in the appeals by the Delhi Cloth Mills, which are before us, unless we could have decided the matter in favour of the appellant. We could have only done that if we were of opinion that the taxing authorities had committed an error apparent on the face of the record. But, as already indicated above, we are not of this opinion.
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1976 (5) TMI 79
Shares – Power, to issue of at discount ... ... ... ... ..... Promila Bansal. In order to avoid any controversy, the company may enter the petitioner s name under her original name of Miss Promila Aggarwal. As regards the contention that the petition is mala fide, I do not see why the petition can be considered to be mala fide only because Shri K.C. Aggarwal appeared once in this court during these proceedings. The petition has to be judged on its own merits and the question of mala fides does not enter into the controversy and clearly the petitioner has been deprived of an investment of Rs. 1,00,000. I accordingly reject all the preliminary objections and allow the petition. I have already mentioned that the result will be that the petitioner s name, i.e., Miss Promila Aggarwal, will be restored to the register of members in respect of 1,738 preference shares of the face value of Rs. 100 each. The company will be free to enforce any calls that remain to be paid on those shares. On account of delay, I disallow the petitioner any costs.
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1976 (5) TMI 78
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... present case which will set out in the scheme the property indicated by the learned counsel. The learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that, as the order is being passed now at one and the same time, it will be possible to amalgamate the contents of Form No. 41 and Form No. 42 and one formal order may be drawn up combining Forms Nos. 41 and 42. If this is possible, the Registry may draw up one formal order. It is to be noted that there has been a change in the law concerning the time in which the certified copy has to be filed with the Registrar of Companies. The formal order will, therefore, specify that the time is 30 days from the date of the order and not 14 days as stated in the form. Further, paragraph No. 5 of Form No. 42 will have to be amended because the Registrar of Companies, Delhi, will have to send the documents relating to the transferor-company to the Registrar of Companies, West Bengal, so that the files of the two companies may be consolidated.
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1976 (5) TMI 63
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... ... ..... uring the year under consideration has increased to a lot. We have also seen that the assessee does not own any trucks, it only hires trucks for transportation purposes and hence he has to incur a lot of expenditure on the labour office staff as well as in entertaining the customors. As such looking to the nature of business of the assessee, we do not think any disallowance is called for except in the shop expenses. Thus looking to the totallity of the circumstance, we delete the disallowance made by the authorities below including the disallowance of shop expenses as the expenses in the asst. yr. 1972-73 were Rs. 13,210.56p. at the Head Office while in the asst. yr. 1973-74, the expenses claimed are only Rs. 9,308. Thus, in view of the increase in the business of the assessee we do not think any disallowance in the shop expenses at the Head Office is called for. 5. In the result, the order of the authorities below are reversed and the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1976 (5) TMI 60
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... ... ..... t history should be taken as the best guide line. It was further brought to out notice by the learned counsel that in the assessee rsquo s own appeal in ITA No. 309-Pat of 1975-76 for the asst. yr. 1972-73 the addition of Rs. 2,875 had been deleted by the Tribunal and the book results were accepted. 3. After hearing both the parties, we are of the view that the addition as sustained by the AAC is not called for when he has found for himself that there is nothing on the record to warrant the rejection of the books of account. When the books of account are properly maintained, simply because the rate of profit shown is slightly lower, that cannot be made any ground for making any addition. We, therefore, delete the addition of Rs. 8,316 as sustained by the AAC and accept the assessee rsquo s trading account. As we have accepted the assessee rsquo s treading results, the Departmental appeal is without merit and it is, therefore, dismissed. The Assessee rsquo s appeal is allowed.
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1976 (5) TMI 58
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... ... ..... rther the assessee had shown the credits in part IV of the return. In these circumstances we agree with the assessee rsquo s contention that the charge of concealment of income is not proved in respect of the cash credits. As regards the discrepancy in respect of the sum of Rs. 551 we are inclined to agree with the submission of the learned representative for the assessee that due to a clerical error there was a double debit in respect of purchase of three-wheeler cycle, On a careful consideration of the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that there is no material on record to show that the assessee is guilty of concealment of income or of furnishing of inaccurate particulars of such income. On the facts as stated above we are of the view that the assessee has discharged the onus of showing that it is not guilty of fraud or gross or wilful neglect so as to be penalised under the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c). We, therefore, cancel the penalty.
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1976 (5) TMI 57
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... ... ..... o or more members of it, whether they be members of different branches or of one and the same branch of the family, can have no legal existence as a separate independent unit, but all the members of a branch, or a sub-branch, can form a distinct and separate corporate unit within the larger corporate family and hold property as such. Such property will be joint family property of the members of the branch inter se, but will be separate property of that branch in relation to the larger family. The decision of the Madras High Court in the case of A. s. K. Rathinaswamy Nadar firm vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras(3), cited by the departmental representative is not relevant to the issue before us. That was a case of inclusion of salary paid to a partner whereas we are concerned in this case with payment of interest to the account of HUF. 7. For the foregoing reasons we uphold the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The appeal of the Revenue fails and is dismissed.
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1976 (5) TMI 56
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... ... ..... t the impugned investments were in facts made by the assessee family out of the funds belonging to it. It is true that the assessment has been made on the family including the impugned investments. But for the purpose of levy of penalty it has to be established that the funds of the assessee family were utilised for making the investments in the names of the minor sons of Sri Paneerselvam. There is no positive material to support the above position. The guilt of concealment of income is, therefore, not brought home to the assessee. At any rate the assessee is entitled to the benefit of doubt on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as set out above. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no justification for the levy of penalty. In this view of the matter we consider that it is not necessary for us to go into the legal issue raised by the assessee regarding the applicability of the amended provisions of s. 271(2). We cancel the penalty. The appeal is allowed.
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1976 (5) TMI 55
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... ... ..... the sale of the loose diamonds. We accordingly cancel the assessment of capital gains to tax in respect of the sale of loose diamonds. 5. After this order was dictated, Shri Reghavan, appearing for the Revenue, submitted that the latest ruling of the Supreme Court of India in the case of H.H. Maharaja Rano Hemant Singhji vs. CIT, Rajasthan, reported in (1976) 103 ITR 61 1976 CTR (SC) 188 would support his contention. The learned counsel for the assessee was also present. We heard his submission also. We find that the Supreme Court in that case decided the issue before it on the facts of that case. In that case the issue was about the leviability of capital gains derived by the sale of sovereigns, silver-bars etc., for a consideration of more than Rs. 20 lakhs. The Supreme Court on those facts held that the silver-bars or bullion could not be deemed to be effects meant for personal use. But the facts of the instant case are different as stated above. 6. The appeal is allowed.
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1976 (5) TMI 54
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... ... ..... alf of the assessee reliance was placed on the order of the AAC. 5. On a careful consideration of the rival submissions we see no reason to interfere with the order of the AAC. It is common ground that the main source of the assessee rsquo s income was share income from three firms. From the material on record it is evident that the impression of the assessee that her share income from the firms would not exceed Rs. 23,000 was bonafide. In view of such impression she did not file the estimate under s. 212(3A). The levy of penalty under s. 273(c) for failure to file an estimate of advance tax under s. 212(3A) is not automatic. It has to be seen whether the failure was without reasonable cause. On that facts of the case as set out above and as considered by the AAC we are satisfied that there was reasonable cause for the assessee rsquo s failure to furnish the estimate under s. 212(3A). We, therefore, uphold the order of the AAC. 6. The appeal of Revenue fails and is dismissed.
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1976 (5) TMI 53
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... ... ..... ld be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation has to be decided on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances and by exercising judicial discretion. It has been observed that even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from a bonafide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute-vide the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC). Applying the ratio of the above ruling to the instant case and analysing the facts of the case, we are of the view that the breach alleged is only venial and, therefore, this is not a fit case for the levy of penalty. We have, therefore, no hesitation in upholding the order of the AAC. 7. The appeal of the Revenue fails and is dismissed.
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1976 (5) TMI 42
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... ... ..... he discrepancies were in respect of few items. The appellants sent their explanation for some small variations. The goods have sometimes moved not because of the same but they were rejected by the purchaser and these goods were either replaced or rectified. The authorities have not taken the trouble of verifying the appellant rsquo s explanation wherever there had been variation. We have gone through the declaration and we are satisfied that the appellant rsquo s explanations are plausible. The other defects are also too minor. In fact the authorities themselves must have thought so because they were content to make a nominal addition. We do not find that the accounts have been sufficiently impugned. Under the circumstances, the appeals will have to be allowed and they are accordingly allowed. 6. In the result the appeals are allowed. The appellants are entitled to the relied of Rs. 4,852.85 for asst. yr. 1972-73 and Rs. 2,000 for 1973-74 at 3-1/2 per cent for both the years.
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1976 (5) TMI 40
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... ... ..... se of the X-ray machine by the Trust was definitely for the purposes of the trust namely medical relief therefore the payment of the price of the X-ray machine has to be classified as an expenditure for the purpose of the Trust. May be, it is a capital expenditure but, for that reason, it does not cease to be an application of the income of the trust for the purposes of the Trust. We derive support for the above proposition from the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Satya Vijay Patel Hindu Dharamshala Trust vs. Commissiner of Income-tax, Gujarat-I (4). 22. We thus, find that the Trust fulfils all the conditions stipulated in s.11 (1)(a). It derives income from property held under trust wholly for charitable purposes, and has during this year also utlized the said income, rather more than it, for the purposes of the Trust. The income of the Trust is therefore, exempt u/s.11. The assessment made is, in the circumstances, quashed and the appeal is partly allowed.
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1976 (5) TMI 39
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... ... ..... sregard of its obligation failed to disclose correct income. Thus the entirety of circumstances and the conduct of the assessee as discussed above, clearly go to show that there are preponderance of probabilities which go to show that there was no fraud or gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee in not returning the assessed income. In the case of D.V. Patel and Co. vs. CIT 100 ITR 524. The Hon rsquo ble High Court observed as under mdash Entire conduct of assessee right from inception to the filing of revised return, the burden lying on the assessee is discharged having regard to preponderance of probabilities. 32. Looking to the aforesaid facts, and the circumstances of the case, in our opinion, penalty is neither leviable under the main section viz. 271(1)(c) nor under Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, accordingly, the finding of the learned AAC could hardly be accepted. 33. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned penalty order is cancelled.
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1976 (5) TMI 38
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... ... ..... w is self evident now, therefore, the order of the ITO were clearly a mistake apparent from record and as such have rectified them under s. 154. 11. The contention of the learned Departmental Representative that the mistake is not patent from the record because it requires a good deal of debate to appreciate the controversy is also not correct, because once the issue is concluded by the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, no debate on the point is possible. The Lordships have, as pointed out by us above, clearly laid down the line upto which the IT Act has ascendancy and beyond which the Companies Act has its own jurisdiction. The zone in which our case lies is the zone of the companies law and inasmuchas in accordance with the said law, the demand raised by the ITO has not become payable within 35 days of the issue of the demand notice, it was not possible to charge interest under sub-s. (2) of s. 220. The appeals of assessee are, therefore, hereby allowed.
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1976 (5) TMI 37
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... ... ..... es of herself and her daughter and the addition of Rs. 8,296 to the total income of the assessee, as his income from undisclosed sources, was not warranted. Accordingly, we delete this addition. 23. Another contention which is common for the asst. yrs. 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70 is that the lower authorities were wrong in including, in the total income of the assessee, the interest received by Smt. Gulabrani and her daughter on the deposits of Rs. 10,000 each in their names. As we have held that these amounts have proceeded from funds belonging to Smt. Gulabrani, there is no justification for including the interest on such deposits in the total income of the assessee. Accordingly, there additions are deleted. 24. Another contention, relating to bad debts for the asst. yr. 1969-70, was not pressed before us at the time of hearing of the appeal. 25. In the result, I.T.A. Nos. 1700, 1701, 1702 and 1703 (Jab)/1972-73 are allowed and ITA No. 1704 (Jab)/1972-73 is partly allowed.
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1976 (5) TMI 36
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... ... ..... tage. There is no dispute that cement was supplied to the assessee by these two Departments and that such cement was utilised by the assessee in the execution of the works contracts undertaken by him. There is no material to establish that the assessee did in fact earn any profit out of these materials supplied by the two Departments for the purpose of executing their works contracts. On these facts, we are of the view that the ratio of the decisions of Madras and Kerala High Courts reported in (1973 92 ITR 90) CIT Madras vs. K.S. Guruswami Gounder and K.S. Krishnaraju and (1973 92 ITR 92) MP Alexander and Co. vs. CIT, respectively is directly applicable to the facts of the present case. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the Revenue that the cost of this material should, be included for the purpose of estimating the assessee rsquo s net profit from his contract business. We accordingly confirm the order of the AAC and dismiss the Department rsquo s appeal.
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1976 (5) TMI 35
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... ... ..... rs in respect of clubbing of interest under s. 64 of the Act was to be debited to and minor rsquo s and wife rsquo s account then the withdrawals by two partners would be less. If an over-all position is taken the other partners have credit to the extent of nearly Rs. 5 lakhs and the firm had made bank borrowings for other purpose and there is on thing to indicate that the borrowings were necessitated only because of the withdrawals by the partners. Since the withdrawals of the two partners during the year were less and overdrawals could be from the capital credits of the other partners or even from the profits of the concern there is no question of diversion of the borrowings from Bank to withdrawals of the partners. Considering the over-all position we agree with the AAC that the interest disallowance by the ITO was not proper and that the AAC was justified in deleting such disallowance to the extent of Rs. 34,091. 12. In the result, the revenue rsquo s appeal is dismissed.
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