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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 119 Records
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1977 (11) TMI 129
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... ... ..... ording to Mr. Joshi, under this sub-section, the Tribunal could pass whatever order it liked, provided such an order appeared to the Tribunal to be just and proper . We are not able to accept this submission. This sub-section was not enacted to confer upon the Tribunal the power to pass any order it liked, irrespective of the provisions of the said Act. The order which the Tribunal could pass in an appeal must be one which is conferred upon it by statute and within the four corners of the statute. What the Tribunal has done by this order is to exercise a power which has not been conferred upon it by the statute. The Tribunal has confused the powers it could exercise in assessment proceedings with those which it could exercise in an appeal in determination proceedings. For the reasons set out above, we answer the question submitted to us in the negative. The respondents will pay to the applicant the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the negative.
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1977 (11) TMI 128
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... ... ..... a particular rate per gallon of hypo water. Thus, all the incidence of the contracts between the respondents and the said firm show that this was a sale of liquid, namely, hypowater. The rate that was fixed depended upon the quantity of hypo water and did not depend upon the quantity of silver which could be extracted therefrom. What the respondents did with hypo water after they purchased it was their look out. For the reasons set out above, we answer question No. (1), as reframed by us, in the affirmative. In view of the statements made by Mr. Sanghavi with respect to questions Nos. (2) and (3), we decline to answer these two questions. Though questions Nos. (2) and (3) did not arise in respect of this assessment period, in its application for reference, the department also asked those two questions to be raised and submitted to us. In view of this fact, we think that a fair order for costs would be that each party should bear its own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (11) TMI 127
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... ... ..... and implemented. None the less, we feel that the said question needs reframing and, accordingly, with the consent of both sides, we reframe question No. (1) as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the sulphuric acid purchased by the respondent-company for refining crude kerosene belonging to Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited was used in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale? For the reasons set out above, we answer question No. (1), as reframed by us, in the affirmative. So far as question No. (2) is concerned, the respondents are entitled to the full set-off of Rs. 13,421.15 and not only to the extent of Rs. 1,101.40 as held by the Sales Tax Officer. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference which, taking into account the length of time which the hearing of this reference has taken, we fix at Rs. 500. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (11) TMI 126
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... ... ..... Madhya Pradesh v. Bharat Kala Bhandar, Khandwa 1971 28 S.T.C. 387 1971 M.P.L.J. 764. , where a Division Bench of this Court considered the impact of the present amendment and observed as under By the aforesaid amendment hessian cloth has been clearly exempted from entry No. 6 of Schedule I and consequently is not exempt from sales tax. Therefore, our answer to the question referred is that hessian is not covered by the term cloth used in item No. 6 of Schedule I to the State Act and, therefore, is not exempt from sales tax . Parties will bear their own costs in both these references. Consequently, in our opinion, hessian cloth could not be exempted from sales tax. Thus, our answer to the question referred to us is that hessian cloth does not fall with item No. 6 of Schedule I of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, and, as such, is not exempted from sales tax. 6.. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (11) TMI 125
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... ... ..... Counsel for the assessee raised a point that the assessee can be assessed to sales tax on the turnover or the value of the cones only if it is shown to be a dealer in cones. We do not find this point having been dealt with in the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal or of the Deputy Commissioner and the Sales Tax Officer. The memorandum of grounds of the assessee to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal seems to raise this ground. But as the matter has not been dealt with or considered in the Tribunal s order, we are unable to hold that there was a failure to decide any question of law, rather than a failure to urge the same. We have also some doubt whether it is necessary to establish that the assessee must be a dealer in cones before it can be assessed to sales tax in respect of its cost, on the facts disclosed in the present case. We are not, however, expressing our final view on the question. We dismiss these revision cases with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (11) TMI 124
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... ... ..... benefit of the reduced rate under section 11(2) would result in discrimination against a commission agent whose principal might be resident in the State and also against an authorised dealer purchasing goods for a branch outside the State. We are afraid, we cannot appreciate the relevance of the argument at all. In the first place, it must be remembered that the outside State principal also pays sales tax in his own State and hence the question of discrimination as such hardly arises. Secondly, what we are concerned with is the true and proper construction of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 11 of the said Act and not with the question of economic policy or the policy of taxation. In the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1)-in the negative. Question No. (2)-does not arise. Question No. (3)-in the affirmative. The respondent to pay to the applicants the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (11) TMI 123
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... ... ..... commodity from the ship itself, and hence the activity would amount to manufacture. The goods manufactured would be the scrap iron and steel obtained or manufactured by the dismantling and breaking up of the ship and the goods used in the manufacture of this scrap iron and steel would be the ship itself. The case is, therefore, clearly covered by the provisions of section 13(a) of the said Act and the purchase tax is payable by the respondents in respect of the purchase price attributable to the frame or hull or the body proper of the ship out of which scrap iron and steel and steel plates as well as wooden planks excluding the loose ones and rivets and bolts were obtained by the respondents. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative so far as the purchase of the frame or hull or the body proper of the ship Jalapratap is concerned. The respondents to pay to the applicant the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (11) TMI 122
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... ... ..... ay not be liable to pay tax under section 3. This sub-section was inserted in section 22 with effect from 15th July, 1962. This sub-section deals with a situation where a person has been registered as a dealer on his own application and thereafter it is found that he ought not to have been so registered. As we are of the view that the respondents are dealers within the meaning of the said expression in clause (11) of section 2 of the said Act, it must follow that they were rightly registered and sub-section (5A) of section 22 does not come into play at all. In the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) In the affirmative. Question No. (2) In the affirmative so far as purchases of materials other than scaffolding materials are concerned. Question No. (3) Does not arise. Looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs and the parties will bear and pay their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (11) TMI 121
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... ... ..... We are, with respect, unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Saurashtra High Court in the aforesaid case for the reasons which have been given by the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. India Cutlery Stores 1971 27 S.T.C. 548.We may point out that the Saurashtra High Court in the above case has placed reliance on the meaning given to the word fireworks in the Railway Rules and the Explosive Rules, 1940, whereas, in our view, it is not possible to place reliance on the meaning given to the said word in other statutes and rules, the object of which is quite different from that of the sales tax legislation. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. As far as the costs are concerned, in view of the fact that all the four references have been heard together, we direct the respondent to pay to the applicant an aggregate sum of Rs. 300 as the costs of all these references. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (11) TMI 120
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... ... ..... the law actually was even apart from the notification. This view appears to us erroneous. The notification has been issued under subsection (5) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act. A plain reading of subsection (5) of section 8 of that Act, as it then stood, makes it clear that but for the exemptions granted the transactions in question would be subject to the levy of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, there is nothing to show that the transactions of sale such as those in question before us would be exempt from the levy of sales tax either under the statute law or by reason of any international convention. The notification cannot, therefore, be regarded as clarificatory. In the result, we answer question No. (2) in the negative. As both these references have been argued together, we direct the respondents to pay to the applicant the costs of these references fixed at Rs. 300 in the aggregate. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (11) TMI 119
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... 633(1) may apply. In all such cases if a proceeding is anticipated, the officer concerned can move the High Court at an early stage and get relief in a suitable case. This has the great advantage of avoiding that other proceeding if the High Court grants relief. If that other proceeding has commenced then the officer concerned has no other course open but to apply to the relevant court under section 633(1) to say that whatever negligence, default, breach of trust, misfeasance, breach of duty or any other default complained of there may be, he, in fact, acted reasonably and honestly keeping in view the circumstances of the case. The court can then grant relief. Thus, the section as it were, operates in two stages. The High Court can grant anticipatory relief and if a case is actually initiated, only the court before which the complaint or trial is going on can grant relief. The preliminary objection has, therefore, to be accepted. I accordingly dismiss the petition. No costs.
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1977 (11) TMI 118
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up, Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1977 (11) TMI 117
Shares – Allotment of ... ... ... ... ..... , cycle, stock-in-trade, security and neon sign . The purchase price of these shares was mentioned as Rs. 1,45,354.58 which was not paid in cash but by conveying the property mentioned in Form 3 by giving possession. In the premises the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority rightly held that the purchase price of the property including the immovable assets of the partnership was a consideration for the allotted shares and that the particulars filed under sub-section (2) of section 75 in Form 3 would attract stamp duty as prescribed for a conveyance of immovable property . The question of the payment of transfer duty as surcharge payable under section 147 of the Corporation Act has already been answered by us in Stamp Duty Reference No. 1 of 1970. This aspect, therefore, is not required to be gone into over again. In view of our above discussion the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties, in the circumstances of the case, to bear their respective costs.
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1977 (11) TMI 114
Oppression and mismanagement –Power of Tribunal on application under sections 397 and 398 ... ... ... ... ..... mber has been elected and another member has still to be appointed. A further direction regarding this member will be given at a later stage. These two members will also have similar powers of nominating members to the various sub-committees. This question will, however, be subject to future directions. The result of this order which is wholly interim in nature would be that the executive committee would function without office bearers for the time being. As most of the executive powers under the articles are to be exercised by the paid secretary, I do not see much difficulty in enabling this association to run without office bearers for the time being. In case there is any difficulty in carrying into effect any rule, a further direction may be sought from the court. The application is decided accordingly, but noting that the orders are interim and on further application by any party may be altered or changed as may be in the interest of the association. No order as to costs.
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1977 (11) TMI 91
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... ... ..... nder s. 129, the principles of natural justice demand that a reasonable opportunity of being heard, as contemplated under s. 274(1), should be given to the assessee by the successor ITO before he imposes penalty on him. This opportunity has to be real and not a mere empty formality. Now, in the present case, no such opportunity was given by Sri S.N. Mishra, ITO, before passing the penalty orders. In fact, no action was taken for about two years after the service of the show cause notice issued by Sri P.S. Audhya and then the penalty order were passed in routine by Shri S.N. Mishra without hearing the assessee. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice and no reasonable opportunity of being heard was given by the ITO to the assessee before levying the penalties in question. We are, therefore, unable to confirm the same. The impugned orders are, accordingly, cancelled. 9. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1977 (11) TMI 90
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... ... ..... as guilty of fraud or gross or wilful neglect in returning its income. Our view derives support from the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. Harnam Singh and Co. (ITA No. 538/1968, (All). In that case, the High Court observed that the explanation to s. 271(1)(c) was not applicable as the enhancement in the assessee rsquo s income was made because the shown by him at 5 per cent was considered to be law by the ITO and a rate of profit of 12 per cent was applied. The High Court held that the provisions of Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) were not attracted because the profit enhancement could not be said to be due to any fraud or wilful neglect o the part of the assessee. In view of this authority, we conclude that penalty is not leviable on the assessee in this case. The AAC has given valid reasons for cancelling the penalty and there is no justification to interfere with his order. The same is, therefore, confirmed. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1977 (11) TMI 86
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... ... ..... rely says that the word signature shall include. It excludes the affixing of a mark. In India it is a well-known practice that when the executant of as document is illiterate he simply touches the pen wherewith some one else signs his name for him. Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal vs. Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal,(1950 S.C.J.364 at p.373 AIR 1950 SC 265). The affixing of the facsimile of a name either by the testator or by somebody else, is sufficient under the law. The word rsquo signing rsquo means the writing of the name of a person so that it may convey a distinct idea to somebody else that the writing indicates a particular individual whose signature or sign it purports to be. Even from the point of view of law or principle therefore, we cannot hold that the lady has not signed either in the partnership deed or in the applications. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order of the AAC which is upheld. The departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1977 (11) TMI 83
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... ... ..... proof that the assessee has intentionally failed to use the goods manufactured for the purpose for which they were purchased. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the assessee cannot be said to have committed an offence under s.10(d) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Hence, we find this point accordingly in favour of the assessee. The State Representative however has pointed out of a decision of this Tribunal in T.A. 973 and 974/75, dated 31st May, 1976 wherein penalty of similar nature was upheld. But even in that appeal it was held that mens rea was a necessary ingredient for levy of penalty under s.10 (d) in that appeal, but the default was under s.10 (d) only because of the High Court rsquo s judgement in T.C.840/71, dated 27th April, 1971 and the communications of the authorities. However, the above referred to appeals related to 72-73 and 73-74. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the orders of the lower authorities are set aside and the penalty levied is cancelled.
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1977 (11) TMI 81
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... ... ..... d his status as lsquo HUF rsquo and filed the returns of net wealth for the years 1959-60 to 1971-72. The wealth returned in these returns was accepted by the WTO but the status declared was changed as lsquo individual rsquo without any discussion while completing the assessments. In our opinion, this was a clear mistake apparent from the records and could be rectified u/s 35 of the WT Act. The fact that in the wealth-tax proceedings for the asst. yr. 1974-75, the status of the assessee has been taken as lsquo HUF rsquo by the WTO himself confirms the view that the assignment of status as lsquo individual rsquo in respect of these assessment years, as against the declared status of lsquo HUF rsquo by the assessee, is a mistake apparent from the records and could be rectified u/s 35 of the WT Act. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders and direct that the mistake regarding the status should be rectified u/s 35 of the WT Act, 1957. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1977 (11) TMI 80
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... ... ..... ld very well fulfil its liability of depositing the tax on self-assessment out of the same. It was submitted that paucity of fund could not be said to be a reasonable cause for not depositing the self-assessment tax. The authorities below were right in levying the penalty and the same should be confirmed. 4. In our opinion, the assessee deserves relief. We have seen the Bank accounts and have also seen the cash book. In our opinion, there is force in the submission of the assessee rsquo s Representative. The over-draft account in the bank is not unlimited. The sales of the assessee increased after September and the assessee made attempt rather, in fact, paid the entire amount due under s. 140A within 3 months beginning from September, 1975. In our opinion, the assessee has shown a reasonable cause for not depositing the self-assessment tax within 30 days of the filing of the return. We, accordingly, accept the said explanation and delete the penalty. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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