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Showing 41 to 60 of 132 Records
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1977 (3) TMI 143
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... ... ..... has no application to the case before us, because, as we have already pointed out, we have come to the conclusion that the rags and chindhis sold by the applicants are covered by the definition of the term cotton fabrics as given in item No. 12 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, on a plain and grammatical interpretation thereof irrespective of any notification issued by the Central Government. Moreover, it is not that the aforesaid notification is sought to be relied to enlarge the definition of the term cotton fabrics as contained in the said item No. 12, but the notification has been relied on merely to show how the said term was interpreted or understood by the Government itself. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The respondent to pay to the applicants the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. The fee of Rs. 100 paid by the applicants to be refunded to the applicants. Reference answered in the negative.
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1977 (3) TMI 142
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... ... ..... e were rejected and thereafter returned, the demand which was raised and the consequent penalty as imposed was improper. Since, in the instant case, there was a contract for sale of stirrup pumps according to the stipulation and the goods supplied were rejected on the ground that they were not in accordance with the stipulated specifications, there was no completed sale of the property as aforesaid and, as such, the rejected goods had not passed to the purchaser. In view of the fact that no property in the said goods was transferred or passed to the purchaser, there was no sale of goods within the meaning of the said Central Act or the Sale of Goods Act. Thus the points as argued by Mr. Sen succeed, so also the application and as such this rule is made absolute. There will, however, be no order for costs. Let appropriate writs be issued directing the respondents and each one of them not to give effect to the impugned orders or to act on the basis thereof. Rule made absolute.
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1977 (3) TMI 141
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... ... ..... rded as furniture within the meaning of the said expression in the said entry 56. In the aforesaid case before the Gujarat High Court, the storage rack did not contain any machinery at all and hence the decision in that case is of little assistance in the present case. In our view, and applying a common-sense point of view as to what is ordinarily regarded as furniture, an article such as the one before us, which contains elaborate machinery, cannot be regarded as furniture at all. In the result, we answer the two questions reframed as aforestated in the negative. As far as the costs are concerned, the learned counsel for the applicant has not pressed for the costs in view of the fact that the aforesaid questions have come up for the first time before this court. There will, therefore, be no order as to costs of this reference. The fee of Rs. 100 paid in each of the two reference applications by the applicant will be refunded to the applicant. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (3) TMI 140
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... ... ..... hout was that they had not committed any breach of the statutory provisions inasmuch as there was no restriction in clause (b) that the goods produced or manufactured should belong to the purchasing dealer himself. As pointed out earlier, this clause has been interpreted differently by different High Courts. It cannot, therefore, be said that in using the goods for a purpose different from that specified in the said clause by reason of placing upon that clause the same interpretation, which we and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana have done, the applicants had acted without reasonable excuse. For the reasons set out above, we answer the questions as reframed by us as follows Question No. (1) in the negative. Question No. (2) in the affirmative. The respondents will pay to the applicants the costs of these three references fixed in all at Rs. 300. The fee of Rs. 100 paid by the applicants in each of these references will be refunded to them. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (3) TMI 139
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... ... ..... y unsustainable. If the grounds on which the Sales Tax Officer had rejected the books of account are not sustainable, the Assistant Commissioner cannot remand the case to the Sales Tax Officer to find out whether there are other grounds for rejecting the books of account. In that view of the matter the order of remand by the Assistant Commissioner was wholly unjustifiable. It follows that the remand of the appeal by the Judge (Revisions) to the Assistant Commissioner to give more intelligible directions to the Sales Tax Officer was equally unsustainable. In the light of the aforesaid discussion our answer to the common question referred to us in these three cases is in favour of the assessee and is as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of the Judge (Revisions) remanding the case to the appellate authority was not justified. The assessee shall get his costs from the revenue in one set and Advocate s fee Rs.100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (3) TMI 138
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... ... ..... Lordships of the Supreme Court that when a photographer undertakes to take a photograph, develop the negative, or do other photographic work, and thereafter supply the prints to his clients, he cannot be said to enter into a contract for sale of goods. The contract on the contrary is for use of skill and labour by the photographer to bring about the desired result. It also held that the occupation of a photographer, except in so far as he sells the goods purchased by him is essentially one of skill and labour. In view of this pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the transaction in question, i.e., preparation of photographs and subsequent sales thereof of the prints are works contracts and not sales so as to attract liability to tax under the Act. In view of our above conclusion, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs.100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (3) TMI 137
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... ... ..... escaped assessment. Therefore, this decision does not apply in the light of the provision as it now stands. So, these decisions are of no use in considering the question on hand. The facts disclose that the assessing authority has determined the turnover that has escaped assessment and assessed the turnover so determined. In this particular case, the escaped assessment included not only the newly discovered turnover but also the original turnover, because no tax was then levied as it was below the taxable limit, Therefore, the view of the assessing officer is right and that of the Tribunal is wrong. Consequently, we allow these tax revision cases, set aside the decision of the Tribunal and restore the order of the assessing officer as confirmed by the appellate authority. Since there has been no authoritative pronouncement on this aspect of section 14(4), we direct the parties to bear their own costs of these tax cases. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each case. Petitions allowed.
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1977 (3) TMI 136
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... ... ..... gument of Dr. Pal. The meaning of any other remedy in article 226(3) of the Constitution of India may be ascertained and decided in an appropriate case in future. In the result, this application succeeds and the rule is made absolute. There will be a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of assessment dated 21st August, 1968, and the order dated 1st June, 1968, and a writ in the nature of prohibition restraining the respondents from giving effect to the said order and the notice dated 5th June, 1968, and all proceedings thereunder for the period from 1st April, 1962, to 31st March, 1963, and for the period from 1st April, 1967, to 31st March, 1968. The matter will now go back to the respondents to be decided according to law in the light of my observations indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. The operation of this order is stayed for a period of four weeks from date. Any further extension must be obtained from the appeal court. Petition allowed.
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1977 (3) TMI 135
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... ... ..... usal of the entry will show that only two items, which had been subjected to a different manufacturing process have been included, namely, coated board and carbon paper , thereby showing that other kinds of papers which had been subjected to some other process will not fall within the entry. We are unable to accept this contention. The very fact that coated board has been included in the entry will clearly show that coated paper should also have been intended to be included because the legislature when it thought that coated board will be covered by the expression paper cannot be imputed to have thought that coated paper will not be covered by the entry paper, all sorts . We are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the PVC coated paper in the present case falls within entry 117 of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Consequently, the tax revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (3) TMI 134
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... ... ..... the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Prakash Trading Co. 1972 30 S.T.C. 348 (S.C.). Thus, an expression generally used to describe a common article of merchandise and occurring in a statute of general application cannot be interpreted to include a generally unknown, uncommon article used for a wholly different purpose merely because both the uncommon and common articles are made alike. I am, therefore, of the view that cotton/woollen dryer felts used in the manufacture of paper are not included in the expression textiles occurring in item 30 of Schedule B of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. I agree with A. S. Bains, J., that the reference should be answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. I do not think it is necessary to refer to the several cases cited at the Bar though I acknowledge that I have derived considerable assistance from them, particularly, State of Tamil Nadu v. East India Rubber Works 1974 33 S.T.C. 399. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (3) TMI 133
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... ... ..... om tax. It is not in dispute that the goods which were the subjectmatter before the Tribunal were dry-cells used in hearing-aids. Equally, it is not in dispute that hearing-aids could not be made use of without the cells. Hence there can be no difficulty in characterising such sales, in such a context, as sales of accessories of hearing-aids. Consequently, there is no ground to interfere with the order of the Tribunal and the tax revision petition is therefore dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (3) TMI 132
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... ... ..... s of Legislature were violated, we are of the view that sub-section (5) of section 26 having regard to the purposes for which it is made, and in the context in which it occurs, cannot be regarded as mandatory. Perhaps the question of parliamentary control of the executive is also largely a political question, in that it is for the legislature to admonish or punish the erring Ministers and not for the judiciary to invalidate the subordinate legislation on the ground of non-laying . The judiciary may enter the picture only if the legislature prescribes the consequence of non-laying and not otherwise. Whatever it is, we are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court whatever our own personal inclinations are likely to lead us. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are unable to hold that the non-laying of the Rules before the legislature invalidated the Rules. The result of the above discussion is that all the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (3) TMI 131
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... ... ..... y for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and a penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. It is significant that the penalty in that case was imposed on the dealer in addition to the tax, for failure to register itself as a dealer, and thus it imposed a distinct and separate liability on the dealer. As we have already pointed out, such a penalty cannot be compared with the penalty of forfeiture provided under section 37(1) of the said Act, which merely deprives the dealer, as it were, of a gain wrongly made by him. In the result, we answer question No. (1) referred to us in the affirmative and question No. (2) in the negative. The applicants to pay to the respondent the costs of these two references fixed at Rs. 300 in all. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (3) TMI 130
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... ... ..... e inquiry, if no fresh facts are placed before the Tribunal giving the later decision, and if the Tribunal giving the earlier decision had taken into consideration all material evidence. A Tribunal, like the Appellate Tribunal, should be extremely slow to depart from a finding given by an earlier Tribunal. In our view, far from supporting the contention of Mr. Joshi, this decision shows not that the assessees would be debarred from taking up before the Tribunal a contention, which had been rejected by the Tribunal in connection with the assessment of earlier years, but that the Tribunal would be slow to depart from its earlier view. In view of what we have stated earlier, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The respondent to pay to the applicants the costs of these references fixed in the aggregate at Rs. 300. The fee of Rs. 100 paid by the applicants in each of these three references shall be refunded to the applicants. Reference answered in the negative.
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1977 (3) TMI 129
TURNOVER — CENTRAL SALES TAX — REJECTION AND RETURN OF GOODS — DISTINCTION — APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 8A(1)(B), CENTRAL ACT, TO REJECTED GOODS — SALE PRICE OF REJECTED GOODS — WHETHER TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING TURNOVER — DEFINITION OF TURNOVER — PURPOSE OF CONJUNCTION AND BETWEEN SALE PRICES RECEIVED AND RECEIVABLE — CENTRAL SALES TAX (REGISTRATION AND TURNOVER) RULES, 1957, RULE 11(2).
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1977 (3) TMI 128
Whether the sales made to a dealer who has applied for registration under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, before his application is allowed, are to be treated as sales to an unregistered dealer or registered dealer, when the registration is effected from the date of the application?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The assessees were entitled to the deduction under section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act in respect of the sales made by them to the purchasing dealer during the whole of the quarter ending March 31, 1966. The High Court was, therefore, right in determining the question posed, in favour of the assessees and against the revenue.
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1977 (3) TMI 127
Whether green ginger falls within the category of goods described as "vegetables, green or dried, commonly known as 'sabji, tarkari or sak' " in item 6 of Schedule I to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Green ginger is included within the meaning of the words "vegetables-commonly known as 'sabji, tarkari or sak' " in item 6 of Schedule I and its sales must be held to be exempt from tax under section 6 of the Act.
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1977 (3) TMI 122
Whether, under the circumstances of the case and under the terms of the contract, the supply of shutters and iron gates worth Rs. 1,08,633.08 was sale or amounted to works contract?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The contract in the present case was a works contract and the transaction was, therefore, not exigible to tax. The High Court was in error in holding that the assessee was liable to pay tax on the sale proceeds of the contract.
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1977 (3) TMI 116
Whether or not hume pipes which are the subject-matter of the present case amount to "sanitary fittings" as contemplated by a notification issued by the Government under the U.P. Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As there was absolutely no material before the Sales Tax Officer to show that any of the hume pipes manufactured and sold by the respondent were meant for use in lavatories, urinals or bath-rooms and, in fact, the material was used entirely the other way, the Sales Tax Officer was not at all justified in holding that they were sanitary fittings. Of course, we must make it clear that if at any time the material produced before the sales tax authorities establishes that in a given case the hume pipes were meant for use in a bath-room, lavatory, urinal, etc., then the notification of the Government would be attracted and the assessee must be liable to be taxed at the rate of 7 per cent.
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1977 (3) TMI 97
Winding up – Power of tribunal to stay winding-up, Power to apply to court to have questions determined or powers exercised
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