Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 132 Records
-
1977 (3) TMI 52
... ... ... ... ..... given our due consideration to the rival submissions and are of the opinion that the authorities below were not justified in including the sum of Rs. 12,178 in the assessment for the asst. yr. 1970-71 merely because accidents took place during the relevant previous year and the assessee had filed claim with the insurance company during the year. The claim filed with the insurance company gave rise to an inchoate right to the assessee to receive the amount of compensation. Therefore, even when the assessee had been maintaining the accounts following the mercantile system it was correct not to incorporate in its accounts the probable amount of compensation which might be given to the assessee as a result of the two accidents to the bus during in the relevant previous year. We fully agree with the assessee s learned counsel that the amount in dispute is assessable in the asst. yr. 1971-72. In these circumstances, we delete the addition of Rs. 12,178 from the instant assessment.
-
1977 (3) TMI 51
... ... ... ... ..... f the assessee s Gratuity Fund the contributions were being made by the assessee without reference to an actuary and such contributions were being allowed for assessment purposes secondly whatever excess payments might have been made in this year would have been set by a corresponding reduction in the actuarial valuation for the subsequent year and thirdly, there is the authority of the Supreme Court (vide Calcutta Co ltd vs. CIT west Bengal (3) for the view that, where the method of accounting is mercantile, it is permissible to allow an accrued liability on an estimated basis. In the circumstances particularly as the assessee s bona fide in providing for a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 are not in doubt, we are unable to uphold the disallowance in question. This ground is accordingly decided in the assessee s favour. 7. In the result, the assessee s appeal (I.T.A. No. 1067/Bang./1975-76) is allowed in full while the departmental appeal (I.T.A. No. 81/Bang/1976-77) is allowed in part.
-
1977 (3) TMI 50
... ... ... ... ..... ale. The shop is situated on the ground floor of a three storeyed building. Only the middle walls were removed and a big hall was made. The roof and the floor remained as they were. It was disputed that the assessee had dismantled this shop and reconstructed it. After hearing the parties, we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the Appellate assistant commissioner. As noted above the shop is on the ground floor of a three storeyed building and it could not have been dismantled and reconstructed as stated by the Income -tax Officer the roof and the floor of the shop remained as they were. Only the middle walls were removed and it has been converted in to a big hall. All this has been done to facilitate the carrying on the business and hence no asset of enduring nature has been created. It is merely revenue expenditure which is allowable under s. 37 and the view taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is entirely correct. 4. In the result the appeal is dismissed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 49
Metal containers - Value of tikklies includible ... ... ... ... ..... vant period is much larger than the number of containers. 3. Item 46 CET refers to containers not otherwise specified the term containers having the meaning assigned to it in Item 27, CET. The explanation to Item 27, CET describes containers as those whether in assembled or unassembled condition. When a tin and tikkly are sold together they could be regarded as container in an unassembled condition, the tikkly being used to close the month of the container. Thus, when they are cleared together either physically or constructively they should be assessable to duty on the total value of the container including that of the tikkly.
-
1977 (3) TMI 48
Horn - Value of bracket not to be included ... ... ... ... ..... means an integral part of the horn. Government of India observe that the horn is complete even without a bracket. The size and shape of a bracket depends upon the place where the horn is to be fitted and not on the horn itself. Thus, the value of the bracket is not to be included in the assessable value of the horn. The revision application is accordingly allowed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 47
Paper - Colouring of paper does not amount to manufacture -Flint paper not liable to duty ... ... ... ... ..... per. We are, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. Vakharia that all other kinds of paper would take in paper which has already been manufactured and on which either printing is done or colouring is done. We, therefore, hold that the respondents erred in invoking sub-item (4) of Tariff Item 17 in demanding the payment of excise duty. It is brought to our notice by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the goods in question had already suffered excise duty and the manufacturer had paid the excise duty payable on the goods sold to the petitioner. This statement made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is not denied by Mr. Vakharia, learned Counsel for the respondents. There is no separate item for payment of excise duty on dint paper. Therefore, the petitioner is not liable for payment of excise duty on the flint paper. 5. We therefore quash the impugned notices and the impugned orders and allow this writ petition and make the Rule absolute with no order as to costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 46
Countervailing duty - Criteria for classification - Aluminium rods ... ... ... ... ..... tion once made shall hold good for the purposes of both the sections, it must be held that the provisions of each of those two sections have to be read without reference to the other, especially when each is self-contained and there is no difficulty in the matter of its interpretation when read all by itself. Although the goods imported by the company were thus held to fall within the ambit of Item 70 (1) of the First Schedule to the Tariff Act and were therefore chargeable to duties of customs thereunder, for the purpose of Section 2A of the Tariff Act, reference has to be made only to the First Schedule to the Excise Act wherein contained in Item 27 which declares aluminium rods (a description to which the goods imported by the company fully answer) as goods liable to excise duty and if that be so, the objection raised by the company to the countervailing duty must be held to be untenable. 4. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed but with no order as to costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 45
Art Silk Fabrics - Tariff - Item 20 ... ... ... ... ..... e is no violation of the condition laid down in the Notification No. 106/70 and 107/70. 3. The condition for availing the exemption provided under Notification No. 106/70 and 107/70, dated 1-5-1970 is that the processing factory should clear the goods without cutting into fents, rags, chindies or any portion of these fabrics whether damaged or not. The expression any portion of these fabrics. whether damaged or not prohibits any cutting of the processed fabrics. It is an admitted fact in this case that the fabrics were cut according to the size of the printing machine. In view of the above facts the petitioners are not eligible for the exemption provided under the said notifications. The Revision Application is, therefore, rejected.
-
1977 (3) TMI 44
Double payment of excise duty ... ... ... ... ..... R-8 for the same period and deposited the amount in the State Bank of India, Ladwa. Meanwhile the Agent had also deposited the duty in the State Bank of India, Ambala City. As duty was deposited twice, the petitioner were under the impression that duty was deposited for a second time, it will be automatically refunded by the Department. As this was not done they preferred a refund claim on 21-6-1977 and the claim was rejected by the Assistant Collector as time barred under rule 11, Central Excise Rules, 1944 as duty was deposited on 19-3-1977 whereas the refund claim was received on 21-6-1977. The petitioners have submitted that as the deposit of duty for the second time was done deliberately as a precautionary measure, the payment will not be covered under the scope of rule 11 which talks of payment due to inadvertance, error or misconstruction. 3. Government of India finds that the above plea of the petitioners is acceptable. The revision application is accordingly allowed.
-
1977 (3) TMI 43
Chindies and rage are cotton fabrics ... ... ... ... ..... Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or the Rules made thereunder. In our view, this decision has no application to the case before us, because, as we have already pointed out, we have come to the conclusion that the rags and chindies sold by the applicants are covered by the definition of the term cotton fabrics as given in Item No. 12 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, on a plain and grammatical interpretation thereof irrespective of any Notification issued by the Central Government. Moreover, it is sought to be relied to enlarge the definition of the term cotton fabrics as contained in the said Item No. 12, but the Notification has been relied on merely to show how the said term was interpreted or understood by the Government itself. 9. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The respondent to pay to the applicants the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300/-. The fee of Rs. 100/- paid by the applicants to the applicants.
-
1977 (3) TMI 42
Advance Tax, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Penal Interest ... ... ... ... ..... payable by the Income-tax Officer is not correct. In the instant case before us there is no doubt that the assessee had preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in which the principal ground of attack against the charge of penal interest levied against it was that the assessee-company being a non-resident company was not liable to be assessed to advance tax at all inasmuch as its income was under one or the other head falling under section 18 of the Act and was outside the purview of section 18A of the Act. In other words, it was a clear case of an assessee denying its liability to be assessed under this Act and as such the appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was competent under section 30(1) of the 1922 Act. The Tribunal s view was, therefore, correct. Having regard to the above discussion, the first question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Revenue will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
-
1977 (3) TMI 41
Income Tax, Original Order ... ... ... ... ..... essed by counsel for the revenue, the guidelines to be applied in reckoning the extent of the property which can be said to be reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case . Discretion counsels us to leave the officer to his own resources, and to correct him where he is shown to be wrong. We are clear that the principle stated by the Tribunal that having evaluated the market value of the property, the income cannot thereafter be taken into account for assessing the gift-tax is correct on principle. We do not think, on the facts of this case, any further guidelines or principles by way of answer to the question is called for. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the court will be communicated to the Tribunal as required by law.
-
1977 (3) TMI 40
Actual Cost, Cost Of Acquisition ... ... ... ... ..... f its order points out as follows In the instant case, the department s case is not that it (the amount of Rs. 48,342) will not go to the actual cost. Consequently, the case of the department before the Tribunal was that this sum of Rs. 48,342 will go into the actual cost as contemplate in section 43(1). That was also the case before us. Pursuant to section 33, the assessee will be entitled to development rebate on the actual cost as defined in section 43(1) which, admittedly, included this sum of Rs. 48,342. In view of this obvious position, having regard to the express provisions contained in section 43A(2), it is rather difficult to appreciate as to how the department contended before the Tribunal that the actual cost should not be computed as provided for in section 43(1). Under these circumstances, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to its costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
-
1977 (3) TMI 39
Assessment Year, Change Of Law, Law Applicable ... ... ... ... ..... is quite unnecessary to go into this region. Even accepting the view contended for by counsel for the revenue that, as expounded in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gujarat Travancore Agency 1976 103 ITR 149 (Ker) FB , a penalty imposed is only an additional tax, there is enough warrant for the proposition, as evidenced by the decisions, to which we have referred earlier, that the terminal for the imposition of a penalty is something different from the terminal for the imposition of a tax in assessment proceedings. As this aspect of the matter has not been gone into by the Appellate Tribunal, we answer the question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Tribunal will pass an order on the appeals before it in the light of the answer made by us to the question of law referred. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the court will be communicated to the Tribunal as required by law. No order as to costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 38
Income Tax Authorities, Legal Representative, Powers Of Commissioner, Recovery Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... -opposition of the opposite party No. 2 over which there is no dispute that the Income-tax Officer, D Ward, District IV(3), Calcutta, in compliance with the directions contained in the impugned judgment of the Commissioner to the extent permissible in law issued demand notices under section 156 on the remaining three legal heirs of the deceased being opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 before us, as also notices under section 226(3) on the aforesaid firms. Thereafter, in view of the default, three certificates against the said opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 dated September 4 and 5, 1972, have been issued by the Income-tax Officer to the said Tax Recovery Officer in respect of tax due on the basis of the disclosure. The opposite parties before us, needless to mention, will be at liberty to take steps in respect thereof, in accordance with law on grounds urged before us and also on grounds as may be available to them and we express no opinion in respect thereof. G. N. RAY J.---I agree.
-
1977 (3) TMI 37
Capital Receipt, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... styled the payment as interest, it was indeed an ex gratia payment by way of compensation worked out through the medium of interest and, therefore, we are of the view that the amount could not be treated as income exigible to tax. Our answer to the first question referred to this court would, therefore, be On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 2,77,692 awarded to the assessee as interest has been wrongly held to be revenue receipt. The second question as framed arose only if the first question was answered in the affirmative, namely, if we found that it was revenue receipt, the second question fell for answer. In view of our finding that the amount is not a revenue receipt, the second question does not arise for answer and we do not think it would be appropriate for us to examine the matter for rendering an answer. Accordingly, we decline to answer the question. We direct parties to bear their respective costs of their reference. PANDA J.-I agree.
-
1977 (3) TMI 36
High Court, Minor Admitted To Benefits Of Partnership, Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... e whatever is paid out or away, there is no reason why payments made for the purchase of stock-in-trade or raw materials should not be regarded as expenditure for purposes of section 40A(3) of the Act. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by this court in U.P. Hardware Stores case 1976 104 ITR 664 (All) and by the Orissa High Court in Sajowanlal Jaiswal s case 1976 103 ITR 706 (Orissa). Shri Sharma has not been able to persuade us to accept his contention that the decision of this court in U.P. Hardware Stores case 1976 104 ITR 664 (All) requires reconsideration. Hence, neither of the two grounds on which Shri Sharma contended that the petitioner should be permitted to bypass the remedies available under the Act and to approach this court directly by means of a writ petition, has any substance. In the result, we dismiss this petition. The interim order made by this court is vacated. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 35
Assessment Proceedings, Income Tax, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... 3) of section 19 of the Act has not to be limited to the year of assessment as has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, the present case would be governed by the principles laid down by this court in the above decisions. We may mention that section 19 of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act corresponds to section 16 of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act and section 30 of the Assam Act corresponds to section 35 of the Tamil Nadu Act. In view of these decisions, we are clearly of the opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal is erroneous and the assessments to tax made by the authorities in respect of the five years referred to above on the basis of the voluntary returns filed by the respondent on January 19, 1969, were legal and were fully in accordance with law. In the result, the tax revision petitions are allowed. The orders of the Tribunal are set aside and those of the assessing authorities are restored. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 34
Agricultural Income Tax, Insurance Premia, Powers Of Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... in this case is that not only the assessee had acquiesced in the order of assessment but he did not take any steps to have that portion of the order revised or modified. But the case on hand is entirely different. In view of the above, I hold that the impugned order is liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed and the matter will stand remitted to the revisional authority for reassessment in the light of the observations made above. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. In W.Ps. Nos. 1449 of 1974 and 1450 of 1974, the facts are identical as those of W.P. No. 1448 of 1974, excepting that they relate to a different assessee, the assessment year being the same, viz., 1971-72. Applying my judgment in W.P. No. 1448 of 1974, these writ petitions will stand allowed and the matter will stand remitted to the revisional authority for re-assessment in the light of the observations made in W.P. No. 1448 of 1974. However, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1977 (3) TMI 33
Agricultural Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... , in effect, would mean substitution of the original authority which cannot be permitted under law. Strictly speaking, there is nothing for revision, since the point relating to the exemption on the basis of the deed of trust was never even urged before the original authority. In effect and substance what the petitioner seeks is the help of the department to correct his mistakes, in which case the original authority alone should have been approached for exemption under section 4(b). Such a power cannot be exercised under the revisional jurisdiction. However, if and when such an application for exemption is filed before the original authority, that will be considered on merits, uninfluenced by the dismissal of the writ petition. The time taken during the pendency of the writ petition will also be excluded with regard to the computation of limitation, if any, in filing the application under section 4(b). With this observation, the writ petitions will stand dismissed. No costs.
|