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Showing 101 to 120 of 145 Records
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1978 (11) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, In Part ... ... ... ... ..... sequently. Mr. Subramaniam, learned counsel for the accountable person, at one stage of his argument sought to contend that the subject-matter of the gift in the present case was not cash, but only an actionable claim. We are unable to accept this argument. As we have pointed out already, in the case of a proprietary concern, the owner of the business is exclusively and wholly entitled to all the assets and liabilities of the business and, therefore, when he debits his capital account, it is not as if he is creating a liability as against him in favour of some other person, but he only draws his own money from the business and, therefore, the conception of actionable claim will be foreign to such a situation. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal committed an error and we answer the question referred to this court in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (Rs. five hundred only).
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1978 (11) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Collaboration Agreement, Foreign Company, Setting Up ... ... ... ... ..... glish company but a composite payment for all the services rendered and information furnished by the English company to the assessee-company in the setting up of the factory as well as the manufacture of the licensed products in that factory. In view of these features present in the case, we are clearly of the opinion that the answer to the question referred to this court must be in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. We have not referred to any decided cases, because in reply to the specific question put to the learned counsel for the assessee-company, the learned counsel stated that there is no direct decision of any court on an agreement similar to the one in the present case and dealing with the claim to apportion the payment partly as capital and partly as revenue. The department will be entitled to its costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred only).
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1978 (11) TMI 43 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Attachment Order, High Denomination Notes, Provisional Attachment ... ... ... ... ..... t not being valid, it is obvious that a mandamus must go to the State Bank of India, Surat branch, directing them to pay the amount of Rs. 56,000 to the newly opened savings bank account of the petitioner with the Bank of Baroda, Vania Sheri branch, Surat. However, in order to see that no complications may arise in future and in order to see that proper steps at all levels can be taken, the Bank of Baroda, Vania Sheri branch, Surat, is directed, not to allow the petitioner to operate as against this amount of Rs. 56,000 before January 1, 1979. Miss Shah, on behalf of the petitioner, undertakes that the petitioner will not operate upon the newly opened savings bank account so far as the amount of Rs. 56,000 is concerned before January 1, 1979. This Special Civil Application is, therefore, allowed and orders are made accordingly. Rule made absolute. There will be no orders as to costs. Intimation of the present order to be sent to the Bank of Baroda, Vania Sheri branch, Surat.
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1978 (11) TMI 42 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Remuneration Paid To Directors ... ... ... ... ..... remuneration or salary. And it is not permissible to disallow any part of their remuneration or salary by simply quoting the language of the section and without stating the facts and reasons in support thereof. In rejecting the claim, the Appellate Tribunal has, inter alia, said We are not concerned with the experience of the directors and it said so without giving any reason whatsoever. It is elementary that a businessman is benefited by the service of the experienced directors or employees. The employees, however, do not manage the affairs of the company. They merely do what they are asked to do, whereas the directors run the business of the company. If the directors are experienced in business, their experience cannot be ignored at all in considering the legitimate business needs of the company. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We, however, do not propose to make any order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 41 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Income Tax, Retrenchment Compensation, Wholly And Exclusively ... ... ... ... ..... ch the provisions relating to annuity deposit were omitted from the I.T. Act, 1961, in our opinion, should be enforced even after that date notwithstanding the said omission. If we view the said omission with reference to s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, s. 6 will be attracted unless there is an intention to the contrary. Having perused the provisions referred to by the learned counsel in support of his proposition, we are unable to see any intention to the contrary so as to exclude the operation of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. In the present case, the liability to pay the annuity deposit is beyond dispute and merely on account of subsequent omissions in the provisions of s. 280C it cannot be said that the liability once validly accrued could not be enforced in view of the subsequent amendment which came into force from April 1, 1967. We, therefore, do not see any justification to invoke our extraordinary jurisdiction. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed summarily.
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1978 (11) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... biguous the recitals would have no effect (see Odger s Construction of Deeds and Statutes, 5th Edn., page 150). In the instant case, the signatures are those of individuals signing for themselves and described as partners. Learned counsel for the assessee also drew our attention to the provisions of s. 184(7) of the I.T. Act, 1961. It was submitted by him that the said section did not confer any jurisdiction on the ITO to refuse renewal of registration. He pointed out that all the conditions laid down in the said section having been duly satisfied by the assessee, the ITO had no other alternative but to grant registration. As we have decided the questions on merits, it is not necessary for us to deal further with this aspect of the matter. To answer the question as framed it is also not necessary for us to go into that aspect. We answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 39 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Application For Extension ... ... ... ... ..... it is the plain language of s. 139(4) read with s. 139(1)(ii) that has been applied by the learned judges in these cases. That the consequence of reading it in that manner would be to render a part of the section ineffective or inoperative has evidently been not sufficiently appreciated by the learned judges. I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in ITO v. Secunderabad Tin Industries 1978 113 ITR 1, that of the Gauhati High Court in Ganesh Das Sreeram v. ITO 1974 93 ITR 19, that of the Karnataka High Court in Indian Telephone Industries Co-op. Socy. Ltd. v. ITO 1972 86 ITR 566, that of the Orissa High Court in Biswanath Ghosh v. ITO 1974 95 ITR 372 and that of the High Court of Gujarat in Chhotalal and Co. v. ITO 1976 105 ITR 230. In this view, I think that there is no reason to interfere with the order of the ITO. The levy of interest is not assailable. The Original petition fails. It is dismissed. No costs.
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1978 (11) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Application For Registration, Registered Firm, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... y of the said period when the assessee has sufficient cause for not presenting its appeal within time. The expression order of assessment in s. 34(3), in our view, does not include an order refusing registration under s. 23(4). In the instant case, it appears, the ITO, when he made the assessment, did not exercise his discretion under s. 23(4) of the Act. This is also the finding of the Tribunal. When the ITO was thereafter directed by the AAC to consider the assessee s application under s. 26A de novo, in our view, it was open to the ITO also to exercise his discretion under s. 23(4). An order refusing renewal of registration under s. 23(4) is, in our opinion, separate from the assessment made thereunder and also separate from an order passed under s. 26A and such orders can be passed simultaneously or separately. For the above reasons, we answer question No. 2 in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment Order ... ... ... ... ..... Act 1979 117 ITR 276 (All). In that case, it was held that any finding recorded by the ITO while passing an assessment order against the firm is not binding on other persons and that the assessment order has no material bearing on the claim of the persons other than the firm. These persons were undoubtedly persons interested within the meaning of sub-ss. (11) and (12) of s. 132 because they were claiming to be the owners of some of the assets which had been seized at the search. They were entitled to establish their claims. They were also entitled to a finding on their claims at the hands of the Commissioner. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated May 2, 1978, is quashed. The matter is remitted to the Commissioner as the not ified authority to decide the applications made by the objectors under s. 132(11) of the Act afresh and in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations made above. The petitioners will be entitled to costs.
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1978 (11) TMI 36 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Law Applicable ... ... ... ... ..... to s. 271 (1) of the Act was added, that the ITO became satisfied of the concealment. It has further been held that the amendment by which the Expln. to s. 271(1) was introduced only prescribed a rule of evidence relating to the burden of proof and that this provision is purely procedural in nature and, therefore, irrespective of the date on which the offence was committed this provision will be attracted if the proceeding for punishing the offender was pending on the date when it came into force. For the reasons stated above, I hold that the Income-tax Tribunal was correct in its decision and in imposing a minimum penalty for each of the two assessment years in question by applying the law which was in force at the time of filing the original return. The question referred to this court is accordingly answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As the assessee has succeeded he is entitled to costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 200. S. SARWAR ALI J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 35 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Income Returned ... ... ... ... ..... decision has clearly observed that when the Expln. to s. 271(1)(c) of the Act is attracted to a case, the onus lies primarily upon the assessee to prove that the disparity between the income returned and the income assessed, the former being less than 80 per cent. of the latter, did not arise from any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on his part. It is not for the department in such a case to prove that the disparity was in fact occasioned by any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee. Such being the position in law the question must be answered in favour of the department, that is to say, that the order of the Tribunal deleting penalty imposed upon the assessee in terms of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act was not in accordance with law. Since, however, the Tribunal has not dealt with the merits of the assessee s appeals against the levy of penalty it may now do so. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. VISHWANATH MISHRA J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Penalty Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal held that notice was essential when there was a change in the officer and, therefore, the imposition of penalty could not be upheld. It was in respect of this decision that the above question is now sought to be referred to this court. Sri Rama Rao, learned standing counsel for the revenue, tries to distinguish the above decision of this court but we find that it is on all fours. Further we are in full agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench there because in our view without a fresh notice by the succeeding officer, the assessee may not be able to know that there was a change in the officer and that thereby an occasion has arisen for him to exercise the right which is conferred on him under the proviso to s. 129. Since the matter is covered by a binding decision, we refuse to call for a statement and direct the Tribunal to refer the question to this court. In the result, all the five wealth-tax cases are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (11) TMI 33 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Interest Paid By Partner, Partner's Share In Income Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... eductible expenditure on the ground that M/s. Soorajmull Nagarmull had utilised this amount for payment of its taxes. The AAC dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee, but the Appellate Tribunal has allowed the claim of the assessee. Section 67(3) of the Act says that any interest paid by a partner on the capital borrowed by him for the purpose of investment in the firm shall, in computing his income chargeable under the head Profits and gains of business or profession in respect of his share in the income of the firm, be deducted from the share. In view of this express provision of the section, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the section does not stipulate that the interest will not be admissible if the amount given to the firm was not used by the firm for the purpose of its business. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... d decisions of the Supreme Court and also the decision of this court in the case of Vishnu Sugar Mills Ltd. v. CIT 1978 113 ITR 583 (Cal) and the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Mihir Textiles Ltd. 1976 104 ITR 167, we overrule his argument. He further argues that this amount is an allowable deduction under s. 28(i) of the Act, for, according to him, it is a commercial loss suffered by the assessee in the course of carrying on his business. But an infraction of the law is not a normal incident of the business and a penalty paid for an infraction of law is not a business loss in the commercial sense and is not a deductible expenditure under s. 28(i) of the I.T. Act, 1961, in view of the aforesaid decisions of this court and the Gujarat High Court including the observation of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. In the premises, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 31 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act ... ... ... ... ..... E.D. Act. Exhibit P-3, is no doubt, a communication by the Board, but it does not state the reasons for declining the petitioner s request. Section 69 of the Act enables a party to approach the Board with an application to seek composition of all or any of the duties payable in respect of the property or interest of the estate. It being a statutory duty, that is imposed under s. 69, refusal to exercise the duty by the Board must be for reasons relevant under s. 69. Such reasons have to be reflected in the order to be passed by the Board. In other words, it must be a speaking order, and must speak on matters relevant for refusal under s. 69. Exhibit P-3 does not mention the reasons but it merely says that the Board declines to determine the question. Such an order will not satisfy the requirements of s. 69. Therefore, Ex. P-3 is quashed and the CBDT is directed to look into the matter afresh and pass appropriate orders. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (11) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Additional Super Tax, Bona Fide, Commercial Profit, Incentive Bonus, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ---- It has been found by the Tribunal that the balance amount was utilised by the assessee in payment of income-tax subsequently. The Tribunal also considered the settlement between the assessee and the CIT including the aforesaid table and came to the conclusion that the incentive bonus provided during the years was not a bona fide liability. In view of the figures shown in the aforesaid table, in our opinion, the Tribunal is fully justified in coming to the aforesaid conclusion on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. As already stated, the assessee has not challenged the main finding of the Tribunal that the liability for incentive bonus was not bona fide. Therefore, the provisions made by the assessee cannot be taken into consideration in calculating the commercial profits for the purpose of s. 23A(1) of the Indian I.T. Act. In the premises, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Actual Cost, Agricultural Income Tax Act, Income Tax Rules, Market Value, Previous Year, Written Down Value
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1978 (11) TMI 28 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... total income for the purposes of tax. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the penalty under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act could not be levied on the basis of the addition of Rs. 23,054 in the total amount agreed to by the assessee for the purposes of tax only unless there was material on the record to show that the agreed addition of an amount was the income of the assessee. Admittedly, there is no independent finding of the departmental authorities to the effect that the addition of an amount of Rs. 23,054 in question was the income of the assessee. Hence, the Tribunal was not justified in upholding the penalty imposed on the assessee under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. No other point is urged. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. D.S. TEWATIA J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 27 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Application For Revision, Assessment Order, Omission To Disclose Fully And Truly ... ... ... ... ..... Co. Ltd. 1974 95 ITR 639 has now received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court and thus in view of these two decisions the order of the respondent dismissing the revision petitions filed by the petitioner herein for the assessment years 1963-64 to 1965-66 and for the year 1967-68 was contrary to law as laid down by this High Court and by the Supreme Court. Under these circumstances, the order dated August 21, 1978, contains errors of law apparent on the face of the record and in exercise of the powers under art. 226 of the Constitution we set aside the order passed by the respondent, being Order annex. E to the petition. This Special Civil Application is, therefore, allowed. The order dated August 21, 1978, annex. E to the petition, is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute with costs. The Commssioner of Income-tax is directed to dispose of the revision petitions in accordance with law as set out in Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. 1977 106 ITR 1(SC) and this judgment.
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1978 (11) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Banking Company, Deposit In Bank, Exemption From Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... y different from the banking company, viz., Indian Bank, transacting business in India. Further, s. 5(1)(xxvi) of the W.T. Act does not require that the deposits must be in India with a banking company to which the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, applies. In the absence of any such restriction found in the statute itself, so long as the deposit has been made with a banking company to which the Banking Regulation Act applies, whichever the place of deposit may be, s. 5(1)(xxvi) will be attracted. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the deposit by the assessee with the Colombo branch of the Indian Bank will fall within the scope of s. 5(1)(xxvi) of the W.T. Act, 1957. Consequently, the Tribunal cannot be said to have committed any error. The answer to the question is patent and, in that sense, no question of law can be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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