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Showing 121 to 140 of 145 Records
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1978 (11) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Cash Credits, Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... had not disclosed fully and truly all material facts relevant to the said assessment year. The Tribunal has also held that it was the duty of the assessee to produce its books of accounts for the subsequent Dewali year in connection with the relevant assessment year or to disclose to the ITO the cash credits appearing in the subsequent Dewali year. Such findings have not been challenged. The submissions of Mr. Dutt that the ITO had no jurisdiction to initiate the reassessment proceedings were also not advanced before the Tribunal. The only submission was that the assessee was not obliged to produce its books of account in that assessment. The question which has been referred to us is very limited in scope. The conclusion of the Tribunal that the reassessment proceedings had been validly initiated has to be upheld. For the above reasons, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Additional Tax On Undistributed Profits, Capital Loss, Commercial Profit ... ... ... ... ..... see was suddenly increased to Rs. 2,29,605 from Rs. 38,124, the directors of the assessee were justified in maintaining the provision for the corporation tax that would become payable due to the revaluation of the said property. In other words, this act of the directors cannot be regarded as unreasonable. The Tribunal found it as a fact that the profit for the assessment year 1960-61 was small which was, however, enhanced in view of the capital loss being turned into capital gain by the ITO as already stated. In the premises and having regard to the smallness of the profits and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gangadhar Banerjee and Co. (P.) Ltd. 1965 57 ITR 176, and by the High Court in the cases cited by Mr. Bajoria, it must be held that the Tribunal was right in cancelling the order under s. 23A(1) of the Act. In the result, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 23 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Financial Year, Mercantile System, Provident Fund ... ... ... ... ..... wing the financial year as the accounting period. The case would become arguable if the quantification had, in fact, taken place after 1st April, 1971. But that is not so. So the question whether the final date of quantification of the liability is relevant or material does not, as a matter of fact, arise. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was justified in negativing the claim of the assessee. At the instance of the assessee, the Tribunal has referred the following question of law for our opinion Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the contribution of Rs. 16,486 relating to the period from February, 1962, to December, 1970, was not allowable as a deduction in the assessment year 1972-73 ? In view of what we have said above, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to his costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (11) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Acquisition Proceedings, Fair Market Value, Reason To Believe ... ... ... ... ..... as a mere cloak or pretence for making a roving enquiry or fishing investigation. Thus, the initiation on the basis of Ex. 1, for the reasons as aforesaid, apart from the other reasons as disclosed, should be deemed to be inoperative, bad, unauthorised and without jurisdiction. Since the initiation was without jurisdiction, the proceedings as initiated should also be deemed to be void ab initio and as such the existence of other remedy , if any, or the non-existence of any present grievance, as was argued by Mr. Pal as a bar to the power of interference by this court at this stage and in this jurisdiction, would also be of no avail and substance. So, the rule is made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs. This order will not of course prejudice the respondents from proceeding afresh in the matter and to make appropriate determination in accordance with law, if such course is available to them in law. The prayer, for stay of operation of this order is refused.
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1978 (11) TMI 21 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
High Court, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... act of purchase was within the terms of the proviso to section 43(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the sum of Rs. 56,248 was a loss covered by proviso (a) to section 43(5) and was to be regarded as a normal business loss ? After hearing of this reference the Division Bench did not agree in the judgment dated December 2, 1977. As there was disagreement between the two judges constituting the Division Bench, the matter was referred to a third judge and, consequently, it was placed before Honble the Chief justice Shri G. P. Singh. who heard the matter and gave his opinion. In view of the opinion of Hon ble the Chief justice Shri G. P. Singh the reference is answered as follows Question No. 1 is answered in the negative and answer to question No. 2 follows from answer to question No. 1. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to. bear their own costs.
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1978 (11) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Additional Super Tax, Previous Year, Substantially Interested ... ... ... ... ..... for declaration of a larger dividend. From the decisions cited, the law, as settled, appears to be that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of an amount distributed as dividend can be judged in the background of a reasonable requirement of the future. This in our view must mean the overall requirement and not confined to a particular item of expenditure incurred subsequently. The subsequent expenditure does not appear to us to be significantly large in the background of the assessed income of the assessee during the relevant previous year. It has also not been found that by reason of this particular expenditure in the subsequent year the assessee could reasonably anticipate a loss in the near future. For the reasons above, the revenue succeeds in this reference. Question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. As question No. 2 has not been pressed we decline to answer the same. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (11) TMI 19 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Acquisition Proceedings, Fair Market Value, Reason To Believe ... ... ... ... ..... ve conclusion of the ITO was sustained and put on a firmer basis by the AAC who examined the statements of the owners of the rubber estates and looked into many other materials at the stage of appeal. These materials were certainly available to the IAC in the proceedings in which he had imposed a penalty under s. 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act. We find that the officer was justified in looking into these materials and in passing the order of imposition of a penalty. We think the Tribunal was wrong in holding otherwise, and laying down the proposition that the imposition of penalty cannot be based on material gathered by the AAC. There is no warrant for such a proposition. In the result, we answer the questions referred in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee There will be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, as required by law.
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1978 (11) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Super Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... effect of its determination of appropriations but it cannot then contend that by being retrospectively effective the nature of the appropriation will change. If the resolution of the directors to appropriate for surtax in August, 1964, is effective from the 1st January, 1964, then it is effective for all purposes and the nature of the appropriation, i.e., its character as a provision for a known liability, cannot undergo a metamorphosis and change into an appropriation of a different character. No other decision is relied on by Mr. Sengupta. For the reasons indicated above, we reject the contention of Mr. Sengupta. We hold that the provision of Rs. 9 lakhs in this particular case is to be treated as a reserve for the purpose of the Surtax Act, 1964, and the Explanation to r. 1 of the Second Schedule to the Act. In that view of the matter, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.--I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Company, Information, Reassessment, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... y proposed dividend as sought to be argued by Mr. Balai Pal. There is no material on the record to show that this was in respect of some present or contingent liability in connection with dividend. Accordingly, we decline to deal with question No. 2. So far as the third question is concerned we accept the contention of Dr. Pal. The Tribunal itself went into the question as to the validity of the proceedings initiated under s. 8 of the Surtax Act.It dealt with the merits of such contention and question No. 1 specifically deals with the same. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the Tribunal was justified in law in refusing to entertain the additional ground. Accordingly, we decline to deal with question No. 2. So far as question No. 4 is concerned, in view of our answer to the questions above, it is not necessary for us to deal with the same. We answer the questions accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 16 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... orrect rule of law. These decisions are given in Sankatha Prasad s case, AIR 1939 All 81, Sankatha Prasad s case, AIR 1940 All 97, Mt. Ram Sakhi Kuar s case, AIR 1924 All 802, and Harsaran v. Musammat Dilraji 1908 8 IC 527. In all these cases, it has been held that it is open to the ostensible owner to plead that he is not the real owner and once that plea is raised the real owner should be impleaded as a party so that the suit can be effectively adjudicated upon. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the trial court was justified in impleading Ranjit Singh as a party to the suit and that s. 281A of the Act is no bar to the impleading of the real owner as a party in the pre-emption suit. No other point was urged. For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. The parties, through their learned counsel, have been directed to appear before the trial court on November 27, 1978.
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1978 (11) TMI 15 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Balancing Charge, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... sed under s. 5(1) of the Act but it is equivalent to a value determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 7A. Reference to sub-ss. (1) and (2) in sub-s. (4) of s. 7A is merely to provide the mode for the determination of the value which is to be the purchase price of the undertaking and, therefore, the expression the purchase price of the undertaking shall be the market value of the undertaking at the time of purchase or at the time of the delivery of the undertaking occurring in s. 7A(1), which was highlighted by the learned counsel for the assessee-company, would not in any way support the contention that the purchase price of the undertaking purchased under s. 6 of the Act would be equal only to the market value thereof. In the result, we answer all the three questions referred for opinion in the affirmative and against the assessee and dispose of the references accordingly. The parties are left to bear their own costs. KULWANT SINGH TIWANA J.-I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... hat the case of the assessee that he sold away the two lorries to one Mir Baquir Ali was nothing but a false story. In such a context, the inference is irresistible that the assessee deliberately concealed the income from the running of the two lorries. Therefore, the Tribunal was in error in deleting or setting aside the orders of penalty in their entirety and it should have held that the assessee was liable to penalty with reference to the concealment of income from the business of plying the two lorries for the two years in question. It is not possible for this court to say as to what would have been the quantum of penalty, if the Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the penalty was leviable with reference to the aforesaid item of income alone and the Tribunal will have to do the same when the matter goes back. Under these circumstances, the question is answered in the negative and against the assessee to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (11) TMI 13 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Company, Super Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... But the facts of this case are distinguishable from that of the present case. In the present case, as observed earlier, there is a provision for taxation and also a provision for dividends which are the liabilities of the current year. There is no clear indication that the amount has been separated from the general mass of profits as reserve in the balance-sheet and from the surrounding circumstances also there is no indication that both these amounts are kept as reserves . For the reasons recorded above, the Tribunal was not right in law in holding that the amounts of Rs. 71,808 and Rs. 1,24,974, respectively, for it provision for taxation and provision for dividends be treated as de reserve to be included in the computation of the assessee s capital under r. 1 of the Second Schedule to the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963. Accordingly, this question in answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The references are disposed of accordingly.
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1978 (11) TMI 12 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... ovt. of India, which must not influence his determination. This order must not be taken to mean that either there is substance in the application for rectification or there is not. The ITO will pass his order on the application for rectification on merits after considering the application and the applicable legal provisions. Accordingly, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). It is unnecessary to consider prayer (b). Further, in view of the fact that the ITO concerned has been specifically directed under this order to ignore the communications of the Commissioner, the CBDT and the Govt. of India at the time of passing his order on the application for rectification, it becomes unnecessary to give any relief in terms of prayer (c) and no specific order need be made since these communications are to be ignored by the ITO. The parties are directed to bear their own costs of this miscellaneous petition. It is hoped that the ITO will dispose of the matter expeditiously.
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1978 (11) TMI 11 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Carry Forward And Set Off ... ... ... ... ..... unabsorbed development rebate will, have to be deducted in arriving at the figure which would be exigible to deduction of 8 under section 80E(1). It appears to us that in view of the above observations, the authority of the decision of this court in Indian Transformers case 1972 86 ITR 192 has been considerably shaken. Besides, on our impression of the language of the section and the scope of the provision, we are of the opinion that the principle in I.T.R. 17 of 1972 (Emeete and Sons (Travancore) P. Lid. v. CIT is the more appropriate principle that has application to the case on hand. In that view, we think the view taken by the Tribunal was correct. We answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of this court will be communicated to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
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1978 (11) TMI 10 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Business Income, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... i) of the Act was applicable to the amount sought to be assessed as the company s income was a question arising out of the order of the Tribunal and the High Court had jurisdiction to decide the question even if it was not raised and argued before the Tribunal. To the same effect are the observations in Seth Balkishan Das v. CIT 1966 61 ITR 194 (Punj) FB , CIT v. Indian Molasses Co. P. Ltd. 1970 78 ITR 474 (SC) and Raghunath Prasad Poddar v. CIT 1973 90 ITR 140 (SC). The ratio decidendi of all these authorities shows that each aspect of the question can be gone into by the High Court in such cases and it is not distinct from the main question. From whatever angle it may be viewed, I am of the considered opinion that the amount in question is trading receipt of the assessee-firm in the relevant accounting year and, hence, is chargeable to tax. I, accordingly, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee-firm. D. S. TEWATIA J.-I agree.
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1978 (11) TMI 9 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nt in its assurances to the Public Accounts Committee. It is on this rather unusual footing that I hold that the order dated 14th May, 1971, passed by the Addl, Commissioner concluding that the assessee was not able to explain the delay and dismissing the revision petition as barred by limitation, is improper. The said order will stand quashed and the Commissioner is directed to condone the delay and proceed there after with the hearing of the revision petition under s .264 on the footing that the delay being condoned, the petition is not barred by limitation. The writ to go down forthwith and it is hoped that the Commissioner will dispose of the revision petition as expeditiously as possible in the circumstances of the case it is suggested that the same be disposed of not later than 30th April, 1979. In the unusual circumstances of the case, although the rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above, the parties are directed to bear their own costs of the proceedings.
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1978 (11) TMI 8 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Firm Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that only the net amount of interest paid to a partner after deducting the interest paid by him could be added to the firm s income u/s. 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? In CIT v. London Machinery Co. (Income Tax Reference No. 608 of 1977, decided on 26th October, 1978) 1979 117 ITR 111, a Bench of this court has held that payment of interest to a partner on amounts brought by him from his HUF or from his individual funds is in either case payment of interest to the partner and both these kinds of payments are within the purview of s. 40(b) and hence are inadmissible as deduction, but in view of the decision of this court in Sri Ram Mahadeo Prasad the net amount paid by the firm to its partners alone is disallowable. In view of these decisions, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (11) TMI 7 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Income, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... Comp Cas 801 (Punj) also cited with approval in S. V. Kondaskar v. V. M. Deshpande 1972 83 ITR 685 (SC), after the winding-up order was passed, the ITO imposed a penalty of Rs. 4,000. As leave of the court was, not obtained before imposing the penalty, the Punjab High Court held that the claim for Rs. 4,000 could not be entertained. In Union of India v. India Fisheries (P.) Ltd. 1965 57 ITR 331 35 Comp Cas 669 1966 3 SCR 679, cited in S. V. Kondaskar v. V. M. Deshpande 1972 83 ITR 685(SC), what the Supreme Court held was that the provisions of the Companies Act were special and those of the I.T. Act general and that if there was an apparent conflict between the provisions of those enactments, the provisions of the Companies Act had to prevail. The provisions of s. 446(2) of the Companies Act, besides being special, contain a non obstante clause also. For the reasons stated above, the order under appeal deserves no interference. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1978 (11) TMI 6 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment, Business Expenditure, Practice ... ... ... ... ..... nge in the year or not, as sought to be argued on behalf of the Revenue now, was not considered in that aspect either by the ITO or the AAC or the Tribunal. It appears to us that the authorities concerned have acted automatically and have followed the order of the earlier year without applying their mind objectively or judiciously as they are bound to do under the Act. Nund and Samont s case 1970 78 ITR 268 (SC) is of no relevance to Mr. Naha. The facts are different. It is not a question of burden of proof but it is the question of the duty of the ITO. In that view of the matter, we accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya. We answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In our opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not correct in holding that the managing director s remuneration allowable for the assessment year 1970-71 was only Rs. 1,200 per month. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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