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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 145 Records
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1978 (11) TMI 127
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... ... ..... basis of the admission made by the respondent in the returns submitted by the respondent for the relevant years, that the appropriate authorities had jurisdiction to pass the orders of assessment, that the amounts could not be ordered to be refunded to the respondent except on the footing that the assessment orders are erroneous, that the finding that the assessment orders are erroneous which alone would lead to an order for refund of the amount collected in pursuance thereof could be given only by the Tribunals constituted in accordance with the provisions of the very Act, that there was a provision for refund of the amount wrongly collected in rule 16, which has now been replaced by section 39-A of the Act, and that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit by virtue of section 51 of the Act. We accordingly allow the appeal with costs throughout and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned First Assistant Judge and dismiss the suit. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 126
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... ... ..... nt with the said view. Apparently, therefore, the requirement under rule 8-D for production of the C forms could not be said to be mandatory and the petitioner could not be denied exemption merely on that ground. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Shivnarayan Jagatnarayan, Raigarh 1978 42 S.T.C. 315 1978 Vikraya Kar Nirnaya (11) 168., a Division Bench of this Court also took the same view. It is, therefore, apparent that in the orders of the assessing authority as well as that of the Commissioner of Sales Tax exercising revisional jurisdiction, there is an apparent error on the face of the record. 12A. The petition is, therefore, allowed. The orders passed by the authorities referred to above are hereby quashed. In the light of the concession made by the learned counsel for the respondents about the legal position, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. The amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner, after verification. Petition allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 125
Winding up – Power of tribunal to stay winding-up ... ... ... ... ..... rs even after the appointment of a provisional liquidator and after a winding-up order. I am, therefore, unable to accept Shri Mahin-dar Narain s contention that an application by a former director should be treated as on the same footing as an application by a stranger. I may also refer to a decision reported in XLV Law Times (NS) 676 in the case of The Aston Hull Coal and Brick Company Ltd. In this case the company had been ordered to be wound up ex parte and Kay J., though with some reluctance, followed the order of Chitty J. in an earlier case and set aside the ex parte order. This case indicates that the notion of setting aside a winding-up order is not in any way unusual or impractical. For the above reasons I am in entire agreement with Kapur J. and hold that C. A. No. 645/77 seeking to set aside the winding-up order is maintainable. In view of these conclusions both this application as well as C. A. No. 644/77 will be posted for hearing on merits on December 13, 1978.
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1978 (11) TMI 124
Annual Return – Penalty for not filing ... ... ... ... ..... t, after the time was over, the original of Ex. P-4 letter was addressed by the respondent to the petitioner, but as disclosed by Ex. P-5 it had come back without being served. It cannot, therefore, be said that in spite of the petitioner having been cautioned in time the default took place and, therefore, he had knowingly and wilfully authorised or permitted the default or non-compliance. On a proper construction of the provisions contained in section 159, sub-section (1) of section 161, section 162 and section 5 of the Act, it could be seen that the prosecution has not succeeded in establishing that the petitioner was an officer of the company who was in default. That being the position, the conviction and sentence of the accused-petitioner by the court below under section 162 of the Act are without any legal basis. Accordingly, I allow this revision, setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by the court below. Fine, if any, paid shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1978 (11) TMI 111
Companies Law Board – Power of, Appeal against orders of, Oppression and Mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398
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1978 (11) TMI 103
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... ... ..... For the purpose of s. 5(1) (xvxii) of the WT Act industrial undertaking means as undertaking engaged in the business of generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power or in the construction of ships or in the manufacture or processing of goods or in mining. The instant case falls within the expression manufacturing of goods . The firm in which the assessee is a partner manufactures Pickles and Spices. The product manufactured by the firm is something which is entirely different from the raw materials used and thus the manufacturing activities result into bringing into existence of something which is different from its components. Thus the assessee is entitled to the exemption as prescribed in s. 5(xxxii) of the Act. Accordingly, we direct the Wealth-tax Officer to ascertain the value of the interests of the assessee in the assets of the industrial undertaking and exempt that value from the liability to wealth-tax. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 100
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... ... ..... fictitious claim. Shri Jasraj has also not been questioned as to how the travelling expenses could have been claimed to the extent mentioned. (Inasmuch as the evidence goes to show that services were rendered by Shri Jasraj, that the assessee had paid the amounts of Rs. 15,000 to Shri Jasraj, and inasmuch as in Shri Jasraj own case there is no material to suggest that the amount of Rs. 15,000 was not actually expended by him as claimed since if there was no such expenditure it would only stand to reason that portion of the amount received from the assessee would have constituted part of his income since it was part of business dealings as far as Shri Jasraj was concerned, to the extent there was no expenditure by Shri Jasraj and would have been assessed as such, which has not been done. We have to hold that there is no warrant for making any disallowance in the hands of the assessee. The assessee is accordingly entitled to further relief of Rs. 14,000. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 98
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... ... ..... T vs. Mrs. Paramati Hariprasad Vas(7) (ii) Mahadeo Prasad Rais vs. ITO, Gorakhpur(8) 8. Our attention was invited to page 220 of the Gujarat High Court s decisions. We are unable to follow as to how the observation on this page of the report support the Revenue s contention. The observation is to the effect that a share which is allotted to the wife or the mother on partition is not a share in the true sense but only a provision for maintenance. Neither this observation nor the ratio of the judgement has any relevance to the issue before us. In Mahadeo Prasad s case the question which had fallen for consideration was whether assets acquired by an individual after partition could be treated as joint family assets. This question was answered in the negative. Here again the issue is different. 9. We, therefore, hold that the view consistently taken by this Tribunal still holds the field and fully supports the finding of the learned AAC. 10. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 97
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... ... ..... t on record to show as to why the retail sales and wholesale sales were bifurcated. Thus the addition of Rs. 4,419 is uncalled for and the same is deleted. 7. The ld. counsel for the assessee did not press ground No. 4 regarding car expenses. So this point is decided against the assessee. 8. Other contention of the assessee was that the ld. ITO was wrong in disallowing the sum of Rs. 725 as entertainment expenses. According to the ld. counsel the sum of Rs. 725 were incurred in providing tea, pan etc. to the employees of the assessee firm, and constituents. Such expenses are not in the nature of entertainment. Thus it was contended that the addition may be deleted. The Tribunal, Indore Bench has taken the view that such expenses are in the nature of the entertainment. Apart from it, some of the expenses were incurred on the employees. Thus there is no justification for disallowing the claim of Rs. 725. So this claim is allowed. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
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1978 (11) TMI 96
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... ... ..... 1962, because nearly all the conditions of this rule appear to have been satisfied. Now this is correct that the assessee has not taken any reasonable steps to institute legal proceedings for recovery of the unpaid rent but obviously in terms of this clause any such steps would be useless. The only thing that can be contended for the Revenue is that the agreement itself is not bona fide, but this is not the ground taken by the CIT for setting aside the order of the ITO. In other words, the ITO is not to conduct any inquiry about the bona fides of the agreement. Unless he is going to do so, the whole proceedings before the ITO would be infructuous inasmuch as no addition can possibly be made to the income of the assessee and the previous orders would stand whether the income be treated as the income from property or business. Therefore, the Commissioner s order would be an exercise in futility in either case. It is accordingly quashed. 7. The appeals are consequently accepted.
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1978 (11) TMI 95
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... ... ..... wance of inadmissible expenditure. The total of the above two sums comes to Rs. 18,780 and this is the only sum in respect of which, the ITO has found on assessment that particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars were furnished. It follows that the condition laid down in s. 274(2) for referring the matter to the IAC was not fulfilled on the facts stated in the assessment order. Hence the IAC cannot be said to have been vested with proper jurisdiction in dealing with the matter in terms of that section. We, therefore, hold that the order of the IAC cannot be said to have been vested with proper jurisdiction in dealing with the matter in terms of that section. We, therefore, hold that the order of the IAC was without jurisdiction and must be cancelled. In the circumstances, we find it unnecessary to deal with the merit of the case on which the parties have reserved their arguments. In the circumstances, the order of the IAC is cancelled. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 94
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... ... ..... to grant exemption under s. 10 (6) even though the limitation for making the assessments in respect of the earlier asst. yrs governed by the amendment had expired. On the other hand, this is a matter where the Revenue wants the penalty to be enhanced and when even in the case of a tax, the Bombay High Court has pointed out that it would be debatable if the amendment could apply to a matter concluded by a decision on appeal, it needs no emphasis to say that enhancement of penalty in quasi-criminal proceedings should not be made lightly unless there are specific words in the statute to give effect to the amendment retrospectively notwithstanding the fact that the matter was carried in appeal and it had become final. Hence, we are of the opinion that our decision in the case of Eva Raha does not require any re-consideration and in that view we find that there is no error apparent on the face of the record which requires rectification. 2. The application is, therefore, rejected.
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1978 (11) TMI 93
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... ... ..... he other whether the income of the assessee is entitled to exemption under s. 11 depends upon the compliance of the assessee with the assessee with the conditions laid down is s. 11, 12 and 13 for the purpose of such exemptions. The ITO has not gone into those matters or decided whether the income was entitled to exemption. This may be because he had determined the income to be a loss and no demand was raised. In any event, the appeal which is only with regard to the status and we are not concerned with that question as to whether the income of the assessee was eligible for any exemption or not and we refrain from expressing any opinion on it. Nor do we consider it necessary to remand the matter to the ITO for considering this question as it is not the subject matter of appeal before us. 6. In the circumstances, we hold that the assessee is a charitable trust and we direct that the assessment be amended by recording its status as such. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 92
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... ... ..... the WT Act. The section provides that penalty can be imposed if any person without reasonable cause has failed to furnish his return. When no wealth-tax return is field there should be a cause for such non-filing. It is incumbent on the part of the taxing authorities to ascertain whether such cause was reasonable so as to justify the imposition of penalty under the above section. It is true that the penalty was imposed by the WTO for all the three years as he concluded that the assessee has wilfully defaulted the provisions of s. 14(2), s. 17 and s. 14(2) respectively for the above three years but without reasonable causes. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the penalty order was not proper and justified. Even otherwise, the assessee s net wealth would be below taxable limit if a proper computation was made, as briefly mentioned above. Accordingly we have no hesitation to cancel the penalty orders for all the above three years. 8. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 91
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... ... ..... pointed out by the ITO was that balance sheet was not drawn up and no separate capital account was maintained. It has been held by the Patna High Court in the case of M/s Sahabuddin Mohammed Raza (1) following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Umacharan Shaw and Bros. (2) that the circumstances that the fact that there was no separate capital account of the partners was not very material to the question whether the partnership was genuine. The assessee having maintained the books of account, the drawing up of a balance sheet was a mere formality and any omission to do so cannot vitally affect the genuineness of the firm and the authorities below have not referred any other fact affecting the genuineness of the firm. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the assessee was a genuine firm in existence as constituted by the deed dt. 6th Dec., 72, and it is entitled to registration. We, therefore, direct the ITO to grant registration. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 90
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... ... ..... there is no merit in this appeal and that the order of the AAC was quite proper and valid and, under the circumstances of the case, we see no reason to interfere. 8. The other objection in this appeal is regarding the inclusion of the amount of Rs. 1,980 being interest received in the name of the wife of the assessee from the firm M/s Manikchand Bachraj. The AAC has given a finding for the asst. yr. 1970-71 that the corpus did not belong to the assessee but to his wife. The inclusion of the interest income was deleted by the AAC. We have looked into this point also and the circumstances and back-ground are similar to the business income. We find that on the materials relied on by the Department, the interest income in the name of the wife of the assessee could not be included in the income of the assessee. On this point also we find that the order of the AAC was quite proper and justified and the same is confirmed. 9. In the result, the appeal of the Department is dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 89
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... ... ..... ous arguments an contentions of the representative of both the sides. We find in the instant period that the assessee did not file return although the firm mentioned above filed its return on 7th Sept., 1971. This firm had preferred an appeal for the same asst. yr. Against the imposition of penalty under s. 271(1)(a) and vide ITA Nos. 319,320, 311 and 313 (Gau) of 1975-76 dt. 25th Nov., 1978, the Tribunal has cancelled the penalty orders imposed on the firm. In the present appeal an don the same premises as in the case of firm we find that there was reasonable cause which prevented the assessee from filing his return in the absence of intimation of his share income from the firm but as pointed out above, the firm itself has filed its return on 7th Sept, 1971. In view of this, we find that the AAC was justified in reducing the ITO to redetermine the quantum of penalty. We, therefore, have no hesitation to confirm the order of the AAC. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 88
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... ... ..... ay in the payment and not in the nature of penalty. It is also not in dispute that the interest accrued in this year since the demand was raised only in this year even though it related to the sales-tax due of some earlier periods. On these facts, it is clear that the payment of interest was an expenditure laid out of the purpose of the business since it was an addition to the sales-tax which itself was an admissible business expenditure. This is a view taken by the Allahabad High Court also in the case of interest paid for delay in the payment of purchase-tax which is an analogous case. The decision of the Calcutta High Court relied on by the Revenue has no application to the facts of this case since that related to the levy of interest of delayed payment of income-tax which itself is not a business expenditure. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the AAC was right in deleting the addition and we have no hesitation in confirming his order. 5. The appeal is dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 87
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... ... ..... below and urged for sustaining the order. 6. We have given our consideration to the facts of the case available along with the contention of the Revenue. We find that the assessee in the present appeals is an HUF and that Shri Ajit Kumar Jain, Karta in his representative capacity and on behalf of the HUF became a partner in the above firm, and not in his individual capacity. S. 64 provides inclusion of income in computing the total income of any individual only. Since it is an admitted fact that the assessee in the present appeals is an HUF, we find that there was no justification for inclusion of the income from the above firm received by Smt. Sulochana Jain along with income of HUF under s. 64(1)(i). We, therefore, direct that the income arising to the wife Smt. Sulochana Jain should be excluded in computing the income of the assessee HUF. The ITO will re-compute the income of the assessee in the light of the above direction. 7. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 86
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... ... ..... ft in this case was a completed gift when the gift deed was executed on30th March, 1967. It is true that the deed was registered on14th April, 1967but it operates from the date of execution viz.,30th March, 1967which date falls beyond the accounting year relevant to the asst. yr. 1968-69. In so far as the interpretation of s. 47 is concerned, it is self-evident but it is also concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in K.J. Nathan vs. Maruthi Rao (2). It was held by the Supreme Court that where the mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was effected on 5th July, 1947, and registered on 22nd June, 1948, under s. 47 of the Indian Registration Act, it would take effect from 5th July, 1947, and will prevail over a subsequent mortgage executed in favour of a third party on 10th Oct.,1947. Therefore, the matter is no more res-integra and is concluded by the said decision of the Supreme Court. We, therefore, annul the assessment under appeal. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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