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1978 (2) TMI 123
... ... ... ... ..... ure because Mohanlal Khandelwal had died during the course of the business of the assessee. In any view of the matter, such expenses were incidental to the business of the assessee firm it was necessary for the assessee from business point of view to make such expenditure. So the expenditure of Rs. 4,763.78 were in connection with the business and in any view of the matter they were incidental to the business. So the learned AAC was wrong in disallowing the claim of Rs. 4,763.78. The remaining expenses were also incurred in connection with the litigation. The details have been given above. Those expenses were also incurred in connection with the business. In any view of the matter they were also incidental to the business. Thus, in my opinion, the entire claim of Rs. 6,555.78 was an allowable expenditure and the same should have been allowed. The finding of the learned AAC to the contrary is wrong. Accordingly, the addition is deleted. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 122
... ... ... ... ..... d AAC was not justified in applying s. 145(2). Certain defects in the books of account did exist but the assessee has been maintaining the books of account on the same basis for the last several years. The authorities below have been determining the assessee rsquo s income on the basis of these books of account by applying the proviso to s. 145(1). In this assessment too the ITO rightly applied the proviso to s. 145(1). The result shown in the bifurcated trading account relating to dyeing and printing which is 8.7 per cent was obviously too low and, therefore, the authorities below were right in making the addition in the trading account. The learned AAC himself felt that gross profit of 14 per cent was appropriate in this account in order to secure that result, we would sustain trading account addition of Rs. 12,000, including Rs. 5,000 already added by the ITO. The addition of Rs. 41,210 is, accordingly reduced by Rs. 34,210. 6. In the result, the appeal succeeds partially.
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1978 (2) TMI 121
... ... ... ... ..... that the assessee moved the Commissioner of Income-tax by filing the revision petition belatedly and that revision petition was dismissed. It is true that a glaring or obvious mistake of law can be rectified under s. 154 as much as a mistake of fact apparent from the records. We do not think that any such mistake has crept into the order of the Income-tax Officer made on 4th June, 1973 so that he can exercise his powers under s. 154 for the second time. In our opinion, the Income-tax Officer was palpably wrong in holding that the change of situation brought about by the decision of the Supreme Court was not a valid ground for the exercise of his power under s. 154 on 4th June, 1973. The fact that the assessee did not keep the question alive by pursuing further remedies before the Tribunal etc. against the original order of assessment does not make any difference. No exception can be taken to the order of the AAC. 3. In the result, the appeals fail and the same are dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 120
... ... ... ... ..... that day and order was passed. Thus the learned assessing authority provided about two and a half months time for filing the remaining declarations. Appellant rsquo s contention is that the collieries had been nationalised and after nationalization the previous owners did not have control over the office etc. and therefore they had difficulty in procuring declarations in respect of transactions which had taken place earlier. This contention is quite reasonable. Considering the circumstances this was a fit case in which more time should have been given. It would be desirable therefore to remand the case to the assessing authority with the direction that the dealer should be given another opportunity to file declarations. 5. The appeal is partly allowed. Penalty under s. 17(3) of the Act is set aside. The case is remanded to the assessing authority for providing the dealer another opportunity for filing declarations under Form XII-A and considering the assessment on that basis.
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1978 (2) TMI 119
... ... ... ... ..... atiya had recovered sales-tax. However, the Adhatiya had not given the certificate that he was responsible for payment of tax, Learned Counsel for appellant produced this certificate at the stage of second appeal. It shows that Adhatiya has taken the responsibility and has also included these sales in his own returns and has paid tax on them. In view of this categorise certificate it would be desirable to remanded the case to the assessing authority for admitting the certificate of the Adhatiya and for considering deduction of this turnover on that basis. 5. The last contention regarding ex-parte decision in first appeal was not pressed. 6. The appeal is allowed. The levy of tax on motor spirit stocks held by appellant on 1st Aug., 1972 is set aside in accordance with the opinion of the Division Bench of the Tribunal. The case is remanded to the assessing authority for admitting the Adhatiya rsquo s certificate and for considering the deduction of this turnover on that basis.
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1978 (2) TMI 118
... ... ... ... ..... the record at the time of the initial assessment. Whether a particular income was earned in individual capacity or as karta of the HUF is a pure question of fact which has been thrashed out by the ITO in the initial assessment itself. If on a certain set of facts he has come to a wrong conclusion, it cannot be said that he was justified in reopening the assessment later on. In view of the statement of the assessee rsquo s representative that he does not challenge the jurisdiction of the ITO except for the limited purpose of the legality of the issue of notice under s. 148, though the learned Departmental Representative has made submissions in regard to the jurisdiction of the ITO also, we do not intended to express any opinion on the said issue. In our opinion the order of the AAC is correct and calls for no interference. 8. The cross objection filed by the assessee merely supports the order of the AAC. 9. In the result both, the appeal and the cross objection, are dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 117
... ... ... ... ..... he substance of the transaction has some times to be looked into irrespective of the legal from it might have taken. In substance we find that the assessee was in need of money. The loan was obtained from LIC though Shri Rastogi on the security of his policies. The amount was utilised by the assessee. The assessee created the Life Insurance Corporation as its creditor. The amount of interest was also directly paid by the assessee to the Life Insurance Corporation. These facts, in our opinion, go to show that the name of Shri Rastogi was used only as conduit pipe for diverting the amount from Life Insurance Corporation to the assessee. This was not a case where Shri Rastogi himself had advanced the amount to the assessee or it could be said that any interest was paid to him. That being the position in reality, the provisions of s. 40(b) of the Act cannot be made applicable to this case. We, therefore, uphold the other of the AAC. 6. In the result all the appeals are dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 116
... ... ... ... ..... shown to us by which we can fill up the obvious wide gap in the above reasoning. 8. We have considered the argument raised by the learned Departmental representative before us but find that the same is not tenable because the first ground taken by the assessee before the AAC is directed against the tagging of the share income from Deonarain Jagadishlal to the individual income of the assessee. The assessee was very much aggrieved against this tagging which aspect the Appellate Asst. Commissioner did not deem it necessary to consider. It is unnecessary to go into the interpretation of the Tribunal s order in the case of the other partner, Smt. Umalal. For the above reasons we hold that the authorities below were not justified in clubbing the income of the H.U.F., which is a separate entity under the Income-tax Act, along with the individual income of the assessee. We direct that the income of the H.U.F. be excluded from the assessment. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 115
... ... ... ... ..... the sole owners thereof. The intention of the settlor, as it appears to us, is quite clear i.e. to create a trust in present and not in further and to become the sole trustee thereof for life and also to provide for the trustees after her death. In our opinion, this intention was effectively carried out by registering the deed dt. 5th March, 1961. This conclusion of ours is also strengthened by the fcat that the settlor described hereself as the trustee of the Ashram in a sale deed dt. 29th May, 1962 which shows that she intended to hold and did, in fact, hold the properties under consideration only as the trustee after the execution of the deed dt. 5th March, 1961. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the properties under consideration passed under s. 6 of the CED Act on the death of the deceased. We, therefore, direct that the value of the said properties be excluded from the principal value of the estate of the deceased. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 114
... ... ... ... ..... expressed would be implied by law in the sale of a growing corp, and that therefore, the expenditure incurred in acquiring the raw material was in a business sense an expenditure on Revenue account and not on capital account, just as much as if the Kendu leaves had been bought in a shop. 5. Although the claim of the assessee was in the nature of penalty payment but this was not integrally connected with the carrying on of the business of purchase of Kendu leaves, that the loss arising for the reason of forfeiture of this amount would be deductible from the income as a business expenses in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prafulla Chandra Mallik 63 ITR 62 (SC) and that of the Orissa High Court in the case of Govind Choudhury and Sons 79 ITR 493 (Ori). In view of our aforesaid discussion we hold that the lower authorities should have allowed the assessee s claim of deduction of Rs. 29,883. We direct accordingly. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 113
... ... ... ... ..... not made available to the assessee was not controverted by the Department. Secondly this provision came in the statute w.e.f. 1st April, 1969. Therefore this was the first time when the assessee could have complied with the terms of the newly inserted s. 212(3A) of the Act. No doubt, ignorance of law is not an excuse but in considering the position of frequent changes in the IT Act in every year or sometimes several times within one year it can be legally presumed that every person cannot be well conversant with the technicality of the changed law immediately after its change. When such provision of law comes into force throwing duty upon the citizen to revise its estimate of income first time whereas upto the immediately last year there was no such application, we can reasonably hold that the cause pleaded by the assessee was a reasonable cause. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no penalty should have been imposed in this case. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 112
... ... ... ... ..... ld be imposable on that firm if that firm was an un-registered firm . 9. It is, therefore, clear from the language of the section that the very object of s. 271(2) is to treat a registered firm as if it were an un-registered firm for the purpose of levy of penalty, once it commits default, notwithstanding the privilege it enjoys with regard to quantum of tax payable by it. We find support for this view of ours from the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Automogiles 1977 CTR (Guj) 33 105 ITR 588 (Guj)) and Kandaswamy Weaving Factory and Co. 1977 CTR (Mad) 366 110 ITR 84 (Mad). We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention of the assessee s counsel that the penalty imposable in this case should be calculated on the basis of assessed tax on it as a registered firm or the quantum of penalty should be restricted to the maximum of 50 per cent of the tax assessed on it as a registered firm cannot stand. 10. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 111
... ... ... ... ..... death occurred in October, 1971. In our opinion these events were certainly disturbing and did constitute reasonable cause for not filing the return. The assessee has filed voluntarily the returns for all the five years on the same date. Under the circumstances, we agree with the AAC that this was not a fit case for levy of penalty. We further find that the lack of personal hearing before the imposition of penalty was not raised as a ground before the AAC and so, he has not relied on the same. We find no infirmity in the reliance placed by the AAC on the notification dt. 12th June, 1969 issued by the CBDT to the effect that very heavy penalties may be excused if the assessee filed the returns voluntarily before being asked by the Department to do so and if the taxes were paid in time. It was not shown before us that the assessee was a defaulter in the payment of taxes. Under the circumstances, we uphold the order of the AAC. 6. In the result, the five appeals are dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 110
... ... ... ... ..... he Department to agree to such assessments being set aside to be reframed on the basis of the guidelines laid down in this circular referred to by the AAC. 4. No doubt, the Department s question would appear in the first flush to be a real question of law. But as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has pointed out that the Board has issued circulars specifically stating that matters which were pending on appeal should be completed on the basis of this circular. That was what the AAC did and we, in effect, upheld his action. It would, therefore, appear to us that the reference application made by the Commissioner of Income-tax is inconsistent with the Board s own view in the matter. In view of that fact that we had dismissed the Department s appeal upholding the A.A.C. s order, wherein he had granted the assessee only those reliefs which the circular of the Board had given to the assessee, we do not think that the question should be referred. 5. The application is dismissed.
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1978 (2) TMI 109
... ... ... ... ..... riods of years. Suffice it to state that on an appreciation of the available material, we do not find any merit in the reasoning of the AAC for reducing the estimate of the income from agriculture. 10. We may add that having regard to the probabilities of the case in the light of the background of the assessee, we are not impressed by the stand of the Department that the expenditure of the assessee must have been larger than stated by the assessee. 11. Thus having regard to material on record, and on an appreciation of the above, we hold that the assessee has explained in a satisfactory manner, the source of the cash deposits of Rs. 62,652 in the two years under consideration. Therefore, we direct that the corresponding additions of Rs. 20,927 and Rs. 21,710 in the two respective years are deleted. 12. As stated earlier, the other addition of Rs. 3,000 made in the asst. yr. 1971-72 is upheld. 13. The appeal for 1971-72 is partly allowed and the appeal for 1972-73 is allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 108
... ... ... ... ..... ermined as a result of the orders of the ITO dt. 18th March, 1974 and 31st Dec., 1974, the interest, if any, would be payable upto the date of regular assessment only which, in this case would be the first assessment made by the ITO under s. 143 i.e. the order dt. 30th Dec., 1972. Shri Dastur, the learned Counsel for the assessee, had repelled each and every contention raised by the Departmental Representative in this behalf. In particular, he had placed reliance on the Calcutta High Court s decision in the case of Chloride India Ltd. vs. CIT (1977) 106 ITR 38 (Cal) and the Supreme Court decision in the case of ITO vs. M.R. Vidyasagar (1962) 44 ITR 732 at 737 (SC). However, in the view we have taken on the main issue. viz the competency of appeal for non-granting of interest under s. 214, we do not consider it necessary to refer to the rival contentions in detail and to finally express ourselves on the points raised. 16. In the result, the Departmental appeal stands allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 107
... ... ... ... ..... re, agree that the IAC was not competent to consider the question whether or not there was concealment of Rs. 18,000 as no satisfaction on the concealment of Rs. 18,000 had been recorded by the ITO at the time of assessment. In the light of the assessment order dt. 7th Feb., 1974 the IAC could have confined himself only to the concealment of Rs. 26,000 in respect of which satisfaction was recorded by the ITO. Thus the IAC travelled beyond his jurisdiction. For this reason, penalty sustained by the IAC on the item of Rs. 18,000 is not legal. We, therefore, cancel the penalty of Rs. 18,000 imposed by the IAC. As the assessee succeeds on legal objection, we do not propose to consider the argument advanced by the assessee s counsel on merits in respect of this item. Para 6 of the Tribunal order dt. 25th July, 1977 is deleted and para 7 of the said order shall be read as per 6 as follows Para 6 In the result the appeal is allowed. Miscellaneous Application is accordingly allowed.
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1978 (2) TMI 106
Steel Ingots - Goods removed for re-rolling and received back for finished goods - Liability to duty
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1978 (2) TMI 105
Brand name and manufacture of goods on behalf ... ... ... ... ..... tipulated by the owner of the trade mark who has to jealously guard quality, specifications and other such standards of the product to be manufactured by parties to whom Franchise benefit is given. Such stipulations do not amount to their interference with the working of the manufacturer or any dilution in the legal character of the manufacturer. The party buy the concentrates and manufactured aerated water out of the concentrates on their own account. They are also independent assessees under the Sales Tax and Income-tax Acts. The affixing of the trade mark Fanta and Campa on the products would also not mean that the product was manufactured for and on behalf of either Coca-Cola Export, Corporation or Pure Drinks Pvt. Ltd. The ratio of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of M/s. Cibatul v. Union of India - 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J 68), would be relevant in this connection. 5. In view of the foregoing, Govt. uphold the order-in-appeal and drop the review proceedings.
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1978 (2) TMI 104
Sugar - Rebate of Excise duty on excess production - Estoppel - Alternate remedy ... ... ... ... ..... ought not to have issued directions of the nature contained in the trade notice. 10. In the counters filed in the several Writ Petitions a point was. raised that the petitioners had an alternate remedy by way of an appeal under Section 35 of Central Excises Act, and Revision to the Central Government under Section 35. In my view, the pursuit of the remedy provided by the Act, in the circumstances of the case, having regard to the instructions issued by the Central Government, the highest authority under the Act, would only be an exercise in futility. The highest authority constituted under the Act having already pre-determined the question and directed all the subordinate tribunals constituted under the Act to interpret the notifications in a particular manner, the statutory remedy has ceased to be a remedy. There can, therefore, be no bar to the maintainability of these Writ Petitions. The Writ Petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150/- in each.
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