Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 153 Records
-
1978 (9) TMI 181
... ... ... ... ..... So as there is no direct evidence to prove that Joseph Thomas went to attend the meeting at the Bishop’s house at the instance of the appellant and spoke there at his instance, and as the circumstantial evidence referred to above was inadequate to reach that conclusion, we are constrained to set aside the finding of the trial court that it was the appellant who "obtained and procured the services of P.W. 6, a police officer, in furtherance of the prospects of the election of the 1st respondent, and the corrupt practice set out in sub-section (7) of section 123 of the Act has been established beyond any doubt." We have given our reasons for differing with the trial court about what was said by Joseph Thomas in the meeting at the Bishop’s house. The appeals are allowed with costs, the impugned orders of the High Court dated December 21, 1977, under sections 98 and 99 of the Act are set aside and the election petition is dismissed. N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
-
1978 (9) TMI 180
... ... ... ... ..... 4, from the sum of ₹ 2,35,453-1-0 instead of from the sum of ₹ 1,50,000/. We do not think there is any justification for the course adopted by the High Court. The plaintiff did not choose to mention in the plaint the particular items of debit which he was giving up. There is, therefore, no reason why the amount given up by the plaintiff should be treated as attributable to the items of debit which have now been found to be not proved. We are, therefore, of the view that the total of the unproved debit items together with interest i.e. the sum of ₹ 80,894-8-4 should be deducted from the sum of ₹ 1,50,000/- for which amount only the plaintiff filed the suit. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to a decree for ₹ 69,105-7-8 with interest at 4 from the date of suit till realisation. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed in part.
-
1978 (9) TMI 179
... ... ... ... ..... t rule 5(8) is deleted but the previous concessions given to the industrialists concerned will continue. It appears, however, that so far as the appellant is concerned, it has not executed any sale-deed though it was allotted a plot which was also demarcated. Apart from the point which we decided in the other appeals there being additional points of law involved in this case, we do not think that this was a fit case which should have been dismissed in limine by the Bombay High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal and remit the case to the High Court for re-admitting and disposal of the writ petition according to law. The point regarding the interpretation of Government order dated 30-7-1968 has already been decided by us in Civil Appeals No. 2009 and 2081 of 1969 and 355 & 356 of 1970 referred to above and will apply to the present case also, if the appellant is able to prove that it falls within the four corners of the Government order. Appeal allowed & remitted.
-
1978 (9) TMI 178
... ... ... ... ..... t possible to accept the grounds given by the Assessing Authority for rejection of the accounts. There is no clear finding that the assessee evaded the surveying party. Even assuming that he did so, only an adverse inference could be drawn against the assessee that in case he had produced his accounts before the surveying party it might have gone against him. 1 his presumption by itself was not sufficient for rejecting the accounts. Some further defect had to be found before this circumstance could be used to corroborate the conclusion that the accounts were not regularly maintained. The second question is only a repetition of first question, and on the finding given on the first question it must be held that there is no material for sustaining the finding regarding rejection of accounts. 4. Both the questions referred are answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at ₹ 200/-.
-
1978 (9) TMI 177
... ... ... ... ..... able law empower the Bellary Municipal Council to claim the municipal taxes retrospectively or prospectively from the Railway concerned in respect of its property situated within the limits of the Municipal Council. The amount of tax which the Municipal Council was getting from the Railway in respect of such property was quite considerable and was, perhaps, necessary for the funds of the Municipality. Such considerations are foreign and not germane for our purposes for deciding the constitutional point at issue. We are regretfully constrained to decide it against the Municipal Council on a plain reading of the constitutional provision engrafted in Article 285(2). We accordingly hold that the respondent's suit cannot be decreed against the appellant. ln the result the appeal succeeds and the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside. But in the special circumstances if the case we direct the parties to pay and bear their own costs through- N.V.K. Appeal allowed.
-
1978 (9) TMI 176
... ... ... ... ..... n for hearing within six weeks after the filing of the counter-affidavit. 83. The learned counsel who appeared before us for the High Court as also the learned counsel who appeared before us for the State of Andhra Pradesh agree that the High Court and the State Government will not raise any objection to the maintainability of the writ petition which respondent 1 desires to file for challenging the order of compulsory retirement, either on the ground of laches or of delay or on any other technical ground. All the contesting parties before us are agreed that the writ petition to be filed by respondent 1, as aforesaid, may be disposed of by the High Court on merits. 84. The Government of Andhra Pradesh shall comply with the order passed by this Court on March 22, 1978 within four weeks from to-day. 85. We quash the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal dated September 19, 1977 in R. P. No. 319 of 1976. We will give our reasons in support of that conclusion later.
-
1978 (9) TMI 175
... ... ... ... ..... lly invoked the review jurisdiction of the Competent Officer, which did not exist, to their advantage, and to the disadvantage of the present appellant, by their application dated March 12, 1958, they could not be heard to say, when the Department invoked the self-same jurisdiction on two important grounds (to which reference has been made earlier) that the review orders of the Competent Officer dated July 10, 1958 and September 8, 1958 were void for want of jurisdiction and must be set aside for that reason. The conduct of the writ petitioners was therefore such as to disentitle them to certiorari, and the High Court erred in ignoring that important aspect of the matter even though it was sufficient for the dismissal of the writ petition. The appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court dated February 26, 1964, is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case. Appeal allowed.
-
1978 (9) TMI 174
... ... ... ... ..... n for hearing within six weeks after the filing of the counter-affidavit. 83. The learned counsel who appeared before us for the High Court as also the learned counsel who appeared before us for the State of Andhra Pradesh agree that the High Court and the State Government will not raise any objection to the maintainability of the writ petition which respondent 1 desires to file for challenging the order of compulsory retirement, either on the ground of laches or of delay or on any other technical ground. All the contesting parties before us are agreed that the writ petition to be filed by respondent 1, as aforesaid, may be disposed of by the High Court on merits. 84. The Government of Andhra Pradesh shall comply with the order passed by this Court on March 22, 1978 within four weeks from to-day. 85. We quash the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal dated September 19, 1977 in R. P. No. 319 of 1976. We will give our reasons in support of that conclusion later.
-
1978 (9) TMI 173
... ... ... ... ..... gion of interference with the administration of the institution, a right which is guaranteed to the minority under Article 30. The Rule, therefore, must be interpreted narrowly and is held to be inapplicable to a minority educational institution in a situation of the kind with which we are concerned in this case. We do not think it necessary or advisable to strike down the Rule as a whole but do restrict its operation and make it inapplicable to a minority educational institution in a situation like the one which arose in this case. It follows, therefore, that the impugned orders dated 5-6-1973 and 2-S-1974 passed by the Regional Deputy Director and the District Education officer respectively are bad and invalid and must be quashed. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and grant the relief to the appellant to the extent and in the manner indicated above. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed .
-
1978 (9) TMI 172
... ... ... ... ..... ences committed by public servants, that the legislature in its wisdom adopted the device of amending section 161 of the Code by adding the Explanation to it and by providing also that the enlarged definition shall govern all the provisions of the 1947 Act. 6. Not finding any merit in the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants, we hold that the enlarged definition of the expression "public servant" as contained in the Explanation added to section 161 of the Code by section 2 of the Kerala Act governs all the provisions of the 1947 Act, that the appellants are public servants within the meaning of that enlarged definition by reason of the language employed in clause (iv) of the Explanation and that, therefore, the offences under clause (c) of sub- section (1) of section 5 of the 1947 Act said to have been committed by them are triable exclusively by Special Judges appointed under the 1952 Act. 7. Both the appeals are accordingly dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
-
1978 (9) TMI 171
... ... ... ... ..... treme positions, is fraught with democracy by proxy of a coterie, of which the nation, in its naivete, may not be fully cognizant. Therefore, the system of law-making and performance auditing needs careful, yet radical, re-structuring, if participative, pluralist Government by the People is not to be jettisoned. We have laid down the law and obeyed the precedents but felt it necessary to lay bare briefly the political portents implicit in the extent law, for action by the national leadership betimes. Who owns and operates India, that is Bharat ? That disturbing interrogation becomes deeply relevant as we debate and decide the jurisprudence of delegation of power and vicarious exercise and so we have pardonably ventured to make heuristic hints and to project new perspectives. The journey’s end is in sight. The discussion has come to a close. The notification suffers from no infirmity. The writ petitions stand dismissed. Costs one set. (to the state) Petitions dismissed.
-
1978 (9) TMI 170
... ... ... ... ..... epting their prayer for adjournment. There was denial of natural justice and they have accordingly pleaded that the case may be remanded to the Appellate Collector for deciding the same after giving them opportunity of being heard. 4. The goods involved after seizure was kept in the custody of the petitioners and those were disposed of by them. Unfinished products cannot be marketed; their plea that the goods were not fully manufactured is not acceptable. The date for personal hearing in this case was fixed on 25-3-1976 by the Appellate Collector. The petitioners’ advocate submitted an application for adjournment but was told by the Appellate Collector that the case will not be adjourned. It was the discretion of the Appellate Collector either to accept the request for adjournment or reject the same. The advocate in the circumstances should have argued the same. Thus, there was no denial of natural justice. 5. The Revision Application is accordingly rejected.
-
1978 (9) TMI 169
... ... ... ... ..... d be insisted that the petitioner should seek the relief of refund of the amount paid by it by instituting the suits. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the amount of ₹ 3629.34 is being withheld from the petitioner without any authority of law and as the writ petition was filed within three years of the date when the mistake became known to the petitioner, there is no ground for refusing relief to it. No other point was argued by the learned Counsel for the parties for our consideration. 32. The result is that these petitions succeed. We allow these petitions and quash the impugned orders. So far as the amounts claimed by the petitioners in all these eight petitions are concerned, there is no dispute about the quantum. We also direct the respondents to refund the amounts. The particulars of the impugned orders and the details of the amounts are mentioned in the Schedule appended to this judgment. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1978 (9) TMI 168
Whether the prosecution was instituted in the instant case within six months next after the commission of the offence as required by S. 533 of the Act?
Held that:- The offence charged against the respondent consists, not in the erection of an obstruction by him, but in his failure to comply with the direction lawfully given to him to remove that obstruction; that the offence must be deemed to have been committed by the respondent, if at all, not on the date of the notice viz. December 5, 1967 nor on any anterior date but on the expiry of the period permitted to him for removing the obstruction viz. on the expiry of fifteen days after the receipt of notice; and that, the expression "six months" which occurs in S. 533 of the Act means six calendar months and not 180 days.
For these reasons we set aside the judgment of the High Court and send back the case to the learned Magistrate for disposal in accordance with law.
-
1978 (9) TMI 167
... ... ... ... ..... be substituted and shall be inserted respectively. Therefore, these phrases added in the year 1972 cannot be read in the original text of the schedule. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that mritasanjiwani sura being an ayurvedic preparation, was not subject to the levy of Finance sales tax for the period ending on 31st March, 1969, as the law then stood. In this view of the matter, the impugned orders by the Superintendent of Taxes, the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes and the Assam Board of Revenue are liable to be struck down, to the extent Finance sales tax has been levied on mritasanjiwani sura. Accordingly, we allow this petition and set aside the levy of Finance sales tax on the petitioner s turnover of mritasanjiwani sura for the period ending on 31st March, 1969. However, since the point canvassed before us was not taken before the Board of Revenue or the lower authorities, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. LAHIRI, J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
-
1978 (9) TMI 166
... ... ... ... ..... s been estimated by applying a profit rate of 12.5 per cent on the sales made by the assessee. The rate of profit applied by the Sales Tax Officer appears to have been adopted from the order of the Incometax Officer. Now, in income-tax assessment, profit rate applied is by reference to the prevailing profit generally earned by assessees in the particular line of business carried on by them. It appears that the assessee had accepted the assessment and had not challenged it by an appeal. This being so, in the circumstances, the Sales Tax Officer could have relied upon the profit rate applied by the Income-tax Officer for estimating the turnover of the assessee. There was as such material on the basis of which the estimate of turnover was made. Both the questions for the assessment year 1964-65 are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1978 (9) TMI 165
... ... ... ... ..... anomalous intention to the legislature. Sri V.D. Singh contended that this view is not consistent with the object of the amending Act. The amendment was effected so as to change the quantum of deposit required of a dealer for filing an appeal. The contention was that while before the amendment the dealer had to deposit only the admitted amount of tax, the amending provision made it incumbent that the correct amount of tax be deposited. It is undoubtedly true that prima facie an amending Act has to be treated as effecting a change in the law as prevailing before it was passed, but this presumption cannot override the express language of the amending statute. There is no dispute that the tax as calculated by the assessee had been deposited in full at the time of the filing of the appeal. This being so, the appeal was rightly entertained. The revision has no force and is dismissed. As no one appeared on behalf of the assessee, there is no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1978 (9) TMI 164
... ... ... ... ..... lative intent cannot be used to curtail the explicit provisions of section 4-B(1). This apart the legislative intent of a statute has, apart from other things, to be gathered from its provisions. Inasmuch as section 4-B permits a concessional rate only to dealers who have recognition certificate, it can safely be assumed that the legislative intent was to grant relief only to such persons, who have obtained a recognition certificate under section 4-B(2). Thus, neither the explicit language of section 4-B nor the legislative intent deducible from this provision sustains the contention that the advantage of the certificate granted to the manufacturer can be availed of by the purchasing agent. The revision is accordingly allowed and the decision of the Judge (Revisions) is reversed. A copy of this order will be sent down to the revising authority in accordance with section 11(8) of the Act. The department is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Petition allowed.
-
1978 (9) TMI 163
... ... ... ... ..... e under the first return does not salvage the position, as it could not convert the first return into a return as required by section 7(1) and rule 41(1). The result is that the first return filed by Sri Laxmi Narain Gupta, Advocate, was not a valid return. The answer to the second question is obvious, once the first question has been answered in favour of the assessee. The basis of the penalty under section 15-A(1)(b) is the concealment or inaccuracy detected on a comparison of the first return and second return, and once the first return is out of the way, the second return truly reflects the turnover of the assessee and no penalty can be imposed on its basis. The first question is accordingly answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee, and the second and third questions in the negative. As the questions referred have substantially been answered in favour of the assessee, it is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1978 (9) TMI 162
... ... ... ... ..... ther decision of this Court in Indian Ceramic House, Agra(3), also in no way helps the department s contention. It is not possible also to accept the contention that as kokat was being used primarily in the locality as raw material for making paper, it should not in that area be treated as firewood. The notification in respect of firewood has been issued under section 3-A and is applicable to the entire State. This being so, an interpretation, which holds good for the entire State of U.P., should be put on the word firewood . Firewood as commonly understood includes all wood, which are used primarily for purposes of fuel. Kokat undoubtedly answers this description and would, therefore, fall within the ambit of the word firewood as used in the relevant notification. The question referred is answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to his cost, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.
........
|