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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 153 Records
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1978 (9) TMI 161
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... ... ..... al procedure. It cannot, therefore, be said that the adjudications were beyond the competence of the sales tax authorities, nor they violated the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, nor this is a case of assuming jurisdiction by wrongly deciding jurisdictional questions of law or fact. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the orders are nullity. The view we have taken finds support from the single Bench decision of this Court in State of M.P. v. Laxman1970 M.P.L.J. 233., wherein it has been held that the suit which was in substance directed against recovery of the tax was barred under section 37 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act. The remedy of the plaintiff was to use the machinery provided by the Act to question the recovery. The plaintiff s suit is clearly barred under section 37 of the Act and it has been rightly dismissed. 10.. Accordingly, the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee as per schedule, if certified. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (9) TMI 160
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... ... ..... materia, they have been applied to proceedings arising under the Act in the case of Mohd. Yakub and Sons v. Sales Tax Officer, Fatehgarh 1972 30 S.T.C. 406. Judging from these principles, the letter received by the Sales Tax Officer was one which would create a mere suspicion on which he may have started an inquiry. It could not form the basis of a reasonable belief required by section 21 to initiate the proceedings. It is worthwhile noticing that similar information existed at the time of the original assessment but no action was taken thereon. The character of the information being the same, it could not on the second occasion instil a reasonable belief in the Sales Tax Officer, without further inquiry, that turnover has escaped assessment. For the foregoing reasons, the question referred is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee, and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its cost, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (9) TMI 159
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... ... ..... he merits. In the above view, we hold that the learned single Judge rightly quashed the impugned assessment orders in respect of the periods ending 31st December, 1967, and 31st December, 1968, including the appellate order in respect of the four quarters ending 31st December, 1969. It is, however, necessary to clarify that the Commercial Tax Officer, Jorasanko Charge, would be at liberty to make fresh assessments in respect of these two periods if not otherwise barred. In making the said assessments, the Commercial Tax Officer would be required to determine the taxable turnover for the two periods in question and, inter alia, to consider the deductions claimed by the registered dealer in accordance with law. Subject to these observations, we dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs. Let the security furnished at the time of issue of the civil rule be returned to the respondent (petitioner in the rule) after three months from date. RAY, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (9) TMI 158
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... ... ..... Bench judgment in Sri Chand v. State of Haryana C.W.P. No. 3365 of 1977 decided on 18th August, 1978 (Punjab and Haryana High Court).. We, therefore, conclude that section 20(5) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act is constitutionally valid. 11.. The learned counsel for the petitioners had further conceded that the challenge to the vires of section 5 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act stands concluded against them by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kultar Singh and Bros. v. State of Punjab 1979 44 S.T.C. 330. (C.W.P. No. 329 of 1978) decided on 1st August, 1978. 12.. No other point was urged. 13. The writ petitions are without merit and are consequently dismissed. This, however, would not bar the petitioners from pursuing their statutory remedies by way of appeal or revision, if strictly available to them, under section 58 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. 14.. There will be no order as to costs. S.C. MITAL, J.-I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (9) TMI 157
Whether a particular contract is a contract of sale or a contract of work and labour?
Held that:- Allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and hold that the contract in the present case was a contract for work and labour and not a contract for sale and, conformably with this view, we answer the question referred by the Sales Tax Tribunal in favour of the assessee and against the revenue
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1978 (9) TMI 154
Whether the supply of meals by the petitioner to the residents, who pay a single all-inclusive charge for all services in the hotel, including board, if they desire to partake of it, without entitling them to a rebate, if they miss it, is taxable under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, as extended to the Union Territory of Delhi?
Whether the service of meals to casual visitors in the restaurant is taxable as sale when the charges are lump sum per meal or when they are calculated per dish?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. As the service of meals to visitors in the restaurant of the appellant is not taxable under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, as extended to the Union Territory of Delhi, and this is so whether a charge is imposed for the meal as a whole or according to the dishes separately ordered.
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1978 (9) TMI 139
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... would only be just and proper to allow the I.T. department an opportunity to file its claim before the official liquidator in respect of the amount of interest that is alleged to be payable by the company in liquidation under section 220(2) of the Act and to have the said claim duly adjudicated upon by the liquidator. Accordingly we direct that the department may file before the liquidator a fresh claim for the amount said to be due by the company in liquidation by way of interest under section 220(2) of the I.T. Act, 1961, within one month from to day, and, if that is done, the liquidator should adjudicate upon the said claim- in accordance with law, more particularly in accordance with the provisions contained in the Companies Act and the Companies (Court) Rules. The appeal is allowed only to the limited extent indicated above. The parties will bear their respective costs. Carbon copies of this judgment will be furnished free of cost to the counsel appearing on both sides.
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1978 (9) TMI 131
Order under section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 challenged - Held that:- Appeal allowed. By virtue of that appointment, the entire company comes under the control of the authorised person appointed under that provision, it is not for us to explore here the effect and import of the order of the Central Government under section 18AA and we desist from doing so. All that we need do and that we can do in the present appeal is to allow it so that the Company Law Board's direction in regard to seven additional directors will come into full force until the final decision of the High Court.
We may make it clear that the learned Additional Solicitor-General did assure the court that nothing which will stultify the two writ petitions before the High Court will be done by the Company Law Board or the Central Government. We hope the High Court will dispose of the case very expeditiously.
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1978 (9) TMI 123
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... ... ..... d as profits and gains of business and not as income from other sources. In CIT, Gujarat vs. Motilal Hirabhai Spinning and Weaving Contended. Ltd., (4) the assessee company was originally running a textile mill which was subsequently closed down. Thereafter, it earned interest on certain advances and deposits made by it. The Gujarat High Court held that the interest income was liable to be taxed as income from other sources. The above decision covered the issue raised in this appeal. It held that the interest income earned by the assessee is liable to be taxed as profits and gains of business and not as income from other sources. Hence the expenses claimed by the assessee should be allowed as business expenditure. Accordingly, I direct the ITO to allow the expenses as business expenditure. The decisions relied on by the learned departmental representative are distinguishable and have no application to the facts of the instant case. 4. Income the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (9) TMI 120
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... ... ..... are taken into consideration and even is Shri Narnoli has denied subsequently, it could not be said that the deposits appearing in the name of Sundaram Narnoli has denied subsequently, it could not be said that the deposits appearing income the name of Shri Sundaram Narnoli were the concealed income of the assessee. Consequently, the payment of interest during the years under appeal on the deposits made by Shri Narnoli could not be doubted. These are penalty appeals where the burden is lying upon the assessee and the assessee has Prima facie discharged its onus to prove that the loans were genuine and consequently, the payment of interest was real. Under the above circumstances, the penalty could not be sustained and the case of the assessee is supported by the decision of Supreme Court in 76 ITR 696. Consequently, the penalty order passed by the IAC are set aside and the ITO is directed to refund the penalty, if already, collected. 5. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1978 (9) TMI 117
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... ... ..... re the transaction becomes exigible to gift-tax. We find that the conclusion which we have arrived at is in conformity with the conclusions of the Kerala High Court in CGT vs. R. Kesavan Nair(3). 25. Before parting with this appeal, we have to refer to the case of N. Durgaiah vs. CGT (8) which was also relied upon by the Department. It is sufficient to state that the point before the Court there was whether the deed of settlement was a family arrangement or not and thus exempt from gift-tax. The Court negatived the plea that it was a requisites of a valid gift had been satisfied. The ratio of the judgment does not, in our view, support the stand of the Department any more than the other judgments of the same Court in which we have referred. 26. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us as under It is necessary that the gift should have been accepted by the donee if it were to be taxed under s. 3 of the GT Act, 1958. 26. The case will now go back to the original Bench.
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1978 (9) TMI 115
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... ... ..... ished a valuer s report. The District Valuation Officer s report is also available. The AAC has not attempted either to reconcile the two or to get an explanation for the difference between the two from any quarter. Neither a proper valuation of these assets nor rendering justice to the parties would be possible without requiring the presence if both the valuers and getting the difference between the valuation settled by examination or cross-examination as may be necessary by either party. 5. Apart from the mandatory provisions of s. 23 (3A) therefore, in the interest of justice, we have to remit the matter back to the AAC for giving an opportunity to the District Valuer as well as the assessee s valuer to be present before him for cross-examination as to the process of the valuation adopted by them in arriving at the value of the assets. Both the assessee and the WTO also must be given adequate facility to present their case. For statistical purposes the appeals are allowed.
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1978 (9) TMI 113
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... ... ..... a truck . Since admittedly the motorised three-wheelers in the present case have been used for transporting goods we have no hesitation in holding that these three-wheelers would fall under the head motor lorries and are thus entitled to depreciation at 30 per cent. We would further state that the three-wheeled motorised vehicle carrying goods is most certainly not a motor-car-motor cycle, scooter or other moped which is entitled to only 20 per cent depreciation, which is the rate allowed by the Revenue. Applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Badhai Pal vs. Asst. STO., Akola(1), construing the term motor lorry in a popular sense meaning i.e., that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the depreciation schedule is dealing, would attribute to the entries, three wheelers used for transporting goods would only fall under the category of motor lorry and non other. 3. We direct allowance of depreciation at 30 per cent. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (9) TMI 112
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... ... ..... they would do under the Hindu law as joint family property. Their Lordships said clearly that it was not so. Their Lordships said that even though the property was the ancestral property of Palaniappa Chettiar by reason of s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, Karuppan Chettiar s son would have no interest in the property. Their Lordships said that the provisions of the statute, namely, Hindu Succession Act, would prevail over the provisions of Hindu law. Their Lordships finally concluded that there cannot be any HUF in regard to the property which Karuppan Chettiar got as a result of such succession of his father s property. The point considered by the Full Bench has no relevance to the point at issue before us. In the instant case the assessee has obtained the property not by inheritance, but in a partition between himself and his father. 3. For the foregoing reasons we uphold the orders of the authorities below as regards the status of the assessee. The appeals are dismissed.
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1978 (9) TMI 111
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... ... ..... not claimed based on the old Rules which require at least a month of user. No doubt, the Rules have changed but it is not beyond the realm of reasonable probability that such a mistake may have been made and depreciation not claimed. Non-claiming of depreciation, therefore, does not militate against the claim of the assessee that the machinery was used. The machinery having been ready to go in use on 30th March, 1975 in as much as it was installed and in as much as there are no circumstances which lead to the inference that the machinery could not be used on the 30th and 31st March, we would come to the conclusion that there is no material to disregard the statement that the machinery was in fact used on the 30th and 31st March, 1975. We would, therefore, for the reasons given by us, differ from the conclusion arrived at by the Commissioner and direct the restoration of the allowance of the development rebate of Rs. 38,339 which was allowed by the ITO. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (9) TMI 110
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... ... ..... e of the assessee, because, in that case, the Supreme Court held A person can still be held to be the owner of a sum of money even though the explanation furnished by him regarding the source of that money is found to be not correct. From the simple fact that the explanation regarding the source of money furnished by A, in whose name the money is lying in deposit, has been found to be false, it would be a remote and far fetched conclusion to hold that the money belongs to B. There would be in such case no direct nexus between the facts found and the conclusion drawn therefrom . Thus, we are of the opinion, that on the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the assessee had reasonably explained the amount of Rs. 20,000 as not belonging to the estate. We accordingly delete the addition as sustained by the AAC. In other words, we delete the entire sum of Rs. 20,000 added by the ITO to the total income of the assessee under the head other sources . 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (9) TMI 109
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... ... ..... O apparently felt that since the assessee would have received its share of commission only on first auction, the payments to agents should be disallowed, as not relating to the accounting period. We are unable to subscribe to this view. The agents have already canvassed for the business. There are a large number of agents involved. There is no dispute regarding the factum of payment. Business having been already canvassed for, services having been rendered and since payment is made for such services rendered and payment was in the accounting period, we consider that the full amount of Rs. 10,557 is an admissible deduction. This finding of the AAC is also upheld. 8. Regarding the expenditure on coffee, tea etc. on visitors, this Bench of the Tribunal has been consistently following the ratio of the Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Patel Bros. and Co. Ltd.(2). We therefore, upheld the finding of the AAC in this regard also. 9. The appeal of the Department is accordingly dismissed.
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1978 (9) TMI 108
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... ... ..... essee is entitled to the relief under s. 80L. It is not disputed that the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act applies to the U.Co. Bank. Though as a matter of convenience the foreign branch of the bank where the deposit is would be dealing with the assessee for purposes like operation of the accounts, the person with him the assessee deals as the bank is the U. Co. Bank. If a suit has to be filed by or against the assessee, it would be the U. Co. Bank which would come into picture and not any particular branch of the same. We have no hesitation, therefore, in holding that these deposits in the foreign branch of the U. Co. Bank are deposits with the Banking Companies to which the Banking Regulation Act applies for the purposes of s. 80L. In the opinion given by the learned counsel for the Department as that of the Law Ministry no reason has been given for holding otherwise. We, therefore, accept the assessee s claim for relief under s. 80L and allow the assessee s appeal.
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1978 (9) TMI 96
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... ... ..... the property under the gift made by the deceased. On a similar question the Tribunal have already rejected a reference, there being no referable question of law one such rejection was in R.A. No. 3. (Mds) of 1978-79, dt. 19th March, 1978 to which one of us was a party. It has been held that it will be self evident from s. 33 (1) (o) that property taken under any gift made to the spouse, son, daughter, brother or sister beyond the period of five years would be exempt provided that the property is either chargeable under s. 5 of that Act, for any assessment year commencing after the 31st day of March, 1964. When similar gifts have been made to the sons and in respect of the properties so taken under the gifts, s. 33(1)(o) squarely operates. In our opinion, when all the facts for the requirement of the application of the section are present in this case, we find that no referable question of law thus arises consequently we decline to state a case. 5. The application is rejected.
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1978 (9) TMI 94
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... ... ..... ved if the returned income is accepted. s. 23(1)(a) of the WT Act does not use the same terminology. Word aggrieved has not been used in the WT Act. The word is objecting to the amount of net wealth. If, therefore, the WTO has failed to grant any exemption, the assessee has a right to prefer an appeal if he objects to the amount of net wealth determined under this Act. It may also be noted that s. 246 excludes an appeal against an order passed under s. 143(1) of the IT Act in specific terms. There is no such exclusion in the WT Act. Therefore, the analogy from the IT Act will not hold good for deciding a question about the maintainability of the appeal against an order passed under s. 16(1) of the WT Act. 8. We hold that an appeal was maintainable against the order of the WTO and the learned AAC was wrong in taking a contrary view. The order of the AAC is set aside and the case is remanded to him for disposal according to law. 9. The appeal is allowed for statistical purpose.
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