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1979 (1) TMI 120
... ... ... ... ..... ss and this action of the ITO was confirmed by the AAC in appeal. it is against the sustenance of disallowance of Rs. 5,000 from travelling expenses incurred in foreign countries that the assessee has come up in appeal before us. 10. We have heard the rival submissions of both the sides and we are of the view that the entire expenses on travelling including expenses on lodging and boarding cannot be allowed and as such disallowance in respect of lodging and boarding deserves to be disallowed. As the ITO had disallowed to Rs. 5000 out of foreign travelling expenses on estimate basis, we restrict the disallowance to Rs. 500. only and as such we modify the order of the AAC and hold that the assessee is not entitled to foreign travelling expenses to the tune of Rs. 2,500 instead of Rs. 5,000. Accordingly the assessee will be entitled to weighted deduction of Rs. 2,500 allowed by us by way of travelling expenses. 11. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed as indicated above.
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1979 (1) TMI 119
... ... ... ... ..... f the shares of the company. In the present case the gratuity fund of the assessee has been recognised by the CWT by his order dt. 8th March, 1974 w.e.f. 5th Sept., 1973. The endorsement to the order shows that actually the trust had been already formed and the Commissioner desired the company to furnish a statement to the effect that the moneys of the fund stand transferred to the fund or the trustees. On the ruling of the Madras High Court the amount payable by the assessee company to the trustees on the date of formation of the trust and any subsequent amount payable to the trustees, as on the valuation date, has necessarily to be deducted in arriving at the break up value of the shares of the company. We hold accordingly and direct and AAC to find out the correct position in this regard and, if necessary, to recompute the value of the shares of M/s International Instruments Pvt. Ltd. having regard to our above observations. 9. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1979 (1) TMI 118
... ... ... ... ..... e profits of the two yrs. have been assessed as per their shares in the assessee-firm. Thus, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we hold that the appellant firm is a genuine one and the authorities below were not justified in refusing the registration and continuation of registration respectively in both the years to the assessee-firm. Besides the above-we have noted that at page 12 of the paper book the amount of Rs. 1,500 which was deposited in the assessee-firm in the account of Khadeeja Bibi have been added to the income of the assessee-firm which shows that for all intents and purposes the ITO has taken the assessee-firm as a genuine firm. In this view of the matter, we reverse the orders of the authorities below in both the yrs. under consideration and direct the ITO to allow registration to the assessee-firm in the asst. yr. 1975-76 and continuation of registration in the asst. yr.1976-77. 5. In the result, the appeals filed by the assessee are allowed.
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1979 (1) TMI 117
... ... ... ... ..... owed 1/3rd of the conveyance expenses as claimed by the assessee while the AAC upheld the disallowance though the disallowed amount was worked out at Rs. 8,078. 5. It was argued before us by the assessee that the partners were living close to the place of business and that the two cars owned by the firm were being very substantially used for the purpose of business. It was, therefore, pointed out that the disallowance should be reduced. The departmental representative on the other hand, pointed out that for the asst. yr. 1974-75 the disallowance was to the same extent as in the year under appeal though the total claim was only Rs. 13,509. 6. Having regard to the fact that the total car expenses were nearly twice as those claimed for the earlier year while the turnover went up from Rs. 8,11,364 to Rs. 12,87,609. We consider the rate of disallowance as adopted by the lower authorities to be reasonable and we decline to interfere. 7. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1979 (1) TMI 116
... ... ... ... ..... goods in the reasonable belief that those were smuggled goods but there must be something mores in support of such reasonable belief when the court is required to ascertain the position whether there are prima facie materials warranting framing of a charge under Section 135(i)(b)(ii) of the Customs Act. In the present case no such materials is forth coming. Some witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution have merely stated that they had reasonable belief that goods seized were of foreign origin but there is nothing in support of such reasonable belief. This being the position, we hold that there was no material before the learned Magistrate on the basis of which he could be satisfied in framing the charge under Section 135 (1)(b)(ii) of the Customs Act against the petitioner. 5. The Rule is accordingly made absolute, the impugned Order is set aside and the proceeding is quashed. Let the seized goods be returned to the petitioner. 6. Order per P.C. Borooah . - I agree.
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1979 (1) TMI 115
Conviction - Sentence - Search and seizure ... ... ... ... ..... d (Control) Act arises. 11.Before concluding this judgment we have got to observe that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate ought not to have admitted in evidence the certificates said to have been issued by Ramesh (Ex-P-4) as Ramesh was not examined. Merely because P.W. 1 has identified the signature of Ramesh on the certificate, it is not admissible as the same does not fall under Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, Ramesh being dead by the time the trial took place. 12.In view of the foregoing reasons, the contention of the appellant that the sentence passed by the learned Magistrate on the respondents-accused calls for enhancement has to fail and the contention of the accused-respondents that they are entitled to be acquitted succeeds. Hence, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the respondents (K. Abubakar and K. Abdul Rahiman)- accused 1 and 2 in C.C. 204/76 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mangalore, and acquit them.
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1979 (1) TMI 114
Prosecution - Evidence ... ... ... ... ..... .M. Chhaya, learned Public Prosecutor has sought to rely on one circumstance, which according to him proves the guilt of accused No. 4. The circumstance on which Mr. Chhaya relied was this. The tests disclosed that silver seized from the pick-up van was similar to silver ingots found from the factory of accused No. 4, during search. Mr. Chhaya submitted that similarity of the quality of silver was a strong circumstance which indicated that accused No. 4 was involved in the commission of the crime. It is however, not disputed by him that there were no distinguishing marks on the silver ingots found from the factory of accused No. 4 and the silver seized from the van. Therefore, there is no satisfactory evidence to show that the silver ingots and pieces seized from the van came from the factory of accused No. 4. In our opinion therefore, the circumstance on which Mr. Chhaya relied does not help the prosecution. 9.In the result, we have no alternative but to dismiss this appeal.
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1979 (1) TMI 113
Conviction of Sevantilal Karsondas Modi for an offence under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 135 of the Customs Act 1962, and a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a year recorded by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay
Held that:- We would consider it extremely unsafe to regard the confession exhibit Z-383 signed by the appellant as having been made by him voluntarily and therefore trustworthy. The appellant, in our opinion, has shown the existence of circumstances which make it appear to the Court that the confession may well have been obtained in a manner which would bring it within the ambit of Section 24 of the Evidence Act, it being undisputed that the concerned officers of the Department of Customs were "persons in authority" within the meaning of that expression as used in the section.
In the result the appeal succeeds and is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is reversed, the conviction recorded against and the sentence imposed upon the appellant by the learned trial Magistrate and upheld by the High Court are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge in its entirety
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1979 (1) TMI 112
Import licence - Debiting of c.i.f. value consignmentwise not admissible - Valuation - Customs Officers - Duties of
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1979 (1) TMI 111
Refund — Exemption based on annual turn over ... ... ... ... ..... ning refund had been exceeded. 5. Counsel to some extent, debated before us the abstract question as to whether a period of limitation would start running before the cause of action had arisen and whether the period of limitation can be said to run even while there is no person to sue. These would take us to a region of law into which it is unnecessary to enter for the purpose of this case. We think the plain provisions of the Rule must be given effect to and on the terms thereof, the writ petitioner s application for refund must be found to have been preferred beyond time. The view taken by the Assistant Collector, in his order dated 13-11-1972, and by the Appellate Collector in Ext. P4 order, and the revisional authority in Ext. P6 order, was correct, and the learned Judge was wrong in interfering with the same. We allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Judge and direct that O.P. No. 124 of 1975 will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (1) TMI 110
Conviction and sentence invalid if there was no legal evidence that the accused was in possession of smuggled goods
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1979 (1) TMI 109
Cotton fabrics ... ... ... ... ..... erved that the technical literature defining the term Duck and Canvas , which is well known in the textile industry, that cloth popularly known as Do Suti and Ded Suti in technical terminology are not distinguishable from duck. 8. In view of the fact that construction particulars of the fabrics manufactured by the petitioners are identical to those of duck variety fabrics and further in view of the ratio of the Allahabad High Court judgment in the case cited above, Govt. are of the view that the fabrics in question are correctly classifiable as duck fabrics within the contemplation of entry 19-I (1) of the Central Excise Tariff. 9. In so far as the demand of duty is concerned, Govt. observe that the calculation of the same is essentially a question of fact. The Assistant Collector is accordingly directed to arrive at the correct assessable value and determine the exact quantum of duty payable by the petitioners. Subject to this, the revision application is otherwise rejected.
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1979 (1) TMI 108
Cooling Coils - Liability - Penalty - Criteria ... ... ... ... ..... Without prejudice to the above, it was submitted that no penalty was warranted as there was no intention to evade payment of duty. The pipes were fitted to the cold storage under the impression that duty was payable only after approval of classification list and price-list. 4. Government of India notes that as the pipes as fitted in the cold storage, to pass refrigerant gas, they are cooling coils leviable to excise duty. 5. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the order regarding penalty is set aside. The revision application is otherwise rejected.
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1979 (1) TMI 107
Whether the prosecution had made out its case?
Held that:- On a consideration of the evidence against the second accused we have no hesitation in agreeing with the trial Court that the prosecution has failed to prove any of the charges against him.
So far as the first accused is concerned when the case for the prosecution is that the first accused used to give false T.P.I. numbers in his sale notes, the prosecution cannot rely on the No. in T.P.I. form for showing that the quality of the tobacco transported was the first quality. It may be that the first accused gave a wrong No. but that would not prove that he transported the first quality tobacco on which higher duty is payable under the guise of the second quality. Even taking into account this circumstance we are not satisfied that the case against the first accused has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
Unable to confirm the conviction and sentence imposed upon the two accused. We set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the order of acquittal of both the accused passed by the trial Court
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1979 (1) TMI 106
Offence for anti-social acts - Imposition of heavy sentence ... ... ... ... ..... tence is sought, adequate circumstances should be brought in support of the demand. It would not suffice to merely urge that the offence is anti-social in character. Some more light has to be as thrown as to the occupation and status of the accused with a view to establish that he is smuggler or a dealer in smuggled goods. It is not shown that the accused is a regular dealer in the smuggled gold or is a carrier of smuggled gold. I, therefore, think that the interest of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to a period already undergone as the accused appeared to be a casual purchaser of the gold. 3. The revision is therefore, dismissed but the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to a period already undergone. The sentence of fine is maintained which the accused will deposit in the court of Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Jodhpur within 15 days in default of which he will serve out the sentence of imprisonment as awarded to him by the learned lower court.
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1979 (1) TMI 105
Refund - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... course, if a government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well-founded, it has to be upheld by the Court, but what we feel is that such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by a government or a public authority, unless of course the claim is not well founded and by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable. Here, it is obvious that the claim of the respondent was a just claim supported as it was by the recommendation of the Assistant Collector of Customs and hence in the exercise of our discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution, we do not see any reason why we should proceed to hear this appeal and adjudicate upon the plea of the appellant based on Section 110 of the Madras Port Trust Act (II of 1905). 3. 8195 We accordingly revoke the special leave granted to the appellant, and direct that the appellant do pay the costs of the respondents.
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1979 (1) TMI 104
Duty liability - `Used' - Connotation of - Synthetic organic derivative - Classification of goods - Wrong order - Classification - Alternative remedy - Existence of
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1979 (1) TMI 103
Labels used on drugs ... ... ... ... ..... terms of proprietary medicine. At the personal hearing they reiterated the stand taken in their written appeal and also relied on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case M/s. Indo French Pharmaceutical Co. v. Union of India and others (1978 Tax Law Report 1856). Samples of the disputed labels have been enclosed with their appeal. They are also available in the original file of the Baroda Collectorate. 3. The Board has examined the samples of the disputed labels. The Board agrees with the appellants that the words Manufactured in India, DODEL LABORATORIES, 120, Vapi industrial Township, Vapi, Gujarat appearing on the labels are only such as are required under Rule 94 of the Drugs and Cosmetic Rules, 1945 and are not such as to bring the drugs in question within the definition of proprietary medicine. The name of the manufacturer on the label is no more prominent than the name of the preparation. In the circumstances, the Board sets aside the order of the Collector.
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1979 (1) TMI 102
Whether the customs authorities were justified in applying the rate of duty (to the imported goods in question) according to the rate prevalent on the date of their actual removal from the warehouse?
Held that:- The rate of duty, rate of exchange and tariff valuation shall be those in force on the date of actual removal of the warehoused goods from the warehouse. As it is not in dispute before us that the goods, which are the subject matter of the appeals before us, were removed from the warehouse after the Amending Order had come into force on July 7, 1966, the customs authorities and the Central Government were quite right in taking the view that the rate of duty applicable to the imported goods had to be determined according to the law which was prevalent on the date they were actually removed from the warehouse namely, the amended Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. There is therefore no force in the argument that the requirement of the amended Section 15 should have been ignored simply because the goods were imported before it came into force, or that their bills of lading or bills of entry were lodged before that date. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (1) TMI 101
Fabrics - Processing of grey cloth - Taxable event - Demand notice - Duty paid under mistake of law - Admissibility of refunds
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