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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 137 of 137 Records
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1979 (12) TMI 17
Commissioner, Settlement ... ... ... ... ..... lement had come into existence and in fact when the settlement was reflected in the orders of the ITO making the assessment and the same order having been served on the assessees, the demand became due and the tax became due for payment within 35 days of the service of the notice. If the assessees had approached the ITO for delayed payment of the tax by instalments, the ITO could also pass orders but he had no jurisdiction to waive the interest as observed earlier. The only possible construction which can be given to cl. 2(ix) of the settlement is that the Commissioner agreed to receive the payment of the tax in the manner stipulated therein, but it cannot be successfully contended that there was any agreement that the interest due under sub-s. (2) of s. 220 of the Act will not be charged from the assessees. For the reasons recorded above, there is no merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. S. S. DEWAN J.-I agree.
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1979 (12) TMI 16
Estate Duty, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... eased in the property. In answering the reference, it was held that the exemption under s. 33(1)(n) should be computed after the value of the share of the deceased was determined and in the light of the decision in CED v. Estate of Late R. Krishnamachari 1978 113 ITR 200 (Mad). What was meant was that the value of the joint family properties, would have to be worked out in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and the value of the property to the extent exempted under s. 33(1)(n) would, at that stage, have to be deducted and the share of the deceased ascertained accordingly. A combined reading of s. 39 and s. 33 can produce no other result. The result is that, in the present case, the question referred to us has to be answered in the following manner. The exemption provided under s. 33(1)(n) of the E.D. Act should be allowed in respect of the dwelling house only to the extent of the share of the deceased in the joint family properties. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 15
Income From Property ... ... ... ... ..... erent considerations would arise. We do not propose to consider any such question here as it does not arise here. The learned counsel for the Commissioner drew our attention to the following cases Raja Mohammad Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur 1965 AIR 1965 SC 1923, CIT v. Biman Behari Shaw Shebait 1968 68 ITR 815 (Cal), CIT v. Union Land and Building Society Private Ltd. 1972 83 ITR 794 (Bom) and S. B. (House and Land) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 785 (Cal). As pointed out by the Calcutta High Court itself in the last mentioned decision, the question of ownership has to be considered only in the light of the particular facts and we have to consider the question only in the light of the peculiar terms of the document before us and also the nature of the interest created in favour of the lady. The result is, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to her costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 one set.
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1979 (12) TMI 14
Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... computing the income under the different heads with reference to the relevant statutory deduction for the purpose of determining the income under s. 11 (1), the question of allowing any other outgoing by way of expenditure in addition to the statutory deductions as contemplated by the second question does not arise and, therefore, we do not answer the second question. The result is, the Tribunal will have, now, to dispose of the appeal afresh in the light of our decision as well as the decision of this court referred to already, namely, T.C. Nos. 643 and 644 of 1975, decided on August 9, 1979 (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rao Bahadur Calavala Cunnan Chetty Charities-since reported in 1982 135 ITR 485) and it will expressly go into the claim of the assessee that the income-tax paid during the year in question should be allowed as a deduction for the purpose of determining the income under s. 11(1)(a) of the Act and render a finding thereon. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 13
Protective Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... off the assessment would make the recovery bad. It was also submitted that the protective assessments (even if they are held to be enforceable), were against the unregistered firm and that, therefore, under the I.T. Act, the liability of such assessments cannot be enforced against the partners of the firm. Mr. Deshpande contended that the amount of tax can be recovered from the partners, even though the assessments are against the firm. All these aspects, however, need not be considered, particularly when we have come to a conclusion that, in the present case, the tax under the protective assessments cannot be recovered. The result, therefore, is that the petition succeeds rule is made absolute. The impugned notice dated March 25, 1977 (annex. A to the petition) and the revisional order dated May 27, 1977 (annex. D to the petition) are quashed and as such no recovery of the tax on the basis of these documents should be effected. There would, however, be no orders as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 12
Deduction, Offences ... ... ... ... ..... o the coming into force of s. 278B of the Act, position of law was the same. We are, however, of the view that if the Legislature itself thought of clarifying the position of law, it would not be proper for us to assume something to be in existence and then to go on to punish a person for a criminal offence. We, therefore, affirm the view taken by the learned Chief judicial Magistrate and decline to allow the appeal as against the respondents Nos. 1 to 3, but we see no reason why respondent No. 4, i.e., the company itself, should be allowed to escape liability. Consequently, we hold this respondent guilty under s. 276(b) and (d) read with s. 276B of the Act and order it to pay a fine of Rs. 200 only. For similar reasons, Criminal Appeal No. 1208 of 1977 is dismissed qua respondents Nos. 1 to 5 and is allowed qua respondent No. 6, i.e., the company, which is convicted of the same offence and is ordered to pay fine of Rs. 200 only. The two appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
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1979 (12) TMI 11
Estate Duty, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... the question as to whether such circular could constitute information for the purpose of issuing a notice under s. 59(b) of the Act because, in the instant case, the only information on the basis of which the notice under s. 59(b) was founded was the view of the audit, as is clear from the order-sheet dated February 27, 1975, recording the information on the basis of which notice under s. 59(b) was issued. The fact that this was the only information is also clear from the stand taken in para. 7 of the return. The respondent, therefore, in the circumstances of the case, must be held to have no jurisdiction to proceed with reassessment. For all these reasons, this petition is allowed. The proceedings for reassessment commenced by the respondent against the petitioner under s. 59(b) of the Act are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1979 (12) TMI 10
Best Judgment Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... n Lal v. CIT 1978 115 ITR 524 (SC) The officer is to make an assessment to the best of his judgment against a person who is in default as regards supplying information. He must not act dishonestly or vindictively or capriciously because he must exercise judgment in the matter. He must make what he honestly believes to be fair estimate of the proper figure of assessment, and for this purpose he must, their Lordships think, be able to take into consideration local knowledge and repute in regard to the assessee s circumstances and his own knowledge of previous returns by and assessments of the assessee, and all other matters which he thinks will assist him in arriving at a fair and proper estimate and though there must necessarily be guesswork in the matter, it must be honest guesswork. In that sense, too, the assessment must be, to some extent arbitrary. The result is that we do not find any force in these writ petitions, and dismiss the same, but without any order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 9
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... ... ..... nd that in the view the Tribunal took that the penalty is imposable in accordance with the law applicable in the year of assessment, the Tribunal did not record a finding on the question as to when the wrongful act was committed by the assessee and, therefore, we are not in a position to determine that question and consider the rival contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. This question will have to be decided by the Tribunal in order to give effect to the opinion which we are expressing in this reference. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative and against the assessee. We again make it clear that in order to give effect to our opinion the Tribunal will have to determine the question of fact as to when the wrongful act was committed by the assessee after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1979 (12) TMI 8
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... , though, in accordance with the provisions in force at the time when the assessment was completed, the orders levying penalty could have been passed only by 26th April, 1972, there was an amendment of the law, in the meantime, that is, before the expiry of the said period of limitation. It is now well settled that if before the limitation period expired, the period of limitation is extended, the limitation provision, being a procedural one, the extended period of limitation would apply to such proceedings. This has been laid down in S. C. Prashar v.. Vasantsen Dwarkadas 1963 49 ITR 1 (SC), which has been recently followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Addl. CIT v. Watan Mechanical and Turning Works 1977 107 ITR 743 FB . The result is that the question referred, at the instance of the assessee, is to be answered as follows The levy of penalty is not barred by time, in view of the amendment of s. 18(5) of the W.T. Act. There will be no order as to costs in both matters.
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1979 (12) TMI 7
Delay In Filing Return, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... as can be seen from the written orders of the ITO and the AAC. That apart, the wrong approach relating to the burden of proof adopted by the Tribunal also might have contributed to the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal in cancelling the penalty. We, therefore, hold that the reasoning of the Tribunal is illegal and consequently the order of the Tribunal must be held to be erroneous and contrary to the law enunciated by the aforesaid Full Bench of this court. However, we do not propose to express any opinion on the question whether the assessee has satisfactorily explained the delay in filing the return in the facts and circumstances of the case. For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the questions is in the negative and in favour of the Department and against the assessee. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has to pass appropriate orders in the light of the aforesaid judgment after affording reasonable opportunity to both the parties. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 6
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... ... ..... ings. We have also held in that case that it is the law in force on the date on which the wrongful act is committed which would determine the penalty. This case was subsequently followed by us in Addl. CIT v. Ratanchand Sewakram 1985 151, ITR 112 (MP) .In the present case also, the penalty proceedings were initiated for concealment of income in the second return filed by the assessee which was after April 1, 1968. In the circumstances, in view of the aforesaid decisions, it has to be held that, in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the default was attributable to the return of income filed in the course of the original assessment proceedings and the amended provisions of section 271 (1)(c) of the Act were not applicable. In view of the discussion aforesaid, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1979 (12) TMI 5
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... ... ..... the assessee s contention that the collections were in accordance with the custom prevailing in the Mattancherry bazaar for specific disbursements to charities. He accordingly deleted the addition. The Revenue preferred an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal followed certain prior decisions of its own finding that a custom existed in Mattancherry bazaar with respect to hill produce market for the collection of laga. It held that the assessee collected money only as the agent for distribution as charities. The Tribunal was of the view that the collections would not constitute the assessee s trading receipts. The Department s appeal was dismissed. The view taken by the Tribunal has been sustained recently by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Bijli Cotton Mills (P.) Ltd. 1979 116 ITR 60. Following the said decision, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 4
Reference Application ... ... ... ... ..... e Agricultural Income-tax Act, are allowable deductions in computing the agricultural income under section 5 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act ? The question so referred is covered directly in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by a recent decision of this court in CIT (Agrl.) v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd. 1978 115 ITR 624 (Ker). Following the said judgment, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 3
Assessment of annual value for the levy of house tax where the building is governed by the provisions of the rent control legislation, but the standard rent has not yet been fixed - held that in the case of self-occupied building also the annual value must be determined on the basis of the standard rent determinable under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
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1979 (12) TMI 2
Assessee is member of HUF whose ancestral house is maintained in India by the karta. Assessee visits India casually and stays either in hotel or family house as a guest - whether the respondent-assessee was a resident in the taxable territories under s. 4A(a)(ii) - his stay in the family house has been found to be as a guest enjoying the hospitality of his kith and kin rather than as an inhabitant of his abode or home - the assessee, in our, view, was rightly regarded as a non-resident
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1979 (12) TMI 1
Interpretation of s. 2(6A)(e) - assessee is the HUF - Loan advanced by company to HUF who is a beneficial shareholder - shares registered in name of the karta. Whether the loan could be treated as " deemed dividend " in the hands of the HUF -Held, no
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