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Showing 21 to 40 of 97 Records
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1979 (5) TMI 138
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... ... ..... the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner has not availed of the statutory remedy. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate that these writ petitions should be dismissed merely on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the result, we hold that the goods used as the packing materials by the company for packing cotton or wool, after the same was pressed, namely, hessian cloth and iron hoops, are not chargeable to sales tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, because there was no transaction of sale of such materials in the circumstances of these cases, as has been explained above. We, therefore, allow all the four writ petitions and quash the orders of assessment passed by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Beawar, and also the subsequent orders passed by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer in these matters. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 137
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... ... ..... ce of the service of the notice dated 6th May, 1965. As the petitioner has prayed for a writ of prohibition on the ground that the Commercial Taxes Officer lacked jurisdiction to issue notice or take proceedings under section 12 for reassessment, and as the proceedings for reassessment are yet to take place, we do not think that it would be proper to refuse relief to the petitioner in this case on the ground of delay. In our view, the petitioner has sufficiently explained the delay in this case, which has occurred in filing the writ petition. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we allow the writ petition and quash the notice (annexure C) dated 6th May, 1965, issued by the Commercial Taxes Officer under section 12 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, and prohibit the respondent from taking any action for reassessment in pursuance of the fresh notice issued on 6th May, 1965. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 136
Court fees - whether there exists a broad co-relationship with the fees collected and the cause of administration of justice?
Held that:- Allow the appeals and the writ Petitions to the extent and direct the Market Committees and the State Marketing Boards not to realize market fee at the rate of Rs. 3/- per hundred rupees on the basis of their impugned decisions and actions which have been found to be invalid by us. We leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
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1979 (5) TMI 135
Whether as owner or usufructuary mortgagee, tenant or otherwise were tax-free goods or of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act which required the turnover relating to sales to a registered dealer of goods specified in his certificate of registration for use by him in the manufacture in Punjab of any goods other than goods declared tax-free under section 6 for sale in Punjab to be deducted from the gross turnover of any dealer in order to arrive at the "taxable turnover"?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In the instant case, the taxable event is the purchase of paddy and not its sale which alone attracts section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act and the taxable person, that is, the person liable to pay tax, is the purchaser and not the seller. The appellants cannot, therefore, complain that any exemption granted to them by the Act has been taken away. Even though the liability to pay purchase tax may be on the appellants, it is bound to have repercussions on the price at which they buy paddy and the price at which rice manufactured by them out of that paddy is sold by them. The tax payable under the Act admittedly being an indirect tax, the tax burden would ordinarily fall on the consumer of rice and not on any of the intermediaries including the appellants. The impugned notification cannot, therefore, be treated as one issued against the policy of the statute.
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1979 (5) TMI 134
Whether any of the provisions in sections 33(6) and 35 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 which are in pari materia with sections 14(6) and 15, respectively, of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 offend article 14 of the Constitution and, as such, are void?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Section 33(6) of the 1959 Act and section 14(6) of the 1953 Act do not violate article 14 of the Constitution and are valid.
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1979 (5) TMI 117
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... unable to accept the plea that the petition should be dismissed in limine. I need hardly add, however, that it will be open to the company, when the petition is heard, to set out its case in greater detail and to show that there is no case for winding up. In these circumstances, the winding-up petition is admitted. Sri Jain had made a request that, in case, I decided to admit the petition, I may hold up the publication of citation by a short time to enable the company, if so advised, to file an appeal against my order. I accept this request and direct that the petitioner-firm should take no steps for publication of the citation regarding the admission of the petition for a period of three months from today. Let the petition be listed for directions as to publication on 21st August, 1979. C.P. No. 97/79 is admitted. C.A. No. 36 of 1969 stands dismissed. C.A. No. 472 of 1978 which is a petition for appointment of a provisional liquidator will stand adjourned to August 21, 1979.
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1979 (5) TMI 108
Winding up – Statement of affairs to be made to official liquidator, Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases
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1979 (5) TMI 100
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... ... ..... 33(1)(b)(B)(i). In that connection it was found that the assessee therein was engaged in the business of purchasing rough castings an supplying the same to the manufacturers of pump sets, tractors etc., after machining and polishing them in its factory and one of the contentions raised by the ld. Counsel before the Madras High Court was that there was no manufacture as such because the assessee bought rough castings and returned the same after polishing them. The High Court was unable to agree with the submissions and held vide its order dt. 22nd Jan., 1979 after following its own reasoning in CIT vs. M.R. Gopal 1965 58 ITR 598 (Mad) that after the rough castings are polished, the product is a new product which is utilised as component in internal combustion engine and answered the question in the affirmative. We, therefore, hold that the assessee would be entitled to the relief under s. 80J as well as the allowance under s. 32(1)(vi). 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 98
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... ... ..... er finding is necessary in the case of the firm, in our opinion, cannot be accepted because if the firm was not engaged in the business of manufacture, the ITO would not have referred to the business as manufacture and sale of handloom sarees in the assessment order. In our opinion that finding is final and a second examination of the question is wholly unwarranted. As to the next question whether the partner of such a firm would be entitled to the exemption under s. 5(1)(xxxii), it has rightly been pointed out by the assessee s Counsel that there are a number of cases decided by the Tribunal wherein it had been held that the partner will be entitled to the exemption. In the light of the same we direct the WTO to take the assets of the partnership excluding those assets which are excluded under s. 5(1)(xxxii) and then compute the interest of the assessee in the firm in which he is a partner for purpose of computation of his net wealth. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 97
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... ... ..... ansfer of Rs. 30,000 was made only by Gurusamy out of his separate properties, still such transfer did not amount to gift as the same was made in discharge of the obligation which both under the law and under cl. 5 of the partial partition deed has been thrown upon him, namely, maintaining and educating and marrying of the daughters. The departmental representative, on the other hand, contended that in view of the decision of the Madras High Court in Ratnaswamy Nadar vs. CIT(2) such a transaction could not be considered as having been made for consideration and would therefore amount to a gift. In view of our finding that the gift, if any, had been made by Gurusamy in his individual capacity out of his separate properties it is not necessary to consider this alternate contention since the assessee before us is a HUF and not Gurusamy in his individual capacity. For the above reasons the cancellation of the assessment by the AAC is proper. In the result the appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (5) TMI 96
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... ... ..... account as part of the assets of the company. Such a contention was taken by the assessee in the course of the assessment proceedings before the WTO though in valuing the shares it had taken the provision made for proposed dividends also an item of asset of the company. The WTO rejected the above contention for the reasons mentioned in an annexure to his order. The AAC also rejected the above contention. In the Expln. 2 or r. 1D are enumerated what amounts shown as assets in the balance-sheet shall not be treated as assets and what amounts shown as liabilities shall not be treated as liabilities. Cl.(B) of Expln. 2 provides that the amount set apart for payment of dividend on preference shares and equity shares where such dividends have not been declared before the valuation date shall not be taken as a liability. In view of this clear provision the contention is devoid of merit and has been rightly rejected by the lower authorities. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1979 (5) TMI 95
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... ... ..... A.R. Narayanan. This is exactly the decision which the ITO should take by using the information after examining the assessee. The information should reasonably lead the ITO to believe that income had escaped assessment before he reopened the assessment under s. 147(b). The factual information contained in that letter was already before the ITO at the original stage. We are not here called upon to say how that information was used or not used. But the fact that it was there is sufficient to say that the present decision to reopen is only a change of opinion. The Commr. s decision cannot take the place of the ITO s belief that income has escaped assessment on the basis of the information which comes to him. In this case the information itself was not new. In view of this, we are unable to agree with the Deptl. Rep. That the assessment has been validly reopened. In view of this, it is unnecessary to consider the merits of the case. We accordingly dismiss the departmental appeal.
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1979 (5) TMI 94
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... ... ..... that the assessee has in fact paid anything more than what is stated in the documents. The mere fact that the assessee has accepted the assessment does not amount to an admission of concealment by the assessee. At any rate in reply to the penalty proceedings he has categorically stated that he had accounted for the actual amount paid by him in purchasing the lands and still no further enquiry has been made to disprove this version. We also find that the AAC was justified in holding that the Expln. to s. 271(1)(c) does not apply to the facts of this case. The assessee has placed all the materials before the officer and in the circumstances it cannot be said that the assessee was guilty of fraud, gross or wilful neglect. In view of the finding that there is no admission of guilt the decision in the case of Durga Timber Works cannot be applied. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we hold that the AAC was justified in deleting penalty 6. The appeal is allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 93
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... ... ..... ged in the processing of goods and also in the manufacture of goods. According to him, the said firm purchases yarn and dyes the same. Thereafter it delivers the dyed yarn to weavers for being woven into cloth. He further contended that even if the firm gets the cloth manufactured by third parties and not on its own looms, it should be considered as being engaged in the manufacture of goods. 6. As already stated, it is clear that the firm purchases yarn and dyes the same. This undoubtedly amounts to processing of yarn and therefore the firm has to be considered as one engaged in the processing of goods. It will therefore be an industrial undertaking . Even assuming that it sells the dyed yarn and thereafter buys cloth, it would still be an industrial undertaking, as it is engaged in the processing of yarn. We therefore, hold that the AAC was justified in accepting the claim of exemption for the assessee s interest in the said firm. 7. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1979 (5) TMI 92
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... ... ..... assessee. There is a completed sale and the consideration has accrued to him. The subsequent events are irrelevant for the purpose of the case. The assessee is, therefore liable to assessment on capital gains. He was rightly assessed. The AAC was right in dismissing his appeal. 3. The assessment appeal dismissed. ITA No. 3106/(Mds)/77-78. Concealment penalty-Appeal by assessee mdash Asst. year 1968-69 4. In original assessment no return was furnished. In the return furnished in reassessment, the figures of capital gains was shown in Part III. The assessee only pleaded that because of certain facts he is not liable for assessment. Under such circumstances, it is preposterous to say that assessee cancelled the income of capital gains or furnished inaccurate particulars thereof. The IAC was wrong in levying the penalty. There is absolutely no concealment in this case. There is no shred of evidence for concealment. 5. Appeal allowed. Penalty imposed for concealment is cancelled.
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1979 (5) TMI 80
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... ... ..... or allowance of Rs. 14,550, Rs. 25,900 and Rs. 14,050 for the above assessment years therefore are in order. For the asst. yr. 1974-75, the ground of appeal relates to a relief of Rs. 28,100 but the learned counsel for the assessee has clarified before us that this was a mistake for Rs. 14,050. The appeals are allowed. C. Kochunni Nair, J.M. mdash I agree with the Accountant Member. I will, however, add a sentence or two. If the interpretation put by the surtax authorities is the correct one, then the provisions in the First Schedule would have been drafted with much more simplicity like (viii). Such amount which is allowed as a deduction under s. 80G of the IT Act instead of this long winding clause as at pre sent. The limitation to Rs. 1 lac has not been incorporated into the provisions. If such limitation is to be made as was done by the surtax authorities then there would have been a specific provision to that effect in the First Schedule like the one contained in s. 80G.
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1979 (5) TMI 79
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... ... ..... fered by the assessee in respect of such discovery, the Hon ble High Court observed that the above sum unearthed in the house of the assessee s son-in-law cannot be held to represent the savings in the business of the assessee and it is remitted to India from time to time. The said decision therefore, would not apply to the facts of this case. We, therefore, agree with the AAC that the assessee s explanation that out of the funds available in Ceylon, remittances were made through unofficial channels is acceptable on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. We, therefore, uphold the orders of the AAC for 1973-74 and 1974-75. For the same reasons we are unable to uphold the orders of the AAC for the year 1975-76. We, therefore, delete the additions of Rs. 7,000 and Rs. 45,000 made in the assessments of the assessees for the year 1975-76 as income from other sources . 7. In the result, the appeals of the assessees are allowed and the appeals of the Revenue are dismissed.
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1979 (5) TMI 74
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... ... ..... Rs. 10,000 for the asst. yr. 1972-73 for purposes of education. 8. Another submission of the departmental representative (though not raised in the ground of appeal) was that for the asst. yr. 1971-72 in the case of the son the exemption has been claimed only for a portion, that there was still balance value of the gift left behind unclaimed. (According to the return the exemption asked for did not cover Rs. 7,710 left unclaimed) and that therefore the claim for Rs. 5,000 in the second year is not a Bona fide claim for purposes of education. We need only say that the assessee could have claimed the entire amount in the first year itself. But in this case the two returns were filed on the same date. We do not think that there is, therefore, much force in this submission. It is only a matter for clerical adjustment on the part of the assessee claiming the entire amount in one return instead of claiming it in two returns. 9. Therefore these two departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1979 (5) TMI 73
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... ... ..... l, in our view, which would show that there was a common control exercised by interlacing, dovetailing etc. over the affairs of the assessee and M/s. Rangaier and Bros. Merely because a few transactions of cheque may have been put through another common concern, it would not amount to interlacing, dovetailing etc. We do not repeat in this case the elaborate discussion in the order of the Tribunal referred to but in the light of the conclusions in law arrived at therein, with which we are in agreement, inasmuch as in the present case the business which are to be carried on by the assessee and M/s. Rangaier and Bros, are totally different and even the capital contribution by the partners is different, we are of the view that for the purpose of income-tax there are two distinct firms and assessments have to be made separately thereon. We accordingly set aside the order of the Commr. and restore the assessment as made by the ITO in the case of the assessee. The appeal is allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 72
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... ... ..... sion emoluments is wide enough to include pension payable to such officials. The Delhi Full Bench of the Tribunal also pointed out that since s. 18(1) of the IT Act, defines salary as including pension, the expression emoluments should be included in the pension which is found to be the part of the salary. Following the detailed reasonings given in the above Full Bench decision of the Delhi Benches of the Tribunal and since in the case of the very same assessee for the asst. yr. 1974-75, this issue was held in favour of the assessee by the Madras B Bench of the Tribunal, we agree with the finding of the AAC that the pensions received by the assessee are not taxable. 4. In view of such finding there cannot be further demand for payment of the compulsory deposit amounts. It is admitted by the ld. Deptl. Representative. that the compulsory deposits in respect of the taxed amount had been paid by the assessee. 5. In the result, all the six appeals by the Department are dismissed.
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