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Showing 161 to 180 of 200 Records
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1979 (7) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Accrual Of Income, Export Promotion, Right To Receive ... ... ... ... ..... lly we have just now disposed of the reference arising out of the Tribunal s order in the appeal against the assessment. It cannot be stated that the appeal was a frivolous one. The matter raised contentious issues and in such circumstances if the assessee believed that there was no liability to tax and, if the Tribunal considered that as the basis for cancellation of the penalty the Tribunal s conclusion cannot be challenged as erroneous in law. Paucity of funds also has been taken into account. A large amount was due from the polytechnic, which is an educational institution whose capacity to return the amounts taken as advances cannot be said to be good. In these circumstances, the Tribunal cannot be taken to have committed any error in cancelling the penalty. The question referred at the instance of the Commissioner is accordingly answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. As neither party has succeeded wholly in the reference, there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 39 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Passing Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... e order of the Appellate Controller and the Tribunal to reject the plea of the accountable person that the income for the earlier four years was also approximately equal (to the subsequent one). In our opinion, even if it was taken at some reasonably lesser figure it could not have been as low as Rs. 80,000 without any basis whatsoever. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that there was no material justifying the rejection of the plea of the accountable person that the income from the Halsoor estate for the four years preceding 1959 was approximately equal to the income of the succeeding four years. For these reasons we hold that the inclusion of a sum of Rs. 32,000, being the price of the Chikkannakonda estate purchased on April 4, 1962, in computing the value of the assets of the deceased applying s. 9 of the E.D. Act was not justifiable. Accordingly, the question referred in T.R.C. No. 80 of 1977 is answered in the negative and in favour of the accountable person.
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1979 (7) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s capacity as owner, upon whom a charge is created under s. 22 in respect of the income from that house property, does not also entitle him to have the benefit of s. 23(2) which provides for a beneficial method to determine the annual rental value for the purpose of s. 22. To put it differently, it is only the house owner who occupies his own house, for his own residence that would be entitled to the beneficial determination of the annual rental value provided under s. 23(2) of the Act, but not in any other capacity. Judged from any angle, we are satisfied that what has been decided by the Tribunal is in accordance with the provisions of ss. 22 and 23 and there is no legal flaw or error therein. For all these reasons, stated above, our answer to the question must be and is in the negative and against the assessee holding that the assessee is not entitled to claim the statutory allowance for self-occupation provided in s. 23(2) of the Act. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Higher Rate, Rate Of Depreciation, Special Rate ... ... ... ... ..... . Though the entry in this appendix has to be reasonably construed there is no question of any broad construction. If an industry does not fall within the entry it cannot be made good by any recourse to breadth of construction. In the present case, we do not consider that the Tribunal acted properly in allowing the depreciation at the rate of 15 per cent. as the industry does not fall within the entry. The learned counsel for the revenue submitted that the goods manufactured by the assessee were overhead cables and wires coming within the scope of Entry III (ii) A(2). As the ITO himself has allowed depreciation at the rate of 10 which is the general rate applicable to machinery and plant, for which no special rate has been prescribed in the Appendix, we do not think it proper or necessary to go into this aspect. The question referred is accordingly answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 one set.
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1979 (7) TMI 36 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons ... ... ... ... ..... he indications given by the W.T. Act. Under the circumstances, the notice, annex. B to the petition, which is challenged in this special civil application, must be quashed and set aside as the petitioner-club which is an association of persons is not an individual for the purposes of the W.T. Act and hence not an assessable entity as an individual, nor is there any other provision in the W.T. Act which makes an association of persons like the petitioner-club an assessable entity. It must be pointed out that the contention of the petitioner regarding association of parsons is only in the context of the W.T. Act and not in the context of any other piece of direct taxation. This special civil application is, therefore, allowed and the notice, under s.14(2)of the W.T.Act being the notice dated January 5, 1979 annex B to the petition, is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly. The respondent will pay the costs of this special civil application to the petitioner.
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1979 (7) TMI 35 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Account Books, Previous Year, Question Of Law, Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... the Act. So far as the first question is concerned, in view of the fact that we have called for a reference in the assessment proceedings, it would be proper to call for a reference in the penalty proceedings also. However, we have reframed the questions, so as to bring out clearly the extent of, dispute between the parties. The question, which we desire the Tribunal to refer to this court is as under Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee was guilty of concealment of income to the extent of Rs. 13,000 and was liable to pay a penalty on the sum of Rs. 13,000 even if the order passed in the quantum proceedings is varied to the advantage of the assessee in the reference called for in such proceedings ? We, therefore, partly allow both the reference applications and direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, to state the cases in both these proceedings and refer the questions as mentioned above to this court for its opinion.
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1979 (7) TMI 34 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Reference To High Court ... ... ... ... ..... ount of estate duty had been overpaid. This finding gave rise to the petitioner s right to get the refund of the amount overpaid with such interest as the Controller may allow. Thus, in our opinion, the petitioner s right to get refund arose only after the decision of the reference by the High Court, and, therefore, s. 29 has no application to the present case. The CED seems to be labouring under the impression that since the assessment was completed by the Deputy Controller, on October 30, 1958, before the coming into force of the Amendment Act, the provisions of s. 64(7) would not be attracted. This impression does not seem to be correct. The result is that we allow this writ petition, set aside the orders dated April 14, 1975, (annex. G ) and June 7/9, 1975 (annex.. I ) and hereby direct that accountable person or persons, as the case may be, shall be paid such interest on the amount of estate duty overpaid, as the Controller may allow. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Property Deemed To Pass ... ... ... ... ..... persisted, the sons were poorer to that extent. No useful purpose would be served by referring to the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Arunachalam Chettiar 1958 34 ITR (ED) 20, for, in that case, it was held that a coparcener had no definable share in the joint family property, and his interest did not pass on his death, for, s. 8 of the Act specifically includes such share. The decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Alladi Kuppaswami v. CED 1970 76 ITR 500 FB also does not resolve the problem in favour of the assessee. That case turns on fact that the widow s interest was not quantified. Here, under the terms of the partition deed, Rani Kalawati was granted a definite amount of money as an annuity and specific property was charged for its payment. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1979 (7) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... r Saraf and Smt. Gayatri Devi Saraf continued to remain with the other members of the family, and were messing together. It has been consistently held that living and messing jointly or separately are not conclusive of the fact that the family is either joint or partitioned See Hari Raj Swarup v. State of U.P. 1970 77 ITR 853 (All). The Tribunal erred in the circumstances of this case in holding that the family had not been partitioned. So far as registration is concerned, that has been refused solely on the ground that no partition had taken place in the HUF and, as such, the partnership could not be registered separately. On the conclusion that we have reached, that a partition had, in fact, taken place in the eye of law, the grounds for rejecting the registration application are not sound. We, accordingly, answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1979 (7) TMI 31 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Higher Rate, Rate Of Depreciation, Special Rate ... ... ... ... ..... e Income-tax Act of 1961 ? (2) If question No. 1 is answered in the negative, whether on the facts and in the circumstances the penalty of Rs. 19,000 levied on the assessee under section 271(1)(c) is valid and justified ? For the reasons stated above, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative holding that the Tribunal has rightly found that the order of penalty of the IAC was liable to be set aside on the ground that no reasonable opportunity had been afforded to the assessee and the Tribunal should have remitted the case to the IAC for deciding the case on merits after affording reasonable opportunity. In view of our answer to this question, the matter has to be remitted by the Appellate Tribunal to the IAC for decision on merits regarding the levy of penalty. The Tribunal will pass appropriate orders under s. 260 of the Act. In this view, we do not propose to express any opinion relating to the merits. The reference is answered accordingly. There is no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 30 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Any Person, Cash Credits, Voluntary Disclosure ... ... ... ... ..... contention of the assessee. But, with respect, we differ from the view expressed in that decision. The legal fiction created by s. 24(3) of the Act, by virtue of which the amount declared by the declarant has to be charged to income-tax as if such amount were the total income of the declarant , is limited in its scope and it cannot be invoked in assessment proceedings relating to some other person and rule out the applicability of the principle recognised by s. 68 of the I.T. Act, that cash credits which are not satisfactorily explained by the assessee may be assessed as income in the hands of the assessee. The construction placed upon the provisions of s. 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1965 by the Tribunal is, in our opinion, not warranted by the provisions of that Act. In our opinion, therefore, the answer to the question referred to us must be in the negative and against the assessee. Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference in the circumstances of the case.
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1979 (7) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Gift Tax, Immovable Property, Movable Property ... ... ... ... ..... t was held that once a gift deed was executed and had been delivered to the donee, the donor cannot revoke the gift even before its registration on the ground that the gift is not completed until the deed is registered. This decision also is of no relevance to the point in issue because we are concerned here with a case where there is no registered instrument of gift as required under s. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. In both cases, a deed had been executed and the only question was whether the deed became invalid or useless because of adoption in one case, and attempted revocation in another. There is no such deed here. The instrument in writing is only the compromise memo or decree. As they are not registered, there is no gift in this year. There is no liability to gift-tax in the previous year under consideration. The result is, the questions referred are answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will have his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1979 (7) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Transfer Of Case ... ... ... ... ..... the discharge of all functions under the Act relating to the assessee it was not necessary that the cases should also be assigned to the IAC when the reference to the functions to be performed by such ITO also included all proceedings concerning the assessee under the Act. The situation in this case is the same when the reference was made to the IAC, Range XX, whose jurisdiction was linked with the jurisdiction of the ITO, A Ward, Howrah, in respect of the assessee which did not include cases . In view of the above discussion, we are unable to sustain the order under appeal and hold that the proceeding commenced by the IAC, Range XXII, is legal and valid in law and within jurisdiction. The appeal accordingly succeeds and is allowed and the judgment and order under appeal are set aside. The application under art. 226 is dismissed and the rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order for costs in the circumstances. SANKAR PRASAD MITRA C.J.-I agree.
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1979 (7) TMI 27 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Notice, Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... he explanation of the assessee do not ipso facto attract penalty under s. 18 of the Act. It is impossible to say to what extent the mind of the Tribunal was affected by the consideration of the material for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1968-69 in arriving at the finding for this assessment year. The finding for this assessment year is also vitiated. We, accordingly, hold, on the facts and circumstances of the case, that the Tribunal was not right in law in upholding the order of penalty under s. 18(1)(a) passed by the WTO. We answer the question in the negative and against the department. To sum up, questions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are answered in the negative and against the department question No. 4 is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. We decline to answer question No. 5. We regret our inability to announce the judgment earlier, as one of us (Lahiri J.) was at Agartala Bench from 17th March, 1979, till Saturday last, the 30th June, 1979. K. LAHIRI J-I agree.
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1979 (7) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... passage has to be understood in the context of the facts and findings in that case. By the mere derivation of profits without more, no definite conclusion can be drawn. The existence of goodwill would depend on several factors. The extent of the profits made and its consistency will be an indication as to whether the profit is due to the existence of any magnetic quality in the business attracting custom. The Tribunal is, however, wrong in ignoring the existence of profits as being wholly irrelevant. Its relevancy is established by the Supreme Court s decision. In the present case, the Tribunal has not considered the existence of the goodwill in the light of the relevant circumstances, viz., the length of the business or its profitability. As the Tribunal s conclusion is in disregard of the relevant materials, the matter will have to be considered by the Tribunal de novo in all its aspects. The reference is accordingly returned unanswered. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 25 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... had any impact on the question of validity of the gifts are undoubtedly questions of law. Similarly, the question as to whether there was material before the Tribunal for coming to the conclusion that the gifts in question were not genuine is also a question of law. In our opinion, therefore, this is a fit case where the Tribunal should be directed to state the case and refer the following questions of law to this court for its opinion (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the gifts made by the guardians were void ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was material before the Tribunal for coming to the conclusion that the gifts in question were not genuine ? These applications are, therefore, allowed and the Tribunal is directed to state the case and refer the aforesaid questions of law to this court for its opinion. Parties shall bear their own costs of these applications.
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1979 (7) TMI 24 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... property in given, case, which constitutes a question of fact. If there are more than one valuation of the same property, the one which is reasonable and nearer to the correct market value, having due regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case alone should be accepted. Therefore, in such case if the higher valuation as between several valuations appears to be reasonable one, the same has got to be accepted. We are unable to accede to the submission that in cases where the value of the property is ascertained under more than one method, the lowest should be accepted. In the result, we answer the question referred for our opinion as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of these cases, the Tribunal was right in-law in holding that the valuation of the self-occupied property of the assessee, ascertained by adopting the land and building method, should be taken as the valuation of that property for assessing the tax liability under the Wealth-tax Act.
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1979 (7) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Appeal To AAC, Appeals, Interest Payable By Government ... ... ... ... ..... hin a period of one month from this day. In the light of the above discussion, as far as the first question is concerned, the answer is in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. The second question does not arise for consideration. Though the appeals before the AAC were not competent and the further appeals to the Tribunal could not also be, in one view, competent, the department having filed the appeals before the Tribunal, did not raise any objection to the maintainability of the present reference on the basis that the orders of the Tribunal were incompetent. The result is, no answer is given to the second question and the reference on that question is returned unanswered. In view of the fact that the Commissioner must have to consider the merits, whatever observations have been made by the Tribunal in this behalf would not in any manner bind the Commissioner or the assessee and the Commissioner will be free to dispose of the revision petition in accordance with law.
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1979 (7) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... x on such statutory obligation. They are not free to borrow as they please. They could not get the loan to the extent needed for carrying on an activity which was in a way forced on it. The sale of the securities thus became unavoidable. Any other trader would have hesitated to sell the securities at such a loss, for carrying on a business and do some benefit to the public. But the assessee had no choice and could not have refused to carry on the trade it was required to do by pointing out this loss. It is indeed harsh on an assessee like this that this loss cannot be allowed. We are, however, powerless to give relief to the assessee. We have to leave it to Parliament to move in this behalf if it so desires. After all, there are, nowadays, very strong voices heard in support of a fillip to the co-operative movement. The assessee has to look to these quarters for help. The second question is answered in the negative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (7) TMI 21 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment, Change In Constitution Of Firm, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... the only course that is open to the income-tax authorities is to make one single assessment for the entire period on the firm which was in existence at the time of the making of the assessment. It is not open to the income-tax authorities in such a case to compute tax separately for the two broken periods. Such a procedure would be illegal and contrary to the provisions of ss. 187 and 188 of the Act. The order of the Tribunal is due to a misconception of the provisions of s. 187 of the Act. We are satisfied that the Tribunal s view in this regard is erroneous and illegal. For all the reasons stated, our answer to the question is in the negative and against the assessee, holding that the assessment of the two periods for the entire assessment year 1969-70 should be made in one single assessment on the second firm, which was in existence at the time of making the assessment. In view of the fact that none appeared for the assessee-respondent there shall be no order as to costs.
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