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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 178 Records
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1980 (1) TMI 215 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (emphasis supplied) 13. The Supreme Court in 1979 CriLJ 1052, Hussam Ara Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar, observed that once an accused person has been under detention for a period of 90 days or 60 days (under clauses (i) and (ii) respectively) it is the duty of the Magistrate to inform the accused person that he was entitled to be released on bail. It is true that from the judgment it does appear that the Supreme Court was taking a note of the change of phraseology in the amended paragraph (as pointed out by us) but we cannot hold that the Court did not have change in view. 14. We would, therefore, answer the question thus While calculating the period of 90 days or 60 days under clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the period of detention authorised by the Magistrate under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 must be included. The matter may now be placed before the learned single Judge to decide the case.
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1980 (1) TMI 214 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... igh Court in the judgment under appeal we have come to the conclusion that the matter requires reconsideration at the hands of the trial court. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the Order of the High Court as also of the trial court and send the matter back to the latter court for a reconsideration of the question as to whether a Commission should be issued in this case or not if so for what purpose. The trial court is directed to do so keeping in view the judgment aforesaid of the High Court. No order as to costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 213 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... been forthcoming. Whether or not a reservation of 70% was called for has not been established conclusively. Indeed, there is hardly anything to show that the authorities applied their mind to a cool dispassionate judgment of the problem facing them. Popular agitation serves at best to arouse and provoke complacent or slumbering authority; the judgment and decision of the authority must be evolved from strictly concrete and unemotional material relevant to the issue before it. Unfortunately, there is little evidence of that in this case. For that reason, I join my learned brother in the directions proposed by him. The petitioners have raised other contentions also, principally resting on the allegation that the University of Delhi is a centrally administered institution, but I see no force in those submissions. Accordingly, subject to the two directions proposed by my learned brother the writ petition is dismissed and the parties shall bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (1) TMI 212 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce it is found that the notice instead of being addressed to the dealer who was to be made liable for the escaped turnover was addressed to an entity which did not exist the whole proceedings stand vitiated in law. The defect in notice was fatal to assumption of jurisdiction by a Sales Tax Officer." In view of the settled principle which is culled out from these various decisions given under Income Tax Act and Sales Tax Act the principle enunciated in Kalapa Nath's case cannot be held to be good law. 7. In the result this revision succeeds and is allowed. The question of law raised by the assessee is decided by saying that notice under Section 21 having been improperly served the initiation of proceedings was without jurisdiction and it could not be validated by participation of the assessee in the proceedings. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which are assessed at ₹ 300/-. The fee of Standing Counsel is specially fixed in this case at ₹ 300/-.
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1980 (1) TMI 211 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nts of the city of Ahmedabad in this behalf. In our opinion, the combined effect of these two notifications is to draw a distinction between the city of Ahmedabad and the rest of the State of Gujarat in view of different problems which arise in the city and not to discriminate against the residents of the city. Therefore, we are unable to come to the conclusion that the impugned notifications suffer from any constitutional infirmity under Article 14. So far as the applicability of those notifications is concerned, we have already stated that the second notification applies to the area where the offence punishable under Section 506 of the I.P.C. was alleged to have been committed by the petitioner. That area - Patrakar Colony- is within the limits of Vadaj village which is now a part of the City of Ahmedabad. The last challenge which Mr. Pandit has raised, therefore, is without any substance and fails. 16. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged.
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1980 (1) TMI 210 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... itted tax and assessed tax may not necessarily be same. The effect of assessment order was that tax assessed on ₹ 569 became payable at 10% but admitted tax continued to be 3%. 3. As regards acceptance of account book the order of Revising Authority cannot be maintained. There is no presumption that inter-state sale is not suppressed. Nor was entire sale made to Government department. In fact out of turnover of ten thousand only three thousand was claimed to be covered by 'D' form. The proper course for revising authority was to remand the case to appellate authority to decided appeal on merits. 4. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed in part. The question of law raised by Commissioner of Sale Tax is decided by saying (i) that appeal was wrongly dismissed for non-payment of admitted tax. (ii) Revising Authority could not accept account books on general assumption that no suppression is made in inter-state sales. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 209 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cuna was of the opinion that the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the opium seized was the opium which was sent to be Public Analyst. In fact, the prosecution realised its mistake and at the fag end of the trial an application was made under Section 540 Criminal Procedure Code to examine Nathu Singh, Gajraj Singh and Jawan Singh. This application was rejected by the learned Magistrate. Even before the High Court the stand taken by the Counsel for the State was extremely vacillating and at one time he filed an application for additional evidence and some time later chose to withdrawn it. It is obvious that the onus is on the prosecution to prove the entire case at the trial and the prosecution could not be allowed to fill up the gaps or lacuna left at the trial, at the appellate or revisional stage. In these circumstances, we do not find any error of law in the view taken by the High Court. We find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
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1980 (1) TMI 208 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... said notification came in for consideration before the Delhi High Court in Mahomed Khalid (supra). 59. We have very carefully examined the different passages of the book "Munaqibe Ahle Bait", which are considered by the State Government as objectionable, and we are of the opinion that they do not contain any matter which may be characterised as written in bad taste or couched in offensive or intemperate language. On the principles of law discussed above, the publication of this book cannot be said to be a criminal act which may be punishable under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code. 60. In view of our findings, the notification of the State Government dated June 28, 1977 is liable to be quashed. 61. The result is that this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The notification No. 6694-p/VIII-6-1196-76 dated June 28, 1977, issued by the State Government under Section 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is hereby quashed. We make no order as to costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 207 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ld the sale. The principle of these decisions has been approved by this Court in Radhakrishandas and Anr. v. Kaluram.(3). The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in Balmukand v. Kamla Wati & Ors.(4) That was a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale executed by the manager of the family without even consulting the other adult members of the family. The object of the sale was not to discharge any antecedent debts of the family nor was it for the purpose of securing any benefit to the family. The only reason for the sale of the land was that the plaintiff wanted to consolidate his own holding. The Court naturally found that there was neither legal necessity nor benefit to the estate by the proposed sale and the agreement therefore, could not be enforced. We do not see what relevance this case has to the facts of the present case. We accordingly allow the appeals and dismiss the suit with cost throughout. Appeals allowed.
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1980 (1) TMI 206 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re consideration would be whether the Association is carrying on any activity for profit, so as to fall with the word "exclusion" in s. 2(15). There is nothing to show that the assessee, in giving assistance by way of arbitration or issuing certificates of origin in respect of goods, was carrying on any activity for profit. The dominant purpose of the assessee Chamber is only to pursue an object of general public utility. 5. The services rendered in connection with arbitration or issue of certificates are only incidental. The income admitted for 1967-68 from these activities comes to ₹ 1,442/-, for 1968-69 ₹ 172/- and for 1969-70 ₹ 667/-. These figures are eloquent to show that the assessee had not indulged in any activity for profit. It is, therefore, manifest that the assessee is clearly entitled to the exemption under s. 11 of the Act. The question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 205 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ive. The ordinary meaning to be assigned to each of such specified items is that such item so specified is a separate taxable item for purposes of single point taxation in a series of sales and this will have to be so because nothing contrary has been shown. Stainless steel does not find place in this clause and therefore, it cannot be said to be covered by it. The view taken by the learned Revising Authority, therefore, cannot be accepted. The result would be, that in respect of the turnover of stainless steel sales tax would be chargeable at 3 1/2 . 6. So far as the question of surcharge is concerned, the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) was of the opinion that surcharge was not leviable on this turnover and since against that finding there was no revision filed by the Department, there is no occasion for going into that question. 7. In the result, the revision is allowed in part. Since no body has appeared for the respondent assessee, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 204 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. After all employment in the public sector has grown to vast dimensions and employees in the public sector often discharge as onerous duties as civil servants and participate in activities vital to our country's economy. In growing realization of the importance of employment in the public sector, Parliament and the Legislatures of the States have declared persons in the service of local authorities, Government companies and statutory corporations as public servants and, extended to them by express enactment the protection usually extended to civil servants from suits and prosecution. It is, therefore, but right that the independence and integrity of those employed in the public sector should be secured as much as the independence and integrity of civil servants. o p /o p I agree with what has been said by my brother Sarkaria J. I have added a few lines to emphasise some aspects of the problem. o p /o p P.B.R. Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1980 (1) TMI 203 - ITAT AMRITSAR
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... ... ..... der 5 r. 20 of CPC. In the case of the assessee, there is no report of the postman that the assessee refused to accept the service of the notice. We do not know in what circumstances the assessee refused to accept the service of the notice in the case which was before the Supreme Court. Refusal on the part of the assessee to take the notice is a very important fact with does not exist in the case of the assessee and, therefore, the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in 65 ITR 603(1) cannot be applied in the case of the assessee. 4. Considering the facts and the circumstances of the case of the assessee, we hold that the notice under s. 148 was not properly served on him and, therefore, the re-assessment order was not validly passed. The re-assessment order being invalid, the addition sustained by the CIT (A) cannot be upheld. 5. The assessee having succeeded on the preliminary point itself, there is no need for us to go into the merits of the case. 6. The appeal is allowed.
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1980 (1) TMI 202 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uring 6,860 sq. yards will be ₹ 13, 720/-. The value of 61,012 sq. yards, the tenants land, will be ₹ 1,22,024/-. Calculating it at the rate of 10 annas in a rupee the value of the appellant's share will be ₹ 76,265/-. The total value of this land thus comes to ₹ 89,985/-. Solatium of 15 on the said amount comes to ₹ 13,497/75 paise. Thus the total extra amount awarded by us over and above the amount awarded by the Courts below comes to ₹ 1,03,482. 75 paise. Thus the total extra amount awarded by us over and above the mount awarded by the Courts below a comes to ₹ 1.03,482.75 paise. The appellant will be entitled to interest on this amount also 6 per annum from the date of dispossession i. e. 1st may, 1951 till the date of payment. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and the judgments of the Courts below are modified. The appellant will also be entitled to get his proportionate costs in the High Court as also in this Court.
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1980 (1) TMI 201 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ue Intelligence whose comments were received on 16-10-79. Thereafter there was absolutely no justification for any delay in taking a decision on the merit of the representation. Even if we assume that there was some reasonable explanation for the delay from 28th September, 1979 to 16th Octo- ber, 1979, there appears to be no good explanation whatsoever for the delay from 16th October, 1979 to 2nd November, 1979 when the representation was rejected by the Government. It is manifest that the Government was not obliged to wait for the decision of the Board because it had to consider the representation independently of what the Board might say. In this view of the matter, we are satisfied that there has been unreasonable delay in deciding the representation filed by the detenu and that by itself is sufficient to render the detention void. For these reasons we allow this petition, set aside the order of detention and direct that the detenu be released forthwith. Petition allowed.
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1980 (1) TMI 200 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... wed and the order of detention passed against the petitioner is set aside and the petitioner-detenu is directed to be released forthwith. 2. In view of the order relating the detenu, Writ Petition No. 1377/79, being a petition from Jail, becomes infructuous and hence no orders need be passed in relation thereto.
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1980 (1) TMI 199 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Shri Hardev Singh, also, Without giving any finding on the questions raised or the reliefs sought in the writ petition, we think, that important questions of law had been raised in this case could properly be determined by the High Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 20. It was, therefore, not proper for the High Court to dispose of this matter in the summary manner, it did. We will, therefore, allow this appeal on this short ground, set aside the order of the High Court and send the case back to it with the direction that it should rehear the parties and dispose of the matter by a speaking order on merits in accordance with law preferably within six weeks from today. If for any good reason, the High Court is unable to dispose of the matter within this period, it shall pass suitable interim order in accordance with law directing extension of the permit for such further period as it may deem fit. Costs to abide the result.
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1980 (1) TMI 198 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... st Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, were not the same, the goods falling under different sub-items were correctly dealt with separately for computing the duty liability. The action of lower authorities stands to reason. Judging from the fact that the petitioners’ duty liability for the future under the law could only be revised, separately for the three varieties of goods whenever necessitated by changes in the quantum of production or changes in the rates of duty of the goods falling under Item 16B(i) and 16B(ii) as the case may be and hence the liability of computing the petitioners’ duty liability separately and independently in respect of each of the goods bearing different rates of Central Excise duty and thereafter taking the three for arriving at the total annual duty liability. 5. The order-in-appeal is thus correct in law and does not warrant any interference. The revision application, therefore, fails and is accordingly rejected.
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1980 (1) TMI 197 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t the mercy of any Authority in the matter of issuance of Transit Notes; they themselves have to issue the same. The requirement has been made with the object of defeating the evasion of payment of duty by merchants who are L-4 licensees and, is therefore clearly in public interest. In the case of Hari Shanker Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1954 Supreme Court 465), the petitioner, inter alia, challenged an order requiring him to take permit from Textile Commissioner to enable him to transport certain textile goods. It was ruled that the requirement could not the regarded as an unreasonable restriction on the citizen’s fundamental rights. In that case, it was the Textile Commissioner who had to be approached for issuing a permit. In the present case, the burden on the Sattadars is much lighter I, therefore, over-rule the petitioner’s contention on the third point also. 9. In the result, the writ application fails and is dismissed, but without cost.
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1980 (1) TMI 196 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... time of stock-taking; thus, confirming the appellant’s contention that variation in weights was mainly due to heavy rains. The arguments advanced in the written appeal as well as at the time of personal hearing have been duly considered. On the basis of the records available, it has been established that the appellant has been denied inspection of the documents relied upon by the Collector and cross examination of the Officer concerned. The show-cause notice was not very specific about the charges made. The variation in weight between the time of stock-taking and the time of release from detention also goes to support the appellant’s plea that the variation in weight was caused by excessive moisture because of heavy rains. Considering the evidence as a whole, it is difficult to conclusively establish the charge of substitution of tobacco by the appellant. Accordingly, the benefit of doubt is extended to the appellant and the Collector’s order is set aside.
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