|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 158 Records
-
1980 (12) TMI 184 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s are thus entitled to licences for the three periods in the writ petition, namely April September, 1960, October/March, 1961 and April/September, 1961. 8. The order of the Chief Controller of imports and Exports, New Delhi, dated 21-5-1962 in so far as it makes the transfer effective from October 1961-March, 1962 period is quashed end set aside. The consequent order of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Bombay, dated 30th November, 1966, the order of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports dated 8th January, 1968. the order of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports dated 19th August, 1969 (on the revision petition) are quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to give effect to the transfer of the quota rights from 1-4-1960 and to issue licences to the petitioner firm for periods (1) April September, 1960, (2) October/March, 1961 and (3) April/September, 1961. 9. The writ petition is allowed with costs. The Rule is made absolute.
-
1980 (12) TMI 183 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... first time, either by way of amendment to the Tariff, or by way of withdrawal of a total exemption, such goods are not to be subjected to duty if they were already in manufactured condition and ready for delivery. The appellants claim here is that 191.732 metric tonnes of Steel Ingots was in fully manufactured condition on the night of 8/9th April, 1979. Therefore, in view of the principle in such case referred to above, and also considering the Supdt. (Central Excise’s) letter dated 18-11-1980 to the appellant the appeal is accepted and the order of the Asstt. Collector of Central Excise is set aside.
-
1980 (12) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
Whether detention of the detenu was illegal?
Held that:- The materials and documents which were not supplied to the detenu were evidently a part of those materials which had influenced the mind of the detaining authority in passing the order of detention. They were a part of the basic facts and materials, and therefore, should have been supplied to the detenu ordinarily within five days of the order of detention, and, for exceptional reasons to be recorded, within fifteen days of the commencement of detention. In the counter-affidavit, it has not been asserted that these documents, which were not supplied, were not relevant to the case of the detenu.
The respondents have, in their counter-affidavit, stated that this representation was not addressed to the Central Government. It is, however, admitted that the Jailor had, on the request of the detenu, forwarded the same to the Central Government on July 18, 1980. No counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Central Government, showing that this representation was considered and disposed of by it. In matters touching the personal liberty of a person preventively detained, the constitutional imperative embodied in Article 22(5) is that any representation made by him should be dealt with utmost expedition. This constitutional mandate has been honoured in breach regarding the representation sent by the detenu to the Central Government.
It is an admitted position that the detenu does not know English. The grounds of detention, which were served on the detenu, have been drawn up in English. The whole purpose of communicating the ’ground’ to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the ’grounds’ are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed - The conclusion was therefore, inescapable that due to the aforesaid contraventions of constitutional imperatives, the continued detention of the detenu was illegal. Appeal allowed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 181 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Tribunal had any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award, particularly when it was based on evidence?
Whether the Tribunal became functus officio on the expiry of the 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parte award under s. 17, by reason of sub-s. (3) of s. 20 and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the award and the Central Government alone had the power under sub-s. (1) of s. 17-A to set it aside?
Held that:- Unable to appreciate the contention that merely because the ex parte award was based on the statement of the manager of the appellant, the order setting aside the ex parte award, in fact, amounts to review. In a case in which the Tribunal or other body makes an ex parte award, the provisions of O. IX, r. 13 of the Code are clearly attracted. It logically follows that the Tribunal was competent to entertain an application to set aside an ex parte award.
That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by respondent No. 3, acting on behalf of respondents Nos. 5 to 17 on January 19, 1977 i.e., before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It had jurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on merits. It was, however, urged that on April 12, 1977 the date on which the impugned order was passed the Tribunal had in any event become functus officio. We cannot accede to this argument. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on the date of the application made to it and not the date on which it passed the impugned order. There is no finality attached to an ex parte award because it is always subject to its being set aside on sufficient cause being shown. The Tribunal had the power to deal with an application properly made before it for setting aside the ex parte award and pass suitable orders. Appeal dismissed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 180 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ate Trading Corporation on the State Bank of India. The assessee had no privity of contract with the foreign purchaser. On these facts, the transactions are not sales in the course of export . We have considered a similar claim in Lakshmi Machine Works Limited, Coimbatore-641 020 v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by the joint Commercial Tax Officer, Coimbatore T.C. (R) Nos. 1300 to 1302 of 1977 and T.C. (A) No. 1393 of 1977 and Tax (R) Case No. 315 of 1979 1981 48 STC 342 and by a judgment pronounced today, we have held that the sales were only for export and not in the course of export and that the purchaser from the assessee was only the State Trading Corporation and not the foreign buyer. For the same reasons as those contained therein, we hold that the transactions were rightly brought to tax by the Board of Revenue and that, therefore, there is no room for interference with the order of the Board. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1980 (12) TMI 179 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sposing of the appeal the appellate authority passed an order which was clearly prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The Commissioner was, therefore, entitled under section 39(2) to revise the said order, as the order imposing penalty could have been passed by the appellate authority. In our opinion, the Commissioner was competent to revise the order of the appellate authority under section 39(2). The limitation for taking proceedings under section 39(2) for revising the order of the appellate authority is three years from the date of the appellate order. We have already stated that counting limitation from the date of the order of the appellate authority, the revisional proceedings were within limitation. 4.. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred as follows In the facts and circumstances of the case, the limitation under section 39(2) had to be counted from the date of the appellate order. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
-
1980 (12) TMI 178 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in difficulty but that has nothing to do with the seller. He is out of picture. Penal action under the Gold Control Act does not make the sale for export a sale in the course of export. There is no bond between contract of sale and actual exportation. The sale by the assessee therefore cannot be considered to be in the course of export. These were sales made for export. They fell in the illustration given in Nilgiri Plantation s case 1964 15 STC 753 at 759 (SC) which has been quoted earlier in the judgment. In the result these revisions succeed and are allowed. The question of law raised by the Commissioner of Sales Tax is decided by saying that the sale made by the assessee to foreign tourists of Jewels, precious stones, ornaments, etc., under export promotion scheme was not in the course of export. The Commissioner of Sales Tax shall be entitled to its costs. A copy of the order shall be sent to the Tribunal to take action under section 11(8) of the Act. Petitions allowed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 177 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he principle had been laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate 1966 17 STC 326 (SC) where the court said that unless there is a statutory provision permitting the assessment of a dissolved firm, no assessment of a firm after its dissolution can be made under the quondam East Punjab General Sales Tax Act of 1948. A similar question is now the power before us (sic). Applying the principle and ratio of the Supreme Court in the above case and having regard to the provision contained in section 61(1)(ii)(e), the authorities are not enabled to bring to tax the dealings of dealers which functioned under the 1939 Act which did not provide for a power to assess such dealings in so far as they relate to the dissolved firm. No contra ruling has been placed before me by the learned Government Pleader. In the circumstances, the rule nisi is made absolute and the writ petition is allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs. Petition allowed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 176 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... onfined to the processing of compound prepared by mixing raw rubber with china-clay and burada. Obviously processing is different from manufacturing and since the manufacture was done in Delhi itself, it cannot be said that the assessee was not entitled to retain the entry in column 3(a) of its certificate. There is yet another aspect of this case and, that is, if the department finds that any manufacturing has taken place outside the Union Territory of Delhi, all that it can do is to apply the second proviso to section 5(2)(a)(ii) and include the said article in the taxable turnover of the purchasing dealer. There is no provision in the Act or the Rules by which the entire entry in column 3(a) of the certificate of registration can be deleted. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1980 (12) TMI 175 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... th rooms. It was further observed by the Supreme Court that the burden of establishing that the G.I. pipes sold by the assessee in a particular case falls within the description contained in entry 26A is on the revenue. In the case before us there is absolutely no material available on record to indicate as to the purpose for which the G.I. pipes in question had been purchased and utilised. In the circumstances without such material before the assessing authority there was absolutely no warrant for invoking its powers under section 19 of the Act and reopen the assessment that had been already made against the assessee taxing the disputed turnover at the general rate. Hence we consider that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that there was no justification for the assessing authority to revise the order of original assessment is perfectly correct and legal. The tax revision case is dismissed on this ground. The parties will bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 174 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d after the retrospective levy of tax and validation of the assessments without making further assessments, is not correct. The taxes due and payable as per such subsisting orders of assessment can be recovered even if such taxes were earlier refunded to the assessees. These tax revision cases, therefore, succeed and are accordingly allowed but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each. We are unable to certify that these tax revision cases involve such substantial question of law of general importance as require the consideration of the Supreme Court or otherwise fit cases for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave refused. We do not see any reason to stay the recovery of the tax. If the petitioners have not collected the tax, the Act itself makes a provision for making an application under section 9 of the Act. We, therefore, see no grounds to grant stay of the recovery of the tax. Petitions allowed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 173 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... trade or commerce where there was no profit-motive were not liable to tax. That was the situation so far as the Central sales tax is concerned prior to Central Act No. 103 of 1976 which came into force only from 1st April, 1976. This difference has also been pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. South India Viscose Ltd.(1) In that case, with reference to the Central sales tax assessment prior to the amendment by Central Act No. 103 of 1976, this Court held that the definition in the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act could not be incorporated in the Central Sales Tax Act at the material time and that the turnover relating to the assessment year 1967-68 could not be taxed. The order of the Board of Revenue, therefore, could not be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the Board of Revenue is set aside and that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 172 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... earned Government Advocate appearing for the department cannot be upheld. On a true construction of the said entry it is not necessary for the applicability of entry No. 7 of Part III of Schedule II appended to the Act that the commodity should be vegetable oil as well as edible oil. It is enough if either it is vegetable oil or it is edible oil. If a particular oil is vegetable oil it is covered by that entry and if it is an edible oil it is also covered by that entry. It was not disputed by the department that cotton seed oil is vegetable oil. In the circumstances the Board of Revenue did not commit any error of law in holding that vegetable oil was taxable under entry No. 7 of Part III of Schedule II appended to the Act and our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the department. 5.. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1980 (12) TMI 171 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ice is a service rendered by the hotel. There is no controversy in the present case that any part of the food is carried away by the customers. So, the entire amount will be excluded from the taxable turnover. As regards the third question regarding eves, we hold that the learned Financial Commissioner was wrong in holding that the amounts received by the hotel for holding special eves were not exempt. Not only was the amount for special eves exempt, but in view of the judgment of the Supreme court, the entire amount in the case of ordinary supply of food to the customers which did not result in the food being carried away by the customers would be exempt. If, in any case, the customers purchased the food and took it away, then only would it be chargeable to sales tax and would be included in the taxable turnover. As our judgment has been based on the position as settled by the Supreme Court, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1980 (12) TMI 170 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... from and is of a much higher order than that required for the purpose of making a best judgment assessment. The Full Bench further observed that though an estimate made on best judgment basis may be legal, for the purpose of imposing penalty something more concrete is required which would enable the judicial mind to reach the conclusion that the dealer actually had the turnover which was fixed by best judgment. As we have already pointed out, no such material is available for us to conclude that there was any wilful suppression of the taxable turnover warranting a penalty under section 12(3). Therefore, the order of the Tribunal imposing penalty is not sustainable and accordingly we set aside the penalty and allow the tax revision case. It may be mentioned that the assessee had only questioned the penalty and not the determination of the turnover or the tax demanded on the turnover determined. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 169 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... or by a shopkeeper or a trader or a customer. Even the contents of icing sugar make it clear that is not the same as ordinary sugar. Therefore, if under a local Act, tax is to be imposed on sale of sugar, it cannot be more than what is provided by section 15 of the Central Act, but as far as exemption is concerned, the position is different. The item which can be considered to be exempt is sugar simpliciter and not sugar with any additives, like icing sugar, which has an additive of starch. Our answers, therefore, to the three questions are as follows Answer No. (i) Question No. (i) is answered in the negative. Answer No. (ii) Answer to question No. (ii) is in the affirmative. Answer No. (iii) The learned Financial Commissioner was not right in holding that in the absence of any specific definition of sugar in the local Act, the definition of sugar under the Central Act should be adopted in preference to common parlance interpretation. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1980 (12) TMI 168 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hases by dealers liable to tax under section 5 cannot therefore be accepted as correct. Thus the purchases made by the two pharmacies were the last purchases within the State by dealers liable to tax under section 5. There was therefore absolutely no warrant for treating the purchases effected by the revision petitioner as the last purchases of the goods in question and subjecting the revision petitioner to tax in respect of the disputed turnover. We accordingly allow this revision petition, set aside the orders passed by the Tribunal, the Deputy Commissioner and the Sales Tax Officer and direct the Sales Tax Officer to recompute the tax liability of the revision petitioner by excluding from liability to tax the disputed turnover of Rs. 37,288 relating to the purchases of dried ginger, pepper and kacholam which were later sold by the petitioner to the Arya Vaidya Sala, Kottakkal, and the Kakkassery Oushadhasala. The parties will bear their respective costs. Petition allowed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 167 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... and the problem arises in T.C.(R) Nos. 1300 to 1302 of 1977 and 1393 of 1977. This point has already been covered by two decisions of this Court in Yercaud Coffee Curing Works Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1977 40 S.T.C. 531. and Surya Fertilisers and Chemicals v. State of Tamil Nadu 1971 40 S.T.C. 538We do not think it necessary to deal with the point over again in these cases and following the said judgments we hold that the exercise of power of revision cannot be questioned. The only other point that survives for consideration arises in T.C.(R) Nos. 1300 to 1302 of 1977. This raises the question of limitation, which has already been dealt with in K. Lakshmanaswami Chettiar and Sons v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 46 S.T.C. 327. and following the said judgment we hold that the assessment cannot be said to be time-barred. The result is that the appeal and the revision petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
1980 (12) TMI 166 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ular weaving machines. It was, however, not disputed that the cotton yarn so woven is cut into different sizes before it is made a marketable commodity as cotton hose. It is thus clear that cotton hose does not continue to retain its initial identity as cloth manufactured in mills. The term cloth in accordance with its dictionary meaning and in its ordinary popular meaning has to be understood as any woven fabric or stuff till it is transformed into ready use as a different article and, after such transformation, that article cannot be said to retain its previous state of cloth though it is made of cloth. 4.. In our opinion, therefore, the Board was right in holding, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, that cotton hose was not cloth and, as such, not exempt from tax as per entry No. 6 of Schedule I to the Act. Reference is, therefore, answered against the assessee and in favour of the department. Parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1980 (12) TMI 165 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that to be supplied by the State Trading Corporation it might be possible for the assessee to contend that the two contracts are an integrated contract and that for all purposes it will have to be treated as one giving privity of contract between the assessee and the foreign buyer. Though in the bills of lading the appellant s name was shown as the shipper it is specifically made as for and on account of the State Trading Corporation. The individuality of the shipper therefore could not be maintained. Similarly, even the invoices clearly refer to the shipment of the goods against the order of the State Trading Corporation. In these circumstances, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that the two contracts in this case should be treated as an integrated contract. The order of the Board of Revenue therefore is not liable to be interfered with. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The respondent will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Appeal dismissed.
........
|
