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Showing 21 to 40 of 217 Records
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1980 (2) TMI 267
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... ... ..... t not be taken to have made any observations one way or the other affecting the rights of the parties. 6. Two further directions are required to be made. The Municipal Corporation shall take a decision regarding the appointment within three months from to day. Further any ad hoc appointment, that may be made or may have been made meanwhile, will not affect the rights of the parties. We also make it clear that the question of seniority of the appointee who may eventually be chosen and appointed as Deputy Municipal Commissioner will have to be decided in other litigation and we should not be taken to have decided that question by this Order. 7. We allow the appeal, set aside the Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay and direct the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay to reconsider the matter in the light of the directions we have made above. The writ petition is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs in this Court and in the High Court.
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1980 (2) TMI 266
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... ... ..... im during the original assessment, the ITO discovers that he has committed an error in consequence of which income has escaped assessment, it is open to him to reopen the assessment. The Court held, in our opinion, the error discovered on a reconsideration of the same material (and no more) does not give him that power. 7. In the present case all the material facts were within the knowledge of the ITO when he passed the criginal assessment order. It was on reading the information expressed in the internal audit report that correctly speaking the receipts were not capital but revenue in nature, that the ITO changed his opinion and we agree with the AAC that the change of opinion was on a highly debatable point. On either Court, the ITO had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessments. 8. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in negative in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at ₹ 200/-.
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1980 (2) TMI 265
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... ... ..... as fully justified in condoning the delay and the High Court was, therefore, clearly wrong in allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the Senior sub-Judge on the ground that he had wrongly condoned the delay. In fact, the High Court having entertained the appeal and keeping the same on its file should have decided it on merits. Since, however, the High Court has not given any decision on merits, we have no other alternative but to remand the case back to the High Court for disposal of the appeal on merits and in accordance with law. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the case back to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The question of condoning the delay is no longer open and has been finally decided by us. The High Court is requested to give top priority to this case which is already 12 years' old in this Court. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 264
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... ... ..... ent authority has acted within the restricted jurisdiction which have been stated with in our judgment. If the competent authority had exceeded its jurisdiction, it would be open to the aggrieved institution to question the validity of such action. These matters will have to be decided on merits. In the circumstances. we remit all the Civil Appeals to the High Court for disposal on merits in the light of this judgment. ORDER In the view of the majority, sections 3(3) (a), 3(3)(b), 6 and 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act, 1975 are valid while sections 3(1), 3(2), 4 and 5 of the Act are invalid in their application to minority educational institutions. It must follow that such institutions cannot be proceeded against for violation of provisions which are not applicable to them. The matters are remanded to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for final disposal on merits in the light of the judgments. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 263
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... ... ..... might have been their means once, that finding has become obsolete in view of later happenings; Sri Krishnamurthi Iyer for the respondent fairly agreed that the law being what we have stated, it is necessary to direct the executing court to re- adjudicate on the present means of the debtors vis a vis the present pressures of their indebtedness, or alternatively whether they have had the ability to pay but have improperly evaded or postponed doing so or otherwise dishonestly committed acts of bad faith respecting their assets. The court will take note of other honest and urgent pressures on their assets, since that is the exercise expected of the court under the proviso to s. 51. An earlier adjudication will bind if relevant circumstances have not materially changed. We set aside the judgment under appeal and direct the executing court to decide de novo the means of the judgment- debtors to discharge the decree in the light of the interpretation we have given. Appeal allowed.
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1980 (2) TMI 262
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... ... ..... n the opening part of the notification dated December 15 1959, we do not think that the omission to set out the boundaries of Tulsipur Town in that notification can make the levy of octroi ineffective as there could be no room for any doubt about the local area within whose limits the said impost would be effective. The declaration made on August 22, 1955 under section 3 of the Act specifies the said limits. In the circumstances, it has to be held that the notification dated December 15, 1959 was neither incomplete nor ineffective. The omission to incorporate the second schedule was only an inconsequential mistake which was rectified by the subsequent notification dated April 14, 1960. We do not, therefore, find any substance in this contention also. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any error in the judgment of the High Court. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (2) TMI 261
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... ... ..... further argued that section 9(1) of the Act is charging section and the court should be precluded from looking to the appendix, that is, the explanation appended to the section itself. Here again, I am unable to accept the contention. To my mind, the explanation appended to the section is obviously to explain the omission in the charging part of the section and the omission in the present case is with regard to the manner of charging cess and at what point it should be charged. In order to remedy it, the Explanation has been added thereto. Thus, this forms the integral part of the section and it must be read along with it. Taking this into consideration, it makes all the more clear that the cess is to be levied on such manufactured goods and finished products at the time of removal from the factory premises which have got exchangeable and marketable value. I, therefore, respectfully agree with the judgment delivered by my learned Brother. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 260
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... ... ..... m. 7. In the instant case, the impugned goods do not bear any banderol to indicate the identity of the manufacturer. The impugned goods are packed in the packs of 5 or 50 in plain containers which do not bear any mark or symbol, monogram or label signature or invented words or any writing which would indicate a connection in the course of trade between the cigars-cigarillos and some person using the name as mark with or without any indication of the identity of the person. The appellant is compelled to write the name of the manufacturer on the container in view of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976. 8. In light of the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of M/s. Indo French Pharmaceutical Co., Madras v. Union of India and Others in a similar matter, I allow the appeal with consequential relief. The appellants would be entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 53/76 and No. 56/76, both dated 16-3-1976 in respect of their unbranded cigarillos.
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1980 (2) TMI 259
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... ... ..... ed by the Honourable High Court of Andhra Pradesh, are admissible post-manufacturing expenses provided they are actually incurred during the relevant period. The appellants have now produced a certificate from their Chartered Accountants dated 12-12-1979. This certificate indicates that the expenditure on publicity, attributable to selling activity, works out to ₹ 5.42 approximately per fan. However, the appellants have claimed before the lower authority an amount of ₹ 4.70 per fan, towards publicity expenses. 11. In view of the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on publicity expenses, I allow the appeal with consequential relief and direction that in abatement be allowed towards publicity expenses, from the price in favour of the appellants, after the Lower Authority is satisfied that the appellants have in fact incurred the publicity expenses claimed by them. Such abatement will not exceed ₹ 4.70 per fan which was claimed by the Appellants.
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1980 (2) TMI 258
Vires of a recent amendment made by the Supreme Court under Art. 145 in the matter of review petitions whereby the judges will decide in circulation, without the aid of oral submissions, whether there is merit in the motion and, in their discretion, choose to hear further arguments in court challenged
Held that:- It is quite on the cards that where no injury to justice will be all, orality may suffer partial eclipse in the shape of time-limitation or substitution by written submission even in categories other than review proceedings. All that we mean to indicate is that the mode of 'hearing', whether it should be oral or written or both, whether it should be full-length or rationed, must depend on myriad factors and future developments. Judges of the Supreme Court must be trusted in this regard and the Bar will ordinarily be associated when decisions affecting processual justice are taken. We thus see no disparity given flexibility in decoding the meaning of meanings.
We see no force in the challenges and do hope that the Bar will make its contribution to making experiments in modernization and humanization of the Justice System and court culture.
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1980 (2) TMI 257
Whether the representation requesting the Central Government to order the revocation under S. 11 of the Act was not forwarded by the detaining authority to the Central Government and as such the detention is illegal?
Held that:- It is clear that a representation properly addressed by the detenu to the Central Government was not forwarded to the Central Government and as such no action had been taken up to date.
As to what will be the consequence if a properly addressed petition is not forwarded to the Central Government and as such left unattended for a period of nearly four months. We feel that in such circumstances the detention cannot be justified as being according to the procedure. In the circumstances we do not feel that we will be justified in sending the representation to the Central Government for disposal at this stage & feel that the continued detention of the detenu cannot be held to be according to procedure. Petition allowed.
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1980 (2) TMI 256
Writ of Habeas Corpus for release of detentu
Held that:- Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case and explanation furnished by the detaining authority, we are of the view that the detaining authority failed to act with reasonable expedition in furnishing the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention. On the facts of the case, therefore, we are satisfied that the detention is not in accordance with the procedure contemplated under law. The continued detention is not warranted. The order of his release has already been issued by this Court.
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1980 (2) TMI 255
Whether the facts here disclose a disregard to the petitioner’s constitutional right as claimed by his counsel in his second and third submissions?
Held that:- There was no delay in furnishing of documents and no legitimate complaint could be made on that score. The detenu’s representation was received by the detaining authority on December 26, 1979. Without any loss of time copy of the representation was sent to the Customs authorities for their remarks. That was obviously necessary because the information leading to the order of detention was laid by the Customs authorities. The facts were undoubtedly complex since the allegations against the detenu revealed an involvement with an international gang of dope smugglers.
The comments of the Customs authorities were received on January 4, 1980. The Advisory Board was meeting on January 4, 1980 and so there could be no question of the detaining authority considering the representation of the detenu before the Board met, unless it was done in great and undue haste. After obtaining the comments of the Customs authorities, it was found necessary to take legal advice as the representation posed many legal and constitutional questions. So, after consultation with the Secretary (Law and Judicial) Delhi Administration, the representation was finally rejected by the Administrator on January 15, 1980. These facts are stated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Delhi Administration and are substantiated by the records produced before us. If there appeared to be any delay, it was not due to any want of care but because the representation required a thorough examination in consultation with investigators of fact and advisers on law. though the Administrator considered the representation of the detenu after the hearing by the Board, the Administrator was entirely uninfluenced by the hearing before the Board. The application for the issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus is therefore dismissed.
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1980 (2) TMI 254
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... ... ..... e final and binding upon the contractor. The language of this clause is materially different from the clause ia the present case and in our opinion was correctly interpreted as amounting to an arbitration agreement, In this connection the use of the words any dispute between the contractor and the Department are significant. The same is true of the clause in Ram Lal s case (supra) which ran thus In matter of dispute the case shall be referred to the Superintending Engineer of the Circle, whose order shall be final. We need hardly say that this clause refers not only to a dispute between the parties to the contract but also specifically mentions a reference to the Superintending Engineer and must therefore be held to have been rightly interpreted as an arbitration agreement. 7. Holding, in conformity with the judgment of the High Court, that Clause 22 above extracted does not amount to an arbitration agreement, we find no force in this appeal which is dismissed with the costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 253
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... ... ..... ercial Tax Officer. It is also not denied that the registration authority, viz., the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer who has given this notice is not the authority competent to make the reassessment, if any, in the present case. We fail to see what purpose will be served by calling upon the petitioner to furnish additional security if the assessment for 1979-80 and 1980-81 had been completed and no proceedings for reassessment had been initiated. Further the authority which has issued the notice is not the authority which is competent to initiate reassessment proceedings. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the abovesaid demand notice ought not to have been issued on the facts of the present case. The writ petition is accordingly allowed commanding the respondents not to take any further proceedings pursuant to the demand notice dated 21st May, 1984, impugned in this writ petition. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Writ petition allowed.
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1980 (2) TMI 252
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... ... ..... llovers which are manufactured by knitting are covered in the entry hosiery . Even in Verma Hosiery 1972 UPTC 258, the Bench was inclined to accept the recent and extended meaning of hosiery in the sense of knitted goods but as the items for consideration were mufflers and topas which were both knitted and, worn next to skin, it did not go into the question. As the notification which came up for consideration in Ram Lal s case 1969 Law Diary 41 was different than that with which the present revision is concerned it is not necessary to refer this case to a larger Bench. 17. For reasons stated above this revision succeeds and is allowed. The question of law raised by the assessee is decided as under (i) that canteen sales were not taxable as the assessee was not a dealer. (ii) that cardigans and sweaters were not taxable as woollen goods but hosiery. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which is assessed at Rs. 300. The fee of the standing counsel is assessed at Rs. 100.
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1980 (2) TMI 251
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... ... ..... annot be levied. Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax (Surcharge) Act states that every dealer who is liable to pay tax under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, on the sale or purchase of goods within the limits of the area in which the Act is in force shall, on and from the date of commencement of the Act, pay a surcharge on such tax at the rate of five per cent of such tax Thus, the levy of surcharge assumes the liability to pay sales tax, and in this case when the turnover is statutorily exempted from sales tax, there was no liability to pay surcharge also. The result is that the order of the Tribunal cannot be said to be erroneous in law. The tax (revision) case is therefore dismissed.
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1980 (2) TMI 250
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... ... ..... n sub-section (3) of section 14, since the assessee failed to prove that the very goods purchased against certificate in form 15 were utilised in the production of goods which were sold in accordance with the declaration contained in the said certificates, the price of all the purchases made against such certificates would be liable to be included in his turnover of purchases. The pro rata formula avoids this harsh result. With this enunication there is respectful agreement but as pointed out above it shall apply in a case where sales of notified goods is less than what it should have been and not where it is more. In the result, this revision succeeds and is allowed. The question of law raised by the assessee is decided by saying that in case it is held that the assessee is the first purchaser he shall be entitled to the benefit of concessional rate of tax at 2 per cent as provided under section 4-B. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 300.
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1980 (2) TMI 249
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... ... ..... sale of food and the rendering of services is merely incidental, the transaction would undoubtedly be exigible to sales tax. In every case it will be for the taxing authority to ascertain the facts when making an assessment under the relevant sales tax law and to determine upon those facts whether a sale of the food supplied is intended. In view of this pronouncement, it would be necessary to refer back the case to the revising authority to determine whether the rendering of services by the assessee is the dominant object or is merely incidental to the sale of food which in substance is the dominant object and if that is so the out-turn in respect of the sale of cooked food, tea, etc., would be exigible to sales tax. 6.. The revision is hence allowed and the case is referred back to the revising authority to decide it afresh, according to law, keeping in view the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1980 (2) TMI 248
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... ... ..... mption in the State of Madhya Bharat which are described as explanation sales and in the other capacity as a resident dealer it effected intra-state sales. There can be no doubt that if a person deals in two capacities he can be assessed separately for transactions effected by him in the respective capacities. In the circumstances no error of law is shown to have been committed by the Commissioner in assessing the applicant as non-resident dealer in respect of explanation sales and as resident dealer in respect of intraState sales. 6.. As a result of the discussion aforesaid our answer to the question referred to us is that in the facts and the circumstances of the case the applicant was liable to payment of sales tax both as resident as well as non-resident company as a resident dealer on intra-State sales effected by it and as nonresident dealer on explanation sales. In the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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