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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 147 Records
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1981 (10) TMI 47 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Valuation Of Assets ... ... ... ... ..... ion it would enable them to discriminate between assessees, which could hardly be said to be in the contemplation of the Legislature. The purpose of section 24(6) was not only to resolve a dispute regarding the method of valuation, but, generally, regarding valuation itself which could involve many other factors. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, we are inclined to hold the view that once the rules are made, they are binding on all the authorities under the Act including this Tribunal. This is in accordance with the aforesaid view of the Allahabad High Court. The above decision in Bombay State Transport Corporation cited by Shri J.P. Shah does not deal with the question of restriction of meaning of a rule so as to bring it within the scope of the Act. In that case the Court held that the rule was beyond the scope of the Act and, therefore, held it to be inapplicable. Consequently, the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) on this point is confirmed and the appeals are dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Confiscation - Contraband goods ... ... ... ... ..... al Collector is obviously erroneous. In fact, the finding that the Master had no personal knowledge and the finding that the Master had failed to establish that he had no knowledge of the smuggling activities is clearly conflicting and contrary. The order under challenge cannot be sustained in this state of findings. The petitioners are entitled to get the relief of setting aside the order of confiscation passed by the Additional Collector in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 115(2) of the Act. 5. Accordingly, the rule is made absolute and the order dated August 24, 1977 passed by the Additional Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, is set aside only as far as the confiscation of the vessel s.s. Mohamadi is concerned. As the order of confiscation of the vessel is set aside, the question of redeeming it on payment of fine does not arise. It is made clear that the rest of the order is sustained. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Classification - Chemicals - Imported goods - Appeal - Alternative grounds - Admissibility of
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1981 (10) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Yarn - Blending or twisting done to give twinkling effect is not manufacture - Removal of goods
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1981 (10) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Franchise Agreement - Trade name - Manufacture for or on behalf of ... ... ... ... ..... rade name of Parle Exports. The petitioners have not received any financial assistance from the Parle (Exports) Pvt. Ltd. nor Parle (Exports) Pvt. Ltd. have got any control over the manner and working of the plant which exclusively belongs to the petitioners. In my Judgment, the excise authorities below were in error in holding that the petitioners were not the manufacturers but the Parle (Exports) Pvt. Ltd. The view taken by the Central Excise Authorities cannot be sustained and the petitioners are entitled to the relief sought in the petition. 8. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (b). In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The petitioners have furnished bank guarantee in pursuance of the interim orders passed by this Court. The bank guarantee shall stand discharged and the same will be returned to the petitioners. The respondents shall refund the amount within a period of six weeks from today.
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1981 (10) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Varnished fibreglass tapes and glass mica tapes -Liability to duty - Trade Notice - Binding effect - Classification - Penalty and fine - Removal of goods
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1981 (10) TMI 41 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Customs Valuation - Interpretation of exemption notification - Form of invoice if statutory - Effect
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1981 (10) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Strips - Insulation of bare copper/aluminium strips as a conductor is not manufacture - Tariff advice - Validity
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1981 (10) TMI 39 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as a transaction of loan. It appears to us that once the case put forward by the assessee and his attempt to have this transaction considered as a transaction of loan is rejected, the assessee can have no basis on which to resist the inclusion of the interest income in his assessment. There is a clear transfer of monies by the assessee to the minor son. This transfer and the deposit of those monies with ICC are transactions effected by the same individual contemporaneously. The monies transferred to the minor were intended to be deposited with ICC to earn interest and were so deposited immediately on their receipt from the assessee. The interest has, therefore, been earned by the minor from assets transferred by the father to him. We are, therefore, of opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal cannot be accepted and the question referred to us should be answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 250.
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1981 (10) TMI 38 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt date. In any event, I am of the view that s. 392 of the Act does not empower this court to issue directions which do not relate to either the sanctioned scheme itself, or its working in relation to the company which the scheme seeks to reconstruct. The demands under Annexs. D and DI, as already pointed out by me, do not form part of the scheme of reconstruction. In the result, the first of the contentions of the petitioner is liable to be rejected, and it is so rejected. The alternative contention that the demands under Annexs. D and DI are contrary to the limitations imposed on the respondent under s. 231 of the I.T. Act is concerned, the company should seek its remedy under the provisions of any other law, and not under s. 392 of the Companies Act, as the company court cannot assume corrective jurisdiction to set aside regular assessments under the I.T., Act. Hence, the petition is rejected, upholding the preliminary objection raised. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... act are raised for the first time at the stage of second appeal. But the veracity of facts can be tested by any competent fact-finding body at any point of time when they are presented and if the Tribunal, as in this case, had preferred to examine the facts placed before it, all by itself and for the first time, then that is a matter which was entirely within the discretion of the Tribunal. Any other Tribunal in that place might well have thought the case a fit one for a remand, or for a further investigation and report either by the AAC or by the assessing officer. But merely because the Tribunal did not take either of such courses, it could not be said that the finding of the Tribunal, which they actually rendered on a consideraion of the contentions put forward before it, was in any sense, vitiated. Our answer to the first question, therefore, is also in the negative and against the department. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 36 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... iew we have taken, it follows that in a case of this type in the matter of ascertainment and apportionment of the cost of acquisition between the acquired and the unacquired portions, the cost of acquisition of the acquired portion should be assessed not on an average of the original common cost of acquisition but by placing a corresponding premium on the acquired portion because it fetched a higher price owing to its advantages, location and also because the portion left behind would not enjoy the same advantage or would come under certain disadvantages not originally existing. As in this case, the cost of acquisition of the acquired portion has not been fixed on this basis, the Tribunal would have to recompute the capital gains after determining the cost of acquisition of the acquired portion in the light of this order after hearing the parties. Subject to the above, we answer the question referred for the opinion of this court in the negative and in favour of the revenue.
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1981 (10) TMI 35 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Offence, Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... the court or other extraordinary situation excites the court s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In between is tertium quid, as for example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. In such a case, the inherent power can be exercised. Having regard to the avoidable hardship and harassment which may flow from continuance of the criminal trial against the petitioner and which may amount to an abuse of the process of law, I am persuaded to invoke the inherent power of this court to quash the complaint and the proceedings pending against the petitioner under s. 277 of the Act. Order accordingly.
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1981 (10) TMI 34 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... gross undervaluation in the previous year. It is needless to proceed further with the matter and deliver an in-depth judgment as to the merits of the proceedings consequent upon the impugned notice under s. 17 of the Act. Suffice it to note that this surely is not a case where the court can with justification hold the said notice itself as one without jurisdiction. As the materials stand in praesenti, the action in issuing it is faultless. It will, however, be open to the assessee, who will now appear in the proceedings pursuant to the said notice, to contest the same on all such grounds as he may be advised, and, which grounds, when urged, will be decided by the concerned authority on their own merits and in accordance with law uninfluenced by the observations herein which, in their very nature, are made in the context of the claim to have the impugned notice struck down as without jurisdiction ab initio. So far as this petition is concerned, the same fails and is rejected.
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1981 (10) TMI 33 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Collection For Charity, Income ... ... ... ... ..... ficer had collected some further data regarding how the assessee has dealt with the amounts whether in the present assessment year or in subsequent assessment years, if a large amount has been collected. This information would ensure that amounts collected ostensibly for charity are in fact utilised for charitable objects and are not taken to or mixed up in any way with the trading account or the profit and loss account. The reason given by the ITO is clearly erroneous and not in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Bijli Cotton Mills case 1979 116 ITR 60. Merely because the amount is collected through sale bills will not make it part of the assessable income of the assessee. The Supreme Court has also dealt with the nature of collections made for dharmada purposes, but we are not obliged to go into that aspect in this matter. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Parties to bear their own costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... sent case is not a direct item of expenditure connected with any such capital item such as acquisition of a capital asset or its expansion. What we have is an item of expenditure which was no doubt connected with the amalgamation of the two business concerns, but was directly incurred in meeting legal charges and court expenses. In such a situation, the claim for allowance in our judgment has got to be dealt with on the different test laid down by the Supreme Court in India Cements Ltd. v. CIT 1966 60 ITR 52. As we earlier observed, after the enunciation of the special principle, if we may call it so, in India Cements case 1966 60 ITR 52 (SC) it is no longer open to the revenue to tar the legal expenses with the same brush which they apply to the particular transactions to which those legal expenses relate. For all the above reasons, we answer the question of law in the affirmative and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1981 (10) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... the section is properly construed then the stay of the assessee being for a period of less than two years, the conditions of s. 54 would not stand satisfied. The learned counsel for the assessee submitted that other expressions have been used in other provisions. We are concerned with s. 54 and when the language is so clear, we do not see any need to look into any other provision as an aid for construction. The learned counsel for the assessee went to the extent of asking for reconsideration of the earlier decision referred to above. As rightly pointed out by the learned judges, if we may say so with respect, the construction of the provision is clear and, therefore, we do not consider that there is any scope or need for a reconsideration of the construction placed on the provision in the said decision. In the result, we answer the question referred to us as follows The sum of Rs. 10,340 was assessable under s. 45 and s. 54 does not apply. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 30 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Understatement ... ... ... ... ..... tatement of the consideration. The fulfilment of the second condition has, therefore, to be established independently of the first condition and merely because the first condition is satisfied, no inference can necessarily follow that the second condition is also fulfilled. Each condition has got to be viewed and established independently before sub-section (2) can be invoked and the burden of doing so is clearly on the revenue. The court also felt that the interpretation canvassed for by the revenue would result in rendering s. 52(2) invalid as violative of art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and thus preferred the construction which made it constitutionally valid. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the judgment of the Full Bench set aside and that of the single judge (Issacs J.) restored. As the conclusion arrived at by us is in consonance with the abovenoted decision of the Supreme Court, we now proceed to pronounce the same and answer the reference as indicated earlier.
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1981 (10) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Collaboration Agreement, Objections By Assessee, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... bjections to get rid of the order in so far as it is adverse to him, as the period of limitation for the filing of the cross-objections is calculated from the date of the service of the appellate grounds. Ire effect, in such a case, a party who did not file an appeal, gets an extended period of limitation for filing what is in effect an appeal. When the assessee has succeeded wholly before the AAC and the Tribunal, there was no scope for filing an appeal or cross-objections. The Tribunal should have dismissed the cross-objections in limine as not being entertainable. The procedure of filing cross-objections is not to be gone through merely for the purpose of putting forward arguments in support of an order which is in favour of the cross-objector. In these circumstances, the second question has to be answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. As the assessee has substantially succeeded in the reference, it will be entitled to costs-counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1981 (10) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... ties of the lineal descendants. Clubbing of the value of the two interests for the purpose of determining the rate of duty applicable in respect of the property passing on the death of the deceased cannot he interpreted as enlarging the scope of the charging section. Thus, the question of constitutional validity of this provision having been set at rest in Badri Vishal Tandon s case 1976 103 ITR 468 (All), this provision has to be given effect to and the interest of the lineal descendants of the deceased in the joint family property of a Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara, Marumakkattayam or Aliyasantana law is to be aggregated with the estate passing on the death of the deceased and estate duty shall be levied thereon at the rate applicable in respect -of the principal value thereof. We, therefore, answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the respondent and against the accountable person. The respondent is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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