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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 147 Records
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1981 (10) TMI 150
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... ... ..... cision could not have been otherwise, for cotton yarn was not a declared commodity under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act till 1st October, 1958. It came to be included in section 14(ii-b) as from 1st October, 1958. Thus the restriction imposed by section 15(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act did not operate so as to fetter the power of the State Government to impose multiple point of tax in respect of the cotton yarn up to 1st October, 1958. There as such arose no occasion to consider either section 14 or section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act in that case. In the present case, sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act have to be actively considered, and on a consideration of these provisions, we are in no doubt that oil-seeds having suffered tax once cannot be subject to tax again, in view of the restriction imposed by section 15(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. We accordingly dismiss the revision. There shall however be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 149
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... ... ..... t held that the shaving creams fell within the scope of entry 37, is clearly wrong, and therefore, the article could only be treated as coming within the multi-point levy. The learned counsel drew our attention to the decision in State of Gujarat v. Prakash Trading Co. 1972 30 STC 348 (SC). In that case, the question was whether shampoo fell within the category of soap. The Supreme Court pointed out that shampoo is a kind of liquid soap and has all the essential ingredients of a soap. Shampoo is different from a shaving cream and we do not consider that a shaving cream can be considered to be either liquid or any category of soap. The collocation of the expression in the entry considered by the Supreme Court was also different. In these circumstances, we do not think it possible to apply the decision of the Supreme Court to the facts of the present case. The result is, the revision petition succeeds. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 148
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... ... ..... t case and the one before us is that in that case there was a sale of a branch, while in the present case there is a closure of a particular line of business. We do not consider that this distinction, on facts, affects the principle to be applied. A person may carry on several lines of business and each line of business would be a unit of business by itself. If there is a sale of that unit of the business as a whole, then the assessee would not be liable to be taxed either on the general principle that there is no sale in the course of business as closure of a line of business cannot be incidental or ancillary to its carrying on or on the alternative basis of application of rule 6(d). We consider that, on the facts, the assessee was eligible for the exemption in respect of the disputed turnover under either of those two grounds. The result is the revision petition succeeds and is allowed and the assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 147
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... ... ..... purchaser enters into an agreement that he would separately pay for the papers and the seller would merely print on those paper. Such a case would be analogous to the first type of cases where the purchaser purchases the papers from outside and supplies the same to the printer. Another type of case would be where the purchaser does not enter into any separate agreement but merely asks the printer to supply printed materials. The obligation to purchase the papers and to print thereon remains with the seller. In such a case, the contract remains indivisible and what is agreed to be sold is the printed material. The present case falls within the second category, viz., where the purchaser enters into separate agreement for the purchase of paper and asks the printer to print on the paper so supplied. The result is, the Tribunal is right in holding that there were no taxable sales in the present case. The revision is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 146
Whether the assessing authority was right in imposing penalty on the assessee under the two assessment orders for not depositing the tax in respect of the amount of freight at the time of filing of the original returns under the State Act and the Central Act?
Whether the assessee was liable under section 11B of the State Act to pay interest on the tax in respect of the amount of freight for the period between the date of filing of the original return and the date when such tax was actually paid while filing the revised return?
Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. The penalties imposed on the assessee under the impugned orders of assessment are set aside. The appeal in so far as the levy of interest is concerned is dismissed..
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1981 (10) TMI 138
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... n bankruptcy and in winding-up of insolvent companies the subject-matter of set-off is wider and unliquidated damages may be set off against a debt.... There is, therefore, no doubt that in bankruptcy and in winding-up of insolvent companies, the surety s liability under a guarantee may be set off against a debt due to the surety by the company. As can be seen from the above, the preponderance of decisions are in favour of the stand taken by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and, therefore, they should succeed. In the result, this application is allowed in part only after setting off the amounts subscribed by the respondents in their respective chit groups. Thus, against the claim of Rs. 1,99875, respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are allowed to set off Rs. 1,85050 only and they together with respondent No. 1 shall pay the balance of Rs. 149 50 to the official liquidator together with interest at 6 per cent, per annum from date of application till date of realisation. It is accordingly ordered.
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1981 (10) TMI 137
Oppression and Mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398 ... ... ... ... ..... o affidavits were obtained by Niranjan Singh, petitioner, from them. There is no reason to disbelieve the affidavits of the said persons. It is well-settled that if the signatures of some of the petitioners were obtained by misrepresentation, it cannot be said that they were consenting parties to the petition at the time of its institution. The facts of Rajah-mundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. s case 1956 26 Comp. Cas. 91 (SC) and In re Bengal Lnxmi Cotton Mills Ltd. s case 1965 35 Comp. Cas. 187 (Cal.) are different. In those cases, the consent was given by the petitioners voluntarily but they wanted to retract from it subsequently. Thus, the observations in these cases are not helpful to the petitioners. After taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the petition has not been presented by the requisite number of members and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Consequently, I dismiss the same with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 300.
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1981 (10) TMI 136
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases, Principles for interpretation of statutes ... ... ... ... ..... duty, misfeasance or breach of trust, etc. He has, like any other director, to satisfy the conscience of the court that he fulfils the criteria to earn relief from liability as laid down in the section, and his being on the Board on account of his expertise or special skill will not in itself be enough to exonerate him from liability it will be just one of the circumstances to be taken notice of as a factor justifying the reasonableness and honesty of the applicant s actions. Looked at from this angle, the fact of a person being on the board of directors because of his special skill or expert knowledge cannot be said to be a wholly extraneous circumstance having no bearing whatsoever on the point in issue. We are, therefore, inclined to answer this question accordingly. Both the questions formulated in the reference having been answered, the reference stands disposed of. Both the company petitions are sent back to the learned company judge for disposal in accordance with law.
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1981 (10) TMI 119
Compromise and arrangements ... ... ... ... ..... ny event, I am of the view that section 392 of the Act does not empower this court to issue directions which do not relate to either the sanctioned scheme itself, or its working in relation to the company which the scheme seeks to reconstruct. The demands under Annexs. D and D1, as already pointed out by me, do not form part of the scheme of reconstruction. In the result, the first of the contentions of the petitioner is liable to be rejected, and it is so rejected. The alternative contention that the demands under Annexs. D and D1 are contrary to the limitations imposed on the respondent under section 231 of the I.T. Act is concerned, the company should seek its remedy under the provisions of any other law, and not under section 392 of the Companies Act, as the company court cannot assume corrective jurisdiction to set aside regular assessments under the I.T. Act. Hence, the petition is rejected, upholding the preliminary objection raised. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 112
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... ... ..... s and give a reasonable opportunity to the assessee of being heard and see whether there was total disruption of the family and see whether there is an assessable entity. The WTO will also consider the judgement of the Supreme Court mentioned. He may then decide the issue regarding valuation. At the time of hearing of the appeals. Shri Kulkarni stated that there are three natural streams in the land which have not been considered by the Valuation Officer and that the procedure under s. 38A is not followed. We direct the WTO that the entire issue of Valuation will be open before him and the assessee will raise his objections as he deems fit provided that the WTO comes to the conclusion that there is an assessable entity. 6. In the result, the appeals are deemed to be allowed. 7. Since we have set aside the orders of the authorities below and restored the matter to the file of the WTO the cross objections filed by the Department are infructuous and therefore they are dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 109
Charitable Or Religious Trust ... ... ... ... ..... carrying on any activity for profit, in our opinion, the lower authorities have erred in holding that the society was founded for non-charitable purposes and, therefore, liable to tax. The orders of the lower authorities on this issue are reversed. 15. During the course of the hearing, the assessee pointed out to us that the IAC had taxed the contributions in the form of donations. The assessee had objected to the same before the Commissioner (Appeals) in his grounds of appeal. The Commissioner (Appeals) had failed to deal with this ground of appeal. Hence, the assessee had taken this ground before the Tribunal also. On a perusal of the Commissioner (Appeals) s order we are unable to see why the Commissioner (Appeals) has not dealt with this ground taken before him. The matter is restored to the file of the Commissioner (Appeals). He will hear the assessee afresh on this issue and decide the matter in accordance with law. 16. In the result the assessee s appeals are allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 106
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... ... ..... , there is no positive profit outside accounts established. As explained by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Variety Hall and Ramakrishna Textiles vs. CIT (1972) 84 ITR 202 (AP), there can be no expectation of division of profits which are merely presumed by the ITO but not proved against the assessee. On the facts noticed in paragraph 3, we have no doubt that there has been no presumption of unaccounted profits in the sense that there is any concealed undivided profits available to the assessee outside the accounts. The ld. Deptl. Rep. alternatively pleaded that we may set aside the order of registration also to be considered in the light of the final assessment order. We do not think that we would be justified in setting aside the order when the facts available in the records at the time of registration order do not justify the rejection of registration. Under the circumstances, this appeal also has to be dismissed. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 104
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... ... ..... d not have anticipated the Sick Mills Undertakings Ordinance of 1972 and also the Act of 1974 which gave retrospective effect from 1st April, 1974 and so the assessee was wrong in writing off this debt as irrecoverable as on 31st March, 1974. Admittedly the debt could not be recovered as on 1st April, 1974. In view of the provisions of Sick Textile Undertakings Act of 1974 even such debt had become irrecoverable as on 1st April, 1974. There is nothing wrong in the assessee rsquo s claim that such debt had become bad and doubtful on the earlier date namely 31st March, 1974. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the debt in question had become bad and doubtful on 31st March, 1974 and hence the assessee can claim it as a deduction for the asst. yr. 1974-75. So the assessee succeeds with regard to the claim of bad and doubtful debts to the extent of Rs. 11,33,190. 5. In the result, the assessee rsquo s appeal is substantially allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 102
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... ... ..... o s award under Arbitration Act. Even otherwise, interest, in plain language is user of assessee rsquo s money withheld by the Government. Since such money rsquo s due form circulating capital of the assessee, it is of revenue nature. It is not a measure of any damage by itself as the principal amount itself is not in the nature of damages of capital nature. Interest is also not by way of damages but interest simpliciter. We hold it to be interest not merely because it is called interest, but it is, in fact, interest stipulated as such. In Westminster Bank Led vs. Riches (1947) 28 Tax Cas. 159 15 ITR Suppl. 86 not capital receipt as there is nothing incompatible in damages being income. Only where damages are for wrongful withholding of or detention of money or other property, it could be a capital sum and not where, as in assessee rsquo s case, interest is given for delayed receipt of contract amounts. In the result, it was rightly brought to tax. 9. The appeal is dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 99
Non-resident ... ... ... ... ..... btedly represent the assets and they have been acquired out of or with the aid of the moneys originally brought in. Therefore, in our view, they clearly fall within the scope of section 5(1)(xxxiii) and the Commissioner (Appeals) is not, in our view, correct in stating that only the properties or assets purchased out of such moneys brought in by the assessee would be eligible and not any accretion or interest earning thereon. He does not appear to dispute the position, that if the assessee had purchased some property or other assets with the moneys brought in and the value of such property or assets goes up with the efflux of time, then the entire such value is eligible for exemption. We do not see why it should be different where moneys brought in increase by efflux of time on account of the interest earnings thereon. We, therefore, uphold the assessee s contention. 13. In the result, the assessee s appeals are treated as allowed and the department s appeals stand dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 98
Hindu Undivided Family, Assessment After Partition ... ... ... ... ..... ld not be applied to the facts of this case as it was decided on almost identical facts unlike the decision of the Calcutta High Court. The Calcutta High Court decision was primarily with reference to section 20(2) whereas we are concerned with the application of section 20(1). It is obvious that section 20(1) is not in pari materia with section 171(1) of the Income-tax Act and the absence of the words hitherto assessed makes a vital difference to the scope of the section. It follows that the decision of the Tribunal in cancelling the assessments under section 17 can in no way affect our decision in upholding the assessments under section 20. 7. In the circumstances, we agree with the AAC that the reassessments were validly initiated in respect of the net wealth of the HUF on the valuation dates relevant to the assessment years 1966-67 to 1971-72 prior to the partition on 31-3-1973 and, therefore, we have no hesitation in confirming the assessments. The appeals are dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 97
Income From House Property, Annual Value ... ... ... ... ..... act that the residential house is not in the actual occupation of the HUF. Therefore, if the other conditions, namely, that the house is not let out and that the owner does not derive any benefit are fulfilled, there is no reason why the owner, in this case happens to be a HUF, should not be allowed the abatement available under this section. It is not the case of the revenue that any member of the HUF is in actual occupation of the house as, obviously, the father of Deepak L. Bankar, who was residing in the flat being separated, is not a member of the HUF. Therefore, all the conditions prescribed in the section, namely, that the owner should not be in actual occupation, that the property should not be let out and that the owner should not derive any benefit, are admittedly satisfied. We have, therefore, no hesitation in confirming the order of the AAC directing the ITO to recompute the total income after allowing the relief under section 23(3)(a). 5. The appeal is dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 96
Capital Or Revenue Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... tor as a capital receipt. It was pointed out therein that the High Court held that the value of these goods could not be treated as revenue receipt because they had been received by way of gift and, in any event, even if they constituted revenue receipt they could in no sense be income , since they were taken out of the ambit of taxability by sub-section (3) of section 10. The Supreme Court, on the finding of the Tribunal, that these were received as gifts and, therefore, as capital assets , allowed the market value of the same as cost of such goods and, therefore, as a deduction from the income on the date of conversion of such capital assets to stock-in-trade . The assessee is in a much stronger position because the amount of Rs. 5 lakhs was not only received as gifts but also as capital fund. Under the circumstances, we have to allow the appeal and delete the addition of Rs. 5 lakhs. 12. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Relief due Rs. 5 lakhs as reduction from income.
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1981 (10) TMI 95
Reassessment, Information ... ... ... ... ..... oes to show that even the value determined by him was not final or accurate. It is well settled that in a reassessment proceedings, even where it is initiated in consequence of any information, the WTO cannot redetermine the issues before him by changing his opinion on the basis of the same material which he had considered earlier. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the reassessments for all the four years, in the absence of any fresh material affecting the determination of the valuation of the properties on the relevant valuation dates, remained a change of opinion on the basis of the same materials earlier considered in the original assessment and cannot, therefore, be sustained. We, have, therefore, no hesitation in confirming the cancellation of the reassessments for the assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73 and cancelling the reassessments for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75. The appeals of the revenue are dismissed and the appeals of the assessee are allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 89
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... ... ..... f the Village Munsiff dated 17th October, 1978 also corroborates the aforeasid facts. In view of what has been discussed above we hold that the donees had perfect and full title ownership in respect of the said property covered by the settlement deed of 26th March, 1962 in favour of themselves by adverse possession for a period of over 12 years prior to the date of the demise of the deceased. In view of this, the life interest which the deceased had got extinguished by the adverse possession of the donees and the deceased stood totally excluded from any benefits in the property for more than a period of two years prior to her death. Thus on the date of death of the deceased there was no passing of property so as to attract the provisions of the ED Act. 12. In the result, the orders passed by the authorities below in so far as it relates to the point in controversy are set aside and the inclusion of Rs. 78,600 in assessment to estate duty is deleted. 13. The appeal is allowed.
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