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1981 (10) TMI 67
... ... ... ... ..... . 14th December, 1977 that the assessee had actually much more stocks both in weight and in value than what had been pledged with it. A dishonest taxpayer would resort to methods converging on sub-standard morality to obtain more funds from its bank by showing stocks much in excess of the stocks which its books depicted. Here, the position is the other way round. The assessee had much more stock in its books both in weight and in value, as compared to those pledged by it with the bank. Therefore, there was absolutely no occasion or circumstance in this case for the assessee to inflate the weight of desi kapas when it could very well show the same weight of desi kapas as in its books on 31st March, 1975 alongwith the other admittedly available stocks without effecting its drawing limit. 10. Vacating the addition of Rs. 81,142, we allow the appeal. 11. On the view which we have taken in this case, it is not considered necessary to go to the other submissions of Sh. D.S. Gupta.
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1981 (10) TMI 66
... ... ... ... ..... t complete inasmuch as he retains partner s rights in that property. Therefore, the provisions of s. 45 of the Act were not attracted and in that view of the matter no capital gains chargeable to tax arose to the assessee. We, therefore, delete the addition of Rs. 19,170. 20. The Sixth ground of appeal states that the Id. CIT (A) erred in holding that no appeal would lie against the charging of interest u/s 217 of the Act and in not entertaining the appeal on this ground. The contention of the appellant is correct because this ground was not taken in isolation but with the other grounds of appeal. In this context, a reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of CIT vs. Raghbir Singh and Sons (1980) 18 CTR (P and H) 107 (1980) 125 ITR 256 (H and P). We, therefore, hold that the CIT (A) erred in holding that no appeal lies against the charging of interest u/s 217 of the Act. 21. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 65
... ... ... ... ..... ere is nothing wrong in the conduct of the assessee. He had honestly thought he would be able to give correct particulars after the meeting was held. The short delay after the meeting can also be explained away if we consider that the assessee would have taken a little more time to compile the statement and file returns of wealth. It is also to be seen that the delay is quite negligible. In finding out whether a person is liable for penalty or not, one has to see the overall circumstances. Merely because there is a default, penalty cannot be imposed ipso facto. All the circumstances will have to be borne in mind. In this case, the assessee filed returns voluntary and paid the taxes. His returns were accepted. This only indicates that there is no wilful disobedience of law on the part of the assessee. In other words, we hold that the assessee was prevented by reasonable cause from filing the returns in time. The penalties are, therefore, cancelled. 5. The appeals are allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 64
... ... ... ... ..... as nearer to the date when the ITO was to issue notice u/s 210 of the Act. Similar option is available to the assessee to substitute the income on which the tax payable had been worked out by the ITO by filing an estimate. The income shown by the assessee in estimate could be substituted for the income for working out the tax payable by assessee as an advance tax. The ITO based his demand notice on the income for the asst.yr.1975-76, but no tax was paid by the assessee for this year u/s 140A of the Act. Under the above circumstances, the notice issued u/s 210 was not valid and any liability cannot be created on the basis of an invalid notice. This issue is well supported by the decision in (1968) 68 ITR 877 (All) and other decisions cited by the assessee. Under the above circumstances, the order of the CIT (Appeals) on this issue is maintained but on a different footing. 11. In the resuit, the assessee s appeal is partly allowed and the appeal of the department is dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 63
... ... ... ... ..... pinion at best the assessee could have taken a month after the receipt of the notice u/s 148 in getting all particulars. Thereafter there is no reason at all for the delay. Merely because the assessee s returns were accepted we cannot hold that there was reasonable cause for the entire period. We accordingly held that the assessee was prevented by reasonable cause till the end of December, 1976. Thereafter there is neither cause much less reasonable cause for the delay and the assessee is liable for penalty for that period u/s 271(1)(a). The penalty is to be recalculated accordingly. 7. The cross objections are merely in support of the order of the AAC. It is also mentioned that the computation of penalty is not correct. Since we have directed computation of penalty for the period of default, no further direction is necessary on the cross objections. 8. In the result, the appeals filed by the Revenue are allowed in part and the cross objections by the assessee are dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 62
... ... ... ... ..... n relation to the asst. yrs. 1972-73 to 1975-76 made in the case of Shri Srichand Golecha, Jaipur vs. WTO CC-II, Jaipur (1981) 12 TTJ 442 wherein on similar facts it has been held that sub-s (4) of s. 7 of the WT Act is a procedural provision and was retrospective in effect. 4. The special bench of the IT Appellate Tribunal at Delhi has also considered this issue at length and vide order dt. 17th Jan., 1981 made by the Delhi Bench A in WTA Nos.614 to 624 (Del) of 1979 in relation to the asst. yrs. 1964-65 to 1974-75 in the case of Shri Biju Patnaik (1981) 12 TTJ 25 (Del) has also held the provision of sub-s (4) of s. 7 is procedural and the assessee was held to be entitled to the benefit of the same since it was also hold that it was retrospective in its application. 5. In view of the above facts, we also on our part do respectfully follow the above decisions, with the result that the impugned order of the AAC is upheld. The appeals by the Revenue failed and stand dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 61
... ... ... ... ..... ly constituted contemporaneous evidence in a matter like this and the non filing of the application cannot per se be construed as absence of a reasonable cause. The ld. Deptl. Rep., on his part, strongly relied on the orders of the authorities below. 4. On a careful consideration of the matter, I find myself in complete agreement with the various submissions that have been made by the ld. counsel for the assessee. On the above facts, which have not been controverted, the assessee could not obviously have filed a correct and complete return until the determination of his share in the firm. The firm, as stated above, filed its own return on 24th Jan., 1974 and the assessee quickly followed suit on 29th Jan.,1974. In the circumstances, the delay in filing his return by the assessee has to be ascribed to be a reasonable cause. The provisions of s.271(1)(a) are, therefore, not attracted. The impugned penalty (of Rs. 2,323)Is accordingly hereby cancelled. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 60
... ... ... ... ..... Bai had received her share of profits for the period 25th July, 1973 to 31st Dec., 1973. Moreover the decision of the Allahabad High Court is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Khanjanlal Sevakram vs. CIT (1972) 83 ITR 175 (SC). The Supreme Court case was under the old Act and referred to Rules 6 and 6A of the IT Act, 1972. Those rules require a certificate regarding the distribution of profit. In that case profits earned outside the books of A/c had not been distributed at all. Under those circumstances, the Court held that the certificate given u/r 6 was false and the firm was not entitled to registration. The facts of the present case are, however, different and we also find that there are a number of decisions in favour of the assessee which have been noticed by the Allahabad High Court. 6. In the result, we do not see any reason to confirm the order of the AAC. We set aside his order and direct that registration be granted to the firm. The appeal is allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 59
Penalty, Procedure For Imposition ... ... ... ... ..... the Constitution by the assessee is misplaced. There is no double jeopardy for the offence committed. We say so, because the first penalty orders for the years under consideration stand cancelled. For the same offence, penalties, if levied, for these two years will be tantamount to levy of penalty once and only once for the offence, if any, committed by the assessee. That being the position, the arguments of the representative for the assessee, as brought out in para 41 above, merit rejection. We hold likewise. 43. Of course the last argument of the assessee that the penalties levied were excessive being in excess of 20 per cent of the tax sought to be avoided for the years under consideration does not survive, as we have set aside the penalty orders as stated in para 38 above. We are sure that the IAC/ITO, in case penalties are to be levied against the assessee, will levy the same in accordance with law. 44. For statistical purposes, the appeals by the assessee are allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 58
... ... ... ... ..... ies and contended that sufficient materials were not advanced by the assessee before the lower authorities in order to enable them to come to a proper conclusion. 9. We have considered the rival contentions advanced by both the sides and we find that the issue can be decided only after bringing more materials on record. We, therefore, restore this matter to the file of the CIT(A) and direct the CIT(A) to examine the necessary materials which may be produced by the assessee to determine whether the assessee was a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and whether, in the light of the statutory and case law on the point, the assessee could be treated as having received retrenchment compensation. In this connection, the CIT(A) may with benefit go into the Supreme Court decisions as the well as Labour Court decision relied upon by the assessee. 10. In the result, the departmental appeal is dismissed and the assessee s appeal be may treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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1981 (10) TMI 57
Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... t for the liabilities for arriving at the principal value of the estate, the Assistant Controller has not gone by the evidence of the balance sheet or what is more important, of any books of account. All this shows that the balance sheet is not the kind of balance sheet which is prepared on the basis of books of account which are closed at the end of the year. It is a rough and ready summary of the assets and liabilities drawn up for the facility of determining the net wealth, etc.. and no more. 19. Therefore, I am of the opinion that even the balance sheet and the history of the assessments to income-tax and wealth-tax do not show that Smt. Sitabai was the benami of the deceased in so far as the flat and rent from the flat are concerned. 20. For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion, that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the department has not succeeded in proving that the property standing in the name of the wife of the deceased is benami of the deceased.
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1981 (10) TMI 56
Export Market Development Allowance, Appellate Tribunal, Orders Of ... ... ... ... ..... involving supply of material and labour outside India. Therefore, the contract was for erection of a plant or building abroad and the expenditure on the supply of raw material has been specifically held not to qualify for weighted deduction. This to my mind, clearly shows that in the case of a contractor of pure and simple labour supply, the amount paid to the labour, both as salary and travelling expenses, is in the nature of cost of raw material and will not qualify for weighted deduction. 6. I am also in agreement with the learned judicial member, that there being a Special Bench decision of the Tribunal taking a contrary view, the Bombay and Madras High Courts decisions will not stand in the way of taking a proper and correct view on the issue. Therefore, I hold that the assessee does not qualify for the weighted deduction in respect of these claims of expenditure. 7. In the result, the appeals will go to the other Bench for decision in accordance with the majority view.
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1981 (10) TMI 55
Capital Gains, Chargeability Of ... ... ... ... ..... racted with regard to that portion of the sale price which is relatable to the occupancy right in view of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to earlier. In any case, the capital gains with regard to the ownership right can be worked out as admittedly it has been acquired at a cost. It is also clear that the capital gains, if any, with regard to the occupancy right, will be long-term capital gains while that with regard to ownership right will be a short-term capital gain. As the necessary materials for working out the matter in the light of what is stated above are not available, the matter will be restored to the Commissioner (Appeals) for the limited purpose mentioned above. 9. In the result, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) with regard to the matter raised in the present appeals is set aside and it is restored to him for fresh disposal according to law and in the light of the observations above. The appeal will be treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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1981 (10) TMI 54
Assessment Order ... ... ... ... ..... ue from the estate of the deceased, Shri Maneklal A. Mehta, cannot be realised because of the fact that the names of the legal representatives, who represented the estate at the time of the assessment orders, have not been specifically mentioned and that the name of the deceased is wrongly mentioned. Consequently, an error of this nature would be an error prejudicial to the interests of the revenue and as such, would be corrected by exercise of revisional powers under section 25(2). We, therefore, reject the contention of the assessee to the effect that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass order to correct the errors in the present cases, in exercise of powers under section 25(2). 15. For the reasons given above, we uphold the order of the Commissioner setting aside the assessment and directing the WTO to make fresh assessments in accordance with law after giving the assessee reasonable opportunity of being heard. 16. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 53
... ... ... ... ..... rship for a third party to be introduced therein and, therefore, there is no scope of applying cl. (c) of s.42 to such a situation. It was held that s.31 of the Partnership Act only recognised the validity of a contract between the partners to introduce a third party without the consent of all the existing partners, that it pre-supposes the subsistence of a partnership and that it does not apply to a partnership of two partners which is dissolved by the death of one of them, for, in that event there is no partnership at all for any new partner to be inducted into without the consent of others. In our view, the observations will equally apply to a case where one of the partners retires because thereafter, there is no partnership to be continued with the introduction of other persons. As the position appears to be concluded by the ruling of the Supreme court in our view, no referable question of law arises in this case. 4. In the result, the reference application is dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 52
... ... ... ... ..... re is nothing improper or irregular in the order passed by the AAC. We uphold his finding. The ITO will no doubt examine the amount of the unabsorbed depreciation that has been finally determined in the files of the firms and allocated to the assessee and set off the same against the current income of the assessee provided the same has not already been set off in the files of the firms themselves in future years. We agree with the ld. Rep. for the assessee that the case of Bellarpur Collieries do not apply to the facts of this case. Subject to the above observation, we uphold the order of the AAC. 7. Coming to the cross objection filed by the assessee, we find no specific ground therein except that the AAC has not given any clear and specific directions to the ITO to set off the unabsorbed depreciation. In view of our findings in the departmental appeal above, the cross objection has become infructuous. 8. In the result, both the appeal and the cross objection are dismissed.
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1981 (10) TMI 51
... ... ... ... ..... however, accept the contention raised by the assessee that the amount of Rs. 87, 000 deposited by the assessee on the basis on advance tax estimate filed on 31st March 1975 on total income of Rs. 1,50,000 should have been taken into consideration while levying the penalty u/s 273 (b). It is trite law and also apparent from the statute that the amount of tax assessed is not the gross tax computed but the tax paid in advances to be deducted and it is always the income-tax payable which is to be considered as assessed tax and in the light of that, the ITO was not justified to consider the default of the assessee without taking into consideration the payment of Rs. 87, 000 made by the assessee as advance-tax. The ITO is directed to recomputed the amount of penalty on the basis of 10 of 75 of the assessed tax in computation of which he will certainly take into consideration the amount of Rs. 87, 000 paid by the assessee. 6. In the result, the assessee s appeal is partly allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 50
Deductions, Profits And Gains From Newly Established Industrial Undertaking, Revision, Orders Prejudicial To Revenue
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1981 (10) TMI 49
... ... ... ... ..... Rs. 67,829.85 included the cost of materials etc. not issued by the U.P.S.E.B. The argument of the learned Departmental Representative in that connection therefore, has no factual premise therefor. The non-production by the assessee of the tender documents is also not material since the relevant conditions of the contract having a bearing on the present controversy, had been placed by the assessee on the Paper Book. The aforesaid terms and conditions clearly show that the property in the materials remained with the U.P.S.E.B. and that not only they were not sold to the assessee but the assessee remained liable to pay at recovery rates, the cost of the consumption in excess of the Standard Schedule of Consumption. On these facts the claim of the assessee that the amount of Rs. 67,829.85 representing the cost of the materials issued by the U.P.S.E.B. was entitled to be excluded, was justified. We held accordingly. 6. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1981 (10) TMI 48
... ... ... ... ..... ard the ld. counsel for the assessee as well as the ld. Deptl. Rep. It clear from the facts as set out by the CIT that the assessee has undoubtedly committed a default u/s. 285A(1) of the Act. The reasons advanced by the assessee for not furnishing the prescribed particulars to the ITO cannot also be regarded as being altogether satisfactory. We are, therefore, of the opinion that a fine under the aforesaid provision is eligible in the case of the assessee. However, keeping in view the fact that this is the first default by the assessee that the assessee has not committed a similar default thereafter and that the assessee might conceivably have been under the impression that it was not required to furnish the prescribed particulars, we are of the view that it would be suffice if a token fine of Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred only) is imposed on the assessee. We reduce the fine imposed by the CIT accordingly. 4. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed.
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