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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 155 Records
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1981 (11) TMI 55 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... and the time when it should spend the dharmada amounts for charitable purposes would not detract from the position the assessee held qua such amounts, namely, that it was under an obligation to utilize them exclusively for charitable purposes. It is true that the assessee did not keep these amounts in a separate bank account but admittedly a separate dharmada account was maintained in the books in which every receipt was credited and payment made there out on charity was debited and the High Court has clearly found that these amounts were never credited in the trading account nor were carried to the profit and loss statement. Having regard to this position, it seems to us clear that the Tribunal s finding that no trust could be said to have been created by the customers in respect of the impugned amounts will have to be regarded as erroneous. We, therefore, answer the aforementioned question in the negative, i. e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. No costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Mistake Apparent From Record, Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the case of Addl. CIT v. Visakha Flour Mills 1977 108 ITR 466, after considering one of the aforesaid Full Bench decisions of this court, took view contrary to that taken by this court, and this controversy has not been settled by the Supreme Court, took the view that it could not be said that no stable question of law arose from out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. This decision does not say that in so far as the I.T. authorities of this State are concerned, they can take the view that this question is of a debatable nature because some of the High Courts have taken a different view, and so, recourse cannot be taken to s. 154 of the Act. On this view the Appellate Tribunal was not right in holding that s. 154 of the Act would not be invoked in this case. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee in entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 250.
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1981 (11) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... s liable to be disallowed. It would be clear from the details of the disputed payments that the amount paid in cash at one time did not exceed Rs. 2,500. Some of the payments were made by post-dated bearer cheques as well. If these cheques were not post-dated, then certainly these payments would have been caught within the mischief of this provision. They were, however, made by post-dated bearer cheques. In other word, they were not payments made on the date on which the cheque was issued or given. The payment of the money mentioned therein would be taken to have been made on the date on which the cheque matured and was encashed. The AAC was, thus, right in holding that s. 40A(3) was not attracted to the disputed payments and the Appellate Tribunal in taking a contrary view acted against the provisions of law. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 250.
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1981 (11) TMI 52 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate, Income From Other Sources, Set Off ... ... ... ... ..... must necessarily partake of the same character. That principle has no application to the facts of this case. The schemes of the two enactments are different. The term business had a wider connotation under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, than what it is under the I.T. Act. See CIT v. Calcutta National Bank Ltd. 1959 37 ITR 171 (SC) In the present case the facts are not in dispute. The assessee is not a banking company. Money was not deposited by it by way of money-lending as a business. That was not its object. The interest arose from amounts deposited in bank otherwise than by way of business. The amount was deposited because money was lying idle and it was safer and wiser to put it in the bank. The interest thereby earned was incidental to the main purpose of the deposit, which was safe keeping and not earning profits. Such income is rightly found to be income from other sources. In the circumstances, the challenge against Ex. P-3 fails. The O.P. is dismissed. No costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... or under s. 34(1)(b) of the Act, but a basic failure of the fact-situation in the assessee s case to fit in with the terms of the statutory grant of development rebate, implicit in the section. On our construction of the general statutory imperative in s. 34(1)(a) and on the authority of the Division Bench ruling in Dalmia Magnesite case 1979 117 ITR 930, our answer to the question of law in this case must be in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 one set. As we concluded the judgment, Mr. Subramaniam for the assessee made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We were informed that against the judgment of this court in Addl. CIT v. Dalmia Magnesite Corporation 1979 117 ITR 930, this court has already granted a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court. It stands also to reason, therefore, that we should grant a similar leave in this case. We do so accordingly.
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1981 (11) TMI 50 - KERALA HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking, Relief ... ... ... ... ..... business. The derivation of the income must be directly connected with the business in the sense that the income is generated by the business. It would not be sufficient if it is generated by the exploitation of a business asset. In the case before as, the income by way of interest from the deposits is no doubt an income derived by investing surplus cash of the assessee generated as profits of the industrial undertaking. But, it is not money derived from the business activity of the industrial undertaking but by the business activity of deposit of the business asset in banks. Within the meaning of the term derived from it will not be possible to hold that the income so generated is the income falling within s. 80J. Hence, we answer question No. 2 in I.T.Rs. Nos. 71 and 72 against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1981 (11) TMI 49 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... fore the Appellate Tribunal, which failed. Thereafter, a reference was filed in this court, which also was answered against him. The case is reported in 1979 120 ITR 387 (Mulkh Raj v. CIT). The Commissioner of Income-tax appealed against the order of the AAC annulling the assessment of the HUF. The Tribunal has dismissed the appeal. As the matter stands, the assessment of Mulkh Raj, individual, has become final. The income sought to be included in the hands of the HUF has already now been finally assessed as the income of Mulkh Raj, individual. In view of the proviso to s. 64(2) of the I.T. Act, 1961, once a particular income is included in the total income of an individual, it has to be excluded from the total income of the family, etc. This provides a complete answer to the contentions of the Commissioner. The question is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee, and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1981 (11) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... elevant evidence and is a reasonable view ? The first question contains a misstatement in so far as it implies that the assessee had not offered any explanation whatever for the delay in the filing of the return. It may be mentioned that the assessee did file letter in explanation before the ITO in the course of the assessment proceedings. But this explanatory letter was ignored by the ITO. Although it was considered by the AAC. The Tribunal apparently did not consider either the assessee s letter or the decision of the AAC as proper on the matters contained in the explanation., The first question, therefore, will have to be altered as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in cancelling the penalty under section 271(1)(a) for the assessment year 1966-67 ? Our answer to this question as reframed, as well as to the second question, is in the affirmative and against the department. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 47 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... into money stand excluded from the scope of the term benefit, amenity or perquisite , that need not necessarily be so. The term benefit, amenity or perquisite may take in any benefits in kind and in service and may take in also cash. Whether convertible into money or not need not qualify the whole range. It only means that it is immaterial whether the benefit, perquisite or amenity may or may not be convertible into money. That would be immaterial. According to us, this would be the proper reading of the section. In the result, we answer the question referred at the instance of the assessee in the affirmative and the question referred at the instance of the Commissioner in the negative. That means that both the questions are answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. A copy of the judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required under s. 260(1) of the Act.
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1981 (11) TMI 46 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Mutual Concern ... ... ... ... ..... s had been disclosed appropriately, but the ITO had adopted an estimate according to the best of his judgment which led to the variation between the returned and the assessed figures of income. On the facts of the case, it was difficult, as rightly observed by the Tribunal, to hold that the assessee for his conduct should be exposed to the ravages of penalty. We are inclined to agree with the representation of the counsel for the assessee that the matter has been disposed of by an appreciation of facts as disclosed and since on the evidence a factual conclusion has been reached, we do not think we can accept the contention of the revenue that any question of law, much less the question as suggested, arises out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. We would, accordingly, decline to answer the references by saying that the Tribunal had reached a finding of fact and no question of law arises. Parties are directed to bear their own costs of these references. PATNAIK J.-I agree.
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1981 (11) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Assets, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... market and the property can be sold in such a market and, on that basis, the value has to be found out. It is a hypothetical case which is contemplated and the tax officer must assume that there is an open market in which the asset can be sold. The decision in CWT v. Purshottam N. Amersey 1969 71 ITR 180 (Bom) was the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court and in the decision in Purshottam N. Amarsey v. CWT 1973 88 ITR 417, the Supreme Court followed the earlier decision in Ahmed G. H. Ariff v. CWT 1970 76 ITR 471. The second question before us, therefore, calls for a plain answer, namely, that the asset cannot said to be of no market value. It has to be answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. In this view, the first question does not call for an answer and, therefore, we decline to answer the question. A copy of the judgment under the seal of the High Court and signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1981 (11) TMI 44 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Far Below Market Value, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... a like report by the same valuer. It seems that there have been subsequent developments and proceedings It appears that the order of the CWT was set aside by the Tribunal. There have been other proceedings by way of appeal before the Tribunal and the High Court in this and allied cases. But we are not concerned with all these proceedings here nor are we concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions of the WTO or Commissioner. All we are concerned with is the short question whether the WTO had some material before him to form an opinion that the value returned by the assessee, though supported by the report of a registered valuer did not reflect the market value of the property. In our view, it is difficult to contend that there was no such material. We, therefore, reject this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. No other contentions were urged before us. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 500.
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1981 (11) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Reference To High Court ... ... ... ... ..... onditioning charges which had been shown separately in the ITO s order were assessable under s. 56, as Income from other sources In the aforesaid view of the matter in view of the obligations undertaken by the lessor and the manner in which the said obligation was discharged in the relevant year, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal arrived at a correct decision. This decision which we are making is also in consonance with the view taken by this court in Income-tax Reference No. 81 of 1970 (Al Haj Amir Hasan Properties (P.) Ltd. v. CIT) judgment delivered on July 7, 1975. In view of the above, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. The lease agreement which we have referred to was not annexed to the piper book. We are treating a Xerox copy of the said agreement handed over to the court as part of the record of this court. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (11) TMI 42 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Reference To High Court ... ... ... ... ..... d from the 1st day of April, 1972 and the name and style of the firm shall be CAPITAL FOUNDRY and ENGINEERING WORKS , (hereinafter referred to as the firm ) to carry on business of foundrymen, engineering manufacturers, dealers in machine tools, rice milling, foodgrains of all kinds, sugar and other eatables, general traders and to carry on such other business or businesses as the partners mutually agree upon. The words to carry on such other business or businesses as the partners mutually agree upon indicate that it was open to the partnership firm to engage in any other type of business, which could be one of renting out the property belonging to the firm. In our considered opinion, the distinction sought to be drawn by Mr. Awasthy cannot be properly drawn in view of cl. 2 of the partnership deed, extracted above. For the reasons aforementioned, we answer the question of law referred to us in the negative, i. e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 41 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment, Balancing Charge ... ... ... ... ..... be allowed to turn round and urge that such an order was incorrect or unwarranted. Faced with this situation, Mr. Gupta submitted that we should either call for a better statement or remand the case to the Tribunal for a fresh decision on the second question. We are unable to accept this submission either. If the statement of the case had not been properly drawn up, the assessee could have filed an application for rectification before the Appellate Tribunal or it could have filed a petition before this court, which application could have been disposed of at this hearing. The assessee did not adopt that course and in view of the admission made by him before the ITO, we are not inclined to allow the assessee to lead evidence on the point that the ITO did not actually allow any depreciation for the relevant year. The second question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against, the assessee. The reference stands disposed of accordingly.
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1981 (11) TMI 40 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... refund the money collected as per the original orders, but to recompute the amount of tax that is payable by the assessee. The original assessment is annulled, not with a view to refund, but with a view to the correct determination of the liability. Refund is only the consequence of that determination. The object of remand is, therefore, not to refund, but to recalculate, and then to refund the excess, if any. That being the position, the question of interest as per s. 244 does not arise until a fresh computation of the tax is made by fresh assessment. With great respect, I do not accept as correct law the views expressed to the contrary by the Allahabad High Court in Purshottam Dayal Varshney v. CIT 1974 94 ITR 187. In the circumstances, Exs. P-9 and P-15, which respectively are orders of the ITO and the Commissioner refusing the assessee s claim for interest as aforesaid, are impeccable. The challenge against them fails. The O.P. is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 39 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... is conferred, as that right is only a contingent right and not an absolute unqualified right. For the reasons I have given above and in the light of the discussion as above, I am of the view that there is no lis between the petitioner herein and respondents Nos. 1 and 2. If the Department has erred in dropping the proceedings, it is not for this court to interfere at the instance of the petitioner who is really unconcerned with the acquisition proceedings except to the extent as already indicated. He has an agreement of sale, it is admitted, he has a suit pending for specific performance under that agreement. Therefore, he is in no way affected by the dropping of That is a matter which the court will adjudicate on the proceedings, merits of the suit. I, therefore, see no reason why a rule should be issued in this case. Any loss to the public revenue is a matter for the CBDT to be concerned with and not the petitioner. It is accordingly dismissed without a rule being issued.
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1981 (11) TMI 38 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... any money received by a shareholder on the liquidation of a company could not be charged to capital gains at all. According to the Supreme Court there is no transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of s. 2(47) of the Act in case where the company in which the assessee holds shares is liquidated. In the light of the discussion above we hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of assessment computing the capital loss and directing a set-off against capital gains in future can be held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue giving rise to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. The answer is in the affirmative and against the assessee. Question No. (3) is consequential to questions Nos. (1) and (2). Since we have answered question No. (2) in favour of the Revenue, question No. (3) is also answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1981 (11) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... but in spite of repeated reminders such books of account were not produced. It further appears that AAC in his order observed (at page 32 of the Paper Book) that although the partner of the creditor-firm at one stage appeared before the ITO, and could only show that the name of the assessee appeared as creditor in the books of account of the creditor-firm, yet it failed to give details as to how cash came from which the amount was advanced. The Tribunal failed to consider and/or has ignored the above finding of the AAC. It, therefore, appears that the Tribunal ignored and/or overlooked the relevant materials on record as also the relevant findings of the ITO and the AAC. Further, the Tribunal erred and/or was misdirected, in law, in arriving at the conclusions that the genuineness of the loan transaction was proved. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we answer both the questions in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... nsel for the Department made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in this case. So far as the first question is concerned, we do not think the Department is entitled to ask for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court, considering that we have merely followed, to the letter, the decision of the Supreme Court on the subject in Vazir Sultan s case 1981 132 ITR 559 (SC). As for the second question, the learned counsel pointed out that the decision in CIT v. Andhra Prabha P. Ltd. 1980 123 ITR 760 (Mad), which we have followed, was the subject-matter of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and this court had granted a certificate as prayed for, in S.C.P.No. 22 of 1981 by order dated March 13, 1981. To be consistent, we think we must accede to this request. We accordingly grant leave to the Commissioner to appeal to the Supreme Court in so far as the second question is concerned. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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