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Showing 121 to 140 of 155 Records
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1981 (11) TMI 35 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. We have earlier in this judgment extracted the material passage from Brij Mohan v. CIT 1979 120 ITR I (SC). In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the contention that the law in force as on the date of the ITO s satisfaction is the relevant law for determining whether the assessee herein has committed the offence charged against him. We answer the first three questions and the first part of the fourth question referred to this court in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. Our answer to the second part of the fourth question is in the negative, that is, again, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. There shall be no order as to costs. Send a copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal as required by s. 260(1) of the 1961 Act.
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1981 (11) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... scounted by the multani bankers with any of the scheduled banks. This, no doubt, might be a fact, but there is no rule of presumption that all un-discounted hundis are false documents, every one of them, without exception. Nor is there any evidence of an invariable practice amongst Multani moneylenders that all genuine hundis are always rediscounted with scheduled banks, and havala transactions are not so discounted. Altogether, we are satisfied that this is only yet another case of the ITO having been disposed, or pre-disposed, to reject the assessee s explanation regarding the hundi credits. The assessee s offer to let the peak credit be treated as taxable income only hastened the process of assessment. It did not furnish any evidence, by way of admission or otherwise, to the effect that the hundi loans were only havala transactions and represented the assessee s concealed income. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question of law against the Department with costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 33 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nalty. They only observed that having regard to the fact that the TRO to whom the realisation of demand had been entrusted had been satisfied with the financial difficulties of the assessee and on a consideration of the circumstances had granted instalments to the assessee to pay the tax, the ITO should not have, in the circumstances of the case, levied a penalty. This indicates that this was a decision arrived at by the Tribunal on the facts and circumstances and it was not the intention of the Tribunal to lay down that once steps had been taken for recovery of tax, no penalty could be imposed by the ITO. For the reasons stated above, we are of opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal that no penalty was imposable in the circumstances of the case was justified on the facts and that the Tribunal was right in cancelling the penalty imposed on the assessee. The question referred to us is answered accordingly. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 350.
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1981 (11) TMI 32 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Firm, High Court, Profits Chargeable To Tax ... ... ... ... ..... and against the assessee. As regards question No. (3) we are of the view that there was no mistake apparent on the record in the appellate order of the Tribunal dated May 18, 1979, which required rectification under s. 254(2) of the Act. The finding of the Appellate Tribunal about the date of dissolution of the firm was based on an appreciation of the evidence and the same could not be rectified under s. 254(2) of the Act by raising debatable or arguable questions. See T. S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart Brothers 1971 82 ITR 50 (SC) . Besides, as discussed earlier, the question whether an order of the Tribunal rejecting an application for rectification can be a subject of reference under s. 256(1) or not is not free from doubt and according to us no reference in respect of such an order is tenable. For these reasons we answer question No. (3) also in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Reference answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reserve For Gratuity, Super Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... er in its order, had taken the view that it is part of the capital base , in other Words, that it is a reserve. But this conclusion has been come to by them without examining the nature of the appropriation along the lines laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court. The Tribunal s order cannot, therefore, be supported. We must accordingly answer the question in the negative. This answer of ours, however, necessarily implies that the matter has got to be considered again by the Tribunal in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, as summarised by us in the foregoing paragraphs. The Tribunal may, if they deem fit, remand the case to the ITO or they may call for a report from him or they may allow the parties to adduce additional evidence on this aspect. The choice must be left to the Tribunal to be made on the basis of the balance of convenience. The reference is disposed of accordingly. In the circumstance of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 30 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... uld be the cost of acquisition within the meaning of s. 48. We cannot read the words to the assessee as incorporated in s. 48(2) of the Act. Wherever the Legislature has wanted such words to be part of a taxing provision, the Legislature has specifically said so. By way of example, we may refer to s. 43 of the Act where, inter alia, the term actual cost has been defined. This provision reads as under 43. In sections 28 to 41 and in this section, unless the context otherwise requires (1) actual cost means the actual cost of the assets to the assessee, reduced by that portion of the cost thereof, if any, as has been met directly or indirectly by any other person or authority ...... .. It is settled law that in taxing provisions a strict view has to be taken, and words cannot be added or subtracted unless one is compelled in the context to do so. Here, we are not compelled to do so. We, therefore, answer this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 29 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Current Repairs ... ... ... ... ..... ntages or features which improved its income-earning capacity were introduced. The very distinction sought to be made out in those two cases is relevant in the case before us and that is why we answer the question in favour of the Revenue. We may also advert to the decision of the High Court of Bombay in CIT v. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. 1974 96 ITR 650. That dealt with a payment made to provide certain amenities to the town including the provision of water supply and the payment was held to be such as not to secure an enduring advantage. That again, as we said, is a decision on the facts of that case. In the light of what we have said here, it follows that both the questions raised have to be answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Department and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required under s. 260(1) of the Act.
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1981 (11) TMI 28 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Agricultural Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... during the accounting year in question. In this case the 3rd respondent has, while accepting the data relating to the number of trees, rejected the data with respect to yield, expenditure, etc., on the reasoning that the report of inspection was not relevant as each year s assessment is independent . The reason adduced in support of the conclusion reached by the 3rd respondent cannot be upheld in the light of the provisions contained in ss. 31(4) and 38(c) of the Act and r. 25A of the Rules. I would, therefore, quash Ex. P-13 order passed by the 3rd respondent, the Dy. Commissioner, and direct him to pass a fresh order, disposing of the revision considering the en-tire material on record including the reports submitted by the commissioner. The writ petition is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs. Issue carbon copy of this judgment to the Government Pleader free of charge and to the counsel for the petitioner on usual terms, if applied for in that behalf.
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1981 (11) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is bona fides have little relevance. Only in the year where a change in the method of accounting is introduced for the first time, it is to be examined by the Revenue authorities whether the change introduced is meant to be regularly followed or not. It appears to us that it is in this context only that the expression of good faith and bona fide occur in the observations in the earlier judgment noted earlier. In our opinion, where it is found that an assessee has employed (changed ?) his regular method of accounting by another recognised method and has followed the latter method regularly, thereafter, it is not open to the revenue authorities to go into the question of bona fides of the introduction and continuance of the change. For the above reasons the assessee succeeds in this reference. The question referred to us are both answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. -In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (11) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dated the 5th September, 1973. It was possible for and open to the assessee to produce evidence at the earlier stages to establish that it had followed the changed method of accounting in subsequent years and thus prove the regularity of the change. We are also unable to entertain the submission of the assessee that it should be allowed to adduce further evidence at this reference to enable it to prove its case or that the matter should be remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh consideration. The Tribunal might have taken into account some irrelevant grounds and facts but it cannot be held that the approach of the Tribunal was entirely incorrect or that its findings are totally vitiated. The assessee, in our view, is not entitled to have the entire matter reopened at this stage. For the reasons given above we answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (11) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... several High Courts which have taken this view. It would be enough if we merely mention those decisions. The decisions which have taken the same view which we have taken are (1) Gates Foam and Rubber Co. v. CIT 1973 90 ITR 422 (Ker), (2) CIT v. Ram Chandra Singh 1976 104 ITR 77 (Pat), (3) Smt. Kamla Vati v. CIT 1978 111 ITR 248 (P and H), (4) CIT v. Smt. Jagjit Kaur 1980 126 ITR 540 (All) and (5) CIT v. Ganeshram Nayak 1981 An additional argument which was advanced by Mr. Dastur was that the notice of penalty, dated July 4, 1969, would now become invalid because now the penalty which was already levied has been sustained by this court and there could not be two orders of penalty in respect of the same default or omission. In the view which we have taken on the validity of the notice of penalty itself, we do not think it necessary to go into the merits of this contention. The appeal must, therefore, stand dismissed. The respondent will be entitled to the costs of this appeal.
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1981 (11) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ch the Tribunal had relied in the case of Addl. CIT v. Kanhaiyalal Jessaram 1977 106 ITR 168 and our attention was drawn to the observation of the court at pp. 170-171 on the effect of acceptance or non-acceptance of the disclosure petition under s. 271(4A) of the Act. We may mention that looked at from one point of view the question of acceptance or non-acceptance of the disclosure petition might not be relevant in deciding whether there were materials before the ITO for the formation of the belief. But we are not concerned whether this would constitute sufficient ground for sustaining assessment if it was ultimately made or even for taking any further proceedings. In that view of the matter it is not necessary for us to express our views on this aspect of the matter. We will, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1981 (11) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Business Expenditure, Depreciation, Developement Rebate, Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... f the court in the case of CIT v. Smt Ashima Sinha 1979 116 ITR 26 (Cal), at p. 38 and also in the case of CIT v. Panchanan Das 1979 116 ITR 272 (Cal), at p. 282 and also to certain observations of this court made in the case of Sudesh Chandra Talwar v. CWT 1982 137 ITR 483. But in the view we have taken, it is not necessary for us to go into this aspect of the matter. In an appropriate case, the valuer s report may be rejected on certain materials and it can also be characterised as an expression of an opinion and not an evidence of fact. Bat on this controversy it is not relevant for us to embark upon in this case. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal on this aspect had arrived at a correct conclusion and we, therefore, answer the question referred at the instance of the assessee, in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (11) TMI 22 - DELHI HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... of the Supreme Court deal with different situations and there is no Teal inconsistency. But even assuming, as contended for the Revenue, that it may be necessary to consider the respective scope of these two decisions on a future occasion, as far as the present case is concerned, it has to be decided by following Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd. 1979 118 ITR 243 (SC). This is because the provisions interpreted therein are couched in language similar to that in issue before us, whereas the Gujarat High Court found the decision in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Company Ltd. 1978 113 ITR 84, more apposite in deciding the issue before it. As such, as discussed earlier, the decision in Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd. is pertinent to the provisions presently under consideration. In the result, for the reasons outlined above, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As the assessee has succeeded, he would be entitled to his costs, Counsel s fee., one set, Rs. 350.
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1981 (11) TMI 21 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Reference To High Court ... ... ... ... ..... could in the meantime make alternative arrangement was recorded. The case was thus ordered to be listed in the first week of November. The record indicates that S.P.C. had been issued to the applicant. When the case was taken up today, neither the applicant nor her counsel was present. Shri Mukati, counsel for the department, was however, present. The circumstances clearly indicate that the accountable person at whose instance this reference was made is not interested in pursuing this reference and getting the opinion of this court on the questions as have been referred to by the Tribunal. Following the course as was adopted by this court in Gajadhar Prasad Nathulal v. CWT 1970 76 ITR 615, wherein the cases of the other High Courts have been dealt with, we would decline to answer the questions referred in this case. Accordingly, we decline to answer the questions referred to us for our opinion. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to the costs of this reference.
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1981 (11) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Company, Provisions, Reserves, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... the so-called reserve of Rs. 1,02,995.32 was for the contingency of a big bad debt, still that would not make it anything other than a provision unless the suggestion is that the assessee can create a reserve even before any debts come into being, which would be quite odd. We thus reject the Tribunal s conclusion as based on a misdirection in law, or rather, on a multiplicity of misdirections. Learned counsel for the assessee referred to a few decisions of the High Courts. We do not think we need examine any of those decisions considering that a comprehensive enunciation of the law on the subject has been provided by the decision of the Supreme Court in Vazir. Sultan s case 1981 132 ITR 559, which we have earlier referred to. A discussion of the earlier case law would, in our opinion, only tend to obfuscate the legal position. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the negative and against the assessee. The Department will have its costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500.
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1981 (11) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Company, Reserve, Super Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... Bombay High Court in the case of Parke Davis (India) Ltd. v. CIT 1981 130 ITR 813, where the court dealt with this question at pp. 816-818 though this point we have mentioned was conceded by all parties concerned. Similar view was taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. 1981 132 ITR 197 (P and H). Our attention was, however, drawn to certain observations of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Oswal Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. CIT 1981 129 ITR 761 (P and H). But that was in the context of different controversy and, therefore, it is not material to refer to the said decision in detail. For the reasons aforesaid, in our opinion, the Tribunal was in error in respect of both these years and, therefore, both the questions must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, parties will pay and bear their own costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (11) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking, Relief From Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... . The position after 1961 amendment was considered by the Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Lucas-T.V.S. Ltd. (No. 1) 1977 110 ITR 338 and the Madras High Court was of the view that a combined reading of r. 19(1) and (6) of the I.T. Rules, 1962, with s. 43(6) of the I.T. Act, 1961, clearly showed that initial depreciation was not to be deducted in computing the written down value of assets for computing the capital employed by a newly established undertaking for the purpose of determining the deduction under s. 84 (now s. 80J) of the Act. In our opinion, the interpretation sought to be given for and on behalf of the Revenue would defeat, the purpose of the amendment and also result in an anomalous position. In that view of the matter we are of the view that the Tribunal had arrived at the correct decision. In our opinion, the question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and each party to pay and bear its own costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (11) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... . CIT 1981 131 ITR 207, where also the Tribunal had made a finding that different ventures did not constitute the same business. Similar is the position in the case of Waterfall Estates Ltd. v. CIT 1981 131 ITR 223. It is on this basis we had previously discharged the rule. We also pointed out this to the learned advocate appearing for the Revenue but he was insisting on the perversity of the finding of the Tribunal and even tried to invite us to look into the balance-sheet to show the perversity. Unfortunately we cannot allow this court s time to be used for the experiment of a new argument to be made on behalf of the Revenue. Normally this court had followed the practice of not allowing the costs especially against the Revenue because the costs would naturally be borne by the taxpayers. But in order to discourage frivolous applications and waste of time this is a fit case where the rule should be discharged with costs with the aforesaid observations C.K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (11) TMI 16 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nclusion arrived at by the Tribunal. Before concluding it has also to be pointed out that there is a small error in the phrasing of the question by the Tribunal. The question refers to the period of 25 months which commenced on 1st July, 1967, and ended on 31st December, 1968. Obviously the reference is to the period from July 1, 1966, to December 31, 1968 (a period of 30 months), being the period for which the Tribunal held that there was reasonable cause for the assessee s failure to furnish the return. The period of 25 months actually expired on 31st July, 1968. This error, however, is not really very material because the basic reasoning of the Tribunal was that since the delay for the first 25 months had been explained by the assessee the penalty could not be imposed under s. 271(1)(a). We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the applicant. As there has been no appearance on behalf of the respondent, we make no order as to costs.
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