Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 141 to 155 of 155 Records
-
1981 (11) TMI 15
Company, Reserves, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... .T. Act, 1964, and whether it was entitled to deduction. Our attention was also drawn to the unreported decision in I.T. Reference No. 272 of 1976 in the case of Duncan Brothers Co. Ltd. v. CIT, the judgment delivered on 4th August, 1978 since reported in 1981 128 ITR 302 (Cal) , where the court was concerned with the question whether the deduction of a provision for taxation and cost of investments in terms of cl. (ii) of rule 2 in the Second Schedule to the C. (P.) S.T. Act, 1964, was allowable or not. The provision for taxation, in our opinion, would stand on a different footing, as was explained in the case of CIT v. Bird and Co. (P.) Ltd. 1982 133 ITR 40 (Cal). For the reasons stated above, we are of opinion that the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion. Therefore, the question as reframed must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear its own costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
-
1981 (11) TMI 14
... ... ... ... ..... it is not necessary to refer to these in detail. Our attention was also drawn to the observations of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Hindustan Gas and Industries Ltd. v. CIT 1979 117 ITR 549, and reliance was placed on the observations of the court at p. 555, where the court made it clear that the onus was on the assessee claiming deduction to prove to the satisfaction of the Revenue that it was so entitled. There is no dispute with regard to this proposition. In this case the assessee had adduced evidence. The evidence was considered by the Tribunal. Having regard to the well-settled principles laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court this controversy, as to on whom the onus lies, does not arise for our consideration. In that view of the matter both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
-
1981 (11) TMI 13
... ... ... ... ..... Commissioner to influence his discretion both in isolation and in conjunction with other relevant factors to exercise his discretion to waive or reduce penalty. Patently, those factors had receded to the background, and altogether ruled out in the manner in which the Commissioner exercised his discretion while passing the impugned order. Necessarily, there has not been a proper application of mind requiring the impugned order to be quashed and asking him to re-determine the cause in the light of the foregoing observations. Resultantly, this petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Commissioner (annex. P-2) is quashed partially, preserving the satisfaction stage, directing him to re-hear the petitioner only on the question of waiver or deduction of penalty in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The petitioner through her counsel is directed to appear before the Commissioner on 2nd December, 1981.
-
1981 (11) TMI 12
Burden Of Proof, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... her husband or it might be the income of the firm. Of these possibilities, excluding other possibilities, whose income it is must be definitely known. Before penalty can be levied on the firm, it must be found on a preponderance of probabilities that the credit represents the firm s income. Of such evidence the Tribunal found none in this case. Nor do we find any ourselves. Mr. Rangaswami mentioned that the firm did not challenge the assessment of the cash credits by preferring an appeal against the assessment. In our opinion, this is not a circumstance from which any adverse inference can be drawn against the assessee. Forbearance to file an appeal might be motivated by many considerations. It will not unerringly indicate that the assessee thereby admits that the credits represent his income. Having regard to all these considerations, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. The assessee will have its costs. Counsel fee, Rs. 500.
-
1981 (11) TMI 11
Appeal To AAC, Delay In Filing Return, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... O, still remains open and if the WTO decides against the assessee, his finding can be challenged in appeal before the AAC. In our opinion, the right of going up in appeal for challenging an order imposing penalty passed by the WTO remains effective and is not waived simply because the assessee approaches the Commissioner for waiver of penalty and he refuses to waive penalty under s. 18(2A). The Tribunal, in our opinion, was wrong in holding that the AAC had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The view that we are taking is fully supported by the decisions of the Karnataka, Madras and Delhi High Courts (see CWT v. B. Kempanna 1980 126 ITR 825 (Kar), CWT v. M.K.S. Vanavarayar 1980 122 ITR 184 (Mad) and Shakuntala Mehra v. CWT 1976 102 ITR 301 (Delhi). For the reasons given above, our answer to the question referred is that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the AAC was not competent to entertain the appeal. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
-
1981 (11) TMI 10
... ... ... ... ..... e IAC, in relation to the aforesaid amounts, as if they were concealed income. The amount so levied as penalty came to Rs. 20,071.71 and Rs. 2,183, respectively. The Tribunal cancelled those penalties in the light of its decision that the relevant amounts brought to tax in the assessment as income, which has resulted in the levy of penalties, were not taxable as income. As the amounts did not represent income, there was no question of the assessee disclosing the same in its return and, therefore, the penalties levied were cancelled. As we have agreed with the conclusions of the Tribunal, we consider that there is no question of levy of penalty on the facts here. When the amounts were not liable to be taxed, there could be no levy of penalty for their omission from the return. The question relating to penalty is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (rupees five hundred only). One set.
-
1981 (11) TMI 9
Firm, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... their relations with the assessee-firm s constitution and its assets and finances, and they could not be merely held to be name-lenders. It has further been pointed out that M/s. C. J. Patel and Co. did not derive any pecuniary benefit through the constitution of the assessee firm and that it paid interest at 1 per cent. on the outstanding periodical balances to the assessee-firm. It was also pointed out that all the partners of the assessee-firm including the ladies made substantial, withdrawals by drafts on the State Bank of India for their own personal requirements. Having regard to these facts and other facts, the Tribunal found in favour of the assessee. In our opinion, the Tribunal s finding cannot be assailed. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred is that the assessee-firm was entitled to the continuation of registration under s. 184/186 of the I.T. Act for the years 1972-73 and 1973-74. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
-
1981 (11) TMI 8
Company, Reserves, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... d that even though the actual distribution of dividend takes place later, since by that time the board of directors would have already recommended the dividend in question, it will have to reduce the figure of reserves in the balance-sheet for purposes of capital computation. The new r. 1A says nothing about the board s recommendation to declare dividend out of reserves. The rule says nothing about the proposal being made by the directors prior to the first day of the account year. The rule brings the axe down in all cases and reduces the reserve by the amount of the dividend where no separate provision is made therefor in the balance-sheet. Rule 1A also applies to cases where there is an excess declaration of dividend over and above the provision made in the balance-sheet. The rule lays down that to the extent of the excess, the reserves must be deducted. For the reasons aforesaid, the reference is answered against the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
-
1981 (11) TMI 7
Business Expenditure, Municipal Property Tax, Urban Land Tax ... ... ... ... ..... her purchases or sales which are subject to taxation, the obligation to pay the tax arises and taxability is attracted. Although that liability cannot be enforced till the quantification is effected by assessment proceedings, the liability for payment of tax is independent of the assessment ... An assessee who follows the mercantile system of accounting is entitled to deduct from the profits and gains of the business such liability which had accrued during the period for which the profits and gains were being computed. The above passage reflects the general legal position, the particular application of which we have laid down in the foregoing paragraphs as the proper basis for claiming deduction for municipal property tax under the mercantile system of accounting. In the circumstances, our answer to the second question is that the deduction must be limited to the amount actually allowed by the ITO. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1981 (11) TMI 6
Business Expenditure, Deductibility, HUF, Urban Land Tax ... ... ... ... ..... head Business for the assessment year 1970-7l. The assessee will have the costs from the Department. Counsel s fee Rs. 500, one set. By the time we concluded the judgment, the learned standing counsel for the I.T. Department made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. He submitted that there was an apparent conflict in the reasoning which found favour with an earlier Bench of this court in CIT v. Woodlands Hotel 1981 128 ITR 603, and the conclusion to which we have arrived at in the present case. He also submitted that it is moot question as to how far Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 363 (SC), can be pressed into service to the question in this case. The learned counsel submitted that these questions raise substantial questions of law for decision by the Supreme Court. On consideration, we think that the learned standing counsel was right in asking for a certificate of fitness. We accordingly grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
-
1981 (11) TMI 5
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... loyment of the workers entirely to the advantage of the assessee. Learned counsel added that although this aspect of the expenditure was not adverted to by the Tribunal it was but one facet of the question of law already before us. We, however, decline to entertain this contention considering that it had not been mooted, let alone considered in earlier stages of the proceedings. A question of law can be considered by this court only where it arises out of the Tribunal s appellate order. And a question can be said to arise only where it is raised and decided by the Tribunal or where it is raised before the Tribunal, whether decided or not, or where it is decided by the Tribunal, whether raised or not. In this case, the point put forward by Mr. Jayaraman was neither raised before the Tribunal nor decided by them. In the result, we answer the reference in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The Department shall pay the costs of the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
-
1981 (11) TMI 4
... ... ... ... ..... rect some omission or wrong statement inadvertently made or not made deliberately in the first return, it is the return on which the assessment is completed which would be relevant for the purpose of applicability of the relevant law for imposition of penalty. Otherwise, if there is any deliberate omission or mis-statement, it will be the very first return which would be relevant for imposition of penalty. We are fortified in taking this view by the decision in Amjad Ali Nazir Ali v. CIT 1977 110 ITR 419 (All). In the present case, the assessee maintained that the return filed by him was correct. That his return was not accepted is a different matter. It cannot be said that because there was a difference in the returns filed on September 2, 1963, and November 22, 1967, the offence was committed on November 22, 1967. The relevant law would be the law applicable on the date when the original return was filed. The references are answered, accordingly, in favour of the assessee.
-
1981 (11) TMI 3
... ... ... ... ..... cts of the case for arriving at its conclusion that the disclosure made by the assessee was full and voluntary and there was no element of fraud or neglect in the conduct of the assessee in the course of the assessment proceedings. We are, therefore, satisfied that the order of the Tribunal, in so far as this assessment year is concerned, must be upheld. The question of law which is referred to us by the Tribunal is as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in cancelling the penalty under section 271 (1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? For the reasons we have earlier set out, our answer to the question would be as follows The Tribunal was right in cancelling the penalty under s. 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1964-65, but the Tribunal was not right in cancelling the penalty for the assessment year 1963-64. Having regard to the results of this reference, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1981 (11) TMI 2
... ... ... ... ..... ase before that High Court, an addition was made to the income returned on the score that the cost of construction as disclosed in the assessee s books was lower than the estimated cost of the building as rendered by a valuer, The learned judges held that a mere estimate of cost cannot constitute material on which finding of concealment can be rendered. In that case, some explanation had been offered by the assessee as to why the construction was at an economical cost. This explanation was not accepted by the ITO. The learned judges held that even if the assessee s explanation was not acceptable, it would still require some further material to support the finding that the assessee had concealed its taxable income. We respectfully agree with this view. Our answer to the second question is, accordingly, in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Having regard to our answers to the two questions, we direct the Department to pay the assessee s costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
-
1981 (11) TMI 1
Company, Statutory Deduction, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... s, so as to derive the correct statutory deduction in terms of the proviso to section 2(8) of the Act. We uphold his interpretation of the provisions rather than that of the Tribunal. In the circumstances, we answer the second question in favour of the Department and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Learned standing counsel for the Department orally applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against our decision in regard to the first question. Considering that the earlier decision of this court in Addl. CIT v. Bimetal Bearings Ltd. 1977 110 ITR 131 (Mad) had been the subject of grant of leave by this court to appeal to the Supreme Court, we are disposed to grant the learned counsel s request. There will be certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court as respects our decision on the first question alone. As for the second question, we do not think that it is of such substantial importance as to require a decision by the Supreme Court.
....
|