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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 200 Records
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1981 (3) TMI 232 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ional impediment for Parliament in incorporating by retrospective legislation any existing State law or laws previously enacted by the State Legislatures. It must be expected that Parliament was fully aware of the laws in force from time to time from 5th January, 1957, up to the date of the commencement of the amending Act in the various States and it decided to apply them for the purposes of the Central Sales Tax Act by enacting section 9(1) of the amending Act to give effect to the policy of complete uniformity and for validating penalties already imposed. There is no element of delegation or abdication in section 9(1). Thus we do not find any merit in the contention relating to the constitutional validity of subsection (2A) of section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act inserted by the amending Act or of section 9(1) of the amending Act. 11. The petition fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs. The security amount be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (3) TMI 231 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y change in the commodity. In Porritts and Spencer (Asia) Ltd. 1978 42 STC 433 (SC) 1979 UPTC 866 (SC), it has been observed that whatever be the mode of weaving employed, woven fabric would be textile . This decision, therefore, gives a very wide meaning of textile. The question, however, is whether the fabrics manufactured by the assessee can be considered to be textile. As pointed out earlier it is admitted that in the process of manufacturing, lamination is involved which comprises of impregnation of plastic material pressed together. It is, therefore, not manufactured by warp and weft method. The Commissioner did not commit any error in concluding that laminated fabrics manufactured by the assessee were not entitled to exemption. In the result this appeal fails so far as laminated fabrics are concerned. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, however, is directed to decide the appeal afresh in respect of plain woven fabrics. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1981 (3) TMI 230 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ny support is gatherable for the present purpose from that decision. We are not, therefore, inclined to take a view different from what has been taken in Rameswarlal Muralidhar v. State of Orissa (S.J.C. No. 2 of 1976) 1980 45 STC 115 where the question directly arose for determination. 4.. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is against the assessee by concluding thaton the facts and in the circumstances of the case, paper and exercise books which are manufactured out of paper are not one and the same thing but are two different things and on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee by making purchase of paper tax-free upon giving declaration in form XXXIV specifically mentioning therein that the purchases were for resale, would violate the declaration for resale if he has sold such paper purchased for resale after converting the same into exercise books. There would be no order for costs. Dr. MISRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (3) TMI 229 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ging freight separately and even if the bill had been raised in separate form, we would have very much doubted as to whether the freight could have been deducted from the taxable turnover. Though the learned counsel for the assessee cited Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1969 24 STC 487 (SC) and Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1960 11 STC 827 (SC), since these decisions also were considered by the Supreme Court in the latest decision in Hindustan Sugar Mills Ltd. s case 1979 43 STC 13 (SC), we did not consider it necessary to refer to them separately in this judgment. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the view of the Tribunal that the freight did not form part of the price is not correct and is liable to be set aside and accordingly we set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore the order of the assessing officer. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1981 (3) TMI 228 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s Tax v. Burmah Shell Refineries Limited 1978 41 S.T.C. 337. and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Automatic Engineering Works 1981 47 S.T.C. 343. (Sales Tax References Nos. 50 and 51 of 1979 decided on 27th February, 1981). The ratio of these two decisions squarely applies to the case before us and, accordingly, the respondents had not committed any breach or contravention of the declaration forms given by them and, therefore, the question of assessing them to tax on that basis did not arise. Equally, the question which the Tribunal has considered and determined did not arise for consideration in the case of the second appeal filed by the respondents, and determining the question submitted to us by the Tribunal in this reference would, therefore, be purely academic. Accordingly, we decline to answer the said question and direct the reference to be returned to the Tribunal. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference returned.
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1981 (3) TMI 227 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dioxide did constitute an industrial gas, but was not similar to oxygen, acetylene and nitrogen. Therefore, in our opinion, the mere specification of three types of gases, namely, oxygen, acetylene and nitrogen, in the entry does not in any way help the construction suggested by the petitioner that notwithstanding carbon dioxide being an industrial gas, it cannot be taxed under the said entry. The facts of the case disclose that the petitioner was using carbon dioxide in the manufacture of aerated water. Therefore carbon dioxide being a gas used in an industry, namely, in the manufacture of aerated water, was liable to be taxed under entry 121. In our view, the Deputy Commissioner was right in holding that the order of the assessing authority was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. Consequently, the Tribunal was also right in confirming the said order. 7.. In the result, we make the following order (i) Revision petition is dismissed. (ii) No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (3) TMI 226 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... .C. 13 (S.C.). In our opinion the principle enunciated therein is not attracted to the facts in the instant case. In that case there was a price fixd by the Cement Control Order which included the freight charges. The court held that by reason of the provisions of the Control Order, which governed the transactions of sale of cement entered into by the assessee with the purchasers, the amount of freight formed part of the sale price within the meaning of the first part of the definition of that term in section 2(p) of the Rajasthan Act and section 2(h) of the Central Act and was includible in the turnover of the assessee . There is no such price fixed under any enactment which included the price of the containers. As such the aforesaid decision has no bearing on the question involved in the instant case. 6.. In our opinion the view taken by the Tribunal is correct. Accordingly, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (3) TMI 225 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the present reference arises has travelled far beyond the ambit of what it was required to do. The question which has been referred to us is also too wide and does not really arise out of the actual controversy between the parties. Accordingly, we reframe the question as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the liability of a purchaser who contravenes the terms of a declaration in form T to entry 39 of Notification No. STA. 1059(iii)-G-1 dated 28th December, 1959, issued under sub-section (1) of section 41 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, read with sub-section (2) of the said section 41, cannot be quantified with precision? For the reasons set out above, we answer the question as reframed by us in the negative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessees. The respondents will pay to the applicant the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. Reference answered in the negative.
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1981 (3) TMI 224 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion to section 45 relating to offences and penalties and contended that if the fiction created by section 15 deeming the legal representative as dealer is to be extended for levy of penalty, it may also attract section 45 relating to prosecution. But section 15 makes it clear that the liability of the legal representative is only to the extent of the assets of the deceased in his hands. There is no personal liability on the legal representatives as such for either payment of the tax or penalty or any other liability of the deceased dealer. Therefore section 45 may not be applicable to the legal representatives and that provision in no way affects or restricts the scope of section 15 or any penalty levied under section 16(2). For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the order of the Tribunal does not call for any interference and the revision petition is accordingly dismissed. The respondent will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petitions dismissed.
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1981 (3) TMI 223 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he said Act. In this view of the matter the respondents had not committed any breach of the declaration forms given by them. Further, in Sales Tax Reference No. 52 of 1978-Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jasmine Mills Pvt. Ltd. 1981 47 S.T.C. 357. -decided on 2nd March, 1981, this Court has held that manufacture for sale could be goods of the purchasing dealer himself or on behalf of some other person who gets his goods manufactured by the purchasing dealer for the purpose of sale. In the result, the question which the Tribunal decided did not actually arise for its determination in any of the above references and accordingly for us to answer the said question in any of these references would be academic. We, therefore, decline to answer the question referred to us in these references and direct these references to be returned to the Tribunal. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of these five references fixed in all at Rs. 300. Reference declined to be answered.
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1981 (3) TMI 222 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ITR 27. The facts and circumstances stated therein are quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In that case under a partnership deed between a father and his two sons, the father had the right to exclude either or both the sons from the management of the firm wholly or in part or to entrust the management to any other person and to determine what quantum of any profits should be distributed and what should be done with the remaining profits. It was accordingly held that there was no partnership in law and the I.T. authorities were right in refusing to register the deed under s. 26A of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. This decision has little application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Thus, in view of the foregoing findings, both the points raised by Mr. Pal cannot be entertained. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (3) TMI 221 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent-assessee is liable to pay sales tax on the sale of goods to his consumers?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Looking at the case from the angle of the notification dated March 30, 1966 it is clear that under that notification the intention was to levy sales tax at the first stage of the sale of specified goods and the notification has gone on to describe three situations in which what should be regarded as a sale at the first stage as required by the explanation to section 5(1-A). Admittedly the instant case falls under the situation described in clause (b) of the notification which alone will be taxable and, therefore, the subsequent sales effected by the respondent-assessee to his consumers would be outside the pale of taxing liability under the Act.
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1981 (3) TMI 213 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondents - assessee are liable to pay purchase tax under section 6(i) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 on the turnover consisting of the price paid by them for purchasing paddy for the purpose of converting it into rice for sale, in their respective rice mills?
Held that:- Appeals are allowed, the judgments of the High Court against which these appeals are filed are set aside and the turnover in question in each case is held to be taxable under section 6(i) of the Act.
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1981 (3) TMI 204 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Compromise and arrangement, Winding up – Definition of contributory ... ... ... ... ..... itted that without an amendment of the memorandum of association business cannot be carried on. Carrying out of the amendment would take considerable amount of time, but that is not the only consideration which has weighed with me in rejecting the prayer for a staying of the winding-up order. The main considerations which have weighed with me, as already noticed above, are that any stay order which is granted may immediately enable the company to carry on its illegal activities of forward trading, may be clandestinely. Furthermore, the company is commercially insolvent and it is not known as to how it will become a viable unit in the near future. If the appeal filed by the company against the winding-up order is allowed the company or its members would be entitled, at that stage, to move an appropriate application under section 391. At the present moment I am not inclined to revive the aforesaid applications. This application is dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.
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1981 (3) TMI 203 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Transfer to Shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal ... ... ... ... ..... how that the share values had gone down as a consequence of the rejection of the petitioners transfer applications. Nor is there anything to show that the directors and their relatives had taken advantage of the situation to purchase shares for themselves at comparatively lower rates. So far as I could see, this was the only attempt made by the petitioners to positively show that the directors had acted corruptly, capriciously and arbitrarily and in that, they have failed. The presumption thus stands unrebutted. It is not established that the directors have acted on wrong principles or that they have acted otherwise than in the interests of the company and their shareholders. It is not made out that they have misused their fiduciary position. The contract embodied in Regulation 24, should, therefore, operate with all its vigour. The result is that there is no scope for interference under section 155. The Company Petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed, but without costs.
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1981 (3) TMI 202 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... of the petitioning-creditor for manufacturing documents. In these circumstances, I am bound to hold that the winding-up petition is not an abuse of the process of the court and the company is unable to pay its debt and has not raised any bona fide dispute to the claim of the petitioning-creditor and there is no substance in the defence sought to be raised either in law or in fact. In the result, I am making the following order The winding-up petition is admitted. There will be an advertisement once in Statesman, once in Basumati and once in Calcutta Gazette but not to be published before April 15, 1981. If the company pays off or settles the claim of the petitioning-creditor together with an assessed cost of 30 G.Ms. the winding-up petition would remain permanently stayed and compliance with rule 28 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, will be dispensed with. In default, the winding-up petition will be advertised as directed and the same would appear in list on June 8, 1981.
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1981 (3) TMI 200 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases
... ... ... ... ..... d by all the tests laid down by Lord Halsbury and Romer J. in these cases, they, in our opinion, are entitled to be relieved of their liability under section 633 of the Act. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the learned trial judge to the extent to which it applies to the appellants and allow the appeal as also their application for relief under section 633 of the Act against any liability under section 633 thereof. The appellants to pay to respondent No. 1 the costs of this appeal quantified at Rs. 2,000. The order of the trial court as to the costs of the Registrar of Companies in the petition will remain. Mr. Chagla states that the notarised statements of the officers of the company are marked Ex. B in the present proceedings. He requests for the return thereof. The same may be returned to the appellants on their furnishing copies thereof for the record of the court and on their undertaking to produce the originals thereof in the event they are called upon to do so.
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1981 (3) TMI 179 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... official liquidator has produced the pronote and the consideration receipt which does not bear any endorsement of discharge. The explanation from the witness though not specifically pleaded in the statement of objections is far from satisfactory. It does not even suggest that they made any enquiries in the matter of endorsing the pronote with the discharge. I, therefore, must hold in favour of the official liquidator that he has proved the existence of the debt and the respondents have failed to prove the discharge pleaded by them. The best evidence available to the respondents has not been produced. For the above reasons, I am compelled to allow the application with costs. An order accordingly will issue directing respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (who remained ex parte) to jointly and severally pay to the official liquidator a sum of Rs. 1,078.80 with costs and current interest at 6 per cent, per annum on the principal amount from the date of application till date of realisation.
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1981 (3) TMI 178 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... of one year in terms of 3. 458A of the Act. Column 3 of article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act states that time begins to run when the right to apply accrues. In the case of the present claimant right to apply accrued on February 4, 1977. Thus, the official liquidator had 3 years plus the maximum advantage of section 458A of the Act which would be the exclusion of 1 year plus another year and 4 months. Thus, the official liquidator could have presented the application within five years and four months from February 4, 1977. Therefore, the application filed on August 22, 1980, is well within time and is not barred by time. The respondents not having pressed or proved the other defences pleaded, are liable to pay to the official liquidator the sum of Rs. 2,323.50 together with costs and current interest at 6 per cent, per annum on Rs. l,437.50 from the date of the application till date of realisation. The application is allowed with costs and the order will accordingly issue.
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1981 (3) TMI 177 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Ascertainment of the directors retiring by rotation and filling up vacancies ... ... ... ... ..... g. In this case, there was no quorum in the absence of a quorum there may be a meeting, but not a meeting capable of deliberating and taking any decision. That is the crux of section 256(4)(a). We, therefore, hold that it is a prerequisite for the applicability of section 256(4)(a) that an earlier meeting should have been held and that section 174 of the Act is not applicable to a case coming within section 256(4). In this case, no meeting was held on January 31, 1974. and the meeting held on February 7, 1974, is not an adjournment coming within section 256(4)(b). In the result, we set aside the decree and judgment of the courts below and declare that the respondent ceased to be a director from February 7, 1974. He is directed to surrender all assets, records and seal of the plaintiff-company to the trial court within one month from today. The trial court will pass appropriate orders for their entrustment to the 2nd appellant when moved. We allow the second appeal with costs.
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