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1981 (6) TMI 133
... ... ... ... ..... to which the rule of res judicata applies. The question whether that view of the Calcutta High Court is correct was left undecided by the Supreme Court. 8. Nevertheless, the bar enjoined by Sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Civil P. C. not to bring another suit on the same cause of action, has no application because the claim and the subject matter are different. Moreover, that question is not at all germane in his revisional application. 9. Since the plaintiff of that suit was permitted to withdraw from it with liberty to sue afresh, in the eye of law there was no existence of any such suit. Consequently, the findings arrived at in the earlier suit have no effect on the present suit. It is, therefore, held that there is no question of res judicata. 10. The question of default has not been challenged. Hence the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner cannot be sustained. 11. The application is, therefore, dismissed. 12. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (6) TMI 132
... ... ... ... ..... t of the share in and the property of the society. The society is concerned only with the shares held by a member and the land given by it to a member and not with the strueture that a member may put up. The member's interest in the Society. The nomination in respect of this structure is, therefore invalid and of no effect. Even if I had held that the plaintiff became entitled in this own right , to the shares and the land by virtue of nomination be can in no cirecunistances become entitled to the structure which must continue with the estate of the deceased and in that view of the matter the defendant can never be a mere licensee and cannot be evicted. The defendant will be equally entitled to the structure as the plaintiff along with other heris. 11. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The decree of the learned trial Judge is set aside, The suit is dismissed. The plaintiff-respondent will pay the costs of the suit as well as of this appeal. 12. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 131
... ... ... ... ..... at him, excepting that it might be through the good offices of Interpol. ( 22. ) These are pragmatic considerations of an extraneous character on which to judge one way or the other a detention order. We have accordingly accorded to this case the kind of inquiry which has the imperative of the Supreme Court and asked the question "Were material facts missed by the detaining authority while forming its subjective satisfaction as to the necessity for ordering the preventive detention"" For the reasons we have earlier set out our answer is that in this case the State Government as the detaining authority did miss certain vital facts and considerations. That in our judgment, has the effect of vitiating the legality of the detention. We accordingly quash the order of detention of the State Government, dated" 31st January, 1981 under section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act and direct the respondents herein to set the petitioner at liberty. Order of detention quashed.
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1981 (6) TMI 130
... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal with a direction to dispose them of in accordance with law after holding a fresh enquiry. We make it clear that the Land Tribunal should not be influenced by any observations made by the learned single Judge regarding the merits of the rival claims of the parties. 16. In the circumstances of this appeal, there will be no order as to costs. 17. After we pronounced the above judgment, Shri K. Channabasappa, learned counsel for respondent 3, made an oral application for grant of a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court from our judgment. 18. In deciding the Point at controversy, we have followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in Income-tax Commissioner v. Benoy Kumar . Hence, in our view, no substantial question of law of general importance, which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, can be said to arise from our judgment. 19. Accordingly, we decline to grant the certificate sought for and dismiss the oral application. 20. Appeal partly allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 129
... ... ... ... ..... rned counsel appearing for Messrs. Jeevanlal (1929) Limited and Messrs. Madura Coats Limited, in Writ Petition Nos. 1551 to 1553, 1590 to 1598 and 1635 of 1976, 2967, 2983, 3032 to 3042, 3047 to 3056, 3766, 3767, 4258 to 4263, 4380 to 4383 of 1977, 2028, 2058, 2073, 2168, 2170 to 2172, 2451 to 2454, 469 to 2471, 2662 to 2665 and 4136 of 1978, 26, 168, 264 to 266 and 614 of 1979, 1732, 19, 9, 2005 to 2008, 2085, 2122, 2134, 2135, 2171 to 2175, 3156 to 3158, 2412, 2426, 2427, 3163 to 3166, 4022 to 4029, 4053 to 4058, 4251 to 4255 and 4257 to 4259, 3567 to 357 and 4408 to 4414 of 1980, made oral applications under Art. 134A read with Art. 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India for leave being granted for appeals being preferred to the Supreme Court against our judgment Since we have rendered judgment on the basis of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court on the questions involved in the writ petitions, we are not inclined to grant leave. Hence the applications are rejected.
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1981 (6) TMI 128
... ... ... ... ..... presumption that the parent circles used in the manufacture of the buckets cleared were of higher thickness was erroneous. They relied on the test report furnished by the National Test House which reveals that the thickness at the edges is much more than the thickness of the parent circle. 4. The party also pointed out that it was for this reason that on their appeal the Central Board of Excise and Customs by their Order-in-Appeal No. 49B of 1981 had set aside the order of the Collector confirming demand of duty on the same issue in another case in regard to circles cleared prior to the period relevant to the proceedings in this case. In their order the Central Board of Excise and Customs held that the test result could not be made applicable to the goods cleared prior to the date of drawal of the samples. 5. In view of the explanation furnished by the party Government do not find it fit to proceed further with this case and accordingly drop the review proceedings.
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1981 (6) TMI 127
... ... ... ... ..... . Vijay Flexible Containers Ltd., Bombay. In the aforesaid order the Government while deciding the issue of classification of printed cartons observed inter alia that the products, like labels, leaflets, etc. could be treated as products of the printing industry. 4. Government have carefully considered the written and oral submissions. Government observe that following the Tariff Advice issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs the Department have accepted the classification of the impugned goods under Tariff Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. Government accordingly accept the petitioners contention and hold that the impugned goods are classifiable under Tariff Item 68 of Central Excise Tariff. Government also accept the contention that the goods are exempt under Notification No. 122/75 as they are covered by the term “products of the printing industry”, which are exempt under the said notification. The revision application is accordingly allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 126
... ... ... ... ..... lants had made sufficient deposit of money towards the duty liability establishing their bona fides. The Board also agrees with the appellants’ contention that there has been no clandestine clearance nor any attempt at suppression of information. In the circumstances the Board does not find it a fit case for penalty on the appellants. Accordingly, the orders of the Collector imposing a penalty of ₹ 1 lakh are set aside. 4. So far as the orders of confiscation are concerned, the fact remains that despite the bona fides of the appellants, the goods have been cleared in contravention of the Act and Rules and because of those contraventions the barges have been rendered liable to confiscation. The orders of confiscation passed by the Collector are therefore, correct. However, the Board takes a lenient view and directs that the fine in lieu of confiscation be reduced from ₹ 1 lakh to ₹ 6,000. The orders of the Collector are modified to this extent.
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1981 (6) TMI 125
... ... ... ... ..... It is not disputed that the appellants had applied for the B.S.R. in the adjoining plot as early as on 20-5-1974 whereas the seizure had taken place on 19-3-1975 and the approval to the B.S.R had also been given to the appellant in May, 1975. The Board therefore, does not find any justification to consider the storage in the new B.S.R. as unauthorised storage. 9. Considering the fact that the appellants are engaged solely in the manufacture of readymade garments which are exclusively exported and the two sales in question were organised as an exceptional measure to dispose of their export rejects the Board is unable to uphold the allegation of diffierent contraventions against the appellants. As the two sales had been organised after considerable publicity it cannot be said that there was any clandestine clearance. Even the sale proceeds are well within the exemption limit. Considering all these factors the Board sets aside the Collector’s orders and allows the appeal.
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1981 (6) TMI 124
... ... ... ... ..... hich the assessee, if he felt that he has been over assessed could claim refund. In their case, six months from the date of closing of the financial year were over on December 1976 and therefore, the assessment should have been finalised by them and then only they could have known their final liability determined by the department and filed refund claim, if necessary. They further pleaded that RT-12 have infact not been finalised, till date. It is their contention that it is in time. I hold that the appellant is correct, in view of the fact that RT-12 have not been finalised as yet. Assistant Collector’s order is accordingly set aside. The refund should be sanctioned if otherwise in order.
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1981 (6) TMI 123
... ... ... ... ..... contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that annexures A and B are such which put an unreasonable restriction on trade, cannot be accepted. Therefore, in my opinion, merely introducing annexure B to be produced at the check post cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction put to a trader to carry on his trade who desires to transport taxable goods from outside the State. 12.. Considering the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules as well as the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the parties, I am of the opinion that both annexures A and B to the petition (as impugned by the petitioner) are not in any way violative either of the provisions of the Rules or of article 19(1)(g) and articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, I hold that the petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed which I hereby do. The rule is discharged, but on the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1981 (6) TMI 122
... ... ... ... ..... f either in purchases or in sales had been pointed out, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that we could interfere with the finding of fact in revision. It is true that with reference to a total turnover of Rs. 93,06,464.21 and a taxable turnover of Rs. 77,94,500.00 the addition of Rs. 35,513.57 is very minor and could have been avoided by the assessing officer. The learned counsel for the assessee may not also be far wrong in contending that simply for the sake of addition the assessing officers have made it. But all the same, as already stated, the rejection of the accounts mainly depends on facts and the Tribunal after having considered the materials had held that the rejection was not unreasonable. Though we have our own reservations on this question, we are unable to interfere with this order of the Tribunal since our jurisdiction under revision is very limited. With these observations, we dismiss this revision petition. There will be no orders as to costs.
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1981 (6) TMI 121
... ... ... ... ..... n by Honourable Mishra, J. 6.. In the view I have taken, the petition deserves to be dismissed without any order as to costs. The security amount will be refunded to the petitioner. 7.. The case shall now be placed before a Division Bench for final disposal in accordance with the majority opinion. (23rd June, 1981) On a difference of opinion between K.K. Dube, J., and one of us (Mishra, J.), the matter was placed before Honourable the Chief Justice, who heard the matter himself and recorded his opinion, dated 10th April, 1981, concurring with the opinion of one of us (Mishra, J.) dated 4th November, 1980. 2.. Now, the matter has been placed before us for final disposal. 3.. In accordance with the majority opinion, which consists of the opinion of the third Honourable Judge (namely, Honourable the Chief Justice, Shri G.P. Singh) and that of one of us (Mishra, J.), the petition is dismissed without any order as to costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1981 (6) TMI 120
... ... ... ... ..... rtment. The SRO reads as under SRO-167.-In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 read with clause (b) of section 2 of the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. XX of 1962), the Government hereby appoint the Excise and Taxation Officers of the Sales Tax Department to exercise the powers and perform the functions of Assessing Authorities and assist the Commissioner for carrying out purposes of the said Act. By order of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. It was then argued, though much faintly, that the impugned order was actuated by malice. No foundation for malice has been laid in the petition, and it appears, that this plea has been taken for the sake of plea only. Section 13(1) of the Act does not enjoin upon the transferring authority to record reasons for transferring a case. It is, therefore, inconsequential whether the order of transfer is a speaking or a non-speaking one. In the result, the petition is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 119
... ... ... ... ..... liable to tax was on the assessee. Since the assessee made no attempt in this regard either before the assessing authority or before the appellate authorities, the assumption of the entire turnover as taxable was a logical finale of the omission on the part of the assessee to discharge the burden under section 6-A. 6.. So far as the third point that on 3rd April, 1980, the partner of the assessee-firm did, in fact, appear before the Commercial Tax Officer and that there was an assurance from the latter that a fresh notice would be issued is concerned, the learned counsel did not, in our opinion, wisely press this contention, after looking into the ground No. 3 urged by the assessee before the first appellate authority. 7. There is thus no merit in the petition. It is accordingly rejected at the admission stage. Smt. M.R. Vanaja, High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file memo of appearance, if it is not already filed within two weeks from today. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 118
... ... ... ... ..... valued at Rs. 14,599.90 and therefore bound to be returned to him as is evidenced in the proposition notice at exhibit A. The petitioner being not the owner of the goods shall not come in the way of the respondents returning the goods to him for the petitioner was the person in charge of the vehicle and the articles were seized illegally from him alone. 11.. In the result, the petitioner succeeds. Rule is made absolute. It is declared that detention by respondent 3 of the goods listed in exhibit A as is apparent from the notice issued to the petitioner under sub-section (4) of section 28A of the Act in terms of the order passed in similar form as per exhibit B is illegal. The petitioner is also entitled to a direction in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to release forthwith the detained articles to the custody of the petitioner on receipt of this order. 12.. But, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 117
... ... ... ... ..... be acting suo motu when he had already received information from audit section. The argument is-wholly meritless. In our adversary system of jurisprudence either party aggrieved by an order, if law so provided, could file a revision petition. For that a period of limitation is provided. So, however, if a third person brings to the notice of the revisional authority any illegality in an order passed by a subordinate officer then the revisional authority can suo motu take action and correct the order if it is found illegal or improper. Simply the receipt of information from an outside source does not render an order of the revisional authority out of the purview of suo motu action. Mr. Sarwal has not been able to cite any authority in support of his contention. Consequently, I find no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed with costs. However, the revisional authority will decide the revision pending before it expeditiously. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 116
... ... ... ... ..... sale price itself. On these facts, in my opinion, the amount of inward freight directly paid by the purchaser to the truck owners would represent a part of the aggregate amount payable by him to the assessee and thus would be a part of the turnover liable to tax in the hands of the assessee. Reliance was also placed on behalf of the assessee on Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M.P. Traders 1980 UPTC 582. That decision is based on its own facts and further the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Sugar Mills 1979 43 STC 13 (SC) 1979 UPTC 37 (SC) has not been considered therein. In my opinion, this decision, therefore, is not applicable to the instant case. In the result, therefore, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The question raised is answered by saying that the amount of inward-freight is to be treated as a part of the sale price of coal liable to tax in the hands of the assessee. The Commissioner is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200. Petition allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 115
... ... ... ... ..... f the Supreme Court in Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1971 28 STC 672 (SC) 82 ITR 363 (SC) this Court held that the liability of a past year cannot be taken into account for computing the income of a subsequent year. 7.. In this view, we think that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the liability to pay tax for the period from 1st September, 1970, up to 31st March, 1973, in one case, and the assessment year ending on 30th June, 1971, and that ending on 30th June, 1972, in the other case arose only in the accounting year in which the cancellation notification of 9th November, 1973, was issued. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessees. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and signature of the registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, under section 260(1) of the Act. Reference answered in the negative.
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1981 (6) TMI 114
... ... ... ... ..... he lesser rate of 3 per cent under item 4(c) of the Second Schedule. We are accordingly satisfied that there is nothing in this judgment which even remotely supports the contention of the learned Government Pleader that declared goods of one class converted into another class are liable for assessment, at the point of first sale after conversion, only under the multi-point rate of levy. In the result, we hold that the sales of scrap in the sum of Rs. 1,13,130.68 cannot be brought to tax as turnover taxable at multi-point at the rate of 3.5 per cent under section 3(1) of the Act, but must be brought to charge at the rate of 3 per cent under item 4(a) or (c) of the Second Schedule. The order of the Board of Revenue to the contrary is, accordingly, set aside. The Board is directed to work out the tax effect of our decision in terms of correct figures. The tax appeal stands allowed on these terms. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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