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1981 (6) TMI 70 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
... ... ... ... ..... CIT vs. M/s. Balaji Pictures and also another judgment of the same High Court in the case of CIT vs. Badjana Parr Salt Company, Nowpada (CR 83 of 1968, judgment dt. 19th April, 1971), and held that there is no finding that the firm in question was not a genuine one. In the circumstances, the Commr. (A) held on the basis of the above two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the provisions of s. 186(1) of the Act will not be attracted. Consequently, it was held that the orders passed under s. 186(1) by the ITO had to be cancelled as unjustified. 4. After hearing the rival submissions, we find that the order passed by the Commr. (A) has to be upheld as he had relied on the binding decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, referred to above. On behalf of the Revenue, reliance was no doubt placed on the decision of the Gauhati High Court reported in (1976) 102 ITR 466 (Guj). In the circumstances, we uphold the order of the CIT (A) and dismiss the departmental appeals.
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1981 (6) TMI 69 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
Charitable Or Religious Trust ... ... ... ... ..... ned in section 13(2)(a). Actually as mentioned earlier it has never been the case of the revenue that the assessee s case would fall under section 13(2)(a). In the assessment order passed for the assessment year 1975-76, which has been followed for the subsequent two assessment years, the ITO has only referred to the provisions of section 13(2)(h). The learned counsel for the assessee had submitted before us that the lending was on 21-10-1965 for adequate interest. The learned departmental representative, as mentioned earlier, had pointed out that there were subsequent loans advanced by the trust and this matter requires investigation. We, therefore, set aside the orders of the authorities below and direct the ITO to grant the exemption to the assessee under section 11 of the Act, if the assessee s case did not fall under section 13(2)(a) after verifying whether the conditions mentioned in it are satisfied. 7. For the purposes of statistics the appeals are treated as allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 68 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
Acquisition Of Capital Asset, Commencement Of Business, Income From Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... rpose of actual cost. There would, therefore, be no warrant for bringing to tax the amount of Rs. 4,900 also in this year. 14. In coming to our conclusion, it would be seen that we have given due regard to the principles laid down in the brochure published by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India to which we have referred and due importance has also been attached to the question of income-tax liability on which emphasis was placed by the learned departmental representative. On the facts, there is no receipt of income nature which would fall to be taxed and we have held accordingly for the reasons which we have set out in detail. We would, therefore, direct exclusion of the entire amount of Rs. 19,900. 15. The ratio of the judgments of the Madras High Court in Madras Fertilizers Ltd. and the Calcutta High Court in New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. relied on, on behalf of the revenue, would not also, in the circumstances, apply. 16. The result is, the appeal is allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 67 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
... ... ... ... ..... had been established and, therefore, penalty was clearly eligible. 6. We have considered the rival submissions. The turnover, as we have already mentioned, was in excess of Rs. 6,000. The items which could not be reconciled were 70 bottles of Readiplex, 7 bottles of Digeplex, 6 boxes of U-Cycline and 52 Capsules of U-Cyclines. These could not be identified in stock or in sales after purchase. It cannot be said that any suppression of sales has been established. In a retail shop where there is a large turnover and numerous items for which stock is taken, the chances of omission in the inventory by oversight etc., at the end of the year cannot be ruled out for items where the value is not very much. Looking to these facts and keeping in view the Tribunal s order in quantum proceedings, and the fact that the gross profit was directed to be accepted, we are of the view that no concealment has been established. We would accordingly cancel the penalty imposed and allow the appeal.
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1981 (6) TMI 66 - ITAT GAUHATI
... ... ... ... ..... le Supreme Court in the case of Kishinchand Chellaram and Ors. (1962) 46 ITR 640 (SC) and also on the decision of the Hon ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. CIT, Punjab (1968) 70 ITR 849 (P and H). 2. We have heard the ld counsel for the assessee as well. We have gone through the orders of the authorities below for our consideration along with the submission made on behalf of the Revenue as discussed above. In respect of the second part of the dividend warrant withheld by resolution in view of the pending receipt of approval from the authority concerned, it cannot be said that the dividend has accrued to the assessee during the year under account. It became due only in the following assessment year. Having regard to the facts of the case, we are of the opinion that the relief allowed by the AAC was quite proper and his order is required to be sustained which we hereby do. 3. In the result, the appeal by the Revenue is dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 65 - ITAT GAUHATI
... ... ... ... ..... e that the interpretation as to the date to be adopted for ascertaining cost price of the assessee in question is legal matter. It is pointed out that the ITO took the interpretation of audit to be the correct interpretation, i.e. to say that the cost price in a case like this should be taken as 1st Jan., 1954 and not on 1st April, 1970. It is stated that even on this score alone, there was no scope for initiation of the proceedings under s. 147 (b) in view of what has been stated earlier. We have given our consideration and it is our considered opinion that there is no merit in the appeals by the Revenue under the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed by us in the preceding paragraph. We find that the initiation of the reassessment proceedings under s. 147(b) was taken by the ITO in view of the mistake of law pointed by the Audit. In this view of the matter, the appeals by the Revenue cannot be accepted. 10. In the result, the appeals by the Revenue are dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 64 - ITAT GAUHATI
... ... ... ... ..... return as per the clear provisions of the section concerned. It is the case of the assessee that had opportunity been given by the ITO to produce the audited statement in the prescribed form such compliance could have been made before the ITO. We find that there is sufficient force in this contention. That apart, it is seen that the ITO has adopted the gross receipt for the purpose of computing the income of the assessee. But the assessee has pointed out that the receipts as taken by the ITO was only gross receipt and the ITO has not considered the out going expenses. For all the above reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the order of the AAC was proper and was based on sound basis. No material or fact has been placed before us to contradict his findings. Having regard to the facts of the case as mentioned earlier, we agree with the findings and conclusion of the AAC. His order is, therefore, upheld. 8. In the result, all the appeals by the Revenue stand dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 63 - ITAT DELHI-E
... ... ... ... ..... y to be executed between the assessee and the said two payees, ld. counsel for the assessee relied on CIT vs. SAP Annamalai (1970) 75 ITR 109 (Mad) and (1972) Taxation 32(2)-92 Delhi. These rulings indicate that execution of such agreement was not indispensable. In the result, we are satisfied that taking an overall view of the matter and the high percentage of return of capital investment as aforesaid and the non-employment of any manager or purchase and sale staff, the expenditure in question could not be said to be unreasonable or excessive, even though the Karta and his wife were persons specified in cl. (b) of s. 40A(2). We hold the expenditure in question to be allowable as deduction. 14. In view of the above finding, there survives no ground for disallowing any portion of interest payable on the credit balances of the Karta and his wife out of the amounts due to them on account of salaries and commission as aforesaid. Assessee succeeds. 15. Appeal is allowed pro-tanto.
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1981 (6) TMI 62 - ITAT DELHI-D
... ... ... ... ..... the above conclusion, we have derived the desired fortification from the ratio of the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Ashokbhai Chimanbhai (1965) 56 ITR 42 (SC) as also that of the Calcutta High Court in the case reported as (1976) 102 ITR 748 (Cal). 7. For completeness and caution, we like to place it on record that for the Revenue strand reliance has been placed on the ratio of the decisions of the Allahabad High Court as also that of the Kerala High Court and as stands reported in (1978) 115 ITR 796, (All) (1980) 123 ITR 164 (All) and (1979) 117 ITR 877 (Ker). We having derived the desired benefit from the above decisions of the Allahabad and Kerala High Courts, with utmost, respect, we feel that the facts of the assessee s case presently in appeal before us, are distinguishable with the facts of the cases as were before their Lordships of the Allahabad and Kerala High Court. 8. In the result, the appeal by the assessee succeeds and is allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 61 - ITAT DELHI-D
... ... ... ... ..... basis the assessee declared the value in the various assessment years as mentioned above. The ld. Valuer of the assessee took into account the age of the building and the fact that the building had already lived its normal life and hence be valued the same on rental basis, ignoring the construction and land cost. The Departmental Valuer, on the other hand seem to have valued this property on cost basis he determined the value of the property at Rs. 76,000 against the figure of Rs. 35,000 estimated by the approved valuer of the assessee. Considering the facts of this property and particularly the fact that the area in which it is located has been declared a slum area we feel that the estimate made by the approved valuer of the assessee was more appropriate and the value estimated by the Departmental Valuation Cell is highly excessive. We accordingly direct that for this property also the value as declared by the assessee be accepted. 10. In the result, all the appeals succeed.
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1981 (6) TMI 60 - ITAT DELHI-C
... ... ... ... ..... the firm within the meaning of s. 187, one consolidated assessment clubbing the income of both the old and new firms cannot be justified. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held as follows in 115 ITR 858 Where there is a change in the constitution of a firm s. 187, merely makes the new firm liable to be assessed in respect of the income derived by the old firm. But this section even by implication does not create a fiction that the income derived by the old firm becomes the income of reconstituted firm. The income of the old firm cannot be clubbed with the income of the reconstituted firm. Therefore, two different assessment orders have to be passed against the reconstituted firm one in respect of income derived by it after reconstitution . 4. As the decision of the CIT (Appeals) Meerut, is found to be in accordance with the law laid down by the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, we feel that the there are no merits in this appeal and hence it dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 59 - ITAT DELHI-B
... ... ... ... ..... y a conclusion that she was a non-resident) and, therefore, status taken is correct. 9. Then it was urged that even if the amount is added in her hands the Supreme Court ruling in the case of CIT vs. Piara Singh (1980) 17 CTR (SC) 111 (1980) 124 ITR 40 (SC) would come to her aid and the amount should be allowed as a deduction as a loss. However, there is no assessment on the ground that she has indulged in smuggling activities and therefore, this ruling has no direct application. However, the assessment in hands of the assessee can be made only on the supposition that either she was the owner or she was doing smuggling, business. She was not proved to be the owner. If she was doing smuggling business she was entitled to deduction. However, we have already held that she not having been proved to be the owner, the value thereof cannot be assessed in her hands. The order of the Commr. (Appeals) is, therefore, set aside and the addition made is deleted. 10. The appeal is allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 58 - ITAT CUTTACK
... ... ... ... ..... derive support from the ratio in the case of Sita Ram Bhagawandas and Murlidhar Mathuraprasad. No doubt, the said cases were with respect to s. 184(7) of the IT Act, 1961 but the situation contemplated under the said s. 12A(b), with which we are concerned, appears to be similar and same. No direct case for or against under s. 12A(b) could be available for guidance. In such a situation the cases decided by their Lordships of the Patna High Court and Allahabad High Court appear to be of tangible guidance. In this view of the matter we are of the considered view that the ITO should have considered the contents of the audit report before finalising the assessment order. Since he failed to do so, the ld. AAC correctly set aside the assessment order and directed the ITO to make fresh assessment after considering the report. The impugned order on the point being correct, needs no interference and the same is confirmed, therefore. 9. In the result, the Revenue s appeal is dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 57 - ITAT COCHIN
Advance Tax, Interest Payable By Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... interest under section 216. The facts of this case are similar to the facts of the case in Hindustan Sanitaryware and Industries Ltd. The ITO has not given a finding that section 216 is applicable. The assessee, in its appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) has urged only one point, namely, that the ITO had not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and found that the assessee-firm had under-estimated the advance tax payable by it and thereby reduced the amount payable in either of the first two instalments and, therefore, the levy of interest under section 216 was not valid. The Commissioner (Appeals) has taken this contention only on record and has come to a finding that the levy of interest was not valid because there was no finding by the ITO as required under section 216. We agree with the Commissioner (Appeals) that in the absence of such a finding, the ITO cannot proceed to levy interest under section 216. 10. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 56 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
... ... ... ... ..... nts or the explanation offered by him is not, in the opinion of the ITO, satisfactory, the value of the investments may be deemed to be the income of the assessee of such financial year. Here, again we find that the bills and vouchers belonged to someone else and even then if there was any justification for the addition made by the ITO, he could not make the addition of Rs. 25,000 because the total amount of bills and vouchers was Rs. 24,000. The ITO at worst could add this amount. But what he did was that he determined the fair market value of the woollen yarn quota on a surmise and took the value of Rs. 25,000. We do not see any jurisdiction for this method adopted by him. In fact, there was no justification at all for the addition as the party concerned had owned up the vouchers, had given necessary proof for the business done by him and satisfied the various points raised by the ITO. We therefore, delete the addition of Rs. 25,000 sustained by the AAC. 8. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (6) TMI 55 - ITAT CALCUTTA-C
... ... ... ... ..... he expression technical or professional qualification referred to in the proviso to s. 64(1)(ii) must also cover the experience gained by a person over a period FO years in a particular trade if the experience is needed to carry on the business and where there is no statutory prescription qualification the experience gained alone should be taken as qualification provided a competent authority certifies to that effect. Further it was stated therein that the qualification refereed to therein cannot in all circumstances be a qualification obtained by grant of a certificate, degree or diploma by a statutory authority and the Coir Board is the highest authority intimately connected with coir business. In view of the finding and reason recorded by the Tribunal with which we agree entirely the proviso to s. 64(1)(ii) is attracted in this case. We therefore uphold the order of the AAC as it is quite justified in law. 4. In the result, the appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 54 - ITAT CALCUTTA-C
... ... ... ... ..... to be interpreted only alongwith r. 119A. According to r. 119A it is very likely to give an appearance only one month interest can be charged. The default though it is for more than 60 days cannot be said for more than two months. The word month in r. 119A in always a calendar month. The assessee has filed the return on 31st Aug., 1977. So it cannot be said that there is default in the month of August. So there is genuine scope for real debate. Hence s. 154 was wrongly invoked. 3. The appeal is allowed. Rectification of two months interest in cancelled. The proper remedy would have been a revision by the Commissioner on the ground that the original assessment was prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.
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1981 (6) TMI 53 - ITAT CALCUTTA-C
... ... ... ... ..... repair of the hotel. The assessee has argued before the AAC that the tenant running a hotel and lodging and the repairs and the maintenance claimed by them may be in respect of the repair they have to do in connection with their business of hotel and lodging and that is in respect of such expenses claimed by the tenant they may have to necessarily incur for the purpose of their business. So the fact that the tenant was allowed repair expenditure will not show that the tenant has agreed to repair. This is admittedly a case of oral lease. There is no specific evidence to show that there is any undertaking by the tenant for suffering the cost on repairs. That is the effect of the oral evidence. So the ordinary inference is that the landlord is to be allowed the notional 1/6th for repairs because the evidence in the case and the facts and circumstances clearly show that the landlord has undertaken the cost of repairs. 1/6th for repairs allowed. 3. The appeal is allowed in part.
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1981 (6) TMI 52 - ITAT CALCUTTA-C
... ... ... ... ..... eptl. Rep. argued that the maximum relief can only be for 18 per cent of Rs. 3 lakhs, which is the costliest of four houses. We disagree. The assessee is a co-owner along with others. So the extent of interest of the assessee in each house is indeterminate and not ascertainable. It is not possible to say that each house belongs to the assessee with 18 per cent interest in each house. It may be that in the partition the house which is valued at Rs. 3 lakhs is allotted to the assessee along with others for her share worth Rs. 1,08,000. It may be that one of the houses below Rs. 1 lakh is given to her in full with the share over any other house to equalise Rs. 1,08,000. So as the assessee is a co-owner and as her interest in each house is indeterminate and not ascertainable in each houses the correct method is to allow 18 per cent of the aggregate value of the four houses. So, the AAC is right in allowing exemption upto Rs. 1 lakh. 4. The two departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1981 (6) TMI 51 - ITAT CALCUTTA-C
... ... ... ... ..... to in the proviso should necessarily mean the experience gained by him over a period of years which could make him regard as one of the best tea tasters. 6. But as pointed out by the ld. Deptl. Rep. there is a flaw in the order of the AAC when he admitted the Coir Board s certificate as a piece of evidence to satisfy himself that the assessee possessed the necessary experience and production techniques. The AAC should have called upon the ITO to offer his comments in order that r. 46A are complied with. Not having done so there is a clear violation of the said rule. We are therefore of the opinion that the matter should be sent back to the AAC with a direction that he should dispose of the appeals afresh after complying with the provisions of r. 46A of the IT Rules. 7. We, therefore, set aside the order on this point and restore the appeals to his file with a direction that he should dispose of the appeals afresh after complying with the provisions of r. 46A of the IT Rules.
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