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Showing 101 to 120 of 175 Records
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1982 (1) TMI 75 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-B
Export Market Development Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... tated, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee was entitled to weighted deduction under section 35B in respect of bank commission of Rs. 3,400. We find that his view is contrary to the view expressed by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of J. Hemchand and Co. The Bench in paragraph 36 of its order clearly stated that the bank commission was not entitled to any such relief. We, therefore, reverse the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and restore that of the ITO. 11. The next contention in the departmental appeal relates to the allowance of claim for miscellaneous expenses. The only submission in this connection is that the relief should be restricted to one-third of the expenditure of Rs. 1,215 and not to the entire expenditure. We agree with this submission and hold that the assessee would be entitled to relief of one-third of Rs. 1,215, i.e., Rs. 705, only. 12. In the result, while the assessee s appeal is dismissed, that of the department is allowed.
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1982 (1) TMI 74 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
... ...
... ... ..... d Hirjibhai vs. CIT (1981) 21 CTR (Guj) 181 (1981) 128 ITR 747 (Guj) has held that once the partners of the firm or any partner of the firm has been individually assessed, so far as his income in the shape of share from the profits of the firm is concerned, the unregistered firm cannot be taxed in respect of that income over again. That being the position, it would be not be possible to tax income of any of the partners as income from unregistered firm in this case. It is true that registration is a stage separate from and prior to the assessment of the share income of the partners as income from registered firm and the latter is a consequence of the former but if the partner s share is to be assessed as income from a registered firm there would be no point in denying registration to the firm. Therefore, the registration would have to be granted to the firm for the assessment year in question. 9. In the result the order of the CIT (A) is confirmed and the appeal is rejected.
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1982 (1) TMI 73 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
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... ... ..... ct. 11. Since the profits were divided according to the profits sharing ratio as specified in the amended partnership deed, it cannot be said that the division of profits sharing ratio as specified in the partnership deed. The firm was validly constituted. It carried no business in accordance with the clauses of the partnership deed. The profits were divided accordingly. So a valid and genuine firm was in existence in the year of account. 12. The decision relied on by the department is not applicable on the facts of the present case. In that case, as a fact, it was found that division of profits amongst partners was not made in accordance with profit sharing ratio as specified in the partnership deed. Under the circumstances, the said decision is not applicable on the facts of the present case. 13. For the reasons discussed above, in my opinion, the finding of the ld. AAC is correct and no interference is called for. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 72 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Income From House Property, Chargeable As ... ... ... ... ..... think that the expenditure allowed by him is unreasonably low. 8. We are also in agreement with the learned Commissioner (Appeals) that the Patna Bench did not consider certain aspects of the matter. The revenue receipts and capital expenditure are two different things. A revenue account cannot be mixed up with capital account for the purposes of determining the income which is to be taxed. For certain economic reasons, it may be prudent to utilise revenue receipt in a particular manner, namely, in acquiring a capital asset, but that is only a question of appropriation. A revenue receipt utilised for meeting capital expenditure cannot alter its taxability. The company might feel it prudent to capitalise a smaller amount by meeting the capital expenditure out of revenue but that does not affect the taxability of the receipts. We, therefore, do not see any reason to differ from the learned Commissioner (Appeals). 9. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 71 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
... ...
... ... ..... therefore, has no relevance to the question. 6. The argument of the ld. rep. on behalf of the revenue that the second resolution dt. 1st Nov., 1976 does not refer to the assessee company is met by the letter dt. 13th Jan., 1977 to the assessee company which has been considered above. Regarding the contention that the balance sheet showed the amount of share capital it must be said that what we have to see is the real nature of the receipt, i.e. the purpose for which the amount of Rs. 6 crores was received. Therefore, for the reason stated above, we are of the view that an overriding title of the government existed in respect of the amount of interest received on the short term deposit of the assessee company. Therefore, this amount cannot be considered to be income of the assessee. Since we are deciding the first point in favour of the assessee, it is not necessary to consider the second argument put forward by the assessee s counsel. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (1) TMI 70 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
Income, Diversion By Overriding Title
... ... ... ... ..... the question before us. 6. The argument of the learned representative on behalf of the revenue that the second resolution dated 1-11-1976 does not refer to the assessee-company is met by the letter dated 13-1-1977 to the assessee-company which has been considered above. Regarding the contention that the balance sheet showed the amount of share capital, it must be said that what we have to see is the real nature of the receipt, i.e., the purpose for which the amount of ₹ 6 crores was received. Therefore, for the reasons stated above we are of the view that an overriding title of the Government existed in respect of the amount of interest received on the short-term deposit of the assessee-company. Therefore, this amount cannot be considered to be the income of the assessee. Since we are deciding the first point in favour of the assessee, it is not necessary to consider the second argument put forward by the assessee's counsel. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (1) TMI 69 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
Payment Not Deductible, Interest Paid By Company ... ... ... ... ..... So it will be thus seen that this amount is not received by the company by way of any deposits on account of borrowing and hence the provisions of section 40A(8) are not applicable. The said letter is also supported from the copy of account of Smt. Jiviben Himatlal Shah for the assessment years 1979-80 and 1980-81. A copy of the same is in the paper book. From the material on record, it is clear that there is nothing to show that there was any borrowing by the assessee-company from the person concerned. On the other hand it appears that the company, being a private limited company, has offered the facilities of a current account as in a bank. Under the circumstances, it does not appear to me that the provisions of section 40A(8) are attracted in the present case. 9. For the reasons discussed above the order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) is cancelled. The additions in question are deleted in both the years under consideration. 10. In the result the appeals are allowed.
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1982 (1) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Confiscation of conveyance used for carriage of smuggled goods - Customs ... ... ... ... ..... lector which would permit confiscation of the ship. What I have indicated above is in accord with the view taken by another Single Judge of this Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India, (76 BLR 675) and with the approach in two unreported judgments, copies of which have been produced for my perusal. These are Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 1620 of 1977 and 54 of 1978 (decided on 20th August, 1981 and 29th August, 1981 respectively by Pendse, J). 7. To sum up, once it is held by the Additional Collector that neither the owners nor the Captain had actual knowledge about the concealment of the contraband, it would follow that in the absence of rules specifying the precautions to be observed there would be no power to confiscate the vessel. If that be so, the petitioners must succeed and the impugned order must stand quashed. In the result, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The respondents will pay to the petitioners costs of the petition
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1982 (1) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Agricultural implements ... ... ... ... ..... 2. If payment is effected and the solicitors to the respondents confirm such payment then the bank guarantee is to be returned to the petitioners for being cancelled. This, however, to be done only on necessary letter being written on that behalf by the respondents solicitors. If no such letter is received by the Prothonotary by 19th February, 1982, the Prothonotary to call upon the bank to make payment of the amount under the guarantee and on receipt of such amount the same is ordered to be paid over to respondent No. 3 towards the claim of the excise authorities against the petitioners. In case there is any difficulty in realising the amount under the bank guarantee then from and after 31st March, 1982 the respondents will be at liberty to take all available and permissible steps against the petitioners for recovery of the amount in respect of which stay was granted. On such recovery the Prothonotary to have the bank guarantee cancelled. Prothonotary to act on the minutes.
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1982 (1) TMI 66 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Burden of proof — Mens rea — Culpable mental state — Connotation of ... ... ... ... ..... that the same are liable to confiscation under Section 111 can be held guilty under Section 125 of the Act. There cannot be any dispute regarding this weighty observation. However, as the learned Single Judge has observed the section contemplates knowledge and in the instant case by the prosecution evidence itself it is revealed that he had no such knowledge and the facts of the said case are distinguishable from the facts of the present case, in as much as in the said case the accused had dealt with the contraband goods. In the instant case, he did not even so much as know that his car was stuffed with contraband goods. We, therefore, feel that the order of acquittal recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge was perfectly justified and that was the only conclusion that he could have arrived at. There being no substance in the present appeals they fail and are consequently dismissed confirming the order of acquittal recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.
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1982 (1) TMI 65 - HIGH COURT OF GOA, DAMAN & DIU AT PANAJI
Search and seizure — Admissibility - Precedents — Ratio decidendi ... ... ... ... ..... ssai s contention, it is pertinent to recall that the test of reasonableness is to be applied to the individual statute impugned and hence, the question is whether a reasoned order regarding seizure and retention is required to make the power of seizure of documents conferred by Section 110(3) of the Customs Act pass the aforesaid test. It appears to me that, as searches and seizures pertain to the procedure relating to the investigation of offences, no such order is required, the authorities cited by Mr. Dessai (Pandurang v. Godse Chandrakant v. Jasjit Singh and Trvankore Rayon v. Union of India, AIR 1971 S.C. 862) being inapplicable to the present case. 17. The power of seizure conferred by Section 110(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 stands therefore, scrutiny and the test of reasonableness and is not, accordingly, violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 18. In the premises, the petition fails and is consequently dismissed with costs. Rule is accordingly discharged.
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1982 (1) TMI 64 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Steel melting scrap - Liability to duty - Runners and risers - Exemption from duty ... ... ... ... ..... f 75 exempts only such steel ingots which are manufactured from the raw materials specified therein with the aid of electric furnace. Therefore, Notification No. 16 of 79 is in some respects wider in scope bringing into its ambit even such steel ingots as are manufactured from raw materials which are not specified in Notification No. 237 of 75. In view of the above, the Government consider that it cannot be said that runners and risers obtained during the manufacture of steel ingots from the raw materials specified in Notification No. 237 of 75 are exempt only from the date of Notification No. 16 of 79. In that view of the matter, the Government find considerable force in the petitioners plea in this regard that Notification No. 16 of 79 cannot be interpreted to have the effect of levying duty on goods already exempted under Notification No. 237 of 75 and accept the same. 5. The Government accordingly set aside the impugned order-in-appeal and allow the revision application.
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1982 (1) TMI 63 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Paper - Rolls of paper - Cutting to size is not manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... tory to manufacture the goods is to cut duty paid rolls of paper to the required size. They do not subject the paper to any process of treatment such as coating, impregnating, corrugation, creping etc. They have contended that mere cutting of paper to size would not amount to a process of manufacture and therefore, no duty is leviable on the goods in question. 3. Government find considerable force in the petitioner s contention that mere cutting of duty paid paper does not be a process of manufacture. Government accordingly set aside the order in appeal and allow the revision application.
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1982 (1) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Classification - Writ jurisdiction - Alternative remedy ... ... ... ... ..... o the impugned order at Annexure C to the petitioner has already preferred an appeal to the competent authority under the Act. 4. Learned Counsel for petitioner contends that there may be similar orders for the subsequent periods in respect of which the petitioner may not have filed an appeal to the appellate forum in view of the pendency of the present appeal. In case there are any such orders, it will be open to the petitioner to prefer appeals against the relevant orders before the appellate authority and we have no doubt that having regard to the observations made herein, the appellate authority will entertain the appeals without raising any plea as regards limitation, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case which have arisen in the context of the pendency of the present petition. 5. In the ultimate result the petition fails subject to the aforesaid directions. Rule is discharged. Interim orders will stand vacated. There will be no order regarding costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR
Excise Duty - Taxable event - Scope of Rule 9A - Interpretation - `Levy' and 'imposition' - Precedent - Interpretation of - `Dismissed the SLP on merits'
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1982 (1) TMI 60 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... provisions of the R.R. Act vesting any authority with the first-respondent to take steps for recovery of the estate duty. In this view, the validity of the impugned notice has to be upheld. I have referred to another argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner based on s. 46(5) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, and the corresponding section in the I.T. Act, 1961, whereunder the State Govt. can cause recovery of the tax in the same manner as and by the same person, who would be competent to recover municipal tax or local rate due and that reference to municipal tax and local rate would indicate that only officers of the local bodies such as a Municipality, Panchayat, Corporation, etc., who could take steps for recovery and not officers under the R.R. Act. Since recovery is competent under s. 46(2) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, it is unnecessary for me to consider the exact scope of s. 46(5) of that Act. In the result, this original petition is dismissed, but without costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... why we do not find any mention of it in the appellate judgment of the Tribunal. These facts distinguish the present case from the case of Shankarlal H. Dave v. CIT 1980 124 ITR 733 (Guj). There, services were rendered by the karta in several partnership businesses. The question was whether he was rendering the services as a partner or as a representative of the HUF. The High Court held that in view of the agreement and on the facts, the karta was rendering services as a representative of the family and so the agreement was bona fide and dictated by commercial expediency. In our view, this decision is distinguishable. In this view, it is not necessary to dilate on the finding that the agreement itself was not valid because it was not on behalf of the minor members of the family. Accordingly, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1982 (1) TMI 58 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re of income from the firm fell for assessment in different hands, the former in the hands of S. K. Sanghi and the latter in the case of his joint family. As we see it, the scheme of s. 10(4)(b) read with s. 16(1) of the 1922 Act or s. 40(b) read with s. 67(1) of the 1961 Act has nothing to do with the circumstance that either the payments or the share or both may not be ultimately assessed in the hands of the partner, because the principle of diversion of income comes in for application in cases where the partner represents other people, who are in the background. We, therefore, do not see any reason to differ from the earlier judgments of this court in the case of K. C. Raj and Co. 1979 121 ITR 911 (Delhi) and in the case of Pannalal Girdharilal 1971 81 ITR 624 (Delhi) referred to therein. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. As the assessee has failed, he will pay the costs of the respondent (one set) counsel s fee Rs. 350.
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1982 (1) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Co-operative Society, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... question in the case of Addl. CIT v. U.P. Co-operative Cane Union 1978 114 ITR 70. In that case, a co-operative society, which ran a printing press, supplied printed stationery, on credit, to its members. The Appellate Tribunal took the view that this society must be regarded as one which provided credit facilities to its members. Disagreeing with that view, the Allahabad High Court held that selling goods on credit is only a mode of carrying on the business. It does not thereby become a business of providing credit facilities. In view of this clear position under the law both as a matter of construction and on the authorities our answer to the question of law is that the assessee is not entitled to the exemption under s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the I.T. Act, 1961, as a co-operative society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members. Thus our answer is against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel fee Rs. 500 (rupees five hundred only.)
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1982 (1) TMI 56 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Interest On Excess Payment ... ... ... ... ..... Again the question whether payment by cheque when the cheque is accepted and is encashed will relate back to the date when the cheque is received is a question considered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. v. CIT 1980 122 ITR 789. We are not going further into that question because it may not be necessary for the purpose of these cases in view of the decision on the main question. In this view, we allow these appeals in reversal of the judgment of the learned single judge. We quash the orders of the ITO declining to pay interest and direct that such interest be paid on the excess. This shall be done expeditiously. Parties are directed to suffer costs. Learned counsel for the revenue made am oral application under art. 134A of the Constitution for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We see no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arising in these cases. Leave declined.
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