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Showing 161 to 175 of 175 Records
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1982 (1) TMI 15
Business Expenditure, Company ... ... ... ... ..... onclusion of ours on the construction and application of the relevant provision leads to the same view as the one reached by the Tribunal. We accordingly answer the reference in favour of the assessee and against the Department, although mainly, if not wholly, for different reasons. This conclusion of ours makes it unnecessary for us to answer the two questions referred to us in terms of the language of their text. Both the questions only touch the aspect of the factual presence of a link between the expenditure and the director concerned. This, as we have shown, may be a matter for enquiry wherever any link at all can be established between the expenditure and the benefit in transactions of this kind. But this is not such a case. Since our conclusion is in accord with that of the Tribunal, the broad answer to the reference must be stated to be that s. 40(c) does not apply to this case which is an answer in favour of the assessee. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 14
Penalty, Unexplained Investments ... ... ... ... ..... spect of the penalty, it was nobody s case that there was an element of profit on the sale of 25 bars of gold during February, 1971. Nevertheless, the Tribunal had sustained the penalty to the extent of Rs. 6,000 only by reference to a plausible profit element in the transaction which the assessee had with Govindaraja Chettiar as respects the 25 bars of gold. We have made mention of these matters only for the limited purpose of showing that in the events that happened, the question of assessment as well as of penalty largely turned on the particular view of the facts which the Tribunal thought was a reasonable view, to entertain. In that sense, therefore, we do not find any scope at all for our interference with the conclusion of the Tribunal, both in the matter of assessment and in the matter of penalty. For the reasons stated above, our answers to all the questions of law are against the Department and in favour of the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 13
Delay In Filing Return, Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... he question No. 1 is answered also in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. We answer the second question by saying that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal has taken note of the press note and has come to the correct conclusion as to the effect of the press note and the Tribunal was justified in so doing and further hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that the law applicable was of the date when the default occurred and the default occurred in this case on the last date allowed for filing of the return under the W.T. Act on which the assessee was obliged to file the return but did not do so. But the Tribunal was wrong in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CWT v. Suresh Seth 1981 129 ITR 328, in so far as it held that the default was a continuing wrong. We answer the questions accordingly. Both the questions are answered in favour of the Revenue. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (1) TMI 12
Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... the Government for the purpose of encouraging export market, that may be the motive of the Government, it is connected inextricably with the act of exportation and, therefore, supplemental to the earnings by exportation. Our attention was also drawn to the unreported judgment of this court in Income-tax Reference No. 4 of 1977 (jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. v. CIT, judgment delivered on March 2, 1981-since reported in 1983 139 ITR 865). There, however, we were concerned with the provisions of the Special Export Promotion Scheme and not of cash assistance as such. But we have referred to the principles enunciated in the said judgment. In the view we have taken, we are, therefore, of the opinion that the majority of the members of the Tribunal arrived at the correct conclusion and the question must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (1) TMI 11
... ... ... ... ..... ests in the taxing officer in the same way as in the appellate authority. The Tribunal took stock of the entire aspect and in exercise of its appellate powers came to hold that the facts of the case did not warrant an imposition of penalty by the exercise of that jurisdiction. This, we are of the view, is a matter within the domain of the Tribunal s jurisdiction and once such finding is reached or recorded, there is hardly any question of law arising for being referred to the court or for being answered. In the facts of the case, we are inclined to think that the Tribunal did come to the conclusion that the facts were such that the assessee s conduct did not warrant visiting him with penalty. The question referred to us, therefore, is answered against the Revenue by holding that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in deleting the penalty levied under s. 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act. There would be no order for costs. BEHERA J.-I agree.
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1982 (1) TMI 10
... ... ... ... ..... efore, in our opinion, the order of penalty imposed by the ITO was vitiated altogether because he had no jurisdiction to impose penalty in the circumstances of the case by virtue of the applicability of the provisions of s. 274(2) of the Act of 1961 as they stood on the material date, to the facts of the case. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to consider the question as to whether the bar of limitation prescribed by s. 275 of the Act of 1961 was or was not attracted. We, therefore, decline to answer the first question referred to us in view of our answer to the second question. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the order of penalty imposed by the ITO under the Act of 1922 was vitiated altogether. Our answer to the second question referred to us is, therefore, in the affirmative and against the Department. Reference answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1982 (1) TMI 9
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... of the business on the ground of commercial expediency may amount to expenditure wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. Tested in the light of these principles, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that the expenditure incurred in the instant case was wholly and exclusively incurred for the purpose of business. We have already stated that the buses were attached by the I.T. Dept. for realising the dues of the United Transport Company. The possession of buses by the assessee was absolutely necessary for carrying on its business. The commercial expediency required payment of the dues for the release of the buses so that the assessee may carry on its business. It is immaterial here that the assessee was not bound to pay the income-tax dues of the United Transport Company. For the reasons given above, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (1) TMI 8
Advance Tax, Interest On Excess Advance Tax, Mistake Apparent From Record, Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... inancial year before lst April, the assessee is entitled to interest under s. 214 See Chandrakant Damodardas v. ITO 1980 123 ITR 748 (Guj), CIT v. Rohtak Delhi Transport P. Ltd. 1981 130 ITR 777 (P and H) and Addl. CIT v. Chitra Sagar 1980 121 ITR 699 (Mad) . Contrary view has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh and the Kerala High Courts See Kangundi Industrial Works (P.) Ltd. v. ITO 1980 121 ITR 339 (AP) and A. Sethumadhavan v. CIT 1980 122 ITR 587 (Ker). In view of this sharp divergence of opinion, it is clear that there could be no mistake apparent on the record on such a question. The ITO, therefore, had no jurisdiction to take proceedings under s. 154 of the Act. For the reasons given above, we answer the questions referred as follows (1) The Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the rectification order was without jurisdiction. (2) In view of our answer to question No. 1, question No. 2 does not arise. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (1) TMI 7
Income Tax Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... r, and it appears that conflicting opinions have been expressed by different High Courts. It does not appear useful to refer to all of them except the decision in Trilok Chand Jain v. D. R. P. Lall 1974 95 ITR 34 (Delhi) FB and Pentakota Surya Appa Rao v. Pentakota Seethayamma 1976 103 ITR 222 (AP), cited by Mr. Rajgharhia. Mr. Prasad relied on the decision in para 66 of the judgment in Trilok Chand Jain s case and, with respect, I express my inability to agree with the observation implying a restraint on the court s power in this regard even after the repeal of s. 137 on the strength of the provisions of s. 138. The views expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pentakota Surya Appa Rao v. Pentakota Seethayamma are consistent with mine and with great respect I adopt all the reasons mentioned therein. In the result, I set aside the impugned order and allow the petitioner s prayer made in the court below. The revision application is accordingly allowed, but without costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 6
... ... ... ... ..... hat the income said to be concealed was actually disclosed within two days from the date of the filing of the first return. The Tribunal has laid great stress on the fact that the share income from M/s. Moti Construction Co. was not shown in either of these returns. It is, however, clear and it was also accepted by the Tribunal that the assessee was not penalized for concealing the income from M/s. Moti Construction Co. The penalty was imposed only for not disclosing the income from the firm, M/s. Karamchand and Bros. The Tribunal s finding that there was concealment of the particulars of the share income from this firm is entirely perverse. For the reasons given above, we answer the question as follows On the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessee had concealed the particulars of income and in confirming the imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c). There shall be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (1) TMI 5
... ... ... ... ..... according to the mercantile system. Learned standing counsel for the Department relied upon Sinclair .Murray and Co. P. Ltd. v. CIT (1974 97 ITR 615 (SC) and Chowringhee Sales Bureau P. Ltd. v. CIT 1973 87 ITR 542 (SC). These cases are distinguishable, because it was not argued in them that the assessees had maintained their accounts according to mercantile system. For the reasons stated above, we answer the questions referred as follows Q. No. 1 The Tribunal was justified in considering the question of method of accounting. The Tribunal, however, did not decide that question properly as it did not examine the crucial question as to what method of accounting was adopted by the assessee in respect of sales tax. Q. Nos. 2, 3 and 4 The Tribunal was not justified in setting aside the order of the AAC in respect of the items of Rs. 36,405, Rs. 1,936 and Rs. 766, without correctly examining the question of method of accounting. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (1) TMI 4
Gift By Muslim, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ount gifted by him. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the decisions cited by the learned standing counsel are of little assistance to him so far as this case is concerned. The principles enunciated by this court in E. S. Hajee Abdul Kareem and Son v. CIT 1963 50 ITR 396 and A.M. Abdul Rahaman Rowther and Co. v. CIT 1965 56 ITR 556, are directly attracted to the facts of this case. We, therefore, hold that on the facts of this case there has been valid gift of Rs. 25,000 by the assessee in favour of his minor son as on March 28, 1969. Consequently, neither the sum of Rs. 25,000 nor the interest that accrued in the subsequent years would be includible in the net wealth of the assessee as on the respective valuation dates, viz., 31st March, 1969, 31st March, 1970, 31st March, 1971, and 31st March, 1972. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (1) TMI 3
Donation For Charitable Purposes, Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... s well as the Bangur Hospital are public charitable institutions, as found by the Tribunal, and the object of making the donations appears to be purely of a charitable nature, namely, providing relief to the poor including the employees of the assessee and reservation of a few beds for patients, who may be recommended by the assessee s officers, could not take the donations out of the purview of s. 15B of the Act. It is the public generally which was to get benefit out of the donations made by the assessee to the Arogya Sadan Hospital and the Bangur Hospital and if the employees of the assessee were also benefited thereby, it was not of much consequence so long as the general public was not denied or refused the benefit of the hospital facilities. We, therefore, find no reason to take a different view from the one taken by the Tribunal on the aforesaid question. We answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the Department. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1982 (1) TMI 2
The fact that the firm has not claimed the expenditure as its own does not affect the right of the assessee to claim deduction in respect of the amount in question in its assessment proceedings which it is legitimately entitled to do. It is not shown how, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, there is any statutory bar to the claim made by the assessee - decision of the High Court does not call for interference.
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1982 (1) TMI 1
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the income from the properties in dispute which were accepted to have been partitioned under the Hindu law but with regard to which an order accepting the claim of partial partition was not made was liable to be included in the computation of the assessee's income - Held, yes
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