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Showing 81 to 100 of 181 Records
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1982 (12) TMI 151
It provides that no gratuity payable to an employee employed in any establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, Railway Company or shop exempted under Section 5 shall be liable to attachment in execution of any decree or order of any civil, revenue or criminal court - Held that gratuity is a social welfare measure rendering socio economic justice by providing economic security in the fall of life when physical and mental prowess is ebbing, corresponding to ageing process and when, once falls back on savings. Such payments cannot be withheld unless specifically permitted by any statutory provision.
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1982 (12) TMI 150
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... from out of the original sale price received and credit interest accrued thereon in a separate account to be dealt with separately as not covered by the security of the bank enjoyed by equitable mortgage and the hypothecation of machinery and raw materials, etc. (4)If there is no agreement reached as to what constitutes usury in the light of decided cases, parties including the bank may in the usual course and in accordance with law appeal to this court against the adjudication of the official liquidator. (5)The official liquidator shall pay Rs. 50 lakhs reserving to himself the right to claim repayment of any sum which may be found to be in excess after adjudication. (6)The claim of the bank shall be adjudicated and disposed of within three months from today and all objections in these proceedings shall also be heard in the adjudication proceedings by the official liquidator. Subject to the above directions, C.A. No. 49 of 1977 is allowed. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 149
Shares – Allotment of, Securities ... ... ... ... ..... le Act itself is inapplicable, then it is difficult to see how even on the contention of the appellants, the provisions of section 13 can be relied upon by the appellants. Some reference was made before us to the Rules of the Bombay Stock Exchange. We do not think it necessary to refer to them because we have chosen to construe the definition of securities in the light of the provisions of the Regulation Act itself. It is also not further necessary to rely on the definition of marketable security in the Indian Stamp Act for the purpose of construing the definition in the instant case. Having regard to the view which we have taken, it is not possible for us to find any error in the view which the learned judge has taken that the present contract is not governed by the provisions of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, and is, therefore, not illegal. Consequently, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Prayer for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court rejected.
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1982 (12) TMI 148
Acquisition by Central Government of foreign exchange ... ... ... ... ..... thout reference to their directions and instructions. It was laid down by the Supreme Court in Erin Estate v. CIT 1958 34 ITR 1 (SC), that control and management means de facto control and management and not merely the right or power to control and manage, approving the decision of the Bombay High Court in B. R. Naick v. CIT 1945 13 ITR 124 (Bom.). In Naick s case, a partner, who under the terms of the partnership deed, had full control over the firm s business resided in India while the firm s business was carried on in South Africa. In the absence of any evidence that he in fact controlled and managed the firm s business from here, his residence was held to be insufficient to establish the residence of the firm in India. The facts here are different. In this view, we have to hold that the petitioner firm is a resident in India and that the Act is applicable to it. Thus, all the contentions advanced by the petitioner having failed, the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 127
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. and Enforcement of orders of courts
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1982 (12) TMI 126
Winding up – Application for, Provisions where Government decides to follow course of action specified in section 18FD(2)
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1982 (12) TMI 113
Customs Valuation ... ... ... ... ..... who were the sole importers of Air Bus/aircraft and its parts into India. Since there was no other importer of such goods in the country, the question of the discount being treated as special did not arise. The representative of the respondent, after seeing the circular letter issued by the General Electric Company, agreed that 28 discount could be considered admissible for computing the assessable value. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The actual assessment should be done after allowing 28 trade discount as claimed by the appellants and the consequential relief granted.
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1982 (12) TMI 109
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... d that the pension fund would completely extinguish an existing liability. There was, therefore, a benefit of an enduring advantage. The company, therein, thereafter need not bother about payment of pension to their employees, that being taken care of by the trust. In the case before us, there is no such complete extinguishment of any liability. The liability is continuous as we have pointed out. As and when necessity arises, the trust will have to deal with them by making payments by way of loans or outright gifts. There is no extinguishment of any liability, as in Atherton s case. This had been explained by the Bombay High Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. as well as in the case of Hindusthan Klockner Switchgear Ltd. For these reasons, we are satisfied that this does not represent a capital expenditure either. Under the circumstances, it has to be considered only as a revenue expenditure and allowed as a deduction. 42. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1982 (12) TMI 106
Debt Owed, House Property, Life Insurance, Net Wealth ... ... ... ... ..... s. 50,000 being the value of the house property which is otherwise includible in the net wealth. It is argued by the department that this view may not be in conformity with the correct legal position as explained by the decisions of the High Courts. But it has been held by the Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese v. ITO 1981 131 ITR 597, that Board s circulars are binding on the department even if they deviate from the true legal position. Having held out to the assessees that a liability secured on a partly exempted asset would be deducted from the taxable value of the asset, it is not possible for the department to resile from that view. The department is, therefore, bound to carry out the assurance given to the assessees and the exemption has to be worked out on the basis of the instructions quoted above. We, therefore, deem it fit to set aside the orders of the authorities below on this point also and direct the WTO to recompute the net wealth. The appeal is treated as allowed.
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1982 (12) TMI 104
Earlier Decision, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... ction 140A(3) under which the penalty is levied in this case for the concerned assessment year are not the same as, or identical with, the corresponding provisions of section 140A declared by the Madras High Court in A.M. Sali Maricar s case to be unconstitutional, they cannot be said to be governed or hit by the High Court decision mentioned above until and unless the High Court itself find them to be so in any appropriate case that may be brought before it. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on this point. 10. However, as we have already noticed, the Commissioner (Appeals) has not examined the justification of the levy of penalty with reference to sufficient cause pleaded by the assessee and, therefore, we find it necessary to restore the appeal to him for disposal afresh after considering the assessee s plea of sufficient cause. The appeal is, accordingly, restored to him for fresh disposal. 11. In the result, the appeal is treated as allowed.
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1982 (12) TMI 103
Additional Wealth Tax, Business Premises, Let Out ... ... ... ... ..... as to tax an asset which is prima facie exempt. We have, therefore, no hesitation in confirming the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on this point. 5. The assessee has filed the cross-objections claiming that the statement of the Commissioner (Appeals) that the valuation of the properties was not contested was incorrect. But as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of ITO v. S.B. Singhar Singh and Sons 1976 105 ITR 570, the question whether the omission to contest a matter was due to the failure of the assessee to urge that ground or due to a lapse on the part of the appellate authority, which deserves rectification, was a matter entirely for the authority concerned. Therefore, it is for the assessee to approach the Commissioner (Appeals) if there was an error or omission in dealing with a ground actually pressed before him. It is, therefore, not necessary to decide this issue as it is premature. 6. In the result, all the appeals and the cross-objections are dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 102
Actual Cost, Capital Gains On Sale, Expenditure Incurred, Interest On Borrowed Money ... ... ... ... ..... n were to be attempted by unnecessarily restricting the scope of cost of acquisition in section 48, it would mean that short-term capital gains which is not to enjoy any concessional treatment would be computed at a figure greater than that ascertainable under commercial principles as an ordinary income and would thus be taxed more harshly than it would have been if it had been treated as ordinary income arising to the assessee from regular business of purchase and sale of asset concerned. We are, therefore, of the opinion that approaching the matter both from the point of legislative history as well as from commercial accountancy principles and in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court cited above, the computation of the short-term capital gains by the assessee was quite correct and did not require to be disturbed by the ITO. We have, therefore, no hesitation in annulling his order. The appeal of the assessee is allowed and the appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 95
Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... clauses (i) and (iii) of section 64(1), namely, the spouse or minor child being beneficiary of a trust being represented in the firm through the medium of a trust. Such statutory presumption in favour of clause (vi) of section 64(1) has not been specifically provided and even the definition of child in section 2(15A) inserted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from 1-4-1976 does not cover grandchild . The contention of the learned counsel for the assessee that no income has been applied to the beneficiary in this year has also not been controverted by the learned departmental representative. In the circumstances, therefore, we uphold the decision of the AAC in excluding the income arising to the beneficiaries. 9. The cross-objection of the assessee was only with regard to the validity of reassessment proceedings taken by the ITO and in view of our decision, it has to be rejected. 10. In the result, the appeal as well as the cross-objection are dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 94
Assessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... document. Therefore, it cannot be said in gift-tax that the document relates back to the date of execution. Therefore, the HUF had got disrupted even on 27-7-1966. So, the initiation for assessment proceedings after disruption is not proper. So, these appeals are governed by the Kerala High Court judgment. 6. A Special Bench of the Tribunal to which one of us, the Vice President, was a party had in an exactly similar case held in favour of the department---C. Chenni Chettiar v. WTO 1982 1 ITD 232 (Mad.). Since then the Kerala High Court has rendered this direct decision to the contrary. So, we are not following the Special Bench decision. Following the Kerala High Court judgment we uphold the finding of the AAC that when notice was served, there was no HUF in existence and his conclusion thereon that the initiation of assessment proceedings is invalid. So, the result is cancellation of the assessments for the nine assessment years. The nine departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 89
Backward Area, Profits And Gains ... ... ... ... ..... area and give it as a deduction from such gross income similar to the deductions under other sections 37 to 43 of the Act in computing the income from business under section 29. We direct the ITO to recompute the relief accordingly for the assessment year 1979-80. Since the computation of the income for the assessment year 1980-81 will depend upon the computation of the income for the year 1979-80, we direct the ITO to recompute the income for 1980-81 also as a consequence. 11. The only other point in dispute for 1980-81 is disallowance of Rs. 7,983 under section 37(3A). This expenditure represented name boards supplied to various dealers showing that the products of the assessee were available for sale in those places. According to the assessee this did not amount to advertisement expenditure at all. We are unable to agree. We, therefore, confirm the disallowance. 12. In the result, Appeal No. 237 (Mad.) of 1982 is allowed and appeal No. 238 (Mad.) of 1982 is partly allowed.
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1982 (12) TMI 88
Powers To Tax, Rate Purpose, Relief From Double Taxation ... ... ... ... ..... s is straightaway attracted to the facts of this case. It was also argued by the department that if the income were totally excluded even for rate purposes, it should not be taxable in India at all or exemption under section 10 of the Act should have been provided. We cannot agree with the department. We have already held that because of provisions to the contrary, section 5, which ordinarily provides for inclusion of this type of income in the total income of a resident, is not applicable to the facts of this case. So, when section 5, invoked to include this type of income in the total income of a resident, is not applicable, the question of inclusion for rate purpose does not arise at all for consideration. 11. In the result, the appeal of the assessee for the assessment year 1977-78 IT Appeal No. 616 (Mad.) of 1981 is allowed. The direction of the Commissioner (Appeals) to include the foreign income for rate purpose is cancelled. The two departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 85
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... ... ..... hai Patel vs. CWT (1981) 20 CTR (MP) 43 (1981) 127 ITR 633 (MP) respectively, the assessee is entitled to deduction to the extent of Rs. 1,22,883. The ld. ITO, on the other hand, has contended that the same is not admissible in view of the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported as CWT vs. Narendra Ranjalker (1981) 129 ITR 203 (AP). It is a common ground between the parties that there is a conflict of opinions on the subject between the various High Courts. The golden rule is that in such situation the view favourable to the assessee should be followed. Kindly see CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC). In view of the golden rule, we are of the opinion that the assessee is entitled to deduction from the net wealth the value of agricultural lands at Rs. 1,22,883. The orders of the authorities below stands modified accordingly. The WTO shall recompute the wealth of the assessee in the light of the above directions. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (12) TMI 84
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... ... ..... of the form of return. There may be a legal obligation in the light of the amended form of the return or under any other legal provision, but the fact remains that the assessee formed the belief only from s. 139 and s. 64, for which even an authority has been shown by the assessee that there was no legal obligation to file return in respect of share income of minor son. The revenue argues that share income of the minor son will be treated to be income of the assessee, when under the law that has to be assessed in the hands of the assessee. There is no need to find out the correct legal position, but what is to decided in this case is whether the assessee had the bona fide belief that there was no obligation on her to return the share income of the minor son u/s 139 and s. 64. Legal position as contended by the assessee, is fully supported by the authority being relied on by her. For the reasons, we uphold the order of the AAC. 3. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 83
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... ... ..... on stated by Shri Koolwal may not strictly come within the term business rsquo but the case of the assessee gives rise to a situation different from the one being stated by Shri Koolwal. In the case of the assessee, no built up house owned by the firm, was let out, but pursuant to its objects, it purchased the plot of land, arranged the finances, constructed the godown and then let it out. Such activity, in our view, is clearly a business activity. The case of the assessee, factswise, is not inferior than the cases in which a firm carries on business of taking the properties on lease and then earning income from sub-letting thereof. When a firm taking the properties on lease and sub-letting them further, can be said to have carried on business activity, then why not the assessee-firm, who purchased the land, arranged the finances, raised the constructions and then let out the same. On these facts, we completely agree with the view taken by the AAC. 3. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 82
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... ... ..... at as per the order of the collector, the assessee could not charge profit exceeding 3 paise per litre, otherwise the licence would have to be cancelled. The AAC found that the total sale of kerosene was 2,68,907 litres and the profit was shown at Rs. 8,397 that is more than 3 paise per litre, Accordingly, the AAC found no substance in the submissions made on behalf of the assessee, particularly, when the sales were not verifiable. He sustained the addition. 8. Before us, similar contentions are stressed by the assessee rsquo s ld counsel that the rate was fixed by the collector of the areas and the assessee cannot charge more profit. But this point was made by the AAC in his finding given above. After hearing both the sides and after considering the facts available on record we are of the opinion that the addition was validly sustained by the AAC and therefore the appeal by the assessee on this point is rejected. 9. In the result the appeal by the assessee is partly allowed.
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