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1982 (8) TMI 14
... ... ... ... ..... bunal. Even within the framework of the question referred to us, the assessee is not competent to raise this contention. The question before us is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the imposition of penalty for the assessment year 1970-71 was justified. The case that was made out before the Tribunal was that there was no concealment. The Tribunal, after reviewing all the facts, came to the conclusion that there was concealment. There was no other argument made before the Tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case before it, the Tribunal was right in holding that the imposition of penalty of Rs. 25,000 under s. 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1970-71 was justified. This question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1982 (8) TMI 13
Any Person, Limitation, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... person in the sense of a person being intimately connected with the assessee. III the facts and circumstances of this case as stated hereinbefore we are of the opinion that the appellant, Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd., being intimately connected with Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd., the second proviso to s. 34(3) would apply and the reassessments are not barred by limitation. We also respectfully agree with the view of the learned judge of the court of the first instance that Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. comes within the mischief of the words association of persons and the reasons for the said view. As in our view the appellant is a person ultimately connected with the assessee, direction for reassessment was validly given by the AAC and in this connection the arguments advanced by the Revenue appear to have a good deal of force. In the aforesaid view of the matter the appeal falls and it is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to cost. S. C. GHOSE C.J.-I agree.
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1982 (8) TMI 12
Partner In Firm, Partnership Deed, Property Passing On Death, Share In Partnership ... ... ... ... ..... his fact. So, the Tribunal was right to this extent that this factor could not be ignored for the purpose of making the valuation but the Tribunal, in our opinion, was not correct in saving that this actual term of the partnership would be only conclusive and the price would only be known as to what it would fetch in the open market. We would, therefore, answer the question referred to us by saying that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on a proper construction of the partnership deed dated the twenty-second day of April, One thousand nine hundred and forty-six, the value of the deceased s share in the assets of the firm constituted under the said deed, in view of the provisions of the partnership deed, should be estimated with this condition ,as to what it would fetch in the open market. We would, therefore, answer the question accordingly, and remand the matter to the Tribunal. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.--I agree.
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1982 (8) TMI 11
Depreciation, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... ull effect cannot be given to any such allowance in any year ? It would be noted that the words used are in the assessment of the assessee or the assessment of the partners . Taking the case of the partners of a registered firm, the assessment must be their individual assessments, i.e., assessments in which the profits from the firm and other sources are pooled together. The Legislature is clearly assuming that effect can be given to depreciation allowance in the assessment of a partner the only way effect can be given in the assessment of a partner is by setting it off against income, profits and gains under other heads. We, therefore, hold that the assessee s claim for set off of her share of the unabsorbed depreciation of the firm for the earlier two years has to be allowed in the assessment year in question. The question referred is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will have her costs from the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (8) TMI 10
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ken into account and the rest of the income was set off against the entire expenditure incurred in respect of which exemption was claimed under s. 12. On this fact it was held by a Division Bench of this court approving Sterling Trust Ltd. 1925 12 TC 868 (CA), that though paid out of a common fund, the expenditure incurred should be considered to have been made out of the income derived from property held under the trust. There was no provision for apportioning the expenditure between the different heads. We are not inclined to take a view different from that already expressed by this court earlier. We also do not express any opinion on the question whether interest paid on money borrowed for payment of income-tax is business expenditure. Accordingly, we answer the second question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Inasmuch as both the Revenue and the assessee have succeeded partly in this reference, each party will pay and bear its own costs. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1982 (8) TMI 9
Unexplained Investments ... ... ... ... ..... aid decision of the Supreme Court may not apply to the facts of this case. There, the value of the currency seized from the assessee was taken to be an income arising out of smuggling operations and confiscation of the same by the customs authorities was held to be an incidental feature of such operations. If the value of the currency seized can be taken as business income of the assessee, then the loss arising out of confiscation of the same should be taken as a deduction under s. 10 as the, confiscation has arisen as an incident of his business operations which involved smuggling. Here, the value of the gold has been assessed, not as business income, but as income from other sources. The assessee is not entitled to claim deduction of the value of the gold confiscated by Government as business loss. In the view expressed by us, all the questions are answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The assessee will have the costs from the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (8) TMI 8
Industrial Company, Processing, Tax Concession ... ... ... ... ..... ive a direction to the Commissioner to make a fresh order under s. 263 of the Act, if the order already passed under that section is found to be one passed without following the statutory procedure and without giving a reasonable opportunity as contemplated by the statute. In this view of the matter, we have to answer both the questions in the affirmative and against the assessee. The references are answered accordingly. The Revenue will have its costs from the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (rupees five hundred only) one set. The learned counsel for the assessee makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment just now pronounced. Since our conclusions are merely based on the observations of the Supreme Court in CIT v. National Taj Traders 1980 121 ITR 535, and in Kapurchand Shrimal v. CIT 1981 131 ITR 451, we do not think that this is a fit case for grant of leave as prayed for. The oral application for leave is, therefore, rejected.
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1982 (8) TMI 7
Appeals, Legal Representative ... ... ... ... ..... or proceeding should be condoned. All these matters can be considered only if a proper petition for condonation of delay is filed along with the amended or fresh proceedings or memorandum of appeal or a petition under s. 256(2) of the I.T. Act, as in this case. On the facts mentioned in such a petition and after hearing the other side against whom the proceeding is sought to be taken, the court would have to consider the question of condoning the delay and only if there is sufficient cause, the delay can be condoned. We do not wish to express any opinion about it much less when all these matters are to be considered, would we be justified in condoning the delay on the oral request of the petitioner by allowing the amendment to be carried out by substituting the legal representatives. The only modification we make in the order, dated August 4, 1982, is that the I.T.C. instead of being rejected, will have to be returned as incompetent against a dead person. Ordered accordingly.
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1982 (8) TMI 6
Burden Of Proof, Income ... ... ... ... ..... endered by the assessee which had been compensated for and there is no legal right in the assessee to receive any further payment for the professional services rendered earlier. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that merely because the assessee is medical practitioner, the gift received by him is towards the services rendered especially when the professional services have been suitably compensated earlier. Having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Mahesh Anantrai Pattani v. CIT 1961 41 ITR 481 and in Parimisetti Seetharamamma v. CIT 1965 57 ITR 532, we are of the view that the services rendered by the assessee is not the causa causans of making the gift by the donor and, therefore, it should be treated only as a gift made out of personal esteem and arising out of the personal qualities of the assessee. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative and against the Revenue. The Revenue will pay the costs of the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (8) TMI 5
... ... ... ... ..... rta, and of which after the former s death, Shankara Shetty became such karta. This is what appears to have been reaffirmed by Shankara Shetty in his declaration dated May 27, 1973. We must, therefore, hold that the HUF in whose hands the said share income was required to be assessed for the year 1974-75 was the same HUF in the hands of which the said share income was assessed in the earlier years. The fact that the share of profits was credited to Shankara Shetty s karta in the books of the firm is only consistent with the circumstance that, so far as the firm was concerned, Shankara Shetty was the partner and that need not necessarily detract from the position that the partner, in turn, represented a HUF. In this view of the matter, the question referred requires to be and is hereby answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. Sri K. Srinivasan, learned senior standing counsel for the Revenue, is permitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks from today.
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1982 (8) TMI 4
Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... ounts of the undertaking. Under section 11(4), any income of the business undertaking determined by the Income-tax Officer, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, which is in excess of the income as shown in its accounts, is to be deemed to have been applied to purposes other than charitable or religious, and hence it will be charged to tax under sub-section (3). As only the income disclosed by the account will be eligible for exemption under section 11(1), the permitted accumulation of 25 will also be calculated with reference to this income. In the view we have taken that the income of the trust has to be determined for purposes of the section only after giving deduction for the income-tax paid, there may not be any surplus for the purpose of allocation. We have to, therefore, agree with the view taken by the Tribunal in this case and answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The Revenue will pay the costs of the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (8) TMI 3
... ... ... ... ..... hat even assuming that the Revenue is right in its submission that notwithstanding the consent or acceptance of the donee, the settlements will be valid and effective for the purpose of levy of gift-tax, since the settlement deeds are void under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, there is no settlement validly in existence which would attract the liability to gift-tax. In the view we have taken on the second question, it is unnecessary for us to consider the question as to whether the consent or acceptance of the donee is necessary to validate the gifts for the purpose of the G.T. Act as, in any event, the Revenue has to fail on the second question. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the first question, referred to above, the question referred can be answered by merely answering the second question. Therefore, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The Revenue will pay the costs of the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (8) TMI 2
Estate Duty, HUF, Unequal Partition ... ... ... ... ..... he sum of Rs. 10,000, the deceased was entitled only to a half share, that is, a sum of Rs. 5,000, and, therefore, the other half share belonged to the other sharer, that is, the accountable person. Even as karta of the family, the deceased had no power to make a gift of the joint family property and, therefore, the gift can be taken to be valid only to the extent of his share of Rs. 5,000. In so far as the deceased has relinquished his share of Rs. 5,000 in the joint family funds, it would attract section 9. Therefore, we cannot agree with the Tribunal that the entire sum of Rs. 10,000 is liable to be included under section 9 and we hold that the inclusion of only a sum of Rs. 5,000 under section 9 is justified. Thus, as regards the second question, our answer is that the inclusion of a sum of Rs. 5,000 under section 9 alone is valid in law. The second question is answered accordingly. In view of the fact that both parties succeed in part, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (8) TMI 1
Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... 1, respectively, should be considered as profits and gains arising from the priority industry for the purpose of computing the deduction allowable under section 80-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73, respectively ? The view taken by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in ITO v. Shardlow India Limited (ITA No. 3025 of 1972-73, dated May 28, 1975) was the subject-matter of a tax case before this court and this court upheld the said order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in Shardlow India Ltd. v. CIT 1981 128 ITR 571. The decision of this court in Shardlow India s case 1981 128 ITR 571 follows an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1978 113 ITR 84. Hence, in view of the decision of this court in Shardlow India Ltd. v. CIT 1981 128 ITR 571, which clearly governs this case, the question of law is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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