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1982 (8) TMI 94
... ... ... ... ..... ecting them assigning cogent and relevant reasons substantiated from the material on record or by the provisions of the law or decision either of the High Court or Supreme Court. The issues raised by the parties cannot be determined by the quasi-judiciary functionary on his general knowledge or understanding. Therefore, we hold that the contentions raised by Shri Chawla referred to above are well founded and as such the order of the CIT(A) is no order in the reference as the same is based on his personal knowledge and understanding. Hence we set aside it. 6. In view of our above discussions and for reasons thereto, we hold that the ITO has rightly allowed the deduction to the assessee. Hence we restore his order. 7. In the result, the revenue s appeal is allowed. S.N. Ratho, A.M.-I agree with the conclusion of my learned brother. However, I disassociate my self from the observations in the last portion of final paragraph beginning from apart from and ending with we aside it.
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1982 (8) TMI 93
Export Market Development Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... mind that the assessee carried on business, and that she did export services and so the Commissioner (Appeals) was quite correct in holding that the assessee was entitled to relief under section 35B. We have gone through the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and we find that she has considered in detail the various items of expenditure one by one, and has specifically stated against each item as to under which sub-clause relief is admissible. None of these findings have been shown before us to be erroneous. The Commissioner (Appeals) has not entertained any fresh evidence. We, therefore, do not see any force in the argument that the ITO was not given a fresh opportunity to examine the eligibility of the various items for relief under section 35B. We find support for the above conclusion of ours from both the orders of the Tribunal cited earlier in this order. For the above reasons, we uphold the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (8) TMI 92
Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... was there before the Commissioner, hence, we agree with his reasons. 9. The common issue which is there in the revenue s appeal for the assessment year 1975-76 is ground No. (1) which is as under On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned Commissioner (Appeals) erred in holding that the expenditure of Rs. 7,32,876 incurred by the assessee on Melting and Refining charges is qualified for weighted deduction under section 35B ? Since, we have determined this issue in the assessee s appeal for the assessment years 1976-77 and 1977-78 against the assessee, for these reasons, we determine this issue, accordingly, and thereby set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on this issue for the assessment year 1975-76 holding therein that no weighted deduction is to be allowed on Rs. 7,32,876 incurred by the assessee on melting and refining charges. 10. In the result, the assessee s appeal is dismissed while the departmental appeal is partly allowed.
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1982 (8) TMI 91
Accounting Year ... ... ... ... ..... the High Courts or the Supreme Court. The issues raised by the parties cannot be determined by the quasi-judicial functionary, on his little general knowledge or understanding or experience. Accordingly, we accept the contention of Shri Chawla, referred to above. Therefore, we hold that the contentions raised by Shri Chawla referred to above are well founded and as such the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is no order in the eye of law as the same is based on his personal knowledge and understanding. Hence, we set it aside. 6. In view of our above discussions and reasons thereto, we hold that the ITO has rightly disallowed the deduction to the assessee. Hence, we restore his order. 7. In the result, the revenue s appeal is allowed. Per Shri S.N. Rotho, Accountant Member--I agree with the conclusion of my learned brother. However, I disassociate myself from the observations in the last portion of paragraph five beginning from Apart from... and ending with we set aside it .
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1982 (8) TMI 90
... ... ... ... ..... ceased, who ceased to have any interest in them from 20th October, 1965, 8th May 1966 and 19th December 1967, as the case may, be. In these circumstances, s. 15 of the ED Act is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The Appellate CED, therefore, rightly included only the premium amounts paid by the deceased in respect of these three policies within the period of two years before his death, as gifts deemed to pass on the death of the deceased u/s 9 of the Ed Act. The surrender value of these policies can be included only if some beneficial interest accrued to the three daughters under the policies on the death of the deceased. But, we find, there is no such beneficial interest accruing by survivorship, or otherwise, to the three daughters on the death of the deceased. Therefore, the surrender value cannot be included in the estate of the deceased. Accordingly, we confirm the order of the Appellate CED and dismiss the appeal. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (8) TMI 89
... ... ... ... ..... he ITO to consider the matter afresh. In this view of the matter, the appeal filed by the assessee before the AAC was incompetent. 11. It was then contended by the ld. counsel for the assessee that even assuming that the Commr. had recorded clear findings on the two matters which are in controversy, the ITO while passing the fresh order was bound to take notice of the subsequent ruling of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Alcock Ashdown and Co. Ltd. (1979) 8 CTR (Bom) 223 (1979) 119 ITR 164 (Bom). This contention has to fail for the simple reason that the decision of the Bombay High Court which was given on 7th July, 1978 is subsequent to the fresh order passed by the ITO, which was on 11th April, 1977. The contingency of the ITO taking notice of the ruling of the Bombay High Court at the time of the passing of the fresh order did not, therefore, arise. 12. In view of what is stated above, the present appeal has to fail. 13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (8) TMI 88
... ... ... ... ..... paid by the employer which is to be taken into account for the purpose of disallowance under this sub-section may higher than the value of the accommodation included as a perquisite in the employee s assessment. 5. On a consideration of all the aspects of the matter, with great respect, we prefer to follow the ruling of the Madras High Court and the view expressed by Kanga and Palkhivala referred to above, in preference to the ruling of the Calcutta High Court referred to earlier. This ground is, therefore, decided against the assessee. Ground No. 2 in Appeal No. 575/(Bom)/81 (Asst. yr. 1978-79) 6. This is identical to ground No. 2 in the appeal relating to the asst. yr. 1975-76 dealt with in the preceding paragraph. The disallowance in the asst. yr. 1978-79 comes to Rs. 5,899 which is also based on the actual rent paid to an employee. For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, this ground is decided against the assessee. 7. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (8) TMI 87
... ... ... ... ..... therefore, be accepted, since in our view these observations were not called for at all when the assessment does not exist. 5. On the facts of the assessment having been set aside, the assessee cannot be said to be aggrieved at all by the order of CIT (A). A grievance and a cause of action arises when something has been done against the assessee by the order of the ITO or the order of the order CIT (A). The assessee, in fact, has filed a return of income and is liable to pay income tax on his income. The order of the CIT (A) having set aside the ITO s order has at least until a fresh assessment is made completely exonerated the assessee from any payment of tax, which he would normally pay certainly on his undisputed income. Against such a back ground, the assessee certainly has no grievance either against the order of the ITO which does not exist or against the order of the CIT (A). We, therefore, dismiss this appeal on this ground as infructuous. 6. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (8) TMI 86
... ... ... ... ..... made on 18th September 1980 was time-barred and hence bad. The assessee s defence on this ground is allowed. The order of the CIT(A) is upheld, though on different grounds. The appeal filed by the revenue is dismissed. K. B. MENON, J.M. I fully agree with my learned brother that the assessee can raise the ground of limitation by way of supporting the order of the Commr. (Appeals), that the assessment is time-barred and that as a result the appeal has to be dismissed. 2. I have some reservations on the question whether the return filed by the constituted attorney of the assessee could have been totally ignored by the department. The claim of the assessee that the returns for some other years, which were also signed by the attorney, were accepted by the ITO and acted upon was not disputed by the ld. Deptl. Rep. I would also like to leave open the question whether s. 292B will apply to all pending assessments. I would, therefore, rest my decision on the question of limitation.
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1982 (8) TMI 85
... ... ... ... ..... made on 18th September 1980 was time-barred and hence bad. The assessee s defence on this ground is allowed. The order of the CIT(A) is upheld, though on different grounds. The appeal filed by the revenue is dismissed. K. B. MENON, J.M. I fully agree with my learned brother that the assessee can raise the ground of limitation by way of supporting the order of the Commr. (Appeals), that the assessment is time-barred and that as a result the appeal has to be dismissed. 2. I have some reservations on the question whether the return filed by the constituted attorney of the assessee could have been totally ignored by the department. The claim of the assessee that the returns for some other years, which were also signed by the attorney, were accepted by the ITO and acted upon was not disputed by the ld. Deptl. Rep. I would also like to leave open the question whether s. 292B will apply to all pending assessments. I would, therefore, rest my decision on the question of limitation.
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1982 (8) TMI 84
... ... ... ... ..... ad relied upon sub-s. (3) of s. 215 and sub-s. (1A) of s. 214 to contend for the position that the regular assessment can mean only the original assessment by the ITO. As already found, the contention was repelled by the Calcutta High Court. We may also observe that if the contention of the Revenue is accepted, there may not be any liability on the assessee to pay interest when the appellate authority enhances the assessment and as a result of the same, it turns out that the advance tax paid by the assessee is less than 75 per cent of the tax as computed on the income as determined by the appellate authority. Respectfully following the ruling of the Calcutta High Court and also for the other reasons set out by us, we hold that the levy of interest under s 215(1) cannot be maintained when the advance tax paid by the assessee is not less than 75 per cent of the tax assessed in pursuance to the order of the appellate of revisional authority. 9. In result, the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (8) TMI 83
... ... ... ... ..... ssessment made on 18th Sept., 1980 was time-barred and hence bad. The assessee s defence on this ground is allowed. The order of the CIT(A) is upheld, though on different grounds. The appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed. K.B. MENON, J.M. I fully agree with my learned brother that the assessee can raise the ground of limitation by way of supporting the order of the Commr. (Appeals), that the assessment is time-barred and that as a result the appeal has to be dismissed. 2. I have some reservations on the question whether the return filed by the constituted attorney of the assessee could have been totally ignored by the Department. The claim of the assessee that the returns for some other years, which were also signed by the attorney, were accepted by the ITO and acted upon, was not disputed by the ld. Deptl. Rep. I would also like to open the question whether s. 292B will apply to all pending assessments. I would, therefore, rest my decision on the question of limitation.
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1982 (8) TMI 82
... ... ... ... ..... decision in the case of K. A. Dhairyawan vs. J. R. Thakur, referred to above. 6. In our opinion, the case of Zorostrian Bldg. Society Ltd. and Union Land and Bldg. Society Ltd. are clearly disitingunishable.I n both these cases, the assessees failed to establish that the land belongs to one and the building belongs to another person. In both these cases the ownership of the land as instant case, the facts are clearly similar to the case of Fazalbhoy Investments Co. P. Ltd. wherein the land belonged to one person and the building contractor and his customers. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the CIT(A) was fully justified in allowing the assessee s appeal and deciding that the assessee was liable only in respect of the income arising from the two flats and one cottage allotted to him. The income from the remaining property was to be taxed in the hands of the respective purchasers of the flats. 7. In the circumstances, the appeal filed by the revenue is here by dismissed.
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1982 (8) TMI 81
... ... ... ... ..... e accepted. It would not, however, be correct for that same reason to include the entire sum of Rs. 25 lakhs outstanding as the net wealth of the assessee joint family. There is a substantial challenge to the assessee s title to the amounts. For wealth-tax purposes what is to be included in the net wealth is the market value of an asset. A willing purchaser would certainly take into account the challenge to the title of a property belonging to the assessee. The value of this asset, therefore, has to be fixed against the background of the continuing litigation with regard to it and the rival claims so far as they are available. Having regard to these facts and also the further fact that the company is one in which the assessee has substantial interest, we would put the value of this asset at Rs. 15 lakhs. 13. The assessee s ld. counsel sought to raise certain additional grounds. At the time of hearing, however, these grounds were withdrawn. 14. The appeals are partly allowed.
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1982 (8) TMI 80
... ... ... ... ..... when this is so, then no different procedure, yard stick of treatment should be adopted by the ITO in the issuance of the notice for passing an order under s. 154 of the Act. 7. Therefore, in view of our above discussions and reasons thereto, we hold that notice as required under s. 154(3) of the Act is not issued on the assessee and as such the proceedings under s. 154 of the Act are invalid or voidable. Accordingly, we quash the order of the authorities below on this issue and send back the case to the file of the ITO to decide it afresh on issuing specific and proper notice on the assessee as stated above. Since we have allowed the appeal on the preliminary issue and as such we do not want to decide the other issues raised in this appeal, which are to be determined by the ITO on hearing the assessee, after issuance of specific and definite notice as stated above for taking action under s. 154(3) of the Act. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
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1982 (8) TMI 79
Industrial Undertaking, Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... se, the construction of tunnel, exit channel and additional water conductor system would amount to construction of a thing for the purpose of clause (iii) of sub-section (2)(b) of section 32A. Merely, because the items manufactured by the assessee are used in its own business, the claim cannot be disallowed as there is no such restriction prescribed in section 32A. The ratio laid down in National Projects applies. 12. Thus, the assessee is an industrial undertaking and the investment allowance under section 32A is allowable on the machinery or plant installed after 31-3-1976. Thus, the ITO was justified in allowing the investment allowance. The Commissioner was wrong in invoking the provisions of section 263 and directing the ITO to withdraw the investment allowance granted in these two years. 13. In the view we have taken on the main point, the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the assessee need not be considered. 14. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1982 (8) TMI 78
... ... ... ... ..... spect of the current year itself. The Deptl. Rep., on the other hand, submitted that the manner in which the calculation has been made would show that the bonus related to an earlier year. 4. We have considered that facts, we are of the view that the claim had not been disallowed correctly. The assessee had stated before the ITO that he was claiming bonus in respect of the current year itself and the claim was not at the minimum of the bonus rate but a higher rate. The fact that the bonus paid for the current year was partly calculated on the basis of an average salary of an earlier year cannot convert it into bonus for earlier year. The payment of the bonus is also not denied. We are of the view that the claim for bonus should have been allowed in full as it related to the current year and was based on an agreement with the employees. It was also not in excess of the claim limits laid down under the Bonus Act. The addition made is, therefore, deleted. The appeal is allowed.
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1982 (8) TMI 77
Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... the revenue get his full claim of depreciation in the following year, which will not prejudice his claim for carry forward of loss or depreciation in any way. Therefore, considering this aspect of the matter also, we find no support for the claim of the revenue that the assessee is making a claim to which he was not entitled in fact or in law. As for the plea that the assessee was not entitled to be considered the owner in absence of registration, we do not consider this a proper plea to deny the assessee the benefit of depreciation. If income derived from the plying of this bus had been subjected to the assessment, which has been arrived at only after considering the receipts and the expenses, we find no justification for denying him the claim of depreciation on the plea that he was not the registered owner. In effect, we reverse the finding of the lower authorities and hold that the assessee was entitled to claim depreciation on the bus. 4. In the result, appeal is allowed.
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1982 (8) TMI 76
Association Of Persons, Body Of Individuals, Interest Income ... ... ... ... ..... ieties Registration Act. It had a set purpose as stated above. The assessee has also transferred the entire amount to this institute vide transfer deed dated 2-4-1979. These facts only go to show that the assessee was working in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of an institute to be founded subsequently. The institute is, therefore, entitled to claim from the assessee the entire collections and the interest. In fact, this is precisely what the assessee had done through transfer deed dated 2-4-1979. We are, therefore, clear in our mind that looked at from either angle neither the collections nor the interest thereon is the income of the assessee. We, therefore, direct the deletion of these amounts from the total income of the assessee for the respective two years. 12 and 13. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues. 14. In the result, while the appeal for the assessment year 1977-78 is fully allowed, that for the assessment year 1978-79 is partly allowed.
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1982 (8) TMI 75
Interest Paid By Company ... ... ... ... ..... o far as the decision of the Bombay Bench in the case of M. E. (P.) Ltd. is concerned, we agree with the Commissioner (Appeals) that it would not apply to the facts of the present case, as in the present case, it is not admitted nor it has been found that they are in the nature of current accounts. It is no doubt true that the mere admission by the assessee of the amount of Rs. 5,175 as an income would not have made the amount taxable, but as we have seen above, in fact, and, in law, the amount in question is taxable. Therefore, the aforesaid action on the part of the assessee is not material. It is not under dispute before us that the disallowable amount is Rs. 5,175. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and in view of the foregoing discussion, the decision of the income-tax authorities regarding disallowance of Rs. 5,175 under section 40A(8) is justified and is upheld. 6. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee fails and is dismissed.
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