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1983 (1) TMI 252
... ... ... ... ..... ed that there was another Notification No. 364/76-Cus., which gave full exemption from countervailing duty to articles falling under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff and since after the Appellate Collector’s decision the goods fell under Heading 90.01 CTA and the corresponding Central Excise classification was Item 68. The Department would have no objection if the appellants claim for countervailing duty was allowed under Notification No. 364/76-Cus. Shri Bhandarkar, stated that the appellants had no objection to this position. 3. We have carefully considered the matter. Since the Appellate Collector has held that the goods were optical glasses, polished and optically worked, they would fall under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff and would be entitled to full exemption from countervailing duty under Notification No. 364/76-Cus., which was in force at the material time when the goods were imported. We allow the appeal with consequential relief accordingly.
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1983 (1) TMI 251
... ... ... ... ..... is that fused Quartz and fused Silica have to be considered as glass because of the extended meaning given to “Glass” by Chapter note 3 in the Customs Tariff Act itself. It would be logical to conclude that but for this Chapter note fused quartz and fused silica would not ordinarily be considered as glass and, therefore, in the absence of a corresponding note or explanation in the Central Excise Tariff, “Glass” in item 23A CET would not ordinarily include fused quartz or fused silica. Though Shri Chatterjee urged, on behalf of the Department, that fused silica is nothing but glass, he produced no evidence or literature to substantiate his argument. We have, therefore, to uphold the claim of the appellants so far as countervailing duty is concerned. 4. Accordingly, we reject the appellants claim in regard to the basic customs duty but allow it in regard to the countervailing duty. We direct that consequential refund be granted to the appellants.
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1983 (1) TMI 250
... ... ... ... ..... mping Foils have been imported and their objection is based solely on the Dictionary meaning of “embellishment”. We find this objection misconceived. The question here is not whether Stamping Foils are parts and components of foot wear but whether they are embellishment for foot wear. The nature of the article with which we are concerned here, namely, Stamping Foils, is such that importing it in any other form would either be impractical or would be so prohibitively expensive as to it impractical. In any case, we find that the concerned trade as well as the Government’s own trade control authorities regard Stamping Foils even in the running length form as embellishments. 7. We, therefore, hold that as per the trade understanding and usuage, Stamping Foils are embellishments and, therefore, entitled to the concessional rate of duty provided for in Notification No. 29/79-Cus. Accordingly, we allow this appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1983 (1) TMI 249
... ... ... ... ..... have been specifically excluded from Chapter 85 Customs Tariff Act by Note 1(b) contained at the beginning of the said Chapter. Since these provisions of the Tariff are statutory, the plea that BSS, I.S.I, and trade catalogue recognise the impugned glass shells as components of lighting fittings cannot alter the legal position. Notification No. 106/77-Cus. does not say that all lighting fittings (flame proof) fall in Chapter 85. On the contrary, what the notification says is that only such lighting fittings (flame proof) which fall in Chapter 85 would get the concession contained in the said notification and since glass envelopes or shells for electric lamps are specifically excluded from Chapter 85, they go out of the scope of notification 106/77-Cus.., too and for the same reason the belated plea of their being brought in Chapter 85 as insulating fittings for electrical equipment is also not tenable. 6. Accordingly, we uphold the impugned order and reject the appeal.
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1983 (1) TMI 248
... ... ... ... ..... he assessment practice thereafter, he stated that he had nothing to urge against the revised assessment practice. 5. We have carefully considered the matter. On seeing the sheet of paper presented to us as a sample from the impugned goods and considering that it was of a comparatively lighter substance (165.9 gms.), we hold that the impugned paper was coated art paper and not coated art board. We are confident that the Collectors-in-Conference who too came to a similar conclusion would have had the benefit of much wider trade inquiries than those got made by the Assistant Collector in this case. In any case, the nature and content of the Assistant Collector’s market inquiry is not on record and there is no evidence to show that the appellants were confronted with his market inquiry report before he passed the impugned order-in-original. Accordingly, we agree with the appellants, allow their appeal and direct that consequential relief be granted to the appellants.
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1983 (1) TMI 247
... ... ... ... ..... e Tribunal has rightly held that even though the assessee has not earned any profit out of the transaction, he is liable to be taxed as a seller. The third contention put forward by the assessee before the Tribunal was that the sale of coins should be taken as the sale of specie and therefore, the sales should be taxed at the lower rate of 2 and not at 4 as has been done by the assessing authority. The Tribunal has held that the assessee has made the coins out of the old silver and silver ornaments and therefore, the manufactured product, viz., silver coins, cannot be said to be a specie. The Tribunal has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. G.S. Pai and Co. 1980 45 STC 58 (SC), to justify its conclusion that the coins manufactured by the assessee cannot be taken to be a specie. We agree with the findings of the Tribunal on all the points. In the result, both the tax cases are dismissed.
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1983 (1) TMI 246
... ... ... ... ..... has to bring out its case clearly within the purview of exemption granted for a tax liability. The petitioners are liable to Central sales tax on the sale or purchase of woollen felts as regards inter-State sale. They are entitled to claim exemption only if their case is covered under section 8(2A) and is not covered under its explanation. As already observed above the exemption granted under the notification dated 21st August, 1979, is not a general exemption but is subject to specified circumstances and conditions and as such the petitioners are liable to pay the Central sales tax. The learned counsel for the respondents had also raised several preliminary objections regarding the non-maintainability of these writ petitions. But in view of the fact that we are deciding the writ petitions on merits in favour of the respondents, we have not proposed to deal with the preliminary objections. In the result, these writ petitions fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1983 (1) TMI 245
... ... ... ... ..... gment of the Court was delivered by MADON, C.J.-In accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Judges who have heard this writ petition and for the reasons set out in the judgment delivered today on the reference made in view of the difference of opinion between Padhye, J., and Mohta, J., we partly allow this writ petition by setting aside the impugned order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, dated 2nd February, 1973, and the order and judgment of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal, Bombay, dated 22nd March, 1974, in Appeal No. 17 of 1973 from the said order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax in so far as the said orders and judgment relate to sales of tarpaulin manufactured and sold by the petitioners. We confirm the said orders and judgment, so far as the other articles manufactured and sold by the petitioners are concerned. The rule issued in this petition is made absolute to the above extent. There will be no order as to the costs of this petition.
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1983 (1) TMI 244
... ... ... ... ..... to the one which figures in this case. The controversy before this Court in that case was whether the situs of a purchase of items of machinery was in the United Kingdom or in the State of Tamil Nadu. The learned Judges as appearing from their judgments, have tacitly approached the question from the point of view of section 4(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, a provision which, as we have earlier pointed out, has pertinence only in inter-State controversies about the situs of sale or purchase. It might very well be open for us to draw a class parallel between section 4(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act and explanation (3) to section 2(n) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. Even so, we cannot apply the one for the other, when each is meant for a different fact-situation and to settle a different controversy. Be that as it may, for the reasons which we have rendered earlier, the petitioner s revision must be dismissed. We accordingly do so with costs. counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1983 (1) TMI 243
... ... ... ... ..... that basis. As we earlier indicated, we do not wish to decide the present case, although arising under parallel provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, on the lines on which the Gujarat High Court rested their decision in Mehta Brothers v. State of Gujarat 1979 43 STC 208. The argument of the learned counsel for the assessee in this case was more or less inspired by the Gujarat decision. But we rest our conclusion in this case on our own understanding of the scope and function of the exemption provision under section 8, the ambit of the entries in the Third Schedule, and the quite limited role of the rule-making power to prescribe an appropriate rule in this regard. For all the reasons stated above, we allow the tax revision case and direct the deletion of the sum of Rs. 32,063.81 from the assessee s assessment to sales tax for 1974-75 under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The State Government will pay the costs of the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1983 (1) TMI 242
... ... ... ... ..... the appellant (petitioner) has collected tax on his sale value of the goods at 5 per cent. If the assessee has, in addition to the sale value of the timber sold, collected the exact amount which he has paid on the value of the timber as sales tax at the time of his purchase, it would have been a different matter. But, here he has collected sales tax on his sales turnover and therefore, his plea that he is passing on the sales tax, which he has paid on his purchases, to his purchaser is not at all tenable. Since the assessee is found to have collected sales tax on his sales turnover, which is contrary to the provisions of the Act and which is specifically prohibited under section 22(1) and which is made a ground for levying penalty under section 22(2). The order of the assessing officer, levying penalty on the assessee, which has been upheld by the Tribunal, does not call for any interference. The revision is therefore dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1983 (1) TMI 241
... ... ... ... ..... hence they are newspapers. Such a registration does not advance the case of the assessee. This registration is for the purposes of the provisions of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. By virtue of such registration which has been done voluntarily by the assessee, the assessee cannot convert a publication which is not otherwise a newspaper into a newspaper. 9.. On behalf of the assessee it was also urged that because both these publications are daily publications, they should be considered as newspapers. In our view, in the the absence of any significant news content in these publications, the mere fact that the publications are brought out daily, has no relevance to the question before us. In the premises, we answer the question referred to us in each of these references in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The respondents will pay to the applicant the costs of these four references aggregating in all to Rs. 300.
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1983 (1) TMI 240
... ... ... ... ..... old it back to the newspaper for the use as newsprint in magazine, etc., where the size of the page is smaller. It is submitted by the counsel that by merely cutting the paper into a different size, the assessee did not become the manufacturer of the newsprint. The newsprint is subject to a single point taxation and it has already borne sales tax when it was purchased by the assessee from the newspaper. The assessee did not produce any commercially different commodity by cutting the newsprint into a smaller size. The assessee can in no case be considered as a manufacturer of different type of paper which would be subjected to tax. In this view of the matter the order of the Judge (Revisions) is not sustainable. In the result the revision is allowed, the impugned order in so far as it holds that the assessee was a manufacturer of writing paper to the extent of Rs. 85,000 is set aside and the matter will go back to the Tribunal under section 11(8) for making appropriate order.
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1983 (1) TMI 239
... ... ... ... ..... ortunity before the Sales Tax Officer to show that this accounts should be accepted. He further submits that no prejudice is caused to the assessee by the order of the Tribunal. The assessee was entitled as a matter of law to a decision of his appeal on merits. There has been no decision of the assessee s appeal on merits. The Tribunal has really allowed the appeal of the assessee because it was allowing the appeal of the department who wanted a fresh determination of the turnover instead of upholding the initial order of the Sales Tax Officer which was actually prayed for in the memorandum of revision. The Tribunal was bound in law to decide the assessee s appeal on merits. It has failed to do so. In this situation, there is no option but to allow this revision, set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal and direct the Tribunal to decide both the appeals of the assessee and the Commissioner afresh on merits. The assessee is entitled to his costs which I assess at Rs. 200.
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1983 (1) TMI 238
... ... ... ... ..... t of the bill amount represents the price of the tiles, while 25 per cent represents labour charges. It can as well be merely a convenient mode of collecting the amount under the bill. This case would have stood on a different footing, had any material been placed before the authorities to show that the price of tiles is 75 per cent, while 25 per cent of the bill amount relates to labour charges, as was done in Hindustan Tiles and Cement Industries v. State of Maharashtra 1975 36 STC 326. We are, therefore, unable to hold merely on the basis of mode of collection of bill amount mentioned in the bill that 75 per cent of the amount represents the price of the tiles, while 25 per cent represents the labour charges. For the above reasons, we are unable to hold that 75 per cent of the bill amount should be treated as sale amount and liable to sales tax. For the above reasons, these two T.R.Cs. too are allowed, but in the circumstances without costs. Advocates fee Rs. 200 in each.
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1983 (1) TMI 237
... ... ... ... ..... at 141). The same principle would apply to the marginal note appended to a rule. The rule expressly talks in clause (i) about excluding from the sale price the amount of tax separately collected while in clause (ii) it speaks of deducting from the sale price a sum calculated in accordance with the formula given in the table thereto. For the reasons set out above, we hold that in respect of the impugned transaction the sale price in respect of which the applicants became liable to pay sales tax was Rs. 14.46 and not Rs. 15.19 and as the sale price was less than Rs. 15 the sales tax payable by the applicants was at the rate of five paise in the rupee and not at the rate of ten paise in the rupee. In the result, we answer the question submitted to us in the negative, that is in favour of the assessee and against the department. The respondents will pay to the applicants the costs of this reference. The applicants will be entitled to a refund of the fee of Rs. 100 paid by them.
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1983 (1) TMI 236
... ... ... ... ..... possessed jurisdiction to enhance the rate of purchase tax from 3 percent to 5 per cent by reason of the retrospective operation of sub-section (2A) of section 14 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, as substituted with retrospective effect by the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment and Validating Provisions) Act, 1973 (Maharashtra Act No. 13 of 1973). Questions Nos. (3) and (4) The contravention of certificates in form 15 given by the applicants was in respect of purchases of the value of Rs. 3,52,597 and not Rs. 7,69,246. We do not give any further elaborate answer to question No. (3) and also do not answer question No. (4) in view of the statement made by Mr. Jetly on behalf of the department that the Commissioner of Sales Tax will give to the applicants relief by way of administrative measures under the Commissioner s circular dated 21st June, 1978. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. The applicants will be entitled to a refund of the fee of Rs. 100 paid by them.
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1983 (1) TMI 235
... ... ... ... ..... n utensils and they do not fall within this entry. The Additional Judge (Revisions) has, as a fact, found that they are so used and imposed tax on that basis. Once it is found that karahies which were admittedly made of cast iron and silica sand, are used for kitchen purposes, it must be held that it falls within item 83. Another argument advanced by the learned standing counsel is that karahies are not made up of pure iron but silica sand is mixed with iron and as such karahies cannot be considered to be an iron-made kitchen utensil. There is no evidence on record to indicate what is the proportion of the silica sand which is mixed with iron and this question has not been raised by the Commissioner before the Judge (Revisions). The question, therefore, cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in the revision. The order of the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, suffers from no error of law. In the result, the revision is dismissed. There will be no order as to
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1983 (1) TMI 234
... ... ... ... ..... benefit of section 4-B(1)(a) of the Act on the net total purchases of oil-seeds made by the assessee which are covered by the recognition certificate granted under section 4-B(1)(a) of the Act. Learned standing counsel urges that the assessee has committed a breach of the recognition certificate by effecting sales contrary to the requirements of law. If that be so, it would be open to the department to take action under the relevant provisions of law. That, however, does not mean that the assessee is not entitled to the benefit of section 4-B(1)(a) of the Act. In the result, the revision is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is partly set aside and it is declared that the assessee is entitled to the concessional rate of tax on his total purchase of oil-seeds in the proportion of 13.83 per cent. The papers will now go back in accordance with the provisions of section 11(8) of the Act to pass appropriate orders. The assessee is entitled to his costs which I assess at Rs. 200.
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1983 (1) TMI 233
... ... ... ... ..... of the contract and in the facts and circumstances of the case there was inter-State movement as a result of or in the execution of the contract of sale, it is in favour of revenue. So far as the second question is concerned for the reasons indicated above it must be held that inter-State movement of components was a part of the sale contract in question. So far as the third question is concerned, in view of the actual terms and provisions of section 3 and section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, in our opinion, there is no conflict between the two sections. The third question and the 4th question are therefore answered by saying that section 4 would not have application to the facts and circumstances of the case and there is no conflict between sections 3 and 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act. These questions are answered also in favour of the revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN, J.-I agree.
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