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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 241 Records
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1983 (1) TMI 182
Time limit of Show Cause Notice ... ... ... ... ..... ter indicated. This would also be true for duty demand for the period 1-11-1981 to 31-1-1982 covered by show cause notice dated 2-3-1982. (i) Duty demand for the period within limitation would be quantified under Tariff Item 68 (ii) Demands for duty for the goods would then be worked out under Tariff Item 15A(l)(ii). Demand raised against the appellants for the periods within limitation, as set out above, would not, in any case, exceed the duty demand that the appellants would have been liable to pay for the period under limitation if the goods were classifiable under Tariff Item 68. To be more explicit duty demands would be restricted to the periods within limitation and the amount that would have been quantifiable under Tariff Item 68 though they have to be worked out on the basis of Tariff Item 15A(l)(ii) of the Central Excise Tariff as it stood at the material time. Rest of the demand is set aside. The appeals are disposed of in the foregoing terms and are partly allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 179
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... ... ..... ken note of its earlier decision in (1980) 122 ITR 70 (SC). There is third aspect of the matter that the second floor of the property was for self occupation and it was so constructed to suit convenience of the assessee who is a medical practitioner. Therefore, no other person having not similar profession would be interested in taking those premises on rental basis. Therefore, we are of the view that the annual letting value shown by the assessee should be accepted. We accept the claim of the assessee and set aside the orders of the authorities below on that point. 15. Regarding the petrol expenses, the AAC for the asst. yrs. 1977-78 and 1978-79 restricted the disallowance to Rs. 500 and we restrict the disallowance for the years under consideration to Rs. 500 only. As regards the depreciation, the AAC has restricted to 1/4th for asst. yrs. 1977-78 and 1978-79, we restrict the depreciation to 1/4th for these years. Accordingly, the appeals of the assessee are partly allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 178
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... ... ..... eeds was accepted in the earlier years, the assessee gave the detail of his expenses per acre which was duly supported by the certificates issued by the two factories. I do appreciate that this piece of evidence was not before the ITO. I hold that the certificates are vital part to support the case of the assessee and the assessee has observed in his order lsquo the estimate of the expenses of the assessee has been supported by certificates issued by Yeshwant SSK Ltd., Akluj as well as Malinagar Sugar Factory. I have given full consideration to the assessee rsquo s contentions and I am inclined to accept the plea of the assessee that his profit on the sale of sugarcane would not be a ITO 40 . The AAC has given cogent reasoning as to why he has given reduction to the additions made by the ITO. Since I accept the reasoning of the AAC, I find no merit in the assessment departmental appeals and accordingly the order of the AAC is upheld and the departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1983 (1) TMI 177
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... ... ..... hri Sathe tried to make out a case that the facts in the subsequent year are different. The only fact recorded in the assessment year is that the sales in subsequent year were made to Bombay and which required double polishing. But in the assessment records, the ITO has himself noted that in other cases a yield of 64 to 65 is accepted as correct. We do not see way that courtsey should not be extended to the assessee. 11. We may also mention that the ITO rsquo s thesis is that the assessee realised that for the first period the yield shown was excessive and therefore he wanted to make full use of it by reducing the yield for the subsequent period. Now this assumes that on 11th September, 1974 the assessee took complete stock of the situation and found that the yield was high. We, therefore, cannot hold that the assessee rsquo s attempt in reducing the yield for the subsequent year was with such a motivation. 12. In the result, the addition is deleted and the appeal is allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 170
Discretionary Trust, Net Wealth ... ... ... ... ..... ies owed by him are deducted. In the present case also since the assessments are to be made as if the trust belongs to an individual, the liabilities of the individual, namely, the amounts which are to be distributed to the beneficiaries, have to be allowed. In the income-tax assessment, the income earned by the trust is assessed according to the provisions of section 164 of the Act. The income distributed by the trustees to the beneficiaries will be application of income of the trust and are, therefore, not allowed as deduction. But this is not so in the case of wealth-tax. In wealth-tax, the incomes so distributable will become liabilities and have to be deducted from the net wealth. Further in income-tax assessments, there is no provision to deduct the income distributed from the income earned by the trust as in the ease of assessment on executors where there is a provision, namely, section 168(4) of the Act. 6. In the result the appeals filed by the revenue are dismissed.
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1983 (1) TMI 168
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... ... ..... he assessments for earlier years also have been made on the same basis. Morever it is not possible for the revenue to state that this particular fact has not been taken into account by the ITO except speculating that if further weight had been given to this fact the resultant determination of the income from property might have been higher. This would mean that s. 263 is being invoked only for reviewing the decision of the ITO on the facts that are already on record. In our opinion, s. 263 does not allow a review of the decision of the ITO as such but in circumstances it would be revision only in cases where the finding of the ITO can be established to be erroneous. As we have stated above, the expression lsquo erroneous rsquo has to be understood as erroneous in law and since the determination of the income from property has not been established to be revised u/s. 263. We, therefore, cancel the order made by the Commissioner u/s. 263. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 166
Assessment Year, Revocable Transfer, Revocable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... any right of re-assumption of power over the income or assets. Since even without clause 22, section 83 of the Indian Trusts Act would operate and the result of the operation would be the same, namely, trustees holding the property for the benefit of the settlor, i.e., the assessee before us, we are unable to see that such a situation is brought about when a clause to the same effect had been introduced in the settlement deed by calling it a transfer made within the meaning of section 63. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view canvassed on behalf of the department that the assessee in this case had created a revocable trust so as to attract the provisions of section 63(a)(ii). The Commissioner, in our opinion, is not justified in directing the ITO to include in the assessments of the assessee the income arising to the trusts of M. C. Shymala Marriage Benefit Trust and M.S. Sowmiyaram Marriage Benefit Trust. We vacate his direction and accept the assessee s appeals.
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1983 (1) TMI 164
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... ... ..... in the circumstances of the case. But that would only mean that the WTO had not given due weight to one of the evidence before him in coming to the conclusion. If the WTO is required to reconsider his opinion by giving due weight to that piece of evidence, it would only mean that he is reviewing his decision on the basis of the same facts already on record. It has been held by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Simon Carves Ltd. 1976 CTR (SC) 418 (1976) 105 ITR 212 (SC) that the statute enabling the reassessment does not enable the assessing authority to review a decision based on the same materials already considered in the original assessment. In the circumstances we are of the considered opinion that though the initiation of reassessments may be valid, the reassessments themselves were invalid because they were not authorised by the powers conferred by s. 17(1)(b) of the WT Act. Therefore, for different reasons we have to confirm the orders of the AAC. The appeals are dismissed.
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1983 (1) TMI 162
Appellate Authority, Assessment Year, Best Judgment Assessment, Time Limit For Completion ... ... ... ... ..... s not made a return, and the validity of the notice would be a vital consideration in determining the validity of such an assessment made under section 144 in default of a return. . . . So it is clear that the best judgment assessment was void. The unnecessary appellate proceedings against it do not confer life to that void assessment. So all those have to be ignored. Therefore it follows that all appellate proceedings against it have also to be ignored. The assessee had furnished a return on 26-12-1975. That is to be construed as a return under section 139(4). Therefore, the assessment had to be completed by 30-3-1977. So the assessment made on 26-5-1981 is barred by limitation. The application by the assessee to the Settlement Commission also will not in this context help the department because that petition was furnished only on 19-11-1977, a few months after the assessment got barred by time. So that application has also to be ignored. 6. Departmental appeal is dismissed.
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1983 (1) TMI 159
Foreign Exchange, Market Value ... ... ... ... ..... orities are not justified in rejecting the contention of the assessee. The point regarding the extent of depression in the value of the property has to be considered by the Wealth-tax Officer keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case and also the decision of the Mysore High Court cited wherein 25 per cent discount has been upheld. Since both the parties have expressed a desire that the matter should be restored to the Wealth-tax Officer for reconsideration, we direct the Wealth-tax Officer to go into this matter in accordance with law. We would, following the earlier order of the Tribunal mentioned above, restore the matter to the WTO for considering the matter afresh and since the matter is going back to him, it would be open to the WTO to consider which he must do, all the other submissions of the assessee in regard to the method or basis of computation of the value of the property in other respects also. 6. In the result, the appeal is treated as allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 156
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... ... ..... larified that the legal position would be the same even in a case where a lump sum payment is made to the retiring partner without taking accounts of the firm. In his view of the matter and contrary decision given by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Tribhuvandas G. Patel wherein it made a distinction between an adhoc payment and a payment after ascertaining the net share in the partnership, was not approved by the Hon rsquo ble Madras High Court. Recently the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. L. Raghu Kumar has also held likewise and specifically referred to the contrary decisions of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tribhuvandas G. Patel and CIT vs. Aslot (H.R.) cited supra, but dissented therefrom. 8. In view of the factual position stated in the relevant clause of deed of retirement and the judicial exposition of law by various High Courts, we uphold the order of the CIT(A) as it is quite justified. 9. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1983 (1) TMI 154
Assessment Year, Set On ... ... ... ... ..... o be carried forward was a formality which was not a necessary part of the assessment order for the year. There was no justification for setting aside the assessment as there was no prejudice even initially in respect of this assessment. Hence, even this order setting aside the assessment cannot stand. We will, however, like to observe that the foot-note even if treated as direction by the ITO to his successor as regards future unabsorbed allowances and the losses to be carried forward cannot bind the authorities in a later year. Such an observation on our part is, however, unnecessary, but made with a view to point out that the apprehension of the authorities as to the possible effect of these orders in later years is not justified. Under the circumstances, we cancel the order of the Commissioner for this year also. 7. In the result, both the appeals are allowed. The orders of the Commissioner are set aside in the light of what we have stated in the preceding two paragraphs.
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1983 (1) TMI 152
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... ... ..... . 1,05,818 was apportioned to Ruby General Insurance Co., but as the risk was not fully covered of the goods with this company, a settlement arrived at that it would honour the partial claim of Rs. 40,000 only. There is nothing on record to show that Ruby General Insurance Company ever agreed to pay the full claim of Rs. 1,05,818. On these facts, the AAC was not right in rejecting the claim of the assessee merely because it was not made a partly in the civil suit. The suit having been filed in the year 1968 in the High Court and that having been withdrawn during the year under appeal, it clearly appears that the assessee made all earnest efforts to recover the amount from the Insurance company and when there was no ray of hope of recover, then alone the impugned amount was written off during the year under appeal. I accept the claim of the assessee un-hesitatingly. The Income-tax Officer is directed to allow the bad debt of Rs. 69,039 to the assessee. . The appeal is allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 150
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... ... ..... estion for consideration is whether the assessee had acquired any enforceable right in the year under appeal. The High Court passed the order pending the writ in the first instance at 3rd Oct 1974 permitting the assessee to sell the stock at the enhanced rate subject to the condition that the excess amount would remain in deposit with the Collector and a separate account will be maintained by the assessee therefore. It clearly shows that the assessee had not acquired an enforceable right during the year under appeal to get the amount, which was deposited with Collector. The assessee having not acquired the impugned amount during the year under appeal, which according to the Madhya Pradesh High Court is embedded in the concept of accrual of income. I hold that the ITO was not right in bringing the difference of the old and new rate to tax in the year under appeal. The question in which year the said amount is taxable, is besides the point. 3. The appeal is, therefore, allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 149
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... ... ..... Civil Procedure Code having not been satisfied, I hold that the AAC was wrong in concluding that the notice had been duly served on the assessee. The requisites of Order 5, r.17 are that in case of refusal for the notice by the assessee that should be duly affixed on either the business or the residential premises. In the instant case, the case of the revenue is that when the notice was refused in the presence of Shri Phool Chand by the assessee, the same was affixed by the notice server on the business premises of the assessee. The AAC is wrong in observing that affixation of the notice is not necessary after its refusal by the assessee. Neither the refusal nor the proper affixation has been proved in this case and I, therefore, agree with Shri Ranka, ld. counsel for the assessee that the assessment made by the ITO was invalid, as not valid assessment could be made without proper service of the notice u/s 148. The assessment is, therefore, quashed. 2. The appeal is allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 148
Appeal Before AAC ... ... ... ... ..... ommissioner (Appeals) will naturally register the appeal as a fresh one but since the assessee has preferred the appeal before the learned AAC on 11-3-1980 and within the prescribed period of limitation under the provisions of the Act and since the assessee has been prosecuting the said appeal, in good faith, bona fidely and on the advice of the ITO as per statutory Form No. 7 notice of demand and since no mala fides are attributable on the part of the assessee, the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) shall be taken to have been filed in time because the delay qua this appeal being registered in the office of the Commissioner (Appeals), Indore, stands condoned in view of the facts narrated above. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) will decide the appeal on merits, in accordance with the law, of course, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee as also to the ITO. 11. The net result is that the appeal by the assessee succeeds and stands allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 147
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... ... ..... income from SOP was disclosed at Rs. 200 and same was accepted by the department. I may point out that for determining the income from SOP the only rent paid for the property is not conclusive evidence of the value, though actual rent might serve as an indication as to what a hypothetical tenant can afford to pay but no more. 7. In the present case, it is not the case of the department that annual value of the property in question determined by the Municipal Authorities is less than the value which may be determined by the Rent Controller as standard rent. The SOP income was taken at Rs. 200. In the subsequent year it was taken by the department at Rs. 164 only. In this year the department did not bring on record any fresh material for increasing income from SOP. 8. Looking to the aforesaid facts and evidence on the record the declared income from SOP should be accepted. Accordingly it is accepted. The addition in question is deleted. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 146
Protective Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... both the years under consideration was earned by both the assessees. There is no material on record till this date that the disputed income belongs to somebody else. 14. The learned AAC while deciding the appeals pointed out that in the present cases the assessees were not aggrieved because the assessments were completed on protective basis. In my opinion, this finding is legally not correct. The ITO has clearly held that the said income belongs to somebody else. Against that order, the appeals were preferred. Under the circumstances, it is quite clear that the appellants before the AAC were aggrieved. 15. Looking to the aforesaid facts and evidence on record, in my opinion, the finding of the learned AAC, in all the years under consideration, is not legally maintainable. It is also not supported by evidence on record. Accordingly, it is set aside. The ITO is directed to treat all the four assessments as substantive assessments. 16. In the result, all the appeals are allowed.
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1983 (1) TMI 145
Business Expenditure, Sale Proceeds, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... y. Under such circumstances the authorities below disallowed the claim made by the assessee. Inasmuch as the price insurance account does not represent a liability to third party who is a creditor of the appellant and inasmuch as the funds had remained with the assessee-company itself representing a reserve for future contingencies, the authorities below were of the view that it does not represent availability which accrued in the year or an enforceable debt by a third party against the appellant. Considering the facts arising in this case, we are of the view that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) on this point. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with his order on this point. 20. The last ground raised by the assessee is with regard to interest under section 215 of the Act. This was not pressed before us. 21. In the result, the appeal filed by the department is dismissed while the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed in part.
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1983 (1) TMI 144
Assessment Year, Rate Of Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... to be retrospective. We are mentioning this merely to point out that the test for interpreting a provision as regards the question of retrospectivity is not different as between income-tax and sales tax cases. No doubt, the Courts have consistently drawn the general inference that all notifications imposing a liability should be presumed to be only prospective. Even so, if the intention to make it retrospective is expressly or impliedly evident, it could well be retrospective. The law for relief cannot be different. Though the words at once do not ordinarily indicate retrospectivity and, therefore, cannot possibly apply to all pending assessments, in our opinion, it clearly indicates that it will apply for the assessment year itself as otherwise it will have no meaning. We are, therefore, of the view that the assessee s claim has to be allowed and it is accordingly allowed. The ITO is directed to rework the depreciation at 40 per cent. 4. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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