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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 209 Records
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1983 (4) TMI 243
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... ... ..... fficer, Kurnool, is clearly without jurisdiction as he cannot collect the compounding fee from the dealer outside his territorial jurisdiction. Under section 32, the compounding fee can only be collected by the prescribed authority. Under rule 59, all officers not below the rank of an Assistant Commercial Tax Officer are empowered to compound and collect the compounding fee. But this power has to be exercised by the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer only within his territorial jurisdiction and not outside. No provision has been brought to our notice under which an Assistant Commercial Tax Officer can collect compounding fee from a dealer who is outside his territorial jurisdiction. Further, the action of the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer in collecting compounding fee of Rs. 3,000 is also illegal, as the case is not covered by section 32(1)(a) but by section 32(1)(b). In the result, all the writ petitions are allowed as prayed for with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each.
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1983 (4) TMI 242
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... ... ..... as occasioned. To put it differently, it is the sale which had occasioned the import which is relevant and decisive. It might be that while the assessees brought about these transactions between Ashok Leyland, U.K., and the actual consumers, they are incidentally honouring their contract entered into long before, but as long as it is the subsequent transaction between Ashok Leyland, U.K., and the actual users which has occasioned the import, the earlier contract between the assessee and the U.K., the foreign seller will have no impact on the subsequent transactions. We reiterate that in all these thirteen transactions, the assessees were only acting as agents of the actual users. Thus, we have no doubt that on the facts in this case, the sales are deemed to be in the course of import, and therefore, not exigible to tax, as contended by the revenue. In the end, we hold all the points against the revenue and dismiss the tax revision case. However, we make no order as to costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 241
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... ... ..... e final assessment, for the previous years in which the sales had taken place and in respect of which relief had been claimed. In the present case the sales in respect of which relief is claimed under section 13(5) took place in the years 1972-73 and 1973-74 and there have been final assessment for those years. But the relief under section 13(5) has been claimed only in the year 1974-75 in respect of sales took place in 1972-73 and 1973-74. Having regard to the provision in rule 5-13, the assessees should have made a claim before the date of the final assessment in relation to 1972-73 and 1973-74 or within six months from the date of the sales whichever is later. The application in the present case having been filed beyond the period of six months and also beyond the date of the final assessment for 1972-73 and 1973-74, we have to agree with the Tribunal that the claim is not sustainable under rule 5-B. The tax case is therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 240
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... ... ..... deemed to consume paddy once they subject it to the process of dehusking at their mills and produce rice from it and as such they will be liable to pay Bharat on the paddy brought inside the limits of the notified area, R.S. Pura, for dehusking at their respective mills, irrespective of the fact whether the resultant rice is intended to be sold within or outside the limits of the notified area. Consequently the petitioners cannot escape the liability merely because the rice produced from the paddy dehusked at their mills inside the notified. area is forwarded for sale to Jammu. The argument to the contrary must fail. The result, therefore, is that these writ petitions fail. They are dismissed accordingly. The interim order is hereby vacated in each of these cases. The respondent-committee shall be at liberty to recover the arrears of tax falling due under such order from the respective petitioner or his surety or both. There shall be no order as to costs. KOTWAL, J.-I agree.
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1983 (4) TMI 239
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... ... ..... ons. We have gone through the orders passed by the authorities. They have given cogent reasons for holding that the petitioners failed to prove that they did not collect turnover tax or surcharge as part of the price. In all these cases, the petitioners concerned deposited the tax and also submitted returns showing their liability for payment of turnover tax or surcharge. This circumstances was rightly held to raise a presumption that the petitioners had collected the turnover tax or surcharge. In any case, the findings reached by the authorities concerned are findings of fact and do not suffer from any apparent error of law. In Misc. Petition No. 468 of 1980, there is an appeal pending on the merits of assessment, and therefore, we refrain from deciding whether the petitioner in that petition collected or did not collect turnover tax or surcharge. 9.. All the petitions fail and are dismissed but without any order as to costs. Security amounts be refunded to the petitioners.
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1983 (4) TMI 238
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... ... ..... ections before the Commercial Taxes Officer against the show cause notice and can pursue his remedies of appeal and revision available under the Act. According to the petitioner s own showing he had gone in appeal against the order of the Commercial Taxes Officer dated 20th May, 1982, for the assessment year 1973-74 and has been given relief by the Deputy Commissioner as such also no distinction can be made with regard to the assessment year in question, i.e., 1977-78, in respect of which the present writ petition has been filed. Merely because any question of law has been raised, the petitioner is not entitled to by-pass the remedy provided in the Act and to approach this Court against the issuing of show cause notice under section 12 of the Act. In view of these circumstances, this writ petition fails on the ground of alternative and efficacious remedy available to the petitioner under the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 237
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... ... ..... The petitioner explained in his affidavit that after the Supreme Court judgment was reported on 15th February, 1977, he approached the auditor and then obtained certified copies of the assessment order which was filed in the appeal and for a certified copy of the order in the appeal which he could not find. Before us it was not seriously contended that the explanation was not proper. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of the judgment of the Supreme Court in McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1977 39 STC 151 (SC) and that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in these impugned assessment orders and the respective appellate orders. They are liable to be quashed as there is no unreasonable delay in invoking article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 each.
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1983 (4) TMI 236
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... ... ..... arnishees, to the extent they hold or become due to the assessee, are liable to pay the amounts due to the State. For these reasons, the garnishee notices issued by the CTO cannot be interfered with by this Court. 26.. In the light of my above discussion, I make the following orders and directions (a) I reject the challenge of the petitioners to the notice dated 6th October, 1977 (exihibit A), and the notices dated 2nd January, 1978 (exhibits C to H), issued by the CTO and dismiss their writ petition to that extent. (b) I prohibit the respondent from initiating recovery proceedings against the petitioners without issuing them proper notices of demand under the Act to the extent of the assets of the deceased in their hands. 27.. Writ petition is disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the case, 1 direct the parties to bear their own costs. 28.. Let a copy of this order be furnished to the learned High Court Government Pleader within 10 days from this day.
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1983 (4) TMI 235
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... ... ..... proceedings would, in the eye of law, be deemed to have been continued without service of the notice of demand and the assessment orders. Such recovery proceedings are without jurisdiction ab initio. They are liable to be quashed. It has been stated in the petition that the respondents coerced the petitioners to pay Rs. 7,379.90. This allegation has been denied. The counter-affidavit says that the petitioners paid the sum voluntarily. First, any voluntary payment against a legitimate demand cannot possibly be directed to be refunded and in the next place, the allegation of undue influence and coercion having been denied, no relief under article 226 of the Constitution can be given on the basis of disputed facts. In the result, the writ petition succeeds in part and is accordingly allowed. The recovery proceedings for the assessment years 1956-57 and 1957-58 only are quashed. The other relief is refused. In view of the divided success, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 234
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... ... ..... ly, which they would sell at the rate of Rs. 10 or more per kilogram. Their liability to pay sales tax at the rate of 4 per cent remained till 31st March, 1978. But, from 1st April, 1978, onwards, they became liable to pay it at the rate of 7 per cent, irrespective of the price at which their goods were sold, provided their annual turnover exceeded Rs. 1,00,000. From what has been stated heretofore, Writ Petition No. 37 of 1978 titled Mangat Ram v. State of Jammu and Kashmir is dismissed. All other petitions are allowed, but only to the extent they challenge the notices issued to the petitioners to submit their accounts for the years preceding 1st April, 1978, and all such notices are by a writ of certiorari quashed. The respondents are by a writ of prohibition restrained from charging any sales tax from halwais for any period prior to 1st April, 1978. In the circumstances of the case, the parties in all these writ petitions are left to bear their own costs. MIR, J.-I agree.
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1983 (4) TMI 233
The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs had not been able to prove any linkage or connection between Ramruch Singh and Bansidhar Singh. But the majority of the High Court held that all the links were clearly proved by the plaintiffs and that it had been found to their satisfaction that Ramruch was the son of Bansidhar. It also held that Ex. J which was an entry made by a Public Officer in a register in the discharge of his official duties squarely falls within the four corners of section 35 of the Evidence Act and, is therefore, admissible in evidence. The appellants however, claimed that it was not admissible in evidence. - HELD: In a hotly contested point, there is a tendency on the part of an interested person or a party in order to grab, establish or prove an alleged claim, to concoct, fabricate or procure false genealogy to suit their ends. In relying on the genealogy put forward, courts must guard themselves against falling into the trap laid by a series of documents or a labyrinth of seemingly old genealogies to support their rival claims.
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1983 (4) TMI 232
The assessees, manufacturers of automobile trucks, supplied raw materials like sheets, rods and other iron and steel materials to ancillary products manufacturers of their required component parts and made debit notes against such ancillary industries in respect of the supply of raw materials and credit notes after delivery of finished components and the raw materials were shown not in terms of weight but in terms of cost of materials in debit notes and made payments for services rendered:
Held, that there was no element of sale in the transaction between the assessee and the ancillary products manufacturers and they were only works contracts. The fact that the debit notes carried entries either in weight or in terms of money with reference to the raw materials was an immaterial factor when ultimately the finished products came back to the assessees.
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1983 (4) TMI 231
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... 972 42 Comp. Cas. 125 (SC), the respondent company must place sufficient material before this court in proof of the tenability of its defence in a civil suit. In this case, no such material has been placed except the plea in the written statements, which, to my mind, appear to be vague and not tenable. The company court exercises a special jurisdiction and as the provision for winding up is made in public interest, the court cannot overlook it. In my opinion, public interest served outweighs the harm that may be caused to the respondent-company, if the advertisement is ordered. . I, therefore, direct that the petition be advertised in accordance with law. The petitioner shall cause to advertise the same in Deccan Herald of Bangalore, the Indian Express of Bangalore and the Times of India, Bombay, before April 30, 1983. The date of further hearing is fixed as June 3, 1983. The office will put up all connected applications and other petitions for further orders on June 3, 1983.
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1983 (4) TMI 230
Board’s sanction to be required for certain contracts in which directors are interested ... ... ... ... ..... e from the limited company. No written statement has been filed nor any opposition has been entered to this writ petition despite service. Mr. Ramesh Kumar, counsel for the petitioner, has sought to sustain the afore-mentioned ground from the ratio of a Division Bench decision, of this court in Surinder Nath Khosla v. Excise and Taxation Commissioner Punjab 1964 15 STC 838 (P and H). This court in Surinder Nath Khosla s case held that unless the statute in question made the managing director of a company personally liable for the dues recoverable from the company, he could not be held personally responsible. Neither in the company law nor in the Industrial Disputes Act does any provision making the managing director personally liable for recovery of dues against the limited company exist. In view of the above, I hold that the direction contained in annexure P-4 is clearly illegal and the same is, therefore, quashed. The writ petition is allowed, but with no order as to costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 213
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... or the last seven years. The interest of the parties will be safeguarded if the opposite parties are directed not to transfer the disputed shares during the pendency of the petition. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties also stated that they have no intention of transferring these shares. The result is that the appeals succeed partly. The judgment of the learned single judge dated December 22, 1982, to the extent indicated below is modified. The application for injunction made by the petitioner, K. K. Somani, is allowed to the extent that opposite parties Nos. 2, 3 and 5 are restrained from transferring shares held by the late H.K. Somani and Smt. Ratan Devi Somani. They are further restrained from transferring 36,900 shares purchased from Steel Enterprises P. Ltd. In other respects, the application for injunction is rejected. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs. Interim stay orders passed in these three special appeals are vacated.
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1983 (4) TMI 212
Name of Charitable or other company – Power to dispense with 'Limited' in ... ... ... ... ..... cannot under any circumstances be treated as a local authority, whatever may be its autonomous position and whatever may be the background, viz., that it was getting privilege to send representatives to the Legislative Assembly, because under no circumstances it can be conceived that it is a public administrative agency or a Corporation having been vested with quasi-governmental powers and authorised to administer revenue-producing public enterprise. In that view of the matter, I am unable to accept the contention tried to be advanced by Mr. Dutt. In these circumstances, as the petitioners are challenging the action of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, such a challenge is not maintainable in this forum as I have already held that the Bengal Chamber of Commerce is not a State within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution. In that view of the matter, this application is summarily dismissed on the ground as not maintainable in this forum. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 196
Meetings and proceedings – Explanatory statement to be annexed to notice, Director number of, Directors - Right of person other than retiring director to stand for directorship
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1983 (4) TMI 195
Penalty for wrongful with holding of property ... ... ... ... ..... trate should have extended the period of limitation. Before leaving the case we may observe that the company had filed an application under section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for special leave to appeal against the impugned order dated 7th May, 1982. There was an objection by the office that no appeal is competent against an order of discharge. The admitting Bench was prima facie of the view that in summons case an order of discharge tantamounts to an order of acquittal and consequently granted leave to appeal. The Bench had left it open to the respondent to object to the competency of the appeal, but the competency of the appeal has not been challenged before us. For the reasons recorded we allow the appeal and send the case back to the learned trial Magistrate to proceed further in accordance with law. The parties shall appear before the court on 3rd May, 1983. Nothing hereinbefore said shall be taken to be an expression of view on the merits of the complaint.
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1983 (4) TMI 179
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... ral shaft ball bearings do not have a bore as they have an integral shaft fixed at the place where the bore should have been. When they do not have a bore, the question of their having a bore diameter does not arise. It is not permissible to ignore the actual condition of the goods imported and assess them on the basis of some deemed condition. Since the subject goods do not fulfil the requirements of sub-heading (2), there is no scope to invoke the Interpretative Rule 3(c) and since by common agreement the goods are bearings, they fall squarely under sub-heading (1) of Heading 84.62. When an appropriate heading for the goods themselves is available in the Tariff, the question of invoking the Interpretative Rule 4 to search for some other heading appropriate to the akin goods does not arise. We, therefore, hold that the subject spindle bearings were correctly classifiable under Heading 84.62(1). 6. Accordingly, we allow this appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1983 (4) TMI 178
Classification of an item of technical nature ... ... ... ... ..... Legislature does not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geologists, or botanists. This would, in a nut-shell, illustrate the circumstances in which rules of construction could be invoked and one rule of construction which would be very relevant and germane in a particular set of circumstances would not apply in a case involving totally different factors and, if so applied may perhaps lead to an absurd result. 11. As for the argument of the learned Departmental Representative about the view taken at the Collector rsquo s Conference held in January, 1979 classifying Dynafax Camera (Model 350) under Tariff Heading 90.07, we would only like to observe in passing that so far as this Tribunal is concerned, it would have no binding effect. 12. In the light of the foregoing, we are in favour of taking a view which would give the benefit of classification of Dynafax Camera under Heading 90.08 of the CTA. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
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