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Showing 21 to 40 of 167 Records
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1983 (5) TMI 252
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... ... ..... val from the Customs area, vests in the Port Trust. The appellants had been repeatedly contending that 11 out of 24 bundles on which duty was paid had not been delivered by the Port Trust as they had been pilferred. Under Section 13, if any imported goods are pilferred before the proper officer has made an order for clearance, the importer is not liable to pay the duty leviable, except where such goods are restored to him after pilferage. We are unable to appreciate the Department’s contention that no enquiry was necessary either from the Port Trust or the Police Authorities, to verify the contentions of the appellants. It would not have been difficult at all to ascertain the correct position so that the claim could be decided one way or the other. We, therefore, now direct that necessary enquiries be made by the Assistant Collector with the Port Trust and Police Authorities in respect of the alleged pilferage and the refund claim be disposed of in accordance with law.
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1983 (5) TMI 251
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... ... ..... mported was initially on the department, the circumstances proved in this case in our opinion, sufficiently discharged that initial burden. When the department has satisfactorily discharged the initial burden rested on it, the burden shifts to the appellant to establish that his possession was innocent. The appellant, in our opinion, has failed to discharge that burden. The totality of facts proved in this case, is enough to raise the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and that the silver in question had been illegally imported into the country. The Dy. Collector and the Appellate Collector in our opinion, did not proceed on suspicion or surmises. There were several circumstances from which inferences could very well be made that the silver had been imported after the law passed in 1948 restricting its entry. 14. After careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances, we hold that there is no merit in this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the same.
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1983 (5) TMI 250
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... ... ..... ther file five separate appeals against the five assessment orders with the requisite court fee stamp etc. or restricting the scope of the single appeal filed before him to one of the assessment orders in dispute. We are, therefore, inclined to remit the matter back to the Appellate Collector for taking appropriate action in the light of this observation. Shri Basu on behalf of the appellants and Shri Saha on behalf of the Department have no objection to this course. We, therefore, direct that the matter be remitted back to the Appellate Collector who shall dispose of the appeal in the light of the observation contained hereinbefore and after giving the appellants an option to file five separate appeals or to restrict the single appeal to one assessment order in dispute, and thereafter, dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. The Appellate Collector shall dispose of the matter on merits without reference to the question of time limit in view of our directions as above.
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1983 (5) TMI 249
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... ... ..... for the department, did not dispute the above statement of facts. If there has been no final assessment and if the assessment has been made provisionally, there is no scope to reject the application for refund on the ground of it being barred by limitation. It cannot be said that there is an order of assessment finally made in the instant case. The explanation to Section 27 makes it very clear that the period of six months shall have to be computed from the date of adjustment of duty after the final assessment when the duty is paid provisionally under Section 18 ibid. The authorities below have not verified the above contention of the appellants. 4. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed by the Assistant Collector and the Appellate Collector and remand the case to the Assistant Collector for the verification of the contention of the appellants and for passing orders in accordance with law in the light of the observations contained in this order.
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1983 (5) TMI 248
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... ... ..... 1. In this case the Appellant, admittedly, went to the Customs and declared his goods and also paid duty on some of the items under the Baggage Rules. Request for detention was made and re-export allowed in respect of one gold Kara. There is no reason why such a request was not made in respect of the gold bar in question as well. 12. In terms of the decision of the High Court of Madras, a request under Section 80 of the Customs Act to detain the goods for subsequent re-export shows a passenger’s intention not to import the same if the goods are prohibited. In the instant matter, it has not been shown to us that the passenger after making entry of the goods by way of declaration simultaneously and immediately asked for re-export of the same. On the contrary, it has been stated that the gold bar was intended to make ornaments after being cleared from the Customs. 13. In the result, we see no reason to interfere with the orders below. We dismiss the appeal.
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1983 (5) TMI 247
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... ... ..... preme Court’s decision. Besides, there was no evidence or suggestion before the lower authorities that the Ore was roasted or treated with any chemicals or subjected to a process which would make it a “manufactured” chemical as distinct from a “mined” product or metallic ore. It had not ceased to ore merely because it had been converted in the form of powder. The contention now raised by Shri Jain before us is a new argument which cannot be taken into consideration. 8. There is also order dated 3-3-1972 by the Government of India in which Battery Grade Manganese Dioxide was also held classifiable under Item No. 26 of the I.C.T. and not Item No. 28 of the I.C.T. This would further weaken the case of the Department. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the lower authorities and direct that Manganese Dioxide be classified under Item 26 of the I.C.T. as it then stood and consequential refund.
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1983 (5) TMI 246
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... ... ..... true it according to its plain language and not on any priori consideration.” In an another decision the Supreme Court in the case of Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh - AIR 1973 S.C. 1034 - has held that the Explanation can sometime even widen the scope of main provision. Keeping in view these decisions of the Supreme Court it is clear that the Explanation added to the Central Excise Rules cannot be treated merely of clarificatory nature but has to be treated a substantive provision. The departmental contention that when an Explanation is added by way of amendment, it should be taken as merely clarifying the position as it originally stood prior to such addition, was negatived in toto by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Neelam Prints v. Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise - 1982 E.L.T. 895 when the Hon’ble Court held that an amendment will only be prospective in its operation even though an Explanation is added by such an amendment.
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1983 (5) TMI 245
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... ... ..... se notice the Rule mentioned in support of the demand is 10(1)(a) suggesting that the proviso to the Rule by which the time-limit could be extended up to 5 years instead of the normal 6 months was invoked. However, there is no material at all in the show-cause notice and the corrigendum alleging any suppression of facts or mis-statement justifying the extension of the time-limit under the Rule to 5 years. We have already observed that the classification lists give full information and he Department has not established that there is any suppression of facts or mis-statement by the appellant. Therefore, we agree with the submission of the Appellant that it is only the normal time limit that applies and not the extended time limit provided in the proviso to Rule 10 C.E. Rules. 5. In the circumstances, we hold that the demand was time-barred. As a result, the appeal is allowed on this ground. In view of this, we do not consider it necessary to examine issues (ii) and (iii).
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1983 (5) TMI 244
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... ... ..... f Notification No. 99/66, dated 17-6-1966 but the duty is paid and the appellants take proforma credit of the duty, thus paid on optical bleaching agent. Notification No. 99/66, dated 17-6-1966 is not thus applicable to the optical bleaching agent in the hands of the appellant. The levy of basic duty and auxiliary duty is therefore quite in order and they cannot provide any argument to the appellant for deciding the issue in their favour as contended. However, as we observed above, this position is not relevant for deciding the matter under appeal. As held by us above, the credit is available but in view of these circumstances, we set aside the orders of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise Division F’ and the Appellate Collector of Central Excise and direct that the amount of proforma credit of auxiliary duty paid on optical bleaching agent be allowed to be utilised for payment of basic duty on O.S.A.A. manufactured by the appellants. This appeal is thus allowed.
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1983 (5) TMI 243
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... ... ..... r of Central Excise, Chandrapur, interpreting that sodium sulphate should go directly into the manufacture of paper. We further find that the definition of manufacture under Section 2(f) includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. Therefore, when even incidental and ancillary processes have been included in the definition of manufacture, there would be no justification for excluding an essential process from the aforesaid definition. We further accept the learned Advocate’s Shri Hidayatullah’s contention that the term manufacture’ in Notification No. 201/79, dated 4-6-1979 has to be interpreted on the basis of its definition in the parent statute. This being so we are satisfied that sodium sulphate is used in the manufacture of paper in the respondents’ factory. Accordingly, we find that there is no merit in the appeal filed by the Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Dn. Chandrapur and we dismiss the same.
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1983 (5) TMI 242
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... ... ..... Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, already paid on the raw material or component parts used in the manufacture of such goods. In other words, it has been made clear that for the purpose of computing special excise duty, the duty of excise chargeable on any excisable goods should be computed with reference to any exemption notification issued by the Central Government in relation to such goods but not any notification which provides for giving credit or reduction of duty of excise equivalent to the duty of excise or countervailing duty of customs already paid on the “Inputs”. This provision obviously takes effect only from 1-3-1983 and would have no application to the past period. In the result, the appellants’ contentions are tenable. The Orders of the lower authorities are set aside and the appeal is allowed. The Assistant Collector is directed to grant consequential relief to the appellants within two months from the date of communication of this order.
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1983 (5) TMI 241
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... ... ..... Others (1981) E.L.T. 147 - Bom.) are worth being reiterated. The Court observed “It is well settled that where the adjudicating authorities, be they in customs matters or excise matters, have preferred one of two possible meanings or placed a product in one category which could perhaps be better placed in another, the Court ordinarily ought not to interfere. However, if the adjudicating authorities have given a strained meaning to an expression used in ordinary parlance or acted in a manner not warranted by settled rules of interpretation then the Court has not merely the right to interfere but also a duty.” 9. It is hoped that the adjudicating authorities would keep in view these observations and display a greater awareness of the need to tailor their orders to meet the ends of justice without approaching their solemn task in a casual or cavalier manner. 10. We, therefore, have no hesitation in allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned order.
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1983 (5) TMI 240
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... ... ..... be determined in relation to the base fabrics which are impregnated, coated or laminated. In providing so, the said proviso reads as under “Provided that in the case of embroidery in the piece, in strips or in motifs, fabrics impregnated, coated or laminated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials, and fabrics covered partially or fully with textile flocks or with preparations containing textile flocks, such predominance or percentages, as the case may be, shall be in relation to the base fabrics which are embroidered or impregnated, coated or laminated or covered, as the case may be.” In view of the above statutory provisions, the majority decision appears to be incorrect inasmuch as it is indirect conflict with the statutory formula laid down for determination of predomination and percentage of cotton contents in the Tariff entry itself. Consequently, the dissenting judgment of Member (Technical) seems to be correct.
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1983 (5) TMI 239
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... ... ..... e G.S.C. which is the appellant before us. According to the Assistant Collector, since the aggregate value of goods cleared by the petitioner and the said company was in excess of the limits prescribed for eligibility for exemption under Notification No. 71/78, the appellant was not entitled to exemption. Since the G.S.C. and the Kerala Ceramics Limited, Kindara were two different legal entities, the simple fact that these were owned by the Government of Kerala could not make them one Unit as viewed by the Revenue. Therefore, without any hesitation, we hold that the Appellate Collector wrongly confirmed the order of the Assistant Collector. Since there is no dispute that if the turnover of the G.S.C. is viewed independently, it would be entitled to exemption under Notification No. 71/78, we hold that the appellant was entitled to exemption. Therefore, allowing the Appeal, we direct consequential relief within three months of the receipt of this Order. 6. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (5) TMI 238
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... ... ..... onsidered the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and we have meticulously perused the papers, including the Certificate of Incorporation under the Companies Act made available by the appellant in pursuance of our directive. We are unable to agree with the view that notwithstanding the fact that the units are not distinct legal entities, the Company would still be eligible for exemption on the basis of the Notifications stated in support thereof. A careful perusal of the Notifications in question would doubtless go to confirm the legal position as stated in Para 4’ of the Order of the Appellate Collector and there is no justification to take a view different from that. In view of the expression “said goods” which according to the appellant would be goods covered by Tariff Item 68 and not other goods, the language of the proviso leaves us in no doubt in accepting the view of the Appellate Collector as well taken. Accordingly, the appeal is rejected.
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1983 (5) TMI 237
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... ... ..... squo;ble Patna High Court judgment is of 1966. Since interpretation of the same Notification is before us, we find no reason or justification to take a view different than the one taken by the three said High Courts. If we have not dwelt with the facts of the Notification in any greater length, it is because we are in agreement with the views expressed by the Hon’ble Punjab High Court in the case of Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd., Supra, where Single Judge decision came to be reversed by a Division Bench in L.P. Appeals. Therefore, allowing the appeal, we hold that the show cause notice issued for withdrawing the rebate of ₹ 63,280/- was misconceived and adjudication against the assessee has been wrong. Since assessee shall be entitled to consequential relief, it follows that if the recovery has been made in relation to the said rebate, it shall be refunded. If no recovery is made, the Respondent shall be debarred from making recovery claim. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (5) TMI 236
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... ... ..... in no doubt that the importer’s claim is correct, and that the import is classifiable and assessable under sub-item 19 of Item 29.04/45 of CTA 75, without CVD as it was not chargeable during the relevant period under Item 68-CET. As far as the levy of customs duty on the indicator paper is concerned, we do not propose to involve ourselves with the classification because we find that the importer agitated levy of countervailing duty only and the Appellate Collector of Customs has allowed its appeal. If we are to allow the importer to raise the classifiation dispute, we shall be adjudicating an issue which was not even raised even before the Assistant Collector. Therefore, the importer fails in the second issue. Since we are accepting the importer’s contention is respect of classification of microscopic stain, the appeal is partly allowed with direction to the Customs authorities to allow consequential relief, latest within four months of the receipt of this Order.
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1983 (5) TMI 235
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... ... ..... to accept it. 8. We accordingly order that all the products which conform to the specifications for refined diesel oil as listed under Heading 8 of the Central Excise Act, that is to say, those consignments which, on test, were found to have a flame height of less than 10 mm. but had a viscosity of less than 100 seconds by Red Wood I Viscometer at 100oF and which were free from bituminous substence would be assessed under Item 8 of CET. The other consignments which on test, were found to have a flame height of less than 10mm and a viscosity of more than 100 seconds at 100oF by Red Wood I Viscometer and were free from bituminous content would not qualify assessment under Item 8 nor under Item 11A for reasons we have discussed above. These should be assessed under Item 68. 9. As a result of the above order and the consequential reassessment that may become necessary, refund should be given of the amounts collected in excess. The order disposes of all the 14 appeals.
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1983 (5) TMI 234
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... ... ..... an exemption from a levy is meaningless. Nor can a levy be inferred from an exemption from such levy when in fact there was none. (c) in the view we had taken about manufacture on bituminisation, it does not appear that the levy under Item 68, is attracted to the process. Even otherwise, paper and paper board subjected to the various treatments specified in Item 17(2) including bonding cannot fall in the residuary Item 68 which comprehends only those manufactured goods not elsewhere specified. Nor does bituminised kraft paper hop into any other item. If at all, it can become exigible to duty all over again under Item 17(2) only and no other. That was not the case as we found on a construction of the said item, as it read at the relevant time. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, both the questions raised are answered in the negative. 11. In the result, we allow the Appeal, setaside the orders below and direct the refund applied for to be made, if otherwise in order.
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1983 (5) TMI 233
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... ... ..... castings only. He added that the expression “iron cast in any other shape or size”, being a general one, would include all varieties of iron castings (ECR 1983-65-D-BOM). 2. We have carefully considered the matter. We agree with the Departments’ representative that the further processes mentioned by the appellants which the subject goods reportedly undergo in the foreign country are such as would not convert iron castings into another identifiable article and these processes are in the nature of cleaning and strengthening of the iron castings. The machining which they undergo is only rough machining to give a smooth surface. The real processing or machining which would convert the iron casting into motor vehicle parts takes place after importation of the castings into India. In view of these facts, we hold that the subject goods were covered by Item 25-CET and were correctly charged to countervailing duty thereunder. Accordingly we reject this appeal.
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