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1983 (8) TMI 252
Whether such an injunction as prayed for could be issued under s. 41 of the Arbitration Act?
Held that:- An injunction order restraining respondents from withholding the amount due under other pending bills to the contractor virtually amounts to a direction to pay the amount to the contractor-appellant. Such an order was clearly beyond the purview of cl. (b) of s. 41 of the Arbitration Act. The Union of India has no objection to the grant of an injunction restraining it from recovering or appropriating the amount Lying with it in respect of other claims of the contractor towards its claim for damages. But certainly cl. 18 of the standard contract confers ample power upon the Union of India to withhold the amount and no injunction order could be passed restraining the Union of India from withholding the amount. Appeal dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 251
... ... ... ... ..... d not appear and contest the matter. The judgment also proceeds on the basis that the assessee had not appeared to dispute the Revenue s contention. That is one of the grounds for accepting the Revenue s contention. Another circumstance is that in the subsequent decision, the earlier two decisions reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ball Bearing Centre 1978 41 STC 264 and State of Tamil Nadu v. Shanti Stainless Steel Co. 1978 41 STC 270 have not been referred to. Therefore, we are inclined to follow the judgments rendered earlier in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ball Bearing Centre 1978 41 STC 264 and State of Tamil Nadu v. Shanthi Stainless Steel Co. 1978 41 STC 270 which have been pronounced after considerable contest. Following the abovesaid two decisions, we allow the tax case and set aside the order of the Tribunal in this case and direct the assessing authority to assess the petitioner under section 7 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 250
... ... ... ... ..... ............. On a plain reading of the said provision, it is clear that as the sales of motor spirit which were taxable at the point of first sale under the repealed Motor Spirit Act had already been subjected to tax before the commencement of the Act and as tax under the provisions of the Act on motor spirit is payable on the point of last sale no tax under the Act is leviable on the sales of such motor spirit after the commencement of this Act. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the department frankly conceded before us that under the provisions of section 54(2) of the Act also the sales made by the assessee of the stock of motor spirit on which tax had already been paid under the Motor Spirit Act were not liable to tax under the Act. Our answer to question No. (2) referred to us, therefore, is in the affirmative and against the department. 12.. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (8) TMI 249
... ... ... ... ..... s then contended that the satisfaction contemplated by rule 8 of the Rules has got to be the satisfaction of the Sales Tax Officer and not that of the Deputy Commissioner. The contention cannot be upheld. Rule 8 does not contemplate subjective satisfaction of the Sales Tax Officer. If the information furnished in the application is found to be incorrect, on the basis of the material on record, the order of rejection passed by the Sales Tax Officer can be upheld by the Deputy Commissioner exercising powers under section 39(1) of the Act, on the ground that rule 8(4) of the Rules justified such rejection. As the impugned order is not shown to be vitiated by any error apparent on the face of the record no interference is called for under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 7.. The petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs of the petition. The security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1983 (8) TMI 248
... ... ... ... ..... he amount of tax from the petitioner and that the respondents be ordered to refund the amount so recovered by them to the petitioner. This application is opposed by the respondents. They have denied that they recovered the amount in violation of the stay order passed by this Court. 13.. Since questions of fact are involved, we do not consider it fit to enquire into the disputed questions of fact in this petition. As the case of the petitioner is that by recovering the amount of tax from the petitioner, the respondents have wilfully violated the order passed by this Court and thus committed contempt of this Court, the petitioner would be free, if so advised, to initiate appropriate proceedings against the officers concerned. 14.. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, this petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of security deposit be refunded to the petitioner after verification.
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1983 (8) TMI 247
... ... ... ... ..... the transport charges and that with reference to the supply of blue-metal to the customers two distinct and separate bargains are discernible, one relating to the supply of blue-metal at a particular price on which sales tax had also been charged for by the appellant and the other relating to the payment of charges for transport shown separately and not forming part of the price. We are, therefore, of the opinion that none of the decisions relied on by the respondent would in any manner assist in sustaining the addition made by the Board. In view of the factual situation arrived at, on a consideration of the materials placed, we do not think it necessary to elaborate upon the cases relied on by the appellant. We, therefore, hold that the appellant is entitled to a deduction of transport charges of Rs. 2,13,454. The appeal is allowed. The order of the Board is, therefore, set aside and that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored with costs. Rs. 250 counsel s fee.
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1983 (8) TMI 246
... ... ... ... ..... en completed before 10th January, 1983, the application for certificate of eligibility has been made long before 31st March, 1983, and in our view, the petitioners have substantiated their right to get the eligibility certificate as contemplated by the 1979 scheme. Accordingly, the petitioners are entitled to the relief. 30.. The petitioners will, therefore, be entitled to a writ directing respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to issue eligibility certificate in respect of the oil mill of petitioner No. 1 at Bhusawal. The petitioner will be entitled to costs of this petition. Writ Petition No. 989 of 1983. It is not in dispute that the decision just rendered in Writ Petition No. 988 of 1983 will also govern this case. In view of that decision, the petitioners will be entitled to a writ directing respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to issue to petitioner No. 1 eligibility certificate in respect of the oil mill at Satara in Nasik District. However, there will be no order as to costs of this petition.
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1983 (8) TMI 245
... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal is a discretionary one. The Tribunal did not choose to exercise its discretionary power to excuse the delay in filing the appeal, and no question of law can be said to arise from such a discretionary order. In this case, the petitioner filed the appeal after a delay of 120 days, along with an application for the condonation of the delay. The delay was sought to be explained by the petitioner by producing a medical certificate showing that the petitioner was suffering from peptic ulcer and that she was advised complete rest. The Tribunal has taken the view that, even assuming that the petitioner was suffering from peptic ulcer, that would not prevent the petitioner from instructing or authorising some one to file an appeal on behalf of the petitioner, and that therefore the petitioner has not shown sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. We are not in a position to find any error in the order passed by the Tribunal. The tax case is accordingly dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 244
... ... ... ... ..... of these two has been established, and therefore, it would not be within the purview of the Revenue to add this item to the total turnover of the assessee. From the foregoing, it is quite evident that the addition of turnover of Rs. 28,750 to the turnover of the petitioner-assessee herein is illegal, and therefore, the same has to be set aside. In the circumstances, the order under revision is set aside to the extent of item of Rs. 28,750 as added to the total turnover of the petitioner herein. Consequently the Commercial Tax Officer concerned is directed to revise the assessment by deleting the item of Rs. 28,750 from the total turnover and levy and collect the tax accordingly. To the same effect, the Commercial Tax Officer shall now make the revised assessment in T.R.C. No. 27 of 1981, by deleting the item of Rs. 35,000 representing the disclosure made under Act No. 8 of 1976. In the result, the two tax revision cases are allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each.
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1983 (8) TMI 243
... ... ... ... ..... counts maintained by the assessees, in the absence of the stock account, the assessing authority was right in rejecting the account books maintained by the assessees in this case. If the account books have been rejected on the ground that the truth or otherwise of the entries therein cannot be verified in the absence of the corroborative material like the stock account, then the best judgment assessment is called for, and while making the best judgment assessment, it is open to the assessing authority to take the book turnover and make an addition towards possible suppression. In this case the assessing authority has added 1 per cent of the book turnover as possible suppression. But when the matter went before the Tribunal, the Tribunal restricted the addition to Rs. 10,000. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, we are not in a position to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The tax revision case is therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 242
... ... ... ... ..... ions taken thereunder have to be equally quashed. The writ petitions are allowed in the terms aforesaid, but in view of the great intricacy of the issues involved, the parties are left to bear their own costs. 43.. Before I part with this judgment, I feel compelled to notice that on behalf of the writ petitioners, the impugned provisions as also the actions sought to be authorised thereby were assailed on a wide variety of other grounds as well. Included therein was the challenge on the basis of the freedom of trade, commerce and inter-course under articles 301 to 305, and equally to the levy of penalties for failure to pay the tax and the claim for interest on the alleged tax due. However, in the wake of my aforesaid finding-that the respondent-State of Haryana lacks the very legislative competence to make the impugned amendment, which has been struck down, the aforesaid issues are rendered entirely academic. I would, therefore, refrain from pronouncing any opinion thereon.
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1983 (8) TMI 241
... ... ... ... ..... d to a substantial extent by the Assistant Commissioner. Thus there is a clear error apparent on the face of the record which had vitiated the order and the same is clearly unsustainable. This is not a case of enhancement of penalty as contended by the learned Government Pleader. Hence it is not necessary to consider the point raised by Mr. S.R. Ashok that the penalty cannot be enhanced without a written notice. In the result, the impugned order levying penalty equal to twice the tax is set aside. We do not propose to remand the matter to the Tribunal as it would unnecessarily protract the litigation. The order of the Tribunal is accordingly set aside and the order of the Assistant Commissioner levying penalty equal to half the tax is upheld. The tax revision case is allowed accordingly. The result of our decision is as follows (1) The addition of Rs. 23,500 towards rice is sustained. (2) Penalty at the rate of half the tax as held by the Assistant Commissioner is confirmed.
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1983 (8) TMI 240
... ... ... ... ..... in respect of which he had requisitioned the forms were neither sales within the State nor sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, implying thereby that the petitioner s request was rejected as in the opinion of the Sales Tax Officer the transactions in respect of which the petitioner had made the requisition were in law to be treated as transactions of sales effected to a consumer. In view of the aforesaid discussion I am clearly of the opinion that this reason given by the Sales Tax Officer for rejecting the petitioner s application for forms III-A is not tenable and the order dated 3rd February, 1983, passed by him deserves to be quashed. Let this opinion be laid before the Bench concerned for further orders. BY THE COURT (August 19, 1983) In view of the opinion of Honourable H.N. Seth, J., the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 3rd February, 1983, passed by the Sales Tax Officer is quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to its costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 239
... ... ... ... ..... ernative. The taxpayer, Equitable Trust Company (Equitable), emphasizes the second analysis. The Comptroller urges the third position, which we adopt. As of September 16, 1974, Equitable entered into a written contract, delineated License Agreement, with Auxton Computer Enterprises, Incorporated (AUXCO). AUXCO granted Equitable a nontransferable and nonexclusive right to use a program, the AUXCO Project Management System, at a one-time price of 20,000. There was no termination date. Equitable covenanted not to publish or disclose to any third person any information concerning the program and not to copy the program tapes or documentation except for internal use. Paragraph 10 of the agreement in part provided that l egal title to the System shall remain with AUXCO, and Equitable agrees that AUXCO may repossess the System upon breach by Equitable of its obligations. This program was acquired for use by Equitable s systems and programming people in tracking project performance.
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1983 (8) TMI 238
PURCHASE OF BATTERIES BY ASSESSEE FROM CALCUTTA AND SALE TO BUYER AT MADRAS BEFORE GOODS WERE DELIVERED BY CARRIER — SALE, WHETHER INTER-STATE SALE AND EXEMPT — EXPORT OR IMPORT — SALE IN THE COURSE OF IMPORT — ASSESSEE PURCHASING GOODS FROM ENGLAND IN CONSIGNMENTS BY POST PARCEL — INTIMATION FROM POST OFFICE TO ASSESSEE ABOUT RECEIPT OF GOODS — ENDORSEMENT BY ASSESSEE ON INTIMATION IN FAVOUR OF BUYER
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1983 (8) TMI 237
Validity of the action taken by the authorities concerned against the petitioners for recovering the arrears of tax due and payable by them under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, by the arrest and detention in civil prison of the petitioners in accordance with section 279(1)(b) read with section 281 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 challenged
Held that:- Appeal allowed in part. The petitioners cannot be detained pursuant to any warrant of arrest already issued. We have, therefore, to quash the warrants which are already issued in these cases and direct that the petitioners against whom such warrants have been issued should not be detained pursuant thereto. We make an order accordingly. This order is made without prejudice to the power of the authorities concerned to realise the arrears by arresting and detaining the defaulters in accordance with law by passing fresh orders in the light of the above decision.
It is stated that the petitioners in some of these petitions have filed appeals or some other petitions under the U.P. Sales Tax Act against the orders of assessment and that such appeals or petitions are still pending. We do not express any opinion on the merits of those appeals or other petitions. They may be disposed of according to law by the concerned authorities.
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1983 (8) TMI 229
Powers of Central Government to assume management or control of an industrial undertaking in certain cases
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1983 (8) TMI 228
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... the bank is bound to take leave for proceeding with a pending suit more so in the present mortgage suit which is based on several securities and hypothecation deeds and in which personal decree has also been asked for against all the defendants some of whom were directors of the company. We have gone though the petition filed under section 446 of the Act and the relevant papers from the paper book. In our view, no special ground has been made out to refuse leave to the appellant, which should ordinarily be granted. We also do not find any such reason mentioned in the impugned order while rejecting the petition for grant of leave. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the company judge is set aside. Leave is granted to the appellant bank to prosecute the aforesaid title mortgage suit pending in the court of Subordinate Judge, First Court, Gaya. As nobody has appeared on behalf of respondents to oppose this appeal we make no order as to costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 227
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... said premises. The suit filed by the applicant appears to me to be prima facie improper and vexatious and if allowed to continue, would expose the company in liquidation to unnecessary litigation and costs leading to the depletion of its assets. I am not otherwise impressed by the conduct of the applicant. Knowing fully well of the pending liquidation proceedings, it has chosen to disregard the provisions of section 446 of the Companies Act and sought to steal a march by filing a suit without leave and obtaining an ex parte order which has resulted in nullifying an order passed by this court. The applicant has come back to this court with a fait accompli and is calling upon the court to rubber stamp its actions with retrospective leave. Such conduct not only lacks in bona fides but amounts, in my view, to an abuse of the process of court. For the reasons as aforesaid, I dismiss this application. The applicant will pay the costs of the official liquidator assessed at 12 G.Ms.
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1983 (8) TMI 226
Winding up – Powers of tribunal on hearing petition, Appeals from orders, Parties to petition
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