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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 235 Records
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1983 (8) TMI 206
Wingding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its pay its debts, Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1983 (8) TMI 196
Annual Return – Penalty for not filing ... ... ... ... ..... eated from day to day that it can be called a continuing offence. There being no express provision in section 162 in that behalf as there are in sections 234, 598, etc., of the Companies Act, it will not be proper to hold that the offence under section 162 is a continuing offence. When the statute itself provides for continuance of offence irrespective of initial default in some cases but does not make similar provisions in respect of some other offences, it would not be correct to say that the latter class of cases also would be continuing offences. That being our view, we respectfully disagree with the view expressed in the case of Apt Kumar Sarkar v. Assistant Registrar of Companies 1979 49 Comp. Cas. 909 (Cal.). Accordingly, we hold that the cognizance of all these cases was bad in view of the bar of limitation and section 468, Cr.P.C., and the pending proceedings are liable to be quashed. The rules are accordingly made absolute. Jitendra Nath Chaudhuri, J. mdash I Agree.
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1983 (8) TMI 187
As the appellants submitted that adopting a multiplier of six, assuming that roughly six years was the period; for which the agreement would have been renewed from year to year, the appellants unconditionally offered to deposit ₹ 1,50,000 in the court to be distributed at the discretion of this court amongst the creditors of the company in liquidation. We recorded this offer in our order disposing of the appeal. We are now informed that the amount has been deposited. The liquidator is accordingly directed to submit the list of the creditors of the company with the names, addresses and claims admitted by him within 4 weeks from today when the matter will appear again on board for directions.
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1983 (8) TMI 179
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... nt of the Hon rsquo ble High Court of Delhi in the Writ Petition No. 750/1972 (The Indian Plastics and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. the Union of India), 1981 E.L.T. 108 (Del.), wherein it has been observed that as the aqueous solution contained not more than 45 of solids it cannot be regarded as artificial or synthetic resin in liquid form, and as such it has been further observed that it was not covered by tariff entry 15A. Shri Bhatt concluded his arguments by stating that the said judgment had already clinched the issue and as such he need not further argue the matter. 4. emsp Mrs. Vijay Zutshi, on behalf of the respondent, stated that in view of the aforesaid judgment, she has nothing to say in the matter. 5. emsp For the reasons given in the aforesaid judgment, we hold that the aqueous solution manufactured by the appellants which contained less than 45 of the solid resin did not fall under tariff item 15A. Accordingly the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 178
Leather cloth ... ... ... ... ..... there was no monitoring of the actual use of the material imported by importer-manufacturers. such is the situation, and the appellants are manufacturers of footwear (this position has not been controverted) and the claim and appeal from the appellants were entertained and adjudicated upon by the lower authorities, we do not see why they should not get benefit of the Notification in case the goods imported by them are found to fall under the Notification in question. On this last point we have the benefit of the decision of the Tribunal reported in 1983 ECR 894D (CEGAT). Applying the ratio of that decision we hold that the goods imported by the appellants, namely, PVC leather cloth, were entitled to the concessional rate of duty provided for in Customs Notification No. 29/79 dated 10-2-1979. We direct that the consequential relief shall be granted to them by the concerned Customs authorities within 3 months from the date of communication of this order. 4. ensp Appeal allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 173
Question whether show cause notice was rendered illegal only in respect of confiscation, referrable
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1983 (8) TMI 172
Adjudicating Order ... ... ... ... ..... by Collectors as well as lower authorities, and (2) the normal presumption would be that it is the more important cases which would normally form the subject of orders or decisions of Collectors, it is improbable in the extreme that the assessee (or the department) would be left without any specific remedy of appeal in such cases. This would, however, be the inevitable consequence if a restrictive view is taken of the words ldquo order or decision rdquo as was done by the West Regional Bench in the case of Coats of India Ltd. 6. I, therefore, fully concur in the broader view expressed by my learned brother, relying on certain relevant observations of a five member bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. S. Kumars Limited, Dewas v. Collector of Central Excise, Indore, - 1983 (13) E.L.T. 1057 1983 ECR 846D and M/s. G.S. Industries, Jullundur v. Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh, - 1983 ECR 855D. 7. In the result, as recorded by my learned brother, the appeal is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 167
... ...
... ... ..... Bombay High Court was considering an identical type of business in CIT vs. Pressure Piling Co. of India (1980) 126 ITR 333 (Bom). The Bombay High Court was satisfied that such a business involved manufacture of articles and that such a company was entitled to deduction u/s 80 J, if such a company could be considered as producing an article for the purpose of s. 80J. It has to be accepted that for the purpose of Finance Act definition of lsquo industrial company rsquo the assessee is producing articles or things. The department rsquo s stand seems to be based on another decision of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. N.U.C. Ltd. (1980) 126 ITR 377 (Bom). That case is easily distinguishable. That was a case where the business was construction of buildings. The assessee before us is not such a construction company at all. They merely prepare concrete piles. We are, therefore, satisfied that the assessee is entitled to be treated as an industrial company. 4. The appeals are allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 166
... ...
... ... ..... competent to pronounce on the state of law and, therefore, the contents of a Board rsquo s Circular cannot constitute information . The Supreme Court decision relied upon by the ld. counsel for the assessee further proceeds to State that in every case a declaration or exposition to be law must be a creation by a formal source either legislative or judicial authority. A statement by a person or body not competent to create or define law cannot be regarded as law. The CBDT is neither a legislative nor a judicial authority and, therefore, the views expressed by it in its Circular under consideration was not law and, therefore, the audit note indicating such a view cannot constitute information . In our opinion, therefore, the CIT(A) has erred in upholding the action u/s 147(b) of the IT Act for the two years under consideration. Her order on this issue requires to be reversed. In the result, the assessee rsquo s appeals succeed on all the counts and they are accordingly allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 162
Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... amount to business of manufacture or production of any articles or things. The activities of the assessee are similar to the activities considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. CTO AIR 1961 SC 412. Therein, the Supreme Court considered the question whether hardened or hydrogenated groundnut oil commonly called vanaspati was still groundnut oil within the meaning of rule 18(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939. The learned Judges observed that even after such manufacturing process there was no change in the essential nature of the oil. In our opinion, this decision squarely applies to the facts of the case before us. The assessee cannot be treated as manufacturing or producing an article. The essential nature of the raw material used by them does not change. This is a basic requirement to show that the assessee had manufactured something. Under these circumstances, we would allow the departmental appeal. 4. The appeal is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 159
Chargeable To Tax ... ... ... ... ..... were both casual and non-recurring. Secondly, that provision applies only to items which can be regarded as income because that section begins with the words that the following incomes will be exempt from tax . Thus, if an item is not income at all, then there is no question of exempting the same under section 10(3). Section 10(3) is invoked in a case where an item of receipt is income and yet the assessee claims the same to be exempt under section 10(3). In this case, we have already held that the receipts under consideration did not constitute income at all, and so, there is no question of exempting the same under section 10(3). If the exemption under section 10(3) does not apply to a case, then the exceptions to section 10(3) will not apply either. Hence, we are not impressed by this argument raised for the revenue. 11. For the above reasons, we uphold the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), though on somewhat different reasons. 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed
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1983 (8) TMI 157
Annual Letting Value, House Property ... ... ... ... ..... which clearly indicate that the deductions under section 23 are required to be made only in determining the annual letting value of the property and there is a limitation against deduction of expenses contemplated by section 24 only in respect of property of the nature referred to in sub-section (3) of section 23 which speaks of only one residential house in the occupation of the owner, but which he cannot occupy on account of certain reasons stated therein. Thus, the provisions of section 24 make it clear that there can be a deduction made under section 24 in excess of the annual letting value as determined under section 23 in respect of property other than the property meant for the owner s use and which cannot for reasons contemplated under section 23(3) be occupied by him. We, therefore, uphold the assessee s contention and direct the departmental authorities to modify the assessment accordingly. 4 and 5. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues .
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1983 (8) TMI 156
Minor Child, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... y the same Court in CIT v. Bank of India Ltd. 1979 118 ITR 809. In CIT v. Central Bank of India Ltd. 1976 103 ITR 196 the Bombay High Court held that the airconditioning equipment installed in a safe deposit vault of a bank is plant and is entitled to development rebate. 6. The ratio laid down in the above cases squarely applies to the instant case. In the instant case, the assessee is engaged in the manufacture and sale of roofing tiles and ridges. In the kiln, tiles and ridges are baked. The kiln is an apparatus or a tool by means of which the business activities are carried on and so, it constitutes plant . But for the kiln, it is not possible to heat the tiles and ridges and the assessee will not be able to manufacture the tiles and ridges without the kiln. Thus, in our view, the kiln would constitute plant within the meaning of section 32 for allowance of extra shift depreciation. Accordingly, we allow the claim of the assessee. 7. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 155
Carry Forward And Set Off, Set Off Of Loss ... ... ... ... ..... voting power of more than 51 per cent of the shareholding has taken place between the two relevant dates he will be entitled to claim set off of carried forward loss if such change in the voting power is not with a view to avoiding or reducing liability to tax. The above ratio squarely applies to the instant case. In the instant case, though the change in the voting power of more than 51 per cent of the shareholding has taken place between the two relevant dates, still the assessee will be entitled to claim carry forward and set off of losses of earlier years as the change in the voting power is not with a view to avoiding or reducing the liability to tax. Thus, the assessee s claim for set off will be permissible under clause (b) of section 79. The Commissioner (Appeals) was perfectly justified in directing the ITO to allow the benefit of carry forward and set off of losses of the earlier years. Thus, we uphold his order. 5. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 152
... ...
... ... ..... 64 of the Act as there is no nexus between s. 64 and the issue involved over here. Hence we also reject it. In view of our above discussions and reasons thereto, we hold that the income excluded by partition or partial partition is to be included in the assessment of HUF which was so partitioned. The ITO has acted accordingly and, therefore, we restore his order while we set aside that of the AAC on the issue as he in acting otherwise committed an error in law, hence his order is illegal on the issue of partial partition involved in these matters. Hence we set aside his impugned orders of the issue. 9. Since the issue of quantum of assessment is consequential to the impugned issue of partial partition which we have decided in favour of the revenue, and, therefore, we decide this issue accordingly holding therein that this issue is consequential hence to be determined or worked out per our decision on the issue of partial partition. 10. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 151
... ...
... ... ..... he deed if it is not otherwise separately debited as expenses to the accounts of the firm. In the circumstances we hold that yearly allowance paid by the firm for the services rendered by a partner in the capacity of a partner is covered by the provisions of s. 40(b) r/w s. 67(1)(b) and the share income of the firm Kartha as determined in the firm M/s Thangam Brick Works is assessable in the hands of the HUF. Since there is no question of HUF paying the sum of Rs. 5,000 out of its share income from the firm earner through the Kartha and in the absence of any evidences of agreement between the HUF and the Kartha or any overriding title so as to divert the yearly allowance before it formed apart of the share income, the claim made by the assessee is not tenable and therefore the ITO has rightly rejected the claim made by the assessee. In this view of the matter, therefore, we reverse the order of the AAC and uphold the orders of the ITO 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 148
Interest On Securities, Interest Payable, Tax At Source ... ... ... ... ..... he country. It cannot, therefore, retrospectively withdraw that concession and then impose a new burden. The courts in India did not view this procedure with favour, some High Courts having been frowned upon this procedure, as this would catch the assessees unawares and withdraw the concession without notice causing hardships. So, the circular given in 1978 alone must be held to hold the field. According to that circular, the assessees did not violate the requirements of section 194A. Thus, looked at from any angle the view taken by the revenue does not appear to be correct. We, therefore, accept the assessee s contentions and hold that when the interest was credited to the interest payable account , it did not amount to crediting the interest to the accounts of the payees and, consequently, no liability for deducting the tax on the interest amount was incurred. The levy of interest is, therefore, uncalled for. We, therefore, vacate the interest levied, and allow the appeals.
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1983 (8) TMI 147
Industrial Undertaking, Investment Allowance, Manufacture Or Production, Profits And Gains, Sales Tax Act
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1983 (8) TMI 142
... ...
... ... ..... overnment, the management agree to pay 10 of the total amount of earnings for the year 1976-77 as lsquo Goodwill Payment rsquo to maintain industrial peace. 3. The workers assured that they will continue to maintain industrial peace and discipline. 4. It has been specifically agreed between the parties that this settlement shall not be quoted as precedent by the employees in making future claims and payment of bonus. Dated at Hindupur this 4th October, 1977. Signature of parties Representing the management Representing the workmen 5. We fail to see what more is necessary (other than the reproduction of the terms of settlement) to carry conviction that it is not bonus deductible under s. 36 and that it is a forced payment extracted from out of management by trade union activities and, therefore, well supported by commercial expediency and eligible for deduction under s. 37. So we allow this amount as a deduction in the computation of total income. Both appeals allowed in part.
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1983 (8) TMI 139
... ...
... ... ..... It cannot, therefore, retrospectively withdraw that concession and then impose a new burden. The courts in India did not view this procedure with favour, some High Courts having been frowned upon this procedure, as this would catch the assessee unawares and withdraw the concession without notice carrying hardship. So, the Circular given in 1978 alone must be held to hold the field, According to that Circular, the assessees did not violate the requirements of s. 194A. Thus, looked at from any angle, the view taken by the revenue does not appear to be correct. We, therefore, accept the assessee rsquo s contention and hold that when the interest was credited to the lsquo interest payable account rsquo , it did not amount to crediting the interest to the accounts of the payees and, consequently, no liability for deducting the tax on the interest amount was incurred. The levy of interest is therefore, uncalled for. We, therefore, vacate the interest levied, and allow the appeals.
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