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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 254 Records
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1983 (9) TMI 271 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... consumption in weaving of fabrics. According to Rule 9A, the rate of duty in force as on the date of such removal has to be applied. Duty at such rate having already been paid, there was no further liability on the appellants. The appellants are right in saying that Notification No. 168/72-C.E., dated 24-7-1972 was not retrospective in operation, and the rates prescribed in this notification could not be applied to the yarn which had been authorisedly removed before 24-7-1972. In these cases, the yarn had not only been removed but also consumed in weaving of fabrics prior to 24-7-1972. In relation to these four appeals, the relevant date under Rule 9A was the date of removal of the yarn and not that of resultant fabrics. Accordingly, we uphold the appellant’s plea that their liability was limited to the duty payable in accordance with the rates prescribed in Notification No. 63/72-C.E., and No. 64/72-C.E., and allow these four appeals with consequential relief to them.
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1983 (9) TMI 270 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the complainant satisfies the eligibility criteria?
Held that:- In the absence of a specific qualification, if the person complaining has a subsisting interest in the protection of the registered trade mark, his complaint cannot be rejected on the ground that he had no cause of action nor sufficient subsisting interest to file the complaint. M/s Mangalore Ganesh Beedies Works, a partnership firm is the registered owner of trade marks, falsification and infringement of which is complained by the present complainant, who is not only a dealer in these beedies manufactured and sold by the registered owner of the trade marks, but he is also the constituted attorney of the owners of the registered trade mark. To say that the owner of the registered trade mark can alone file the complaint is contrary to the provisions of the statute and commonsense and reason. Therefore, the order of the learned Magistrate dismissing the complaint at the threshold on the ground that the present appellant has no cause of action to file the complaint is utterly unsustainable and must be quashed and set aside. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (9) TMI 269 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... v. Pio Food Packers 1980 46 STC 63 (SC) this Court in T.C. No. 1049 of 1980, State of Tamil Nadu represented by Additional Deputy Commissioner (CT), Madras Division, Madras v. Ceyvere Southern Inc., Kilpauk, Madras-10 1983 52 STC 328, held that merely because that lobsters purchased by the assessees in that case were subjected to some process before sale, they could not be said to have become a commercially different commodity and that those lobsters, even after the process, retained their original character, as the same commercial commodity. We have to, therefore, hold that the process of cutting, cleaning and freezing and the like did not result in the frog legs being treated as a commercially different product and that even after the process of cutting, cleaning and freezing, they continued to be frog legs. In this view of the matter, the view taken by the Tribunal appears to be right, and we feel that no interference is called for. The tax case is accordingly dismissed.
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1983 (9) TMI 268 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (for the purpose of assessment of sales tax), the assessee ought to have been given an opportunity against that action. The order does not disclose the application of mind for not allowing the deduction for purpose of assessment of sales tax nor does it show how and on what basis the authority has proceeded to assess to the best of his judgment under section 18(4)(d) of the Act. We are, therefore, of opinion that the assessment of sales tax cannot be upheld. 5. The petition is allowed. The impugned order of the S.T.O. dated 11th April, 1979, in so far as it relates to the assessment of sales tax, and the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax dated 15th October, 1980, upholding that order are hereby set aside. The petitioner shall be given an opportunity of being heard and to show cause why the deduction claimed by him be not allowed. Under the circumstances of this particular case, we make no order as to costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1983 (9) TMI 267 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e petitioner moved the Tribunal beyond the period of limitation and as such this Court should not interfere in the exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court. The circumstances in which the delay had occurred have been explained in the writ petition. That apart, since the point raised is of general importance, I am of the view that the legal controversy should be set at rest by interpreting the relevant provisions of the Act. I am, therefore, of the view that it is a fit case in which the petitioner should be given appropriate reliefs. 10.. I would, therefore, allow this writ application and quash the orders contained in annexures 1 to 3 in so far as they hold that additional sales tax is not deductible from the gross turnover and remit the case to the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes for redetermination of the liability of the petitioner in the light of this judgment. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. SYED HAIDAR SHAUKAT ABIDI, J.-I agree.
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1983 (9) TMI 266 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng law of the land and framing all the matters of such interpretation to flout the dockets of this court. Shri P.C. Jain submits that the assessing authorities are not acting according to the judgment of the Deputy Commissioner given earlier for the year 1973-74 on the ground that the State has filed a revision. He prays that a direction may be given to the assessing authority to act according to the judgment of the Deputy Commissioner. We are afraid no such direction can be given by this Court because firstly, it is expected the subordinate assessing authority would always respect decisions of the higher and the Deputy Commissioner comes in that. In the very nature of things unless the judgment of Deputy Commissioner is reversed or its operation is stayed, the original assessing authorities are bound to accept it unless there is some other judgment to the contrary. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that this appeal is devoid of any fact and the same is dismissed.
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1983 (9) TMI 265 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ment, the transaction becomes complete. The aforesaid process is a strong pointer in favour of the contract being one for sale and nothing else. Hence, it is a contract of sale for transfer of the property, and the delivery of possession with title to the buyer, which is the essence of contract of sale. Further, the stage payments are made on furnishing bank guarantees and also on the coverage of insurance policy by the builder to be assigned in favour of the respondent. At the end the ferry will be delivered afloat provisionally at Visakhapatnam yard and finally at Port Blair by the builder to the buyer, voyage insurance being on the builder. Judged from any angle the totality and the cumulative effect of the circumstances constitute the contract in question a sale and not a contract for work and labour. The question, therefore, framed at the outset is accordingly answered, as has been done by the Tribunal and so, the revision is dismissed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1983 (9) TMI 264 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ical devices that assist in operating or controlling the tone resources of an organ. Accessories are not necessarily confined to particular machines for which they may serve as aids. The same item may be an accessory of more than one kind of instrument. In view of the aforesaid observations, it is clear that a speedometer is not a device which is an essential or integral part of a vehicle but merely adds or supplements in operating or controlling the speed of the vehicle and in that sense, would only be an accessory, and not a part, which, when it becomes faulty or is lost, can be replaced by a spare part. The clarificatory notification relied on does not at all assist the petitioners in any manner. We, therefore, agree with the authorities below that the sales turnover of the petitioners relating to speedometers should be assessed at 15 per cent and not at 13 per cent as claimed by the petitioners. Consequently, the tax case is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (9) TMI 263 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... now to contend that their total turnover comprised of the turnover relating to their two principals whose total turnover did not exceed Rs. 10,00,000 each and since their principals are not liable to pay additional tax, the assessees are also not liable to pay additional tax. As already stated, the levy of additional tax under section 2(1) of the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970, is consequential on the original assessment, and if the original assessment to sales tax has been made on a person and that person s turnover exceeds Rs. 10,00,000, then the levy of additional tax is automatic under section 2(1). It is not possible at the stage of levy of additional tax to dissect the turnover of the assessees to find out whether it is their personal turnover or whether it related to their principals. In this view of the matter, we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal is this case. The tax case is therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (9) TMI 262 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tribunal shows that what it in effect finds is that neither the exemplars pertaining to the country liquor dealer of Allahabad nor those which concerned other country liquor dealers of Lucknow, could, in the circumstances of the case, provide a proper basis for assessing the profits earned by the petitioner. According to it, applicant s profits could properly be worked out in the light of its assessment in earlier years. In this view of the matter, no question of the Tribunal either ignoring any relevant material or its relying upon an irrelevant material arises. The findings recorded by the Tribunal in this regard are findings of fact based on appraisement of material on record and they do not appear to be vitiated by any error of law. 5. In the result, we are not satisfied that any statable question of law arises from out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. This application under section 256(2), therefore, fails and is rejected with costs which are assessed at Rs. 125.
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1983 (9) TMI 261 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ies manufactured on powerlooms, excluding durries, carpets, hosiery goods and readymade garments but including the goods specified in the annexure hereunder. (a) Cotton fabrics of all varieties. A bare perusal of this notification clearly indicates that before exemption can be claimed in respect of the textiles it must be manufactured on powerlooms. In the present case it may be conceded that the raw material utilised for making the fused collar is manufactured on power looms, although there is no clear indication in this respect. But the exemption is not being claimed in respect of the convenient of the fused collar but for the fused collar itself. The method of manufacturing the fused collar has already been indicated earlier, and it clearly shows that fused collars are not manufactured on powerlooms. This being so the assessee could not claim exemption in respect of fused collar manufactured by it. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs which is assessed at Rs. 200.
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1983 (9) TMI 260 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... blish that a noble metal is one which does not corrode or tarnish in air or heat or water and are not easily attacked by acids. And brass was a metal which did not easily corrode or tarnish. In Hindi, Notification No. ST-1367 dated 5th April, 1961, read as under, Mill-store tatha lohe ke bani vastuyen. It clarifies that the entry has to be confined to articles of iron only. The word hardware may be wide. It may include small articles of base metal but if the notification is confined to things made of specific metal, namely, iron, then it cannot be extended to articles made of brass, etc. In view of this it is unnecessary to consider whether brass is noble or base metal. In the result this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Additional judge (Revisions) is set aside. The question of law raised by the assessee is decided by saying that brass rivets were not taxable as hardware in 1970-71. The assessee is entitled to its costs which is assessed at Rs. 300.
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1983 (9) TMI 259 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Since we are quashing the reassessment proceedings on this ground, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether this is a case covered by section 14(4)(cc) of the Act. Before parting we must observe that the opportunity given in this case is appallingly inadequate. The assessment is sought to be revived after a period of 4 years. The original assessment relates to 1972-73. The assessment was made in June, 1976. The notice of reassessment was given in March, 1978, giving only 3 days time for submitting the explanation. The opportunity contemplated under section 14(4) is a reasonable opportunity and 3 days can hardly be said to be a reasonable time in the circumstances of the case. Even on this ground, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. Since we have quashed the assessment on the ground of limitation, there is no necessity to send them back for giving a reasonable opportunity. In the result, the tax revision case is allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1983 (9) TMI 258 - DELHI HIGH COURT
CEGAT (Now CESTAT) - Vice-President, discharge of - Natural justice - Hearing - Government servants - Quasi judicial posts - Appellate Tribunal - Termination of temporary Members -
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1983 (9) TMI 257 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... should be maintained till a final decision is reached whether the scheme should be implemented or not. The pendency of the winding-up proceedings, in my view, is no bar to the scheme being considered by the creditors in the usual course. In the facts and circumstances and for the reasons stated hereinabove, I dispose of the application filed by the petitioning creditor, inter alia, for recalling of the order passed on May 12, 1983, by the following order. The meeting of the creditors as directed would be held without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the petitioning creditor and other supporting creditors. The winding-up proceedings will not be stayed but the provisional liquidator will not take any further steps in respect of the properties, assets and records of the company. All other proceedings pending in respect of winding-up of the company will stand adjourned till the meeting is held and the report of the chairman is filed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (9) TMI 256 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Notice for meeting, Winding up – Avoidance of voluntary transfer ... ... ... ... ..... of directors dated February 7, 1980, and has submitted that the date of sale of the boiler and some other dates had not been correctly mentioned therein. In the circumstances of the case, it is also not necessary to go into the contents of the resolution. Even if that resolution had not been passed, the sale could not be assailed by the petitioner. The petitioner also moved C. A. No. 42 of 1982 in the abovesaid petition stating that Mr. Sudhma Ram, Mr. R. K. Grover and Mr. S. K. Kalia have perjured and prepared false documents and they should be ordered to be prosecuted. I have already dealt with the affidavits. It is well-settled that a prosecution ought not to be directed unless there is reasonable probability of conviction. After taking the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, I do not propose to order prosecution of the aforesaid persons. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in both the company applications and dismiss the same. No costs.
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1983 (9) TMI 255 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Public deposits ... ... ... ... ..... plied with the provisions of section 58A of the Companies Act and the rules framed thereunder even during the financial year ended June 30, 1980. In the balance-sheet, the auditors have certified that the company has complied with the provisions of section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, and the rules framed thereunder wherever applicable. This contention has been put forth to show that the company has not wantonly flouted the provisions of the Act and that the excess deposit amounts have been brought into conformity with the Act and the directions during the year 1979-80. This contention may prove the bona fides of the company, but in so far as the legal contention raised by the company is found to be a sustainable one, the proceedings initiated against the company and its officers deserve to be quashed. Consequently, both the petitions will stand allowed and the proceedings in C. C. No. 7571 of 1979 on the file of the III Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras, will stand quashed.
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1983 (9) TMI 236 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Dividend manner and time of payment of ... ... ... ... ..... istinction must necessarily be worked out looking to the ratio the number of bonus shares bears to the increased number of shares after the bonus issue, and it is a condition of proportionate reduction. The reduction must be such that the figures, after reduction, are in proportion. The plaintiff s stand proceeds on the basis that proportionate reduction means a reduction of the same percentage, a position to my mind, which is wholly untenable. In view of this, the method adopted by the defendant company cannot be faulted. The plaintiff s contention must, hence, be rejected. What is more is that by the method adopted by the defendant, a shareholder and a bond holder would be placed on a footing of equality, as is evident from the calculations, set out in appendix 2, the plaint. These calculations are not challenged. In view of this, the question must now be answered in the negative. The summons must stand dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs on the summons.
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1983 (9) TMI 235 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... no explanation worth the name has been brought out which can be treated as sufficient justification for closure. It has failed to pay the salaries and bonus to the employees from 1980, and has also not deposited the amounts due towards the Employees State Insurance and the provident fund contribution. Oriental Bank of Commerce has instituted a suit for the recovery of rupees 62 lakhs against it. There is another suit as well brought by a different party and two criminal litigations have also been set in motion against the directors for dishonouring of cheques. Large amounts are also due to the sales tax authorities and Central Excise department. The result, therefore, is that I order the winding up of the respondent company. Let the official liquidator take over its assets and proceed with the winding up. Citation be issued of this winding up in the newspapers The Hindustan Times and Hindustan (Hindi) as well as in the Official Gazette. The Registrar of Companies be informed.
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1983 (9) TMI 218 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in view of the provision contained in section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the court will have jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Taking the most favourable view of the decision of the Appellate Bench and assuming that the Bench had in its mind the inherent power of the court to grant injunction despite statutory inhibition and consistent with the view taken by the courts in England, it had then in order to do justice between the parties first reach an affirmative finding that the winding up petition as and when presented by the Corporation—the creditor would be frivolous and would constitute an abuse of the process of the court or a device to pressurise the Bank to submit to an unjust and dishonest claim. It must also reach an affirmative conclusion that the debtor-Bank is sufficiently solvent to satisfy the claim as and when established. It has also to record an affirmative finding that the Corporation—the creditor—is not seeking bona fide to present a petition for winding up but is actuated by an ulterior motive in presenting the petition. The decision of the Appellate Bench is conspicuously silent on these relevant points and for this additional reason also the appeal must succeed.
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