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Showing 21 to 40 of 249 Records
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1984 (1) TMI 329
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... ... ..... d by the Applicant on 10-8-1983 and the application itself was filed on 10-10-1983. In terms of Section 82B of the Act, an application for reference to the High Court of any question of law arising out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal is to be preferred “within 60 days of the date” upon which the applicant is served with a notice of the Tribunal’s order. The word ‘of’ (underlined) is the equivalent of “after”. (Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary Fourth Edition-p. 1823). If, therefore, the service of the order was effected on the Applicant on 10-8-1983, the period of limitation of 60 days commenced to run after the date of service, i.e. to say from 11-8-1983 onwards. Apart from this, 8th and 9th October, 1983 were closed Holidays for the Tribunal and the application could have been presented on the 10th October, 1983 in terms of Clause 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Accordingly, the application is not barred by limitation.
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1984 (1) TMI 328
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... ... ..... this is a legal submission and goes to the root of the matter be acceptable, we do not think that this ground can be raised or accepted while exercising the powers of rectifying any mistake under sub-section (2) of Section 35C ibid. 4. As to other grounds, like concurrent findings of fact by the lower authorities and not dealing with the Tariff Advice referred in paras 1 to 5 of the order, it is sufficient to say that a reading of para 6 of the order shows that decision of the Bench was not based on these contentions. It is also not necessary that a Bench or a Court gives findings of each and every argument advanced by the party unless it considers it necessary to do so. If an argument is advanced and no findings is given on that argument, then the same is taken to have been rejected. These cannot be said to be errors apparent from the record. In view of the foregoing, we do not see any merit in this application for rectification under the provision and reject the same.
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1984 (1) TMI 327
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... ... ..... ly if demand notice was issued after assessment and if there is no assessment, rule 9(2) will apply. 21. In the present case before us, admittedly there was no assessment as the appellants had removed the goods under the belief that those were not subject to levy of excise duty. The Department had no knowledge as to when those goods were removed. In these circumstances, the Department has rightly invoked the provisions of Rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, and the demand is within time. 22. In view of our findings above, we partly allow the appeal to the extent that differential duty of excise on the Kraft Ammunition Paper is not to be charged from the appellants and if the same stands recovered, it shall be refunded within three months from the date of the communication of this order. 23. Regarding the Excise Duty sought to be charged on teleprinter papers and tapes, the order of the Appellate Collector is upheld and the appeal is dismissed on that point.
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1984 (1) TMI 326
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... ... ..... the Evidence Act was correct in law. It is a well settled law that the fundamental principles underlying the Evidence Act shorn of technicalities apply on a broad and pragmatic way to proceedings under Section 167(8) of the Customs Act, in view of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Collector of Customs v. D. Bhoormull (AIR 1974 SC 859) though not cited by the parties. Since the appellant’s counsel wanted the cross-examination of witnesses and the examination of the witnesses has to be in accordance with the principles set out under the Evidence Act. In the interests of justice, I, therefore, remand the case back to the Additional Collector of Customs to look afresh into the matter after giving an opportunity to the appellants to cross-examine the witnesses, if he so desires. Since I am remanding the case to the lower authorities, on the ground of legal propriety, I am not going into the merits of the case. For statistical purposes, the appeal is allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 325
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... ... ..... orced by some other material, but a case of two layers of plastic film with intervening layers, one adhesive and anti-halation layer and another a Photo-sensitive nylon resin layer. The present case is, therefore, on all fours with the case which was before the Bombay High Court. In 1983 ECR 1168-D (CEGAT), the point before this Tribunal was whether plastic sacks known as high density polyethylene woven sacks, are classifiable under Item 15A(2) or under Item 68-CET. The woven sacks were made entirely of plastics. Here again, we do not see how this decision is relevant to the facts of the case before us. 11. In the light of the foregoing discussions, we hold that additional duty of Customs was leviable on the subject goods with reference to Item 68 and not Item 15A(2) of the CET. We allow the appeal and direct that the consequential relief shall be granted to the appellants by the concerned Customs authorities within 3 months from the date of communication of this order.
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1984 (1) TMI 324
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... ... ..... e cases the learned Additional Collector as well as the learned Collector have not imposed any personal penalty. They have also not ordered absolute confiscation. There cannot be any estoppel in a matter of this nature. If there had been an improper understanding of the Policy during the earlier period, the appellants cannot continue to have that benefit and urge that as a ground for the release of the goods. As has been stated earlier it may cause injustice if the appellants were made to pay penalty or if the goods have been confiscated absolutely. When that had not been done, there is not much scope for the grievances now made. We, therefore, reject the contention of the learned Advocates. 41. In the result, for the reasons set out in this order, we hold that the imported goods which are the subject matter of all the appeals are banned items and therefore dismiss these appeals and confirm the orders passed by the learned Additional Collector and the learned Collector.
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1984 (1) TMI 323
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... ... ..... nt. As a matter of fact in one of the appeals the Appellate Collector himself refers to the contentions of the appellants that drawback rates shall have to be fixed under sub-serial No. 1401. Assuming that the Assistant Collector and the Appellate Collector was justified in rejecting the claim under sub-serial No. 1303 they committed an error in not considering the application made by the appellants. In the said circumstances we consider that there has been a denial of principles of natural justice. We, therefore, set aside the orders of both the authorities and remand the case for fresh consideration to the Assistant Collector in the light of the observations contained in this order. The Assistant Collector shall also consider the claim under sub-rerial No. 1401 by reason of the brand rate fixed by the Govt. of India in their order dated 17th Nov., 1980. The Assistant Collector shall dispose of this matter within a period of 6 months from the date of receipt of the records.
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1984 (1) TMI 322
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... ... ..... E.L.T. (J 47). All these decisions are centered on Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees “equality before law” to all citizens. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Indo-China Steam Navigation v. Jagjit Singh - 19S3 E.L.T. 1392 (S.C.) - has held the erstwhile Revisionary Authority acts under the Customs Act as a Tribunal. Even the present Tribunal has come in substitution to the said erstwhile Authority as all pending Revision Applications have been transferred to the Tribunal. In the eye of law the erstwhile Revisionary Authority was in no way inferior to the present Appellate Tribunal nor the present Appellate Tribunal is in any way superior to the erstwhile authority. The present Tribunal has merely stepped into the shoes of the Revisionary Authority, therefore, the law as laid down by the Revisionary Authority is to be treated binding on the Tribunal, like the decision of one Bench of the Tribunal is binding on the other Bench of the Tribunal.
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1984 (1) TMI 321
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... ... ..... lly provided for wind screens; (l) we cannot find any support in the said decision for the contention of the Revenue before us; (m) nor does reliance on 1980 E.L.T. 249 etc. help the Appellant. All that has been stated in the said decision was that Item 68 of the First Schedule is rather too wide in its ambit and residuary in character and, in the context of technological advances, can hardly subserve the purpose of earning the revenue. This may be so but the decision itself is an authority for the proposition that it is essential to classify the goods according to the general and commercial usage and known denominations of the various goods. In accordance with trade usage and denomination, we find that headlight covers cannot be described as ‘glass’ or ‘glassware’. 8. In the view we have taken on the first question, it is unnecessary for us to go into the second. 9. In the result, we see no merits in the Appeal and dismiss it accordingly.
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1984 (1) TMI 320
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... ... ..... case of Godfray Phillips India Ltd., Bombay in Order-in-Revision No. 219 of 1976, dated 6th. Feb, 1976 reported in 1982 E.L.T. 495. In that case, it was held that the cigarettes returned to their factory for reprocessing under rule 173-L of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 were of Viscount brand; the tobacco obtained out of these cigarettes was mixed in the production of Cavender brand cigarettes. Viscount brand of cigarettes were manufactured out of a mixture of flue-cured and non-flue cured tobacco, whereas in the Cavender brand of cigarettes the percentage of flue-cured tobacco was higher. It was held that the goods fall in the same class and the classification did not change, (not cited by the parties) I hold that fire bricks and mortar fall in the same class of goods keeping in view the dictionary meaning and the judgment of the Government of India. 6. In the result, I uphold the order passed by the Collector (Appeals). The appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 319
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... ... ..... n to offer any comments on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court cited by the appellants. In his opinion, the sub-item (3) of item 29A of the Tariff should be read independently and all parts of refrigeration and air-conditioning appliance and machinery, whether they are assembled at site or they are ready for assembly or not, attract Central Excise duty. Saleability of such parts is not the criterion. 4. The Bench considered the submission made by both parties. The Bench is of the view that the facts of the case are fully covered by the citations referred to above. In particular, the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Mother India Refrigeration Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Supdt. of Central Excise is clear and following this judgment we hold that the make-shift contrivance for milk cooling made by the appellants could not be considered excisable under entry No. 29A(3). We, therefore, set aside the order of the Appellate Collector and allow the appeal.
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1984 (1) TMI 318
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... ... ..... l have to examine the first finding afresh and the matter will be remanded for that purpose. 14. The order of the Collector of Customs dated 23rd October, 1970, the order of the Gold Controller (Administrator) dated 2nd June, 1972 and the order in revision of the Government of India dated 18th October, 1979 are quashed and set aside. The Collector of Customs shall issue a fresh show cause notice in respect of the alleged failure of the petitioners to maintain the requisite records upto date and he shall, after considering the reply of the petitioners and after granting them a personal hearing, come to a fresh conclusion thereupon. In so doing he shall act upon the basis that bangles had not been illegally acquired by the petitioners. In view of the fact that the bangles shall remain in the custody of the respondents till such time as an order is passed, the Collector is directed to pass it on or before 31st March, 1984. 15. Rule accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1984 (1) TMI 317
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... ... ..... so that it would enjoy concession under Notification No. 71/76. 2. There has been not enough reasons given by either the Assistant Collector or the Appellate Collector (Appeal Order No. 693/78, dated 28-6-1978) why the paper would not qualify to be classed as a waxed paper so as to be entitled to the exemption. Simply because the paper was treated to give it anti-rust property would not make it less a waxed paper. The fact that it was waxed is not denied by the Department. In my view the treatment with sodium benzoate will not remove the paper from the category of waxed paper because acquisition of additional properties will not make the article cease to be what it was unless the additional properties change it completely so that it is no longer the article it was or is without the acquired properties. 3. In view of this I agree that the Notification No. 71/76, dated 16-3-1976 should be extended to the appellants as in the order written by learned brother Sankaran.
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1984 (1) TMI 316
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... ... ..... avenue for redress but it has no case to have more than one such avenue. These are important and weighty business and the energy of the State and its avenues must not be frittered away by opening as many doors as possible for a person who desires of enter to seek succour from injustice. One remedy at a time, one avenue at a time is surely what commonsense dictates, not extravagance of two or three, with, may be, two or three more at the next stage. An irrational idea. Coromandel can claim that it was in order for it to appeal to the Government of India against the Collector’s order in review; in that case the Government of India would have two appeals/applications and the appellant/applicant also demand that two orders must be issued. I am not convinced by anything said on behalf of the appellants that the Tribunal should hear any appeal against the Appellate Collector’s order as there was no such order that can be appealed. Coromandel’s appeal is rejected.
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1984 (1) TMI 315
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... ... ..... ed by them with the department. We are afraid that we are not in agreement with the reasonings and the conclusions arrived at by the Collector. The Trade circulars and other instructions on the subject are clear enough as guidelines for computing the value of capital investment on plant and machinery and the appellants could justifiably assume that certain expenses incurred by them as stated above would not form part of such capital investment on plant and machinery. In this case, even according to the calculations made by the Department, the total excess of such investment is only ₹ 22,057/- over the maximum limit of ₹ 10 lakhs. Even if the expenses on items like transportation and technical know-how fees are excluded the total value would fall below this limit of ₹ 10 lakhs. 4. On consideration of all the facts and circumstances the Bench sets aside the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, and allows the appeal with consequential relief.
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1984 (1) TMI 314
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... ... ..... . We find that in this case also, certain affidavits, Orders and Invoices were annexed with the reply itself, submitted by the party to the show cause notice, which unequivocally indicate that these were being treated as automobile parts, (Annexure II, III and VI), but we do not find any rebuttal, although the Government has had ample opportunity to rebut the same, they having been made part of the Reply to the Show Cause Notice. 18. We, therefore, do not think that any further discussion is necessary in this appeal to examine the correctness of the stand taken by the Board, as no substantial material has been placed on record or shown during arguments in support of the stand, to justify setting aside the Board’s orders, which we find on the facts of this case, to be wholly justified and not open to challenge, and squarely covered by judgment of Bombay High Court, referred to above. We accordingly do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is rejected.
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1984 (1) TMI 313
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... ... ..... the date of removal is the crucial date for application of the rate of duty only although excise is essentially a duty on manufacture. In the case of M/s. Shinde Brothers v. Dy. Commissioner, Raichur as well (AIR 1967 S.C. 1512), the axiomatic proposition that a taxable event must be the manufacture though the levy need not necessarily be at the stage of production or manufacture has been reiterated. 26. From the discussions supra, it would appear that - (a) excise is a duty upon manufacture of goods specified in the First Schedule to the Act; (b) taxable event is accordingly “manufacture”; (c) the Rules fix the time with reference to which the rate of duty must be applied and not the point of incidence of the duty or the taxable event; (d) if the taxable event occurs prior to the imposition of the duty, there cannot be any question of levy or assessment of duty afterwards. 27. In the premises, I propose an order allowing the Appeal.
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1984 (1) TMI 312
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... ... ..... n. Hence the Notification 119/75 is not attracted since the radiator part is not assessable under Item 68, CET. The Departmental Representative has countered the above contentions of the appellants and has stated that the goods in question are, in fact, semi-finished component parts of radiator which are manufactured from the raw-materials supplied by M/s. Universal Radiators to the appellants. The parts so fabricated by the appellants fall under Item 68 of the Tariff and not under 34A, CET as such they would not be eligible to the exemption under Notification No. 99/71, dated 29-5-1971 as amended. The Bench is of the view that the fabrication process undertaken by appellants has not resulted in an identifiable or distinct manufactured product or goods. Even if it is assumed that this process results in production of radiator parts, these would be eligible to exemption under the Notification No. 99/71, dated 29-5-1971 as part of a radiator. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 310
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... ... ..... basis of chemical Examiner’s report that Mill-scales is Iron Oxide would have, therefore, be excluded. Mill-scales arose during process of manufacture of Iron and Steel Products. The material on the record shows that it is exported through Metal Scrap Trading Corporation, a Govt. of India Undertaking. From this, it would be reasonable to infer that Mill-scales are nothing but iron or steel scrap. Besides, all this, during arguments, Sh. Majumdar also placed a cutting from the daily Statesman Calcutta dated 23-3-1979, from which it appears that Government decided to import Mill scale treating the same as scrap. This would lend further support to the appellants’ argument. 6. In view of the foregoing, the Bench feels that lower authorities were not justified in classifying Mill-scale as Iron Oxide falling under T.I. 68 of the C.E.T. The orders passed by the lower authorities are set aside with consequential refund to the appellants. The appeal is thus allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 309
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... ... ..... pellants they say as follows - The goods are normally sold in these cartons from the factory and crating is resorted to only when the goods are to be sent by trucks or by rail to distant places. To illustrate this point, the appellants submit that they cleared 418 pcs. in card board cartons during August and September, 1975 and 2,230 pcs in wooden crates during the period. Examination of this statement made by the appellants shows that overwhelming majority of pressure cookers were cleared in wooden crates during the relevant period. Besides, in term of the judgment of the Supreme Court the position is quite clear that the cost of the crates has to be included in the assessable value inasmuch as the appellants have not showed us that crates constitute special secondary packing ordered by the customers. It must, therefore, be taken as normal secondary packing and its value included in the assessable value. For these reasons, we see no merit in the appeal and dismiss the same.
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