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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 249 Records
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1984 (1) TMI 221
Baggage - Re-export when not permissible ... ... ... ... ..... for the Appellant was that the goods are not liable to confiscation once a declaration has been made in terms of Section 77 of the Customs Act, 1962 and detention receipt for re-export obtained in terms of Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1962. In each of the cited cases there was a definite request for detention in terms of Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1962 and detention receipt in respect of the prohibited goods was, indeed issued. 7. That was not the case in either of the two Appeals before us in 1983 ECR 604 and 1983 (14) E.L.T. 1938 or the instant Appeal. The facts were distinguishable. 8. In the instant Appeal, it would appear that the Appellant chose to take a chance in adjudication rather than request for detention and is now asking for re-export once he (sic) found that the penalty imposed was beyond his (sic) expectations. 9. Accordingly, following the ratio of our decisions in 1983 ECR 604 and 1983 (14) E.L.T. 1938, we have no hesitation in dismissing this Appeal.
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1984 (1) TMI 220
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... ... ..... is plea of the appellants, stated that he had no submissions to make. 3. We have carefully considered the matter. The so-called rebate granted to the appellants was nothing but refund of a portion of the Central Excise duty paid by them on sugar and to which they became entitled by virtue of an Exemption Notification. Rule 10 specifically applied to recoveries of erroneous refund. The Rule made no distinction between refund granted in cash or through a credit entry in the Personal Ledger Account. In either case, it was a refund of the duty. The Department has not placed before us any material to show that Rule 10A could be attracted in the facts of this case. As this was clearly a case of erroneous refund which attracted the time bar of Rule 10, we hold that the show cause notice issued to the appellants was time barred. In view of this finding we do not consider it necessary to go into the merits of the case. The appeal is allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1984 (1) TMI 219
Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... tice is wholly set aside because of the Demand being partly time-barred, and partly, owing to the fact that duty stands already paid under the relevant Tariff Item, now determined by us. Appeal No. ED(SB)(T) 1482/83-D is disposed of, to the effect that whereas demand on account of the first two items namely, Polyester/Viscose/Acrylic in the ratio of 24 26 50 and Polyester/Viscose/Acrylic in the ratio of 45 5 50 completely falls on merits, on the basis of duty having already been paid under T.I. 68 the rest of it in respect of the third item is confirmed only with effect from 5-1-1979 under T.I. 18E. The appellants would, of course, be allowed set-off on account of duty, if any, already paid on the constituent yarns under same Tariff entry namely, T.I. 18E. This, we direct, in the light of our earlier decision in the case of General Industrial Society Ltd. (supra) 1983 (14) E.L.T. 2497 . 30. Cross Objection No. ED/SB(CO) 82/83-D filed by the Department rejected as not pressed.
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1984 (1) TMI 215
Tractor - Diesel Engines ... ... ... ... ..... ly rsquo imported by the Appellants would clearly be eligible to the exemption under the aforesaid Notification No. 82-Cus., dated 6-8-1960, since all the conditions making them eligible for exemption have been substantially satisfied in this case. The D.G.T.D. certificates clearly certified that these goods are required for the purposes which are specified in the Notification and has recommended the grant of exemption. The actual use of these components viz. Piston assemblies has also been conceded by the Department. The Bench, therefore, orders that the goods in question i.e. lsquo Piston Assemblies rsquo be granted exemption under the aforesaid notification. As to the claim for countervailing duty, since refund of countervailing duty was not agitated before the lower authorities nor in their Revision application, we do not propose to deal with this claim at this stage. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the extent stated above with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1984 (1) TMI 212
Export Assistance Scheme for Cotton Textiles ... ... ... ... ..... and the 1st respondent is always free not to act thereon. The 1st respondent itself would not, I think, want its representations so treated. 17. The petition is dismissed against the 2nd respondent. The decision and order of the first respondent reproduced in the circular of the 2nd respondent dated 6th January 1979 is quashed and set aside insofar as it affects those exporters who had entered into contracts under the said Scheme prior to 1st January 1979. The first respondent shall, within a period of 6 months from today, examine each of the contracts mentioned in the annexures to each of the petitions to determine whether they were entered into under the Scheme and whether they were entered into prior to 1st January 1979. To the petitioners who had entered into such contracts the 1st respondent shall grant cash assistance under the said Scheme within the said period of 6 months. The 1st respondent shall pay to the petitioners the costs in each petitions. Rules accordingly.
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1984 (1) TMI 209
Claasification ... ... ... ... ..... gems, as if they thought that if the one rule should fail them, the others might perhaps not. We are totally dissatisfied by the case, to say nothing of our disquiet by the 4 years delay in holding the personal hearing, a fact we have referred to above. And let us all note that the Assistant Collector imposed a penalty of Rs. 200/- (not Rs. 2,000/- or Rs. 20,000/-, but Rs. 200/- for what he thought was a fraud of 5 lakhs. These leisurely halfhearted steps are not the reaction of men who have discovered a fraud worth half a million. We believe not a word of the story of suppression. 9. emsp We think that the only right thing to do is to limit the demand under the show cause notice, dated 1-9-1973 to only, 1 year of Rule 10 and not the unlimited time set by the department, as we are satisfied that there has been nothing to justify a demand for such unlimited periods. We order, accordingly, and all actions be taken in consequence of this order shall be completed within 3 months.
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1984 (1) TMI 206
CLAASIFICATION ... ... ... ... ..... ive up his argument for re-assessment of the goods under the concessional rate of duty under the Notification No. 77, dated 18-6-1977 which covered the goods falling under sub-heading (1) of 73.15 of the Customs Tariff. He, therefore, requested that the refund on account of re-assessment to countervailing duty under Item 26AA CET be given. 6. ensp The classification for the purpose of basic Customs Duty is not an issue before the Bench, i.e. whether the goods are classifiable under Heading 73.11 or 73.15(1). In either case the classification for the purpose of countervailing duty would be 26AA. That in fact, the Appellate Collector found in favour of the appellants but it appears he declined relief to the appellants possibly on a miscalculation overlooking the Notification No. 77 of 18-6-1977. In view of the foregoing it appears that the appellants are justified in getting their claim for refund of C.V. duty. The appeal insofar as it relates to refund of C.V. duty is allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 205
CLASSIFICATION ... ... ... ... ..... machines of which they are parts and not under a separate heading. Since these are parts of the turbine suitable for use principally with the turbine, they are correctly classifiable under 84.04/05. These are entirely made of steel and hence their classification under Heading 84.64 was not correct since that heading covers only Gaskets and similar joints of metal sheeting combined with other material or of laminated metal foil, etc. The Supplier rsquo s cable dated 18th September, 1979 produced by the appellants shows that the packing rings are made of 15 xm steel which are meant for preventing the leakage of steam from one side of the diaphragm to the other through clearance between diaphragm and the rotor shaft. The Departmental Representative, after looking into the documents produced, particularly the drawing and the supplier rsquo s cable, accepted that the rings were properly assessable under Heading 84.04/05. The appeal is accordingly allowed with consequential relief.
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1984 (1) TMI 204
Excess Production Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... B the clearances of all the products which fell for classification under 15A(1) CET as it stood during the base period and the excess clearances, of all the products which fell within the scope of 15A(1) CET during the incentive period. The fact that the coverage and scope of Item 15A(1) CET was not the same but was different in the base period and the incentive period would not, in our opinion, make any difference to the above position. Nor is a product to product linkage envisaged in the Notification. It only calls for a computation of the clearances of all goods which fell under 15A(1) CET as it stood during the base period and similarly a computation of the excess clearances for all the goods which fell under 15A(1) CET as it stood during the incentive period. 8. ensp In the above view of the matter, the appeals succeed. The concerned Central Excise authorities shall grant consequential relief to the appellants within 4 months from the date of communication of this order.
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1984 (1) TMI 203
... ...
... ... ..... onal research or charitable institution or hospital. Undoubtedly, M/s. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. even though its shares are owned by the President of India is not Government. It is a Government Company and is not Government. In view of the foregoing, the extended time limit cannot be applicable to the appellants. As to Shri Tandon rsquo s argument that for the purpose of making less charge demand under Section 27(ia) of the Act, Customs authorities have treated M/s. H.A.L. as Government and applied the time limit of one year. It is sufficient to say that merely because the Customs authorities committed a mistake in those cases would be no reason that the same mistake should be repeated in the appeal before us. As to prayer for condonation of delay, it is sufficient to say that there is no provision in statute for condonation of such delay. In view of the foregoing discussion, without going into the merits of the case, on the question of time bar, the appeal stands dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 190
Foreign Exchange - Appeals ... ... ... ... ..... on behalf of the appellant firm whereas S.A.O. No. 53 of 1983, has been filed on behalf of the department. 3. emsp Under Section 54 of the Act, an appeal shall lie to the High Court only on a question of law from any decision of order of the Board. Thus, the scope for interference by the High Court in second appeal is very limited. 4. emsp No meaningful argument to challenge the findings of the Board as to be interfered with by this Court has been raised. However, as regards the amount of penalty, I find that the minimum penalty of Rs. 5,000/- would meet the ends of justice. 5. emsp Consequently, S.A.O. No. 53 of 1983, fails and is dismissed where-s S.A.O. No. 67 of 1982 is partly accepted to the extent that the penalty imposed is reduced from Rs. 6,000/- to Rs. 5,000/- only. 5. emsp Consequently, S.A.O No. 53 of 1983, fails and is dismissed whereas S.A.O. No. 67 of 1982 is partly accepted to the extent that the penalty imposed is reduced from Rs. 6,000/- to Rs. 5,000/- only.
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1984 (1) TMI 186
Refund on Returned goods ... ... ... ... ..... ard to the grant of refund in respect of the goods lost during reprocessing is erroneous. Rule 173L is a complete code in the matter of refund of duty on goods returned to the factory. When refund is admissible and when it is not admissible are laid down in the said rule. The rule is explicit and unambiguous. It says that the Collector may grant refund if the manufacturer claiming refund satisfies the Collector the conditions laid down in that rule. 13. In what circumstances the refund is inadmissible is set out in clauses (i) to (iv) (at the relevant time) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 173L. Thus, both positive and negative aspects had been provided in the rules. The rules in my opinion is more eloquent and it would be incorrect to state that rule is silent. 14. emsp After careful consideration of all the aspects, I allow these appeals and set aside the orders passed by the authorities below and direct the Central Excise authorities to grant consequential relief to the appellants.
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1984 (1) TMI 185
Refund of duty on short-landed goods ... ... ... ... ..... out that the photostat copies produced by the appellants do not contain the particulars of the packages in respect of which refund is claimed. 7. emsp It can be again said that the appellants had been callous in perusing their remedies. If they had taken proper care at proper time they could have saved the public time and expenses. But then that by itself cannot be a ground to reject the just claim of the appellants. 8. emsp In the result, I allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed by the authorities below and remand the matter to the Assistant Collector, MCD, for consideration afresh in the light of the observations contained in this order. The appellants are directed to produce the original invoice in respect of the cases which are shortlanded as per the certificate issued by the BPT. The Customs Authorities are at liberty to verify as to whether subsequent to the issue of the shortlanding certificate any of the cases had been traced and deliverd to the appellants.
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1984 (1) TMI 180
... ...
... ... ..... petitioners that even if grounds of detention are explained and translated at the time of delivery it would not be good enough in order to make an effective representation. The detenus should be able to read, re-read or have read or re-read the grounds of detention to them quite a few times before they can really give an effective representation. This necessitates giving a translation of the ground of detention to the detenus in the language known to them. That is the law. If this safeguard is not observed the right to make an effective representation as contemplated by Article 22(5) will be denied to a person held without trial in a civilised society. We, therefore, hold that the detention is vitiated by non-compliance of the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The detention of the petitioners are quashed. The respondents are directed to set them at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained under any other valid order of detention or an order of a court.
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1984 (1) TMI 177
... ...
... ... ..... l. The Press Note has held out para 21 of (1975) 101 ITR (St). 95 that when u/s 14 where there is a search under income-tax or wealth-tax the assessee is immuned form penalty in respect of disclosed income or assets representing such disclosed income. So if an assessee is under the belief that all what he need do in a case where there was a search in income-tax or wealth-tax is to make a disclosure of income and the rest like assessment to wealth-tax are only consequential and will take care of themselves and that, therefore, there is no need or hurry to file consequential wealth-tax returns, such belief is only a reasonable belief and such reasonable belief do constitute reasonable cause for failure to file the wealth-tax returns. So there is reasonable cause also in this case. apart from the reasonable cause on erroneous advice found by the AAC. We also agree with the reasonings and conclusion of the AAC. So, for these reasons, these five Departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1984 (1) TMI 175
... ...
... ... ..... th reference to payment of self-assessment tax for a later year or amendment of order under s. 210(3) by the ITO. Therefore, if advance-tax payable were to be computed in accordance with ss. 208 to 219 inclusive of s. 209(1)(d) and the Explanation thereto, the condition regarding total income under s. 208(2) should be satisfied r/w Explanation to s. 209(1)(d). Even s. 209A(1) clearly specifies that if his current income is likely to exceed the amount specified in sub-s. (2) of s. 208 . Therefore, when once it is found that the current income is not likely to exceed the amount specified in s. 208(2) of the Act, the assessee is not obliged to send a statement of advance-tax and, therefore, the question of paying the amount of advance-tax did not arise at all. Therefore, the authorities were not justified in holding otherwise. Consequently, we set aside the orders of the authorities imposing the penalty and direct deletion of the penalty. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 173
Assessment Year, Carry Forward And Set Off, Registered Firm, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... of an unregistered firm, the partners concerned would not be eligible to have the share of income or share of loss set off against the profits for those years or carry forward the same, in the year under appeal, where it is the firm which is entitled to the carry forward and set off against the profits in the year of assessment concerned, even when it is assessed as a registered firm, the provisions of section 77(1) will clearly come into play and the firm s loss, whether it is the loss of the year or carried forward loss, will be eligible to be apportioned in the partners assessments, who should be entitled to the set off and carry forward of the balance, if any, left. We, therefore, accept the assessee s contention and direct assessment of the firm and apportionment of the partners share, accordingly. The set off will, of course, be subject to the other provisions, which may have a bearing on or may apply to the facts such as sections 70, 71, 72, etc. The appeal is allowed.
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1984 (1) TMI 171
... ...
... ... ..... only to the expenses on stay and does not cover other expenses incurred provided they are not personal and are exclusively for the purpose of business. Since the illustrations of the nature given by Shri Vaish can be multiplied, we do not wish to embark upon any speculation of the category of such expenses, but we would only say that r. 6D read with s. 37(3) seeks to limit the expenditure incurred on travelling to the extend of stay in hotels confining it to daily allowance referred to in r. 6D and do not extent to any other expenditure incurred provided that expenditure was for the purpose of business. 3. Applying this test to the facts of the case before us, we are of the view that the expenditure incurred by the assessee before us, though reasonable, comes within the category of expenditure referred to in r. 6D and is, therefore, subject to the limitation provided therein. With these observations, we would agree with the view take by our ld, brother, expressed so lucidly.
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1984 (1) TMI 169
... ...
... ... ..... e stay in hostel. The restriction confines itself only to the expenses incurred provided they are not personal and are exclusively for the purpose of business. Since the illustration of the nature given by Shri Vaish can be multiplied, we do not wish to embark upon any speculation of the category of such expenses, but we could only say that r. 6D r/w s. 37(3) seeks to limit the expenditure incurred on travelling to the extent of stay in hotels confining it to daily allowance referred to in r.6D and do not extend to any other expenditure incurred provided that expenditure was for the purpose of business. 3. Applying this test to the facts of the case before us, we are of the view that the expenditure incurred by the assessee before us, though reasonable, comes within the category of expenditure referred to in r. 6D and is, therefore, subject to the limitation provided therein. With these observations, we could agree with the view taken by our ld. Brother. expressed so lucidly.
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1984 (1) TMI 167
Transfer Of Assets, For Benefit Of Spouse Or Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... T v. Vegetable Products Ltd. 1973 88 ITR 192. 4. The Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, has held in the case of Surya Prakash v. WTO IT Appeal Nos. 2178 (All.) of 1979 and 1953 (All.) of 1980 dated 17-2-1982 that the income of an HUF of which the assessee was a karta could not be treated as the income of the assessee-individual for the purpose of deciding whether the income of the assessee individual or the income of the wife was greater. It has also pointed out that the HUF is a distinct and separate entity from the individual and the legal position that a person representing HUF in a firm is a partner in his individual capacity is for the limited purpose of determining who is the partner and the logic cannot be extended to determine who between the spouses has the larger income for the purposes of ascertaining in whose hands income is to be clubbed. In view of the authorities cited, we uphold the order of the AAC as it is justified in law. 5. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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