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Showing 81 to 100 of 231 Records
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1984 (12) TMI 199
... ... ... ... ..... er No. 1561 of 1981 in the case of Everett (India) Pvt. Ltd. and the facts of the appellant rsquo s cases are similar. There is no reason as to why the appellant should not be given the benefit of the Calcutta High Court judgment as stated above. This Court has already passed many orders on this issue and has repeatedly followed the said Hon rsquo ble Calcutta High Court judgment. I, therefore, order cancellation of the orders imposing penalties of Rs. 1,850/-, Rs. 784/-, Rs. 800/-, Rs. 2,000/-, Rs. 2,010/-, Rs. 8,249/-, Rs. 9,271/- and Rs. 1,910/- totalling Rs. 27,324/- (Rupees twenty seven thousand three hundred twenty four only). In the result, the said 8 appeals are accepted. The revenue is directed to refund the penalties paid by the appellant in respect of the aforesaid 8 appeals after making necessary verification as to their payment within 4 months from the date of this order. The Registry is directed to place the copies of this order in all the 8 appeals rsquo files.
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1984 (12) TMI 198
Phenolic resin lamp capping cement ... ... ... ... ..... ered was contrary to the claim made by the factory . The Appellate Collector himself does not say clearly what is it that was added to the product to make it a blend adding the marble dust filler would not produce a blend of resins and if he thought that the filler was a resin, he was completely off the track. The blend that disqualified is only a blend of the phenolic resin with other synthetic resins. There was no other artificial resin mixed or blended with this phenolic resin the test report does not say so. As this is the reason for the rejection by the Appellate Collector of the claim to concessional assessment under Notification No. 122/71-C.E., we set his order aside as it is wrong and contrary to the facts and to technology. We direct that the phenolic resin Grade PR/707 produced by M/s. Indian Plastics Limited should be assessed as a phenolic resin under Notification No. 122/71-C.E. If this order results in any refund, that refund should be paid within three months.
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1984 (12) TMI 195
... ... ... ... ..... t, 1982 has to be read harmoniously with Sections 11A and 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. I am inclined to hold that the impugned order is not legally sustainable. In this view of the matter, I set aside the impugned order appealed against and allow the appeal as prayed for with consequential relief. 4. emsp I have heard both sides to the reference application. As a result of discussion, it was agreed that only the following question would emerge for reference from the order of the Tribunal. Accordingly, I refer the following question under Section 35G of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 to the Honorable High Court of Judicature at Madras ldquo Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that on a harmonious interpretation of Section 51 of the Finance Act, 1982 and Sections 11A and 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the order of refund has become final at the hands of a quasi-judicial authority. rdquo
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1984 (12) TMI 192
Questions when having relation to rate of duty not referable to High Court ... ... ... ... ..... emplated by Section 35H of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, would lie only if there was a properly maintainable, and duly entertained, application under Section 35G of the said Act. The provisions of Sections 130 and 130A of the Act are pari materia to the provisions of above quoted sections, i.e., Sections 35G and 35H of the Act and these observations shall apply appositely here also, with the result that in case reference itself was not maintainable under Section 130, the question of invoking Section 130A, for reference to Supreme Court would not arise, because that can only be through, a properly maintainable application under Section 130. In the result, the mere fact that there was some divergence in the views taken by the Bombay High Court and the Delhi High Court, would not entitle the applicants to have a reference made, and the only remedy for them seems to have been by way of appeal to the Supreme Court. We are therefore constrained to reject this application.
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1984 (12) TMI 191
Import - Colour Television set ... ... ... ... ..... Since I set aside the order of confiscation of the above two items, question of setting aside the fine in lieu of confiscation does not arise because it cannot exist independently. However, the confiscation of the TV set valued at Rs. 4,000/- is confirmed but the same is allowed to be redeemed on payment of a fine of Rs. 4,000/-. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The confiscation of Items 10 and 12 namely Video Cassette Recorder, and Video Cassette Tapes (assorted) and the fine in lieu of confiscation of the said items are set aside. They shall be released to the appellant on payment of duty. 11. ensp The confiscation of TV set is confirmed but the appellant is allowed redemption on payment of fine of Rs. 4,000/- in lieu of confiscation. The appellant and the members of his family shall be granted admissible ITC allowances taking into consideration the allowance already granted in respect of other items which were ordered to be cleared by the Assistant Collector.
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1984 (12) TMI 184
‘Coconut oil’ - In common parlance and trade circles understood to include both edible and non-edible variety
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1984 (12) TMI 183
Appeals - Five claims disposed of by an order numbered separately textually identical ... ... ... ... ..... would still be ldquo a decision rdquo with the meaning of Clause (a) of Section 35B(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and filing of one appeal is sufficient. It appears that while taking the present decision the Tribunal has been guided by the theory of institution of a suit and passing of lsquo a decree rsquo in a civil matter, but the proceedings in a Civil Court being adversary in nature stands altogether on a different footing than the proceeding in a tax matter before hierarchy of departmental authorities. In relation to a tax matter, the Andhra High Court in the case of C.I.T. v Shri Venkateswara Talkies - (1985) 20 Taxman 47 - has held that one single appeal is maintainable against a common order passed by the authorities. A somewhat similar decision was earlier taken by the Calcutta High Court in the case of C.I.T. v. Rupa Traders - (1979) 118 ITR 412. In the light of these Court pronouncements the decision of the Appellate Tribunal needs reconsideration.
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1984 (12) TMI 176
Gold - Confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... reasonable opportunity of making a representation in writing. If it is so desired, he should be heard in the matter. Admittedly no notice was issued to Shri Satish Kumar, Shri Nanak Chand Gupta or Shri Bodhraj Gupta. The ruling reported in 1983 E.L.T. 687 cited by the learned Consultant holds that if no such notice was given within six months from the date of seizure, the gold seized was liable to be returned to the person from whose possession it was seized. The learned Consultant also produced before us a copy of the ruling of the High Court of Kerala in O.P. 3113 of 69 wherein it was held that notice under section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act should be given. The recent decision of CEGAT reported in 1984 ECR 1620 also supports our view. Hence having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the orders of the lower authorities cannot be sustained. The impugned order is therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief.
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1984 (12) TMI 175
Short landing of goods - Show cause notice ... ... ... ... ..... instant case the submission of Shri Gidwani that there had been delay on account of balancing of various items had not been seriously disputed by the appellants. The appellants have taken an extreme position namely that they had accounted for the shortlanded goods at Calcutta port but they had failed to establish that they had discharged at Calcutta port the quantity found short at Bombay port. They were issued with a show cause notice and also a reminder. Still they did not choose to send any reply. The appellants to some extent are guilty of latches. The penalty imposed by the Dy. Collector appears equivalent to the duty payable on the shortlanded goods. Though demand was made after a lapse of ten years, considering the latcheson the part of the appellants and the false plea taken by them regarding accounting of the shortlanded cargo, I am not inclined to set aside the whole of the penalty imposed on the appellants. However, I reduce the penalty amount from Rs. 29,453/- to
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1984 (12) TMI 170
Short landing of goods ... ... ... ... ..... ed that if any enquiry is made within a period of one year there will be claim against the Steamer Agent by the consignee. The object of issue of show cause notice is to given an opportunity to the Steamer Agent to account for the shortlanded goods. 6. emsp In the present case, the Steamer Agents have produced a tally sheet. The document by itself does not show that the goods actually loaded have been landed. All that it shows is about the number of items landed. It is not in dispute that the Port Trust issues short landing certificate on the basis of the tally, sheet. Therefore, if the Port Trust had issued a certificate showing that out of 26 drums 8 only had landed, the same has to be accepted in the absence of any other evidence. I, therefore, allow this appeal in part and direct the Assistant Collector, MCD to grant consequential relief in respect of 8 drums which were shown to have been landed. In other respects, the orders passed by the authorities below are confirmed.
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1984 (12) TMI 167
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... he ITO has exercised any such option, it is the duty of the appellate authorities, as mentioned above, to give a finding as to whether such an option if exercised, is correctly exercised. From the facts above, we hold that in fact no such option has been exercised. The AAC, therefore, fell into an error in annulling the assessments. In the case law, relied upon by Shri Gadgil, there was no dispute about the actual exercise of the option. Hence, that case law is not applicable to the facts of this case. 11. Accordingly, we hold in the interest of justice that the matter should be sent back to the AAC, who should examine the main question, viz., whether there was an AOP doing business. 12. The AAC should also examine the alternative contention regarding the existence of adventure in the nature of trade, etc., of AOP after hearing both the sides. Accordingly, the order of the AAC is set aside for fresh disposal on the lines given above. 13. Appeals are treated as partly allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 164
... ... ... ... ..... ent made by the Asstt. Controller was only based on a change of opinion as to what constituted the correct extent of land appurtenant to the building. To constitute information, the Asstt. Controller must know or learn something which he did not know earlier. This section does not permit the Asstt. Controller a fresh application of his mind to the same issue or enable him to correct his own or his predecessor rsquo s errors of judgment. The Asstt. Controller cannot take action under this section merely because he happens to change his opinion or to hold an opinion different from that of his predecessors on the same set of facts. Applying these principles to the present case, it is quite clear, that the audit objection requires of the Asstt. Controller only to change his earlier opinion in this behalf. Having due regard to these principles, we are of the opinion, that the Appellate Controller was justified in cancelling the assessment. 7. In the result the appeal is dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 163
... ... ... ... ..... ct, the interest adjusted on the debit balances of the partners in the books of the firm was not deductible from the share of profits of the respective partners. In the present case, the question at issue is totally different namely, whether the interest disallowance to be effected under s. 40(b) in the assessment of the firm is to be confined to the net amount after adjustment of interest received from the partners or the same should be extended to the gross amount of interest. We, therefor, do not agree that this decision of the M.P. High Court has a direct bearing on the issue. Accordingly, following (1979) 11 CTR (All) 239 (1982) 134 ITR 312 (All), we direct, that the interest from the individual partners should be adjusted against the interest paid to them by the firm and only the net amount of interest paid to them should be disallowed under s. 40(b). 7. In the result, we direct allowance of relief to the extent of Rs. 3,777. The appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 162
... ... ... ... ..... ing the proceedings validly initiated under s. 147(b). 11. As regards the third point, that the assessment reopened, should not be enlarged to consider issues other than those for which the assessment was reopened (1970) 75 ITR 373 (SC) is authority for the proposition that, once assessment is reopened, the previous under assessment is set aside and the whole assessment proceedings start a fresh and the ITO not only had the jurisdiction but it was his duty to levy tax on the entire income that had escaped assessment during that year. This decision has been followed by the Calcutta High Court in (1982) 133 ITR 204 (Cal). We, therefore, respectfully following the decision of the Supreme Court, hold, that this objection has no valid basis. We accordingly uphold the reopening of the assessment proceedings for the above mentioned reasons. Para Nos. 12 and 13 are deleted as they are not related to the main issue. 14. In the result the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 161
... ... ... ... ..... t, even as per the decision of the Gujarat High Court in (1981) 21 CTR (Guj) 26 (1980) 126 ITR 654 (Guj), interest paid on the advance made by the partners in their individual capacity, when they are partners of the firm in their representative capacity is to be disallowed under s. 40(b). This proposition has been clearly established by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in (1983) 33 CTR (MP) 29 (1982) 138 ITR 347 at 350 (MP). We are, therefore, of the opinion, that the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court still holds good and, since this case falls within the jurisdiction of that High Court, were are bound to follow that decisions with respect. Even otherwise, as mentioned by us, even 126 ITR of the Gujarat High Court lends support to the view, that the interest paid in the individual accounts of the partners is not admissible under s. 40(b). We therefore, confirm the disallowance of interest effected by the ITO under s. 40(b). 7. In the result the appeal is allowed in part.
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1984 (12) TMI 154
Assessment Year, House Property, Sale Proceeds, Valuation Date ... ... ... ... ..... . By some ingenious logic, the AAC has come to the conclusion that even after the conversion the exemption to be allowed is to be restricted to the sum which the original asset would have been entitled to prior to its conversion The actual fact is otherwise, namely, the exemption claimed is in respect of the bank deposit and the same under section 5(1A) is eligible for exemption up to Rs. 1,50,000. The measure or extent of the exemption is to be decided with reference to the operative part of the section, namely, 5(1A) and not with reference to a hypothesis as to what the assessee might have got, if the original asset had not been sold. In this view of the matter, we have absolutely no reservation in our mind that the exemption sought is in respect of the bank deposits and the same is eligible up to a ceiling of Rs. 1,50,000 under section 5(1A). Accordingly, we direct the WTO to allow exemption up to Rs. 1,50,000. 6. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 153
Dispose Of, House Property, Income From Other Sources, Profits And Gains Of Business ... ... ... ... ..... Gujarat High Court in Sajjanraj Divanchand s case interest paid on the advances made by the partners in their individual capacity when they are partners of the firm in their representative capacity is to be disallowed under section 40(b). This proposition has been clearly established by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jalam Chand Mangilal (No. 1) s case and Jalam Chand Mangilal (No. 2) s case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court still holds good and, since this case falls within the jurisdiction of that High Court, we are bound to follow that decision with respect. Even otherwise, as mentioned by us, even Sajjanraj Divanchand s case of the Gujarat High Court lends support to the view that the interest paid in the individual accounts of the partners is not admissible under section 40(b). We, therefore, confirm the disallowance of interest effected by the ITO under section 40(b). 13. In the result the appeal is allowed in part.
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1984 (12) TMI 152
Assessment Order, Assessment Year ... ... ... ... ..... s not signed by the assessee stands on the same footing as that of the other returns which are signed by some other persons who are not competent to sign. As pointed out earlierwe are of the considered opinion that non-signing of the return on the facts and in the circumstances of this case is the omission contemplated under section 292B and the return filed by the assessee cannot be held to be an invalid one for a simple mistake that has not been committed deliberately by the assessee. Therefore, the Commissioner is not justified in exercising jurisdiction under section 263 and visit the assessee with such a harsh penalty of cancelling the entire assessment passed by the ITO. Since we have accepted the first limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee, we do not propose to deal with the other arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee. The order passed by the Commissioner is, therefore, quashed and the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 151
A Firm, Set Off ... ... ... ... ..... Act, the interest adjusted on the debit balances of the partners in the books of the firm was not deductible from the share of profits of the respective partners. In the present case, the question at issue is totally different, namely, whether the interest disallowance to be affected under section 40(b) in the assessment of the firm is to be confined to the net amount after adjustment of interest received from the partners or the same should be extended to the gross amount of interest. We, therefore, do not agree that this decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has a direct bearing on the issue. Accordingly, following the case of Kailash Motors, we direct that the interest from the individual partners should be adjusted against the interest paid to them by the firm and only the net amount of interest paid to them should be disallowed under section 40(b). 7. In the result, we direct allowance of relief to the extent of Rs. 3,777. The appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 146
Assessment Year, Delay In Filing Return, Late Filing ... ... ... ... ..... n avoiding injustice. On the facts of the present case, there is nothing in the aforesaid opinion which is in conflict with the conclusion that we have arrived at. 20. The learned departmental representative also invited our attention to the letter of the Board, F. No. 236/335/73-A and P AC II, dated 11-12-1974 wherein it was stated that in the matter of levying interest under section 139(8) the actual date of filing the return should also be included in computing the total period for which interest is chargeable under section 139(8) . In the present case, we have to apply the terms of rule 119A, which is a statutory rule and which uses the expression month and with reference to the actual dates, on the basis of the judgment of the Madras High Court, we have to come to the conclusion that there is no default of one whole month. Therefore, the interest levied under section 139(8) has to be cancelled. 21 and 22. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
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