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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 318 Records
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1984 (3) TMI 403 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e. On a perusal of those exhibits, it is clear that the machinery would come within the heading 90.10. The position is further confirmed by the Notification 36/81. It must be said that colour scanners have been classified under Chapter 9 and exemption has been granted for import of such machines when used in the printing industry. So, it is reasonable to conclude that the intention of the Govt. is to treat colour scanners as falling within Chapter 90. The learned counsel for the appellants sought exemption under Notification 112/77. But that Notification applies to machines attracting duty under 84.35. Moreover, that Notification contemplates “process cameras within its ambit.” The learned counsel for the appellants fairly conceded that the colour scanner imported, is not a process camera. In the show cause notice it is stated that chromographic colour scanners was correctly assessable under 90.10. 9. In view of the discussion above, the appeal is dismissed.
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1984 (3) TMI 402 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... of penalty under the provisions of the Customs Act are, therefore, technically in order. The question is whether there are any extenuating circumstances as urged by the appellant. The department has not controverted the contention that there was a balance of quota of 45,000 pieces of powerloom blouses against which the 672 pieces could have been exported and that even otherwise the appellant had absolutely nothing to gain by way of Replenishment Licence, Cash Compensation, Duty Drawback etc. It is true, however, that such misdeclarations, whatever their cause, bring indirect harm to the country’s exports and violation of the law in this regard cannot be ignored or glossed over. 7. Keeping all the circumstances in view, we reduce the penalty to rupees five hundred (Rs. 500/-) and while upholding the confiscation, reduce the fine in lieu of confiscation to rupees five thousand only. The impugned order is modified to this extent and the appeal is otherwise rejected.
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1984 (3) TMI 401 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... in India or that the production or manufacture of article in India is a condition precedent to the valid levy of the c.v. duty.” 11. In this case, there is no dispute about the fact that the said product i.e. Methyl Isocyanate which was imported after 1-3-1979 had it been manufactured in India would have attracted excise duty under item 68, C.E.T. and therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 3(1) read with the explanation appended thereto c.v. duty was rightly levied upon this product by the Customs authorities. The question whether the levy of c.v. duty on goods the like of which are not manufactured in India is illegal and beyond the competence of the Union Legislature, cannot be raised before this Tribunal which is the creation of the Statute. This Tribunal has to interpret the Statute as it stands and it is beyond its competence to declare any provisions of the Statute as illegal. 12. We find no merits in this appeal, the same is hereby dismissed.
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1984 (3) TMI 400 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ply the law to a set of facts which remain to be investigated, cannot be corrected by way of rectification. (Not cited by the parties). During the course of arguments, we had brought this judgment to the notice of the learned authorised representative Shri P.R. Biswas as well as the learned S.D.R. Shri A.K. Saha. The Tribunal after considering the facts and materials and the legal pronouncement observed that the finding of the Tribunal is a finding of fact and no question of law does arise out of aforesaid order of the Tribunal. In the result, the reference application is rejected. 9. The respondent has filed cross-objection to the reference application dated 21st December, 1983, the same was presented in the Registry on the 21st December, 1983. The cross-reference application filed by the revenue is barred by time and the learned S.D.R has not been able to justify his claim for confirmation of delay. The cross-reference application being hit by limitation is dismissed.
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1984 (3) TMI 399 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... For ascertaining whether there was contrary intention it was necessary to look at the provisions of the Gold Control Act, 1968. In order to see whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed law had been put an end to by the new enactment, the correct approach was not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law but whether it had taken away those rights and liabilities. There is no doubt in our mind that the new enactment, the Gold Control Act, 1968 kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed laws and that an offence or an action that constituted an offence under the repealed law continued to be an offence under the new Law of 1968 and that proceedings can therefore be initiated and taken under the new law even if the offence were committed under the repealed law. 6. For the reasons, we consider that there is no case for a reference and the application is therefore, dismissed.
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1984 (3) TMI 398 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ically controlling flow of liquids and, whether treated as electrically operated or not, neither Heading 94.28 nor 94.24 would be appropriate. There is considerable force in the argument of the learned D.R. that the actuator has an independent function. This is borne out by the fact that it can be operated by the hand-wheel or by an electric motor or by an air motor. Applying Notes 2 and 4 to Section XVI and the Explanatory Note regarding classification of an action device under its own appropriate Heading, the most appropriate classification of this appliance, in our opinion, is Heading 84.59(1). Since the rate of duty here is identical to that at which the goods were originally assessed, it makes no difference as regards the amount of duty paid and, therefore, no refund of duty is involved and no relief would be due to the appellants. 9. In the circumstances, subject to our finding regarding the incorrect classification by the lower authorities, we reject this appeal.
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1984 (3) TMI 397 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... fit” or “appropriate order” is clearly not a sufficient compliance with this provision). Secondly, even if the show cause notice had proposed to demand duty for the earlier period, it would have been hit by the time-limit in sub-section (3) (b). 12. We accordingly hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the differential duty is payable by the appellants only from 12-10-81 onwards which was the date when the Collector’s show cause notice was issued for changing the classification. The demand issued by the Superintendent on 30-4-83 was only a consequential action pursuant to the Collector’s order and the date of the said demand by itself can, therefore, have no significance. 13. Accordingly, we uphold classification of the subject goods under Item 22F(4) but direct that the demand for differential duty payable by the appellants should be restricted to the period from 12-10-81 onwards only. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1984 (3) TMI 396 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e appellants laid down numerous conditions of eligibility such as value of the plant and machinery installed should not exceed ₹ 7.5/10 lakhs and total clearances in the preceding financial year should not exceed ₹ 30 lakhs, etc. etc. These conditions had to be gone into to determine whether the appellants were eligible to avail of the exemption under these notifications or not. But the basic question still remained that of the appellants’ entitlement to ‘nil’ rate of duty/concessional rate of duty under these notifications. Since Section 35G specifically bars reference to High Court in respect of any order “relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment” and Section 35L(b) provides for an appeal direct to the Supreme Court against such orders of the Tribunal, we reject the reference application as not maintainable.
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1984 (3) TMI 395 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... appeal has been decided only with reference to the limited question of limitation under Section 11A of the Act, in my opinion, it is not open to the learned Counsel for the applicant to raise for the first time the question of jurisdiction of this Tribunal and assail the validity of the order under reference. Strictly speaking, I will not have jurisdiction at all to consider the contention regarding jurisdiction at this stage when the appeal has already been decided and the application before me is only a reference application under Section 35G of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. 7. The learned Counsel for the applicant submitted that a question of law would arise as to whether Rule 10(l)(a) is applicable to the facts of the case. Since this question never arose for consideration at all before this Tribunal, the question of making a reference to the High Court on this point also does not arise. 8. For the above reasons, the reference application is rejected.
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1984 (3) TMI 394 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... duct, as long as the powder is of the same nature and composition as the rock from which it is ground, and has not acquired any character by reason of the grinding to set it apart from the rock. 16. The significant thing is that the powder here is sought to be assessed under Item 68, not that it has fallen into an item for “soap stone powder”. The doctrine about a new product seems to me to hold true only when, by reason of the change (grinding), the new product attracts a definition in one of the tariff headings. The rule, laid down by the Supreme Court, dealt with a problem of whether a refined oil has been produced. Such an oil has a tariff heading that it fits into. 17. Item 68 is not a description. It defines nothing. We cannot say that the soap stone has become goods “not elsewhere specified”, by reason of the grinding. It is not a product that has qualified for Item 68. 18. However, in view of the majority view, the appeal fails.
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1984 (3) TMI 393 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... s a result of pilferage) or destroyed, at any time before clearance for home consumption, the Assistant Collector of Customs shall remit the duty on such goods.” The note on clause 48 of the Finance Bill, 1983 reads as follows - “Clause 48 seeks to amend section 23 of the Customs Act, 1962, to exclude from its purview goods pilfered before their clearance for home consumption.” 21. It is thus clear that only with the amendment effected by the Finance Bill, 1983, Section 23(1) of the Act excluded from its purview goods pilfered before their clearance for home consumption, the implication being that in respect of pilferage of imported goods Section 13 alone and not Section 23 is applicable. It would be reasonable to infer that prior to the amendment, Section 23 (1) did not exclude from its purview goods pilfered before their clearance for home consumption. In this view of the matter, I agree with the conclusion reached by Shri Hegde and allow the appeal.
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1984 (3) TMI 392 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... led delivery charges were actually incurred at the stated rate. In the absence of this information, the Collector held that the delivery charges could not be arbitrarily excluded from the assessable value. The Board in his Order-in-Appeal has stated that, except for making a vague contention, the appellants had not tried to give any details of the charges and, therefore, the Collector was correct in rejecting the contention. Even at this stage, apart from certain submissions, no material has been placed before us by the appellants to enable us to consider whether this aspect of the matter should be remanded to the Collector for a fresh determination. As such, we do not accept Shri Rangaswamy’s prayer that this aspect of the matter may be remanded to the Collector and that he might be permitted to adduce evidence before the Collector in this behalf. 28. In the result, both the appeals are rejected. 29. A copy of this order shall be placed in each of the files.
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1984 (3) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT
Contempt of Court - Interim Relief - Held that:- The High Court not having set any limit of time for the disposal of the applications, it was not for the writ petitioners to impose a time-limit and demand that their applications should be disposed of forthwith. If the writ petitioners were aggrieved by the failure of their authorities to dispose of their applications expeditiously, it was open to them to seek a further direction from the court to fixing a limit of time within which the applications were to be disposed of. We fail to see how the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports or the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports could be said to have committed any contempt of court, even prima facie, by their mere failure to take action in the matter of the disposal of the applications of the writ petitions. In the circumstances, we perceive the application to commit the authorities for contempt of courts to be a device to exact licences from them.
We accordingly allow the appeal, vacate the interim order dated November 22, 1983 of the Calcutta High Court
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1984 (3) TMI 390 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... declaration. The assessee in that case was working under the system of physical excise control. It was in these circumstances that the Tribunal held that the provisions of Rule 9(2) could not be invoked by the Excise authorities. In the cases before us, though classification lists were submitted by Formica and approved by the Department, Formica continued to produce and consume the disputed products without payment of duty and without mentioning the fact of captive consumption and the quantity and value of the goods so captively consumed in their assessment returns. In these circumstances, the ratio of the cited decision is not applicable. 31. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, we direct that the demands for duty shall be re-determined and collected for the period commencing from the date of approval of the classification list in respect of each of the products. This, of course, will be subject to the decision we have given on the classification of each product.
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1984 (3) TMI 389 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... is jurisdiction, however erroneous or grossly erroneous the interpretation may be 1983 E L.T. 1327 (S.C.) - A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sebhraj Wadhwaai). Where between two competing entries, the statutory authority applied one or the other it is not a case of want of jurisdiction ab initio or acting in excess of it. (g) Where the alleged erroneous determination of the duty payable did not result from either want of Jurisdiction or acting in excess of jurisdiction, the period of Limitation prescribed in the Act will govern the proceedings. Thus, in AIR 1976 S.C. 638 .1983 E.L.T. 1579 (S.C.)- (M/s. Madras Rubber Factory v. Union of India), it was held that an application for refund of duty charged in excess beyond the statutory period of Limitation prescribed under Sec. 27 of the Act is barred and is thus rightly rejected. (h) Having applied under Sec. 27 of the Act, it is futile for the Appellant to contend that the period of Limitation prescribed therein is inapplicable.
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1984 (3) TMI 388 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the excise authorities entertain a doubt as to whether the goods are excisable or not and do not object to the clearance of the goods without payment of duty." So, the recovery of any duty relating to the period from 7-10-1969 to to 17-12-1974 is barred by limitation because this case is covered under ‘the provisions of Rule 10 which prescribe the period of limitation of one year. 24. In view of our discussion and findings above, we hold that this product i.e. electrical insulating varnished paper is not classifiable under Item 17(4) of the Central Excise Tariff. However, the department is at liberty to classify this product in any other appropriate tariff entry applicable to it at the relevant time but the demand for the period 7-10-1969 to 17-12-1974 is barred by limitation as described under Rule 10 read with Rule 173-J as it then was. With these findings we set aside the order of the authority below in both the appeals and accept the appeals accordingly.
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1984 (3) TMI 387 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... also, therefore, no substance. During the hearing before us, the Department’s representative raised yet one more objection saying that scrap graphite resulting after, use of the graphite mould had some economic value and so it could not be said that graphite rod/mould had been used up in the process of manufacture. We find no such condition embodied in the exemption notification. It is quite evident from the process of manufacture that-after being used, the graphite mould is broken up and cannot be re-used. We, therefore, hold that in terms of the language used in the pre-amended notification, the graphite rods/moulds were used in the manufacture of other dutiable goods and the appellants were thus entitled to the exemption upto 27-2-82. The demand for duty made on them in respect of the period upto 27-2-82 in set aside. 4. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in respect of the demand for the period upto 27-2-82 and is rejected in respect of the period thereafter.
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1984 (3) TMI 386 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... te that the intention of the Government of India is to exempt only those products which could be attributed to printing. Of course, even in respect of newspapers and periodicals, a certain amount of operations like cutting the paper and folding it, are also contemplated. But those activities are incidental and ancillary to the main industry. As laid down in 1981 E.C.R. p. 108, the printing industry has an identity of its own. Further, the Tariff Item does not make any distinction between a printed carton and a normal carton in respect of packing industry. The argument that a plain carton is a product of the packaging industry but a printed carton is a product of the printing industry is hardly convincing because a carton is after all a carton only which in common parlance is understood as a product of the packaging industry. So, the product manufactured by the appellants has been rightly classified as not relating to the printing industry. The appeal is therefore, dismissed.
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1984 (3) TMI 385 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... as excessive or unreasonable. 12. Shri Gupta finally put forth an argument that in any event the hand-loom cess should not have been levied on the fabrics processed by the appellants. This point does not seem to have been raised before the Additional Collector, nor has it been discussed in his order. We are not therefore able to deal with it in detail. Since dyeing is also a process of manufacture, it cannot be said that the levy of handloom cess on fabric which had been subjected to dyeing was illegal provided the handloom cess had not been levied at an earlier stage. Since the full facts in this regard have not been placed before us, nor has this aspect been the subject of the consideration in the order of the Additional Collector, we would only observe that if the appellants can show that the fabrics in question had already been subjected to handloom cess, they would not be liable to a further levy of handloom cess. Subject to this observation, we reject the appeal.
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1984 (3) TMI 384 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... and, therefore, they cannot be proceeded against under the Customs Act. In our opinion to bring home the charge under Section 112 of the Customs Act, the question as to whether a person was or was not in charge of the vessel has no relevance. The mere fact that the Master was in-charge of the vessel could not be the foreground on the basis of which he could be found guilty of an offence under Section 112 if the circumstances concerned do not warrant the same. In this view of the matter, we exonerate the appellants of the charge under Section 112 of the Customs Act, in the facts and circumstances of this case and set aside the impugned order in respect of the same. 11. We, therefore, affirm the finding of the adjudicating authority in respect of the confiscation of the vessel and consequent redemption fine but set aside the personal penalty of ₹ 50,000 imposed on each of the appellants under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962. The appeal is thus partly allowed.
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